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ABSTRACT 
 
 
If one considers the fortunes of economic history in the 20th century U.S., the 
1940s, 50s and 60s stand out as a particularly vibrant time for the field and 
economists’ contributions to it. These decades saw the creation of the main 
association and journals - the Economic History Association, the Journal of 
Economic History for example – and the launching of large research programs – 
Harvard’s history of entrepreneurship, Simon Kuznets’ retrospective accounts, 
cliometrics for example. Why did American economists write so much history in 
the decades immediately following WWII, and why and how did this change 
with cliometrics? 
 
To answer these questions I use interviews with scholars who were active in the 
mid 20th century, their publications and archival material. The bulk of the 
analysis focuses on the U.S., yet it relies in part on a comparison with France 
where economic history also experienced a golden period at this time, though it 
involved few economists. Instead it was the domain of Annales historians. This 
comparison sheds light on the ways in which the labels “economist” and 
“historian” changed meaning throughout the period of study. 
 
Economists’ general interest for history is best understood as a part of an 
ongoing debate on scientific method, specifically about whether and how to 
observe and what constitutes reliable empirical evidence. These debates 
contributed both to draw social scientists to history, and change the way they 
wrote history. In the U.S. the mid 20th century surge in economist-history was 
principally due to the post-war demand for knowledge about growth and 
development. The sense of urgency that came with this task increased scholars’ 
willingness to work with estimated (as opposed to found) data. This was 
reinforced by American economists’ experience in war planning and ensuing 
spread of an operations research mentality among graduate students. The issue 
of whether or not to estimate became a new demarcation line between 
“historians” and “economists”. By the late 1960s, scholars who wanted to turn to 
the past to observe economies evolve over several decades, and let these facts 
“speak for themselves” had largely been replaced by researchers who used 
modern economic theory to frame historical investigation, and relied on 
quantification and estimation as their main empirical inputs.  
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CHAPTER 1. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIST-HISTORIANS  
IN THE MID 20th CENTURY 
 
 
 
1. “Economist-historians” 
The main institutions  - associations, journals and committees - for 
economic history in the U.S. were founded in the 1940s and 1950s, just before 
young economists who called themselves “cliometricians” surfaced in the 1960s 
bringing data estimation, modeling and econometric techniques to historical 
questions such as the profitability of slavery, the contribution of railroads to 19th 
century growth, or medieval English peasants’ rationale for scattering their 
plots.1  This so-called “cliometric revolution” unfolded in a broad rhetoric that 
suggested that cliometricians were the first American economists to tackle 
historical questions (see chapter 2). This tended to obscure the fact that the 
upheaval came in the wake of earlier initiatives – creation of the Economic 
History Association (1941), of the Journal of Economic History (1941), of the 
Harvard Research Center in Entrepreneurial History (1948), of Explorations in 
Economic History (1948) and of Simon Kuznets’ restrospective national income 
accounts (1949) – all of which were spearheaded by economists who, for one 
                                                   
1 Conrad and Meyer (1964); Fogel (1964); McCloskey (1975). Stanley Reiter, a 
mathematician and economist coined the word “cliometrics” in the early 1960s. He held 
an appointment at Purdue University, in Indiana, where he interacted with young 
economists who had an interest in economic history. The term was meant to embody 
their shared commitment to quantification, as it was the combination of “Clio” – the 
Greek muse of history – and a suffix denoting measurement. For a more detailed 
investigation of this term and the scholarship it denoted, see chapter 7.  
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 13
reason or another wrote history. Thus cliometrics can be seen as one facet of a 
much larger mid 20th century phenomenon in the U.S. that drew numerous 
economists to economic history. In other words, cliometricians were one of many 
groups of American economist-historians.2 Seen from this perspective, we may 
wish to know why American economists wrote so much history in the decades 
immediately following WWII, and why and how this changed with cliometrics? 
The 1940s, 50s and 60s stick out as unusually eventful decades for 
economist-history, compared both to events that came before and after this time. 
Economic history’s mid 20th century golden age certainly contrasts with the 
situation today. Scholars familiar with contemporary economics and economic 
history have argued that it is only a question of years before economist-historians 
disappear from the American (and perforce international) economic scene.3 As 
an indication, a quick survey of the top-ten graduate programs in economics 
shows that over 50% do not list economic history as a required course for their 
Ph.D. students.4  It also contrasts with the situation in the late 19th and early 20th 
                                                   
2 I will use this term to refer to economists who investigated past events while retaining 
their identity as economists.  
3 The argument is never this simple, and is usually in the form of: “unless we do 
this…economic history will continue losing favor among economists”. See for example 
the collected essays in Field, Ed. (1987). For a more recent example, see a 2004 initiative 
at the Center for Economic Policy Research in London, where economic historians are 
urged to write more quantitative and “presentist” economic history of Europe: 
http://www.cepr.org/Research/Initiatives/EH.htm 
4 The top ten include: Harvard, Chicago, Stanford, MIT, Princeton, Yale, U. C. Berkeley, 
University of Pennsylvania, Northwestern and Minnesota. Ratings tend to be 
controversial, but most agree that these 10 universities would be on the top 20 list in any 
system of rating and weighting, Thursby (2000). 
Harvard does not require its graduate students to take economic history 
(http://post.economics.harvard.edu/graduate/requirements.html); neither do Chicago 
(http://economics.uchicago.edu/about_lit_grad0405_requir.shtml ), Princeton 
(http://www.econ.princeton.edu/grad/Requirements%2004.pdf ), U. Penn 
(http://www.econ.upenn.edu/Graduate/Description.htm#Core) or Minnesota 
(http://www.econ.umn.edu/graduate/prgyrone.html). U.C. Berkeley has economic 
history as a required course (http://emlab.berkeley.edu/econ/grad/program-yr1.shtml 
); so do Yale (http://www.econ.yale.edu/graduate/requirements.htm); MIT 
(http://econ-www.mit.edu/graduate/core.htm) and Stanford (Gavin Wright confirmed 
that the requirement for economic history had not changed in 21 years, correspondence 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
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century. In a broad sense, American economists’ relationship to history dated as 
far back as its roots in classical political economy: Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
(1776) made abundant reference to ancient economic practices, Karl Marx’s Das 
Kapital (1867) was built around a historical argument.5 However classical 
economists were not self-conscious about their use of historical information, nor 
did they propose a justification for history being necessary to economics. In stark 
contrast, starting in the mid 19th century, several groups of economists developed 
a “historical” creed: the German historical school, the British historical school 
and, a few decades later, various strands of North American “Institutionalism”- 
for example the labor economists around John R. Commons at Wisconsin.6 In 
America, these historical scholars did not adopt a single label: “economists”, 
“historical economists”, “institutionalists”, and even “heterodox” may have 
applied to one group or another, at some time or another. Very few chose the 
label “economic historian” and did not always do so systematically.  
To understand the uniqueness of mid 20th century American economist-
history this thesis will proceed comparatively across time, country, but also 
across discipline. Historians of science often rely on comparative exercises, 
seeking to replicate the ideal of laboratory work: hold all factors constant save 
one, and observe the consequences of this variation. In our case, by contrasting 
situations where an event occurred and those where it did not, we may make 
                                                                                                                                                       
with Cristel de Rouvray, October 27th 2004). Northwestern has a unique program in this 
respect, as economic history is part of an “Economic History and Development” 
requirement sequence, which signifies that students can avoid taking a class in economic 
history and take development economics instead 
(http://www.econ.northwestern.edu/phd/currentreq.html). As this thesis is being 
defended at the LSE, the reader may wish to know that the LSE Economics Department 
does not offer any course in economic history (nor suggest how its research students 
could use the Economic History department to find advanced training there) – 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/calendar2004-
2005/programmeRegulations/mResPhD/mResPhDinEconomics.htm. 
5 Marx (1976); Smith (1976 [1776]). 
6 For a relatively brief presentation of the historical nature of these “schools”, see 
chapters 17, 18, 20 and 27 of Spiegel (1983). 
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sense of the factors that led to the mid 20th century surge in American economist-
history.  
 
2. The French foil 
American economists’ mid 20th century commitment to history contrasted 
with the situation in other countries, which can be used to our advantage in 
seeking to understand the origins of this golden age. The most frequent contrasts 
chosen by scholars interested in the origins of American economists’ 
commitment to history (in particular as it related to the “cliometric revolution”) 
have been with France and Britain.7  
The British case could be considered the ideal candidate for a comparison 
with the U.S., due to the many vehicles of communication between the two 
countries. This leads to the plausible assumption that while Britain may not have 
been marked by the same social, political, and economic trends as the U.S., 
British scholars had enough common epistemological and scientific grounds with 
their American counterparts to approximate the desired controlled environment 
(i.e. if no cliometric revolution occurred in the U.K., the reasons are to be found 
in contextual elements, rather than epistemological differences). However, the 
existence of separate departments of Economic History since the early 20th 
century in Britain has come to represent a unique case in the Western world, 
effectively limiting the type of friction between “historians”, “economists” and 
different “types” of economists that make economic history such an interesting 
space to study (see section 3 below).  
To some readers, France may appear to be characterized by traditions of 
scholarship so radically different from those existing in the U.S. to caution 
against any comparative exercise. There certainly was little communication 
between French and American scholars in the late 19th and early 20th century, 
when America was still an importer of ideas from Germany and Britain. WWII 
                                                   
7 See for example Coats (1980); Lamoreaux (1998). 
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had not significantly altered this tableau as most French WWII émigrés to the U.S. 
returned to France after the war, and did not really leave a lasting mark on 
American universities.8 Such lack of mutual influence may render a comparative 
exercise very difficult, yet these stark differences can also be exploited to better 
understand the situation in the U.S. Not only was there no cliometric revolution 
in France, but at first glance, there also seemed to be no enduring and varied 
legacies of economist-history, as there had been in Germany and the U.K.  
The striking feature about France in the mid 20th century was that it 
produced its own “golden age” of economic history with very few “economists” 
involved.9 As we shall see in chapter 5, economic history in mid 20th century 
France was the domain of Annales historians, not “economists”. Yet, the reminder 
that Annales history was the driving force behind a broad reconfiguration of 
social sciences in post-war France should serve as a warning not to adopt pre-
established classifications that presume to fix once and for all what “economists” 
and “historians” were doing. We must use these terms with care, as they 
changed meaning throughout the period of study, and are only useful to the 
historian if she shows how they reflected and established distinctions between 
various members of the social science community. Thus the preceding statement 
about the curious absence of economist-historians in France must be read to 
mean that the delineation between economist and non-economist in France was 
different from that in the U.S.  In other words, the comparative study of 
economic history in these countries can serve to introduce a more systematic 
treatment of the second fundamental question in this thesis: what exactly were 
“economists” and “historians” and how did these labels change throughout the 
period of study? Though the situation in France is principally studied in chapter 
5, occasional reminders weave the geographical comparison throughout the 
thesis.  
                                                   
8 Fermi (1971); Novick (1988), chapter 1. 
9 For an overview of this golden age, see Crouzet and Lescent-Giles (1998). 
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3. The history foil 
While frictions between the history and economics communities appeared 
more clearly in the French context, where Annales historians engaged in open 
conflict with economists who had ventured into drawing up National Income 
Accounts for the 18th and 19th centuries, the types of issues raised in these 
debates had counterparts in the U.S. In America these debates tended to be 
conducted within the economics community. This is consistent with most 
historians of economics’ contention that American economics was “pluralistic” 
until WWII, hence more prone to conflicts among economists (rather than 
between disciplines).10 While it may not be very useful to reduce explanations of 
differences between scholars to statements such as “X was a historian, while Y 
was an economist”, it is useful to ask whether differences in the specific ways 
one approached historical study (or rejected it altogether) were not the product 
of a methodological stance, which at certain times united historians and 
economists, and at other times distanced them. This thesis explicitly avoids a 
narrative that defines cliometrics as history practiced by economists, while 
everything else was done by historians. Such narratives tend to take modern 
definitions of both terms and apply them indiscriminately to an early and mid 
20th century academic realm that was different from ours in many respects.11  
This movement of proximity and dissociation between “economists” and 
“historians” was but one facet of the much larger issue of “scientificity” for 
economists. The question of what it meant to be a “scientific economist”, and 
how one went about meeting this ideal, was a recurrent issue for the economics 
profession, though it did not mark all individuals, epochs or generations equally. 
It tended to resurface at crucial times in the profession’s history, and the 
                                                   
10 Mary Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford (1998a). 
11 These narratives also tend to be woven by people with stakes in the cliometric debate. 
See for example the cliometric narratives discussed in chapter 2, or Alfred Chandler’s 
essay in Amatori and Jones, Eds. (2003). 
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consensus that emerged from these debates would periodically reconfigure the 
parameters of legitimate practice, and continues to do so today.12 
The importance of these “scientificity” debates has been well documented 
for the late 19th century emergence of an independent American economics 
discipline.13 It has also been used to explain the complex professional 
reconfiguration that occurred in the mid 20th century, a phenomenon generally 
known as “the transformation of American economics”.14 Though the broad 
strokes of this transformation have been painted there is still much work to be 
done on the nature and process of this change.15 This constitutes one of the main 
goals of this thesis: to enhance our understanding of the directions towards 
which American economics converged after WWII, and the process by which 
these consensus points were enforced. I hope to accomplish this by focusing on 
economic history as a borderland, a stage for dialogue, debate and disagreement 
among different types of economists and historians. This is the main virtue of the 
“history foil”: by comparing certain American economists who resembled French 
“historians”, to those who did not resemble them at all, the analyst can 
distinguish between scholars who were gradually being pushed outside 
legitimate economics and those who became “members” of the new post-WWII 
economics.  
  
                                                   
12 As an example of contemporary “scientificity” debates one may cite disagreements 
about the legitimacy of experimental economics. It has quite recently become part of 
legitimate economics, in spite of Lionel Robbins’ 1920s rejection of all inquiry relating to 
the psychological dimensions of economic decision-making. This is consistent with the 
view that these “scientificity” debates are rarely closed once and for all and tend to 
resurface periodically.  
13 Furner (1975). 
14 Mary Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford, Ed. (1998b). 
15 One notable exception to the majority broad-brush studies is Malcolm Rutherford’s 
extensive work on the evolution of “Institutional” economists, schools, research centers 
and universities in the interwar period. See for example, Rutherford (2003); Rutherford 
(2005); Rutherford (Forthcoming). 
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4. The contingencies of American economist – history 
This thesis presents the three “golden decades” of American economist-
history (1940s, 1950s and 1960s) as having been shaped by the pro-active efforts 
of various groups of economists, who held strong and often conflicting visions 
about “good” economics and the right method for the discipline. Their actions 
had relatively drastic consequences for American economic history, either 
because they resulted in the establishment of a new recognizable sub-field, or 
because they entailed the division or the radical transformation of the existing 
space. The consequences were dramatic because of economic history’s hybrid 
position: though a part of economics, it was always a borderland – a place that 
could be inhabited by scholars who were not immediately recognized as 
“economists” by insiders, and consequently was a stage for dialogue, 
disagreement and controversy not typical of “normal science” rituals inside 
economics. These interactions almost systematically resulted in crises whose 
outcome was in part determined by the epistemological coherence of each 
camp’s beliefs, and also by the ways in which they could relate to other groups 
outside the zone of friction – including other economists, foundation officers and 
university administrators. This added an important degree of “contingency” to 
the outcome of the debates.  
For example, as we shall see in chapter 3 when the founders of the EHA 
set out to create a space for economist-history, they were confronted by Simon 
Kuznets who favored a predominantly quantitative and comparative view of the 
past. This clash revealed that the former’s commitment to historical empiricism 
was inextricably tied to a vision of America’s economic success grounded on a 
harmonious blend of individual initiative and institutional soundness. Thus they 
favored relatively descriptive studies of government action or entrepreneurial 
initiative, and invited sociologists and political scientists into their newly created 
realm, hoping to reconfigure research in economics to systematically include 
insights from these disciplines. In the early 1940s, while these views of “good” 
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research may have been on the wane in the economics community at large, they 
still held sway among officers of the Rockefeller Foundation who could provide 
the financial means for such initiatives to be launched and sustained.  However, 
this financial lifeline was not a neutral element in the evolution of their research, 
contributing no small part to its eventual focus on the entrepreneurial system as 
the key to understanding economic growth. By choosing the entrepreneur as a 
symbol of their historical work, they combined political conservatism (certainly 
in an age where Keynesians were radicals and communists were heretics!) with 
historical empiricism, a way to stay within the permissible borders of the 
American profession without adopting the technical tools that were quickly 
taking over economics. 
  As we shall see in chapters 6 and 7 when cliometricians entered the field 
two decades later, they had to reckon with these representatives of “older” 
epistemological views, and their clashes revealed the degree to which notions of 
good empirical practice had changed in one generation. But the disagreements 
also revealed the extent to which the barriers of permissible behavior had 
evolved. For example, “scientific” economists in the U.S. were by then nearly 
offended by studies that displayed too close an association with business schools 
(which incidentally, were being heavily sponsored by both the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Ford Foundation). As might be expected from crises in 
borderlands, those who “lost” were pushed out of both economist-history and 
economics, though ironically the act of pushing them out was also the genesis 
moment for a new group. Thus, when cliometricians sealed the borders of 
acceptable economist-history, and excluded entrepreneurial historians, this 
considerably strengthened the emerging field of business history.  
In France, economic history was also a border place though the spatial 
dynamics were different from those in the American case. It was a stage for 
interactions among members of various social sciences, but it was not a place 
predominantly inhabited or ruled by economists. Rather, it was the stronghold of 
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Annales historians, some of whom strove to reshape this overlap with economics 
into a new model for the social sciences. Thus the momentum really came from 
Fernand Braudel and his colleagues, gathering economists and other social 
scientists along the way. The Annalistes’ ability to create such momentum was 
greatly aided by the patronage of the Ford Foundation, whose interest in French 
economic history was intimately tied to the actions and reputation of pre-
cliometric economist-historians in the U.S. Hence, while the dynamics of this 
borderland may have been different between countries, the stories met at several 
crucial junctions. These encounters are reminders of the high degree of 
contingency inherent in the events presented in the thesis.  
 
5. Sources and Outline 
As we shall see in chapter 2, there is little secondary material about 
economist-historians in either France or the U.S. The bulk of material comes from 
three other sources. The first is published works by protagonists in these debates, 
as they reveal epistemological dispositions and other elements economists took 
for granted (for example their implicit definitions of “economist”, “historian”,  
or“social scientist”). In this search for published materials I sought out instances 
of open controversy between members of various schools of economic historians, 
even when they involved scholars who set themselves up against “straw men” – 
like “orthodox” or “deductive” economics. 
The second source is archive material (correspondence, unpublished 
papers, grant applications) principally drawn from the records of the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations - two American philanthropic organizations that played 
a crucial role for economist-history in the mid 20th century – and from the 
archives of the Economic History Association. I also used the papers of various 
economists. A list of the archives and collections I consulted is presented in 
Appendix 1.  
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The third source of information consists in interviews with protagonists or 
their students, in both France and the U.S. In the course of two years, I 
interviewed tens of people in each country. I use these unpublished materials to 
further document the implicit beliefs about good science. But I use these 
materials cautiously, mindful that recollections of events that happened decades 
ago are subject to memory lapses (a problem that can sometimes be 
circumvented by triangulation of evidence from other sources), and distortions 
due to narratives that interviewees construct when placed in the relatively 
artificial role of being supposedly objective witnesses of a past they had high 
stakes in (and sometimes still do).16 Thus, in the following chapters quotes from 
these interviews will principally be used as evidence that narratives are 
constitutive of identity and border creation rather than reflections of a past as it 
happened, or as it was experienced then. A list of all the people I interviewed 
and my methodology for interviews is included in Appendix 2.  
This thesis begins with a review of the literature pertaining to the history 
of economist-history (and perforce economic history) in the 20th century. Thus, 
chapter 2 develops themes that are only hinted at in this brief introduction. The 
thesis then proceeds chronologically. Chapter 3 begins in the late 1930s and 
chapter 7 ends in the late 1960s. Each chapter tells the story of a momentous 
controversy, or scientificity debate in economic history. Chapter 3 is an account 
of the motivations and circumstances that led a group of second-generation 
German-inspired economists to create the Economic History Association (EHA) 
and Journal of Economic History (JEH) in the early 1940s, with help from the 
Rockefeller Foundation and in opposition to what they considered to be bad 
economics. Chapter 4 then investigates the relationship between this form of 
historicism and the comprehensive, quantitative and comparative use of history 
advocated by Simon Kuznets. The difference between these two types of 
economist-history is confirmed by an analysis of the situation in France in 
                                                   
16 Scott (1991); Weintraub (2005). 
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chapter 5, where Annales scholars held many epistemological and personal ties 
with the founders of the EHA and the JEH, and clashed with Kuznets’ chosen 
French colleagues. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 suggest that differences between so-called 
“historians” and “economists” are perhaps better understood as differences 
among economists, and as the result of changes in accepted methods in 
economics. The comparison with France brings to light the strategic nature of 
economic history in the mid 20th century, as it constituted an open door for 
historical empiricists to lay claims on economics.  
Chapter 6 investigates economic history at Harvard in the late 1950s and 
the battles that opposed Alexander Gerschenkron to proponents of an 
entrepreneurial view of social change.  The full effects of his efforts to recruit 
young economists to economic history are analyzed in chapter 7, where we get a 
measure of the transformation of American economics, and its implications for 
economist-history.  By the mid 1960s, economists had changed the way they 
wrote history, reflecting their belief that they could no longer spend time on the 
laborious and decade long compilation of “facts” - whether quantitative, 
qualitative, historical or contemporary. This compression of time horizons is 
discussed in the concluding chapter where I tie the mid 20th century surge in 
economist history to the rapid emergence of growth and development economics 
and to an operations research mentality widely diffused after WWII. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
 
 
ECONOMISTS’ RELATIONSHIP TO HISTORY 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the origins of American 
economists’ mid 20th century enthusiasm for historical study and the apparent 
changes it underwent with the “cliometric revolution”. This may be seen as one 
facet of a much larger study: namely the history of economic history. 
Consequently, the first literature to be surveyed in this chapter deals with the 
origins and evolution of economic history (or economic and social history) in the 
Western world. These broader narratives have primarily focused on European 
countries, notably Germany, Britain and France, where the field emerged as an 
autonomous space in the late 19th and early 20th century. These accounts 
considered the actions and motivations of stakeholders in numerous disciplines, 
though they often acknowledged economists’ fundamental role in creating and 
shaping this space. This was in large part due to the perceived weight of the 
Methodenstreit – the mid 19th century dispute that pitted the German economist 
Gustav Schmoller against the Austrian economist Carl Menger. In this schematic 
view, historical economists inspired by Schmoller created economic history to 
break away from classical and marginal economics. 
In reviewing this literature we will look out for issues that pertained 
specifically to economists’ stakes in the creation of this new space. Yet, we 
should be careful not to let ourselves get caught up in a dichotomous view that 
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artificially divided economists between presumed inductivists and deductivists, 
thus claiming that economic history was the necessary outcome of this divide. 
Instead, we should privilege narratives that recognized that most early 20th 
century economists were rather hybrid in their views of good scientific practice, 
and that economic history’s creation corresponded to many lines of divide and 
disagreement among them, not just methodological ones.  
The second literature this chapter surveys is made up of accounts of the 
1960s “cliometric revolution”. These studies tended to interpret this event within 
a framework similar to the Methodenstreit dichotomy. The cliometric revolution 
was seen as the deductive economists’ takeover of a space that historically 
inclined empiricists had forged earlier. There was more than a grain of truth to 
such views, yet their reliance on supposedly irreducible deductive and inductive 
(or theoretical and a-theoretical) oppositions was problematic. Indeed, even in 
the 1960s, such labels fitted few economists. In the cliometric debates, the “old” 
economic historians were certainly not a-theoretical and the cliometricians were 
empiricists of a certain kind. Once we break free of dichotomies that pit theory 
users against pure fact collectors, we realize that the lines of dispute were more 
about different types, methods and shades of empiricism than about the proper 
origin of theory.  
The third literature this chapter surveys is made up of key contributions 
in the history of science and the history of economics.  By broadening the lens to 
take into account phenomena that were occurring in economics and history at the 
time, and more generally by thinking of economic history in ways historians and 
sociologists of science frame their studies of scientific practice, we can uncover 
different (non Methodenstreit) ways of thinking about economist’s relationship to 
history. 
This chapter aims to develop a framework that can help make sense of 
economists’ mid 20th century interest in history. After examining the 
Methodenstreit view and assessing its actual role in explaining the origin of 
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European economic history (section 2), this chapter looks at its counterpart in 
traditional accounts of the origin of American cliometrics (section 3). In both 
cases, the framework does not fully account for either the motivations or the 
context of economists’ commitment to history. Section 4 suggests new ways of 
thinking about the issue. Generally, the chapter argues that economists’ mid 20th 
century enthusiasm for history is best seen as an episode in a lasting debate 
about the proper scientific method in economics, but that the actual course and 
outcome of this debate was shaped by the political and ideological environment 
of the early 1940s-mid 1960s period, and the changing status of economic science 
in America. The challenge for the historian is to bring to light the mechanisms by 
which these external factors interacted with the methodological debate. 
  
2 The Methodenstreit and economic history 
2.1 The Methodenstreit in mid 19th century Germany and similar movements 
outside Germany 
 
The emergence of economic history in Europe has been portrayed as 
intimately linked to methods battles (Methodenstreit) between representatives of 
an increasingly abstract mathematical procedure and challengers defending an 
empirico-historical method. 1 This polarized view of economic history’s genesis 
was partly inspired by the situation in mid and late 19th century Germany, where 
“historical economists” sustained vigorous disagreement with British political 
economists and Austrian marginalists, ultimately resulting in the absence of 
dialogue between the camps, and the emergence in Germany of economic history 
as an activity quite separate from theory.2 
                                                   
1 Schumpeter (1954), 804-19. 
2 Carl Menger’s criticism of the German historical position dated from the end of the 19th 
century (1884). However the debates started much earlier - as early as 1843, the year 
Wilhelm Roscher published his seminal work Grundriss zu Vorlesungen uber die 
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The German economist Gustav Schmoller was the most adamant advocate 
for turning economists into economic historians. He argued that theorizing could 
only take place on the basis of the accumulation and comparison of numerous 
historical monographs: empirical building blocks such as studies of a particular 
industry, long term series of prices and wages or descriptions of various 
institutions. He convinced his colleagues and students to produce enough 
monographs that differed from each other by only one or two factors, and 
establish causal statements via comparison.  In arguing for such a method, he 
claimed to be drawing from proven scientific processes in the natural sciences.  
In his view, systematic comparisons across time and place - using the variation 
contained in this collection of historical descriptions – amounted to running 
laboratory “experiments”.3   
Schmoller’s own work on 17th and 18th century guilds and Prussian 
financial policy exemplified the belief that a good economist needed to be a good 
historian. This was due to the fact that historians excelled at describing the 
material world:   
 
“The more incomplete the descriptive part of a science is, the more the 
theory consists in mass generalizations (…) The way to make progress 
consists first and foremost in adding to the number, precision and 
thoroughness of observations, so that with the assistance of more 
comprehensive and more perfect descriptive material of every sort 
gathered from experience, the classification of phenomena, the elaboration 
of categories may be improved, finally the typical phenomena series and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Staatswirtschaft nach geschichtlicher Methode. Historians tend to distinguish between 
Roscher’s “old” historical school, and Schmoller’s “younger” historical school, the latter 
being more prominent in the Methodenstreit against Menger. Possibly because Menger 
was the most articulate defender of the non-historical position at the time, his ideas 
tended to be applied to the refutation of the entire German historical agenda. See Koot 
(1988); Hodgson (2001). 
3 Schumpeter (1954), 804-820; Schefold (1987). 
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their interconnections, the causes in their entire scope may be more clearly 
recognized.”4  
 
Thus for Schmoller description and historical inquiry were one and the same. 
The end goal was not a collection of curious and mildly interesting stories about 
the past, but an extensive empirical base from which generalizations could be 
made.   
Schmoller’s methodological call was heard outside Germany. Indeed, 
there were many similarities between Schmoller’s agenda and methodological 
claims made by British historical economists like Thomas E.C. Leslie, William 
Ashley or William Cunningham and by American historical economists like 
Richard T. Ely or John Commons in the late 19th century, or even by American 
institutionalists like Wesley Mitchell and Simon Kuznets in the interwar period. 5  
This connection was substantiated by these non-German historical economists’ 
ample reference to Schmoller and his colleagues, though the question of 
“influence” deserves a better look than just counting the references.6 These 
Anglo-Saxon proponents of “realistic” economics were principally concerned 
with the usefulness and descriptive accuracy of economic statements. They 
contrasted this with another type of economics whose logical consistency and 
exactitude they appreciated, but whose usefulness they seriously questioned.  In 
general, the late 19th and early 20th century saw the recurrent emergence of 
debates about the role of observation, and more narrowly the role of history, in 
economic science. 
In some instances these debates took the shape of methodological bi-
polarism, as for example in Britain with Cunninghman’s 1892 attack on Alfred 
Marshall’s use of historical evidence, in France with Francois Simiand’s favorable 
                                                   
4 Schmoller (1893), Zur Methodologie der Staats- und Socialwissenschaften cited in Small 
(1924), 220. 
5 See Koot (1988); Kadish (1989); Hodgson (2001); Backhouse (2002), chapter 8. 
6 For a closer discussion of German influence on American economists, see chapter 3.  
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reviews of Schmoller’s work and critiques of “speculative abstraction”, or in the 
U.S. in the acrimonious duals opposing Richard T. Ely to Simon Newcomb. 7  In 
these debates, historical economists often made points about the need to erect 
economic history as a separate activity for true scientists. For example, Ashley 
made such a claim in his provocative 1893 inauguration speech for the first 
professorship in economic history (established at Harvard), when he declared 
that: 
 
“The historical movement has pursued its way, and is now settling down 
into channel of its own. This is none other than the actual investigation of 
economic history itself”. 8   
 
Such episodes of polarized exchange have been used to confirm the view 
that historical economists created economic history as a survival (or victory) 
strategy in a methodologically divided world. Figure 2.1 illustrates this view. 
Seen from this perspective, economic history was the necessary outcome of a 
fundamentally divisive methodological battle that made it impossible for 
historically inclined economists to share the same title and institutions as 
entrenched deductive economists, as each side considered the other to be “non-
scientific”. In other words, the genesis of a separate economic history was solely 
(or principally) linked to methodological disputes within economics (to the 
exclusion of other disciplines, or to other terrains of dispute). 
 
                                                   
7 Cunningham (1892); Simiand (1903); Furner (1975). See chapter 3 for a discussion of the 
Newcomb v. Ely debates and chapter 5 for Simiand’s arguments. 
8 Ashley (1893), 6. 
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Figure 2.1. Taking the Methodenstreit at face value to explain the origins of 
economic history.  
 
 
 
The basic problem with figure 2.1 is that it takes dichotomous methods 
statements at face value, without asking if they corresponded to the actual work 
done by these economists, or if they overlapped with other motives for the 
creation of a separate economic history. For example, Mary Furner has shown 
that late 19th century American economics did not correspond to the picture that 
one might draw from reading only Ely and Newcomb’s methodological rants.  
True, Newcomb did write about the necessity for a scientific economics to 
resemble astronomy; and Ely did mock rational economic man and practically 
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every other abstract device in economic reasoning.  Yet, these extremisms were 
not representative of American economists at large, who would be more 
accurately described as hybrids.9 Thorstein Veblen could be taken as one 
example of this hybridity: he was a self-identified “historical” economist but not 
really an “empiricist” in the meticulous, monographical sense of the term, and he 
certainly emitted some broad, rather speculative theoretical statements based on 
hypotheses about human nature, such as his concept of “conspicuous 
consumption”.10 
In general, a more detailed analysis of the origin and spread of historical 
claims in and outside Europe has shown that very few scholars adopted one or 
the other methodological stance in its pure form. Alfred Marshall was often cited 
as an example of this hybridity. Alon Kadish’s fine study of the separation of 
“economics” from “economic history” in the U.K. in the early 20th century has 
shown that it was not driven by fundamentally incompatible epistemologies but 
rather by more prosaic factors, such as different political stances and 
administrative rivalries between Cambridge departments.11  
 
2.2 Economic history in early 20th century Britain 
As Kadish has shown, Marshall actually wanted to keep economic history 
in the economics degree (“Tripos”) he set out to design in the late 19th century. 
Marshall had a vision for economics that rested in part on formal laws (deduced 
from basic assumptions about the individual) and on careful empirical 
validation.  His own work embodied his commitment to economic history, and 
he maintained that certain institutions could not be understood via universal 
causal statements but needed to be set in historical sequence.12 As he was 
                                                   
9 Furner (1975), 60-66. 
10 Hodgson (2001). 
11 Kadish (1989). 
12 Ibid, 174-5. 
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primarily interested in explaining contemporary phenomena, he favored the 
history of events that had occurred after the industrial revolution. Yet this did 
not lead him to any outright rejection of earlier economic history, only to suggest 
that this area of inquiry was potentially less crucial to an education in 
economics.13 This division of labour did not seem to please the Cambridge 
historians, who were not particularly keen on seeing economic history (of any 
century) be included in the Moral Sciences Tripos (Marshall’s economics degree 
was first institutionalized as the Moral Sciences Tripos, Part II), in particular if it 
came to focus on the 19th century. Indeed this subject was an entry point for 
training students for the public examinations (Civil Service, Foreign Service etc.) 
and thus strategic for drawing more students. Consequently, the History Tripos 
held fast to all economic history, and Marshall had to give it up (or retain a very 
reduced version of it in his degree). 14 
 In the late 19th century, when Marshall was laboring to design this first 
economics degree, he was in a vulnerable place. He was convinced that his 
ability to establish this separate track was a necessary condition for the eventual 
emergence of economics as a science – enabling the creation of a new kind of 
scholar trained in the numerous skills Marshall deemed crucial.  Thus, he was 
not in a strong position to negotiate the exact composition of his degree – which 
led Kadish to conclude that Marshall’s creation of a high-theory track may well 
have been the result of negotiations with the Moral Sciences and History boards, 
rather than the direct consequence of his epistemological and methodological 
beliefs. Notice also that the story Kadish told was that of the “liberation of 
economics”, not the liberation or creation of economic history. 
Once the division between those who trained to become “economists” and 
those who wanted to focus on actual events in historical perspective (i.e. study 
economic history) was enacted, it practically gained a life of its own. Economic 
                                                   
13 Ibid, 200-1. 
14 Ibid, 168-219. 
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history professorships in History were often staffed by anti-theoretical (in 
particular anti-neoclassical) scholars, who were strongly opposed to Marshallian 
(and later Pigouan) economics.  This made meaningful dialogue across fields 
rather difficult (Cunningham was a good example of an economic historian who 
hampered dialogue, and he had counterparts among economists, like Pigou 
himself).15 The subsequent creation of separate economic history departments, 
the Economic History Society (1926) and the Economic History Review (1927) was 
more a matter of failure to keep open a dialogue between those who had trained 
to teach theory and those who had trained to teach history, than the purposeful 
result of historical economists’ will to secede from neoclassicism, or the reverse.16 
By then, a political component had also contributed to worsen the lines of 
division, as “historical economists” (or economic historians) accused Cambridge 
theoretical economists of being excessively conservative and naively in favor of 
free trade.17  
In essence, Kadish turned upside down the story told in Figure 2.1 – in the 
U.K. it would seem that economic history was separated from economics before 
the real methodological divide set in, and the divide was made possible by the 
actual lack of conversation between camps! Kadish’s study showed that the 
Methodenstreit was useful neither for describing the complex methodological 
lines that criss-crossed through early 20th century British economics, nor as a 
causal account of the creation of a separate economic history. Yet, this should not 
lead us to completely ignore methodological statements that referred to such 
dichotomous views. As we shall see in section 3, the methodological divide may 
not have been an accurate description or explanation for the events, but it 
certainly served to consolidate identities once other factors had opened the way 
for their creation.  
 
                                                   
15 Ibid, 214-5. 
16 Ibid, 241-5. 
17 Ibid, 234-5. 
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3 Strategic uses of the Methodenstreit view 
3.1 Participants’ accounts of the cliometric revolution 
The 1960s cliometric revolution was the object of much attention among 
economists and economic historians. For the most part, these accounts tended to 
be produced by scholars who participated in the movement (or were their direct 
descendants): prefaces and introductions to works of cliometrics or “new” 
economic history often delved into brief recollections of the movement’s origins, 
antecedents and founding moments. 18  In the 1960s and 1970s, many articles 
published in the Journal of Economic History, Explorations in Economic History and 
the American Economic Review briefly alluded to the history of cliometrics and the 
events that led to its creation. These biographical narratives tended to be 
anecdotal rather than attempts to provide any comprehensive intellectual 
history, yet they did contain implicit explanations of how and why cliometrics 
emerged. These explanations were predominantly “internalist” and somewhat 
“Whiggish” - arguing that the superiority of their scientific method was at the 
root of the revolution and its success – and paid very little attention to the 
general academic and social context of the time. 19  The basic premise was that 
there existed a natural transfer of improved methods from theory (and this 
included behavioral and statistical theory) to the lower field of applied work, 
                                                   
18 Examples include Davis, Hughes and Reiter (1960); North (1963); Fogel (1965); Hughes 
(1965); North (1965); Fogel (1966a); Hughes (1966); Parker (1971); McCloskey (1976); 
McCloskey (1978); AEA (1997). See also Encyclopedia articles like North (1968); 
Engermann (1996). For examples in textbooks see Andreano, Ed. (1970); Temin, Ed. 
(1973); Lee Susan Previant and Peter Passell (1979); McCloskey (1987); Atack Jeremy and 
Peter Passell (1994). 
19 The term “Whig history” was coined by Herbert Butterfield in Whig Interpretation of 
History (1931), where he described it as “the tendency in many historians… to emphasize 
certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification 
if not the glorification of the present”. The term “internalist” denotes explanations that 
rely principally on the internal course of ideas (contradictions, anomalies for example) to 
account for change in science; see the introductory chapter in Novick (1988) for a brief 
account of this position in the history of science. 
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including history – and cliometrics was simply the application of modern 
economic theory and methods to historical inquiry.  
A good example of this type of reasoning may be found in the preface to 
collected essays in honor of Douglass North - a renowned cliometrician, and co-
winner of the 1993 Nobel Prize for economics (awarded to two economic 
historians): “there can be no doubt that the power of the philosophy espoused by 
the New Economic History explains the movement’s eventual triumph”.20 North 
himself had expressed this feeling two decades earlier: 
 
“A Revolution is taking place in the United States. It is being initiated by a 
new generation of economic historians who are both skeptical of 
traditional interpretations of U.S. economic history and convinced that a 
new economic history must be firmly grounded in sound statistical data. 
Even a cursory examination of accepted “truths” of U.S. economic history 
suggests that many of them are inconsistent with elementary economic 
analysis and have never been subject to-and would not survive testing 
with statistical data.” 21 
 
  These participant histories traced the birthplace of this inevitable 
revolution to a 1957 meeting where two young economists Alfred Conrad and 
John Meyer gave two joint papers. 22 The first was an attempt to test the 
profitability of slavery by comparing the actual return on slave labor to the 
                                                   
20 Ransom, Sutch and Walton, Eds. (1981), xiii. 
21 North (1963), 128. 
22 See North (1965); Fogel (1966b); Temin, Ed. (1973), 12; Lee and Passell (1979); Ransom, 
Sutch and Walton, Eds. (1981). All of these accounts mentioned at least one of Conrad 
and Meyer’s two papers; many mentioned the 1957 meeting as well, though did not 
always specify who had organized it. The fact that it was jointly sponsored by the 
Economic History Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research seemed 
relatively unimportant to these authors who presented their movement as something 
that was bound to happen, regardless of who mobilized the scholars. See chapters 6 and 
7 for more information about these sponsors and their motivations.  
Chapter 2-  Economists’ Relationship to History 
 
 
 36
interest that could be earned on alternative uses of capital.23  The second was a 
methodological argument that called for a rigorous study of the past, using 
recently developed economic and statistical theory to frame and investigate 
explicit hypotheses.24 Their slavery paper was meant as an illustration of the 
power of this new method. According to anecdotal histories, this agenda 
appealed to many and the enthusiasm it triggered was taken as proof of its merit. 
However such histories did not credit Conrad and Meyer for being the creators 
of this agenda; rather they were remembered for having blown the battle horn. 
Most biographical recollections suggested that the revolution was bound to 
happen, given the multiple currents that were pushing in this direction. This 
feeling of inevitability was well expressed by McCloskey in 1976: 
 
“At about the same time [as the debut of Gerschenkon’s workshop in 
economic history], another example of simultaneous discovery so 
common when an idea’s time has come, similar centers had sprung up at 
Rochester (…) and at Purdue.”25 
 
For McCloskey, there was something natural about the advent of new economic 
history, as it sprung up in many – supposedly independent - places, like Harvard 
and Purdue University. This was consistent with a view of its origins: new 
economic history was created to replace “old”, obsolete studies whose findings 
were inconsistent with modern economic theory. Hughes, for example, argued 
that economics had undergone a great leap forward beginning in the 1930s and 
culminated in the prestige of post-WW2 mathematical economics. Given this 
change, he believed that economic history should be rescued by this new 
knowledge:  
                                                   
23 Conrad Alfred and John Meyer (1958). 
24 Conrad Alfred and John Meyer (1957). 
25 McCloskey (1976), 441. 
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“The generation of economic historians contemporaneous with the older, 
pre-Keynesian theorists [those before the great leap forward] continued 
their work with ever dwindling number of recruits from economics 
departments. By the early 1950s the profession of economic history was 
largely being recruited from the ranks of graduate students in straight 
history. The small number of ranking economic historians trained as 
economists aged 45 to 65 is dramatic evidence of this history. The 
revolutionary changes in the logic of economics analysis had passed 
American economic history by.”26   
 
For Hughes, cliometricians were on the cutting edge of economics – which 
included Keynesian macro economic theory - while the people they overturned 
had missed the boat. Figure 2.2 summarizes this participants’ view of events. 
 On the right side of Figure 2.2 we see a schematic representation of 
Conrad and Meyer’s methodological piece. A combination of statistical theories 
and tools (new ways to observe and extract from observation) with explicit 
theoretical hypotheses (about the behavior of agents) generated a demand for 
cliometrics. Implicit in this figure is a historical argument: progress in these tools 
had been so considerable in the preceding decades that post-war economists just 
could not resist the duty to apply this knowledge to badly posed and 
inadequately answered historical questions. Recent progress in economics had 
confirmed that scientific economics could only proceed via the progressive 
formalization of abstract statements, and the subsequent validation or 
falsification of these propositions. 
                                                   
26 Hughes (1966), 48. 
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Figure 2.2:  A participant’s view of the Cliometric Revolution 
 
 
 
In this view, the patient accumulation of facts was an inadequate and 
unproductive use of economists’ time. Hence economists who had once argued 
in favor of this method, and had been broadly labeled “institutionalists” were 
placed on the same side of the divide as “historians” – i.e. they had no chance of 
ever explaining anything! 
 Labels, “name calling” were a particularly important feature of the 
cliometric debate, and changes in the names used by participants were a first 
indication that there may be more to the narrative than is expressed in Figure 2.2. 
Though three decades of anecdotal histories produced by cliometricians tended 
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to agree about the main causal claim, there was a significant change in the 
presentation of the argument in the late 1970s.  Before then, anecdotal histories 
were predominantly told in the frame of “old” versus “new” economic history. 
Beginning in the 1980s these anecdotal histories were much less schematic. This 
shift in perspective could be seen in changes between the 1st and 2nd edition of 
the main cliometric textbook: A New View of American Economic History. In the 
first (1979), the authors spent a sizeable part of their introduction describing 
economic history before 1960 and ways in which the new economic history 
challenged the “old”. There was practically no mention of this in the second 
edition (1994). Instead, the authors focused on cliometricians’ relationship with 
economists. This focus was amplified as time went by. For example second 
generation cliometrician Claudia Goldin (she was Robert Fogel’s student) began 
a 1995 article on her teacher’s Nobel Prize with a telling question: “what is this 
cliometrics, and how have these two Nobel Prize winners furthered the 
discipline of economics”?27 According to Goldin, the cliometric revolution might 
have been about getting history right, but for the sake of economics and policy, 
not history. This constituted a clear reversal of emphasis – remember Douglass 
North’s earlier quote, where he presented economists as rescuers of an obsolete 
history profession, with no explicit call to contribute to economics. 
This change in narrative suggests the purpose these participant histories 
served: they created a set of anecdotes (myths) to lay the bases for a shared 
identity and memory. 28 The 1980s shift in focus was an indication that 
cliometricians’ self identity was changing.  In the early years, identifying a 
challenger was one of the pillars of identity construction. Once the cliometricians 
had won the battle with “old” historians, and established their way of doing 
economic history as the professional norm, they encountered a new challenge – 
                                                   
27 Goldin (1995), 208. 
28 For a detailed presentation of the ways in which intellectual histories can root the 
identity of factions in economics, see Mata (2004). 
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namely to appeal to economists who seemed less and less interested in historical 
study. These shifting agendas were reflected in the names used for the various 
protagonists mentioned in these accounts. Pre-1980 narratives insisted on 
cliometricians’ historical purpose: they were alternatively “cliometricians”29, 
“new economic historians”30 or “econometric historians”31. In contrast members 
of the opposing camp were alternatively called “old economic historians”32, 
“traditional economic historians”33 or “institutional historians”34. Labels used in 
later accounts emphasized cliometricians’ economist identity, even adopting 
names that had once belonged to the supposedly unscientific side of the divide, 
such as  “historical economist”35 or “economist economic historian”36. 
Another indication that these biographical accounts were principally 
constructed to forge group identity can be gleaned from responses cliometricians 
gave when I interviewed them (see Appendix 2) and asked them to recall the 
people and scholarship that lay behind such labels as “old economic history” or 
“institutionalism”. North’s responses were fairly typical of most interviewees. 
When probed about institutionalism he acknowledged that it was a “bad word 
back then”, though he had since changed his mind, as he now embraced the 
“influence” of Commons and Veblen. He defined “old economic history” as 
economic history practiced mostly by historians. When prompted about specific 
names (like John Nef, Earl Hamilton or Arthur Cole) he agreed that they would 
have been called “old”. As we shall see in chapter 3, they were actually all 
economists (insofar as they were trained and taught in economics departments, 
and they were eager to engage other economists in conversation). In general, 
                                                   
29 See for examples Fogel (1966), Temin (1973). 
30 See for example Hughes (1965), North (1965), Davis (1968), Temin (1973). 
31 See for example: Fogel (1966), Temin (1973). 
32 See for example North (1965), Temin (1973). 
33 See for example Lee and Passell (1979). 
34 This label is quite rare in the literature. See Temin (1973). 
35 See McCloskey (1987). 
36 See Field, Ed. (1987). 
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most respondents recognized that there had been some exaggeration in the 
depiction and rejection of past scholarship in economic history. As Fogel said, 
“we probably exaggerated too much the break between us and our predecessors 
in economic history”.37  
Because these anecdotal histories were principally aimed at identity 
creation they constitute primary material for my research rather than reliable 
causal accounts of scientific change. Indeed, in the process of focusing on 
challengers, identities and labels, these accounts generated incomplete 
explanations. As they took the movement for granted, these ad hoc accounts did 
not inquire into the social, economic and political context that might have made 
it more likely, or even possible. They did not discuss potential differences 
between the approaches embodied by the different groups involved in the 
“revolution”, or the role individual scholars might have played, or the projects 
and sponsors that brought them together. Even if one agreed with them that the 
idea was ripe, they gave us little sense of where this ripeness might have come 
from. They claimed it came from the internal necessity of scientific progress. Yet 
it was unclear why economists should have felt the need to reform history, or 
even to do history.  Why was it so natural for economists to want to turn to 
history, then and there? What was this “idea” whose time had come: the idea of 
reforming history, or the idea of doing economics differently? What did identity 
wars have to do with these methodological and substantive debates? 
 
3.2 A broader approach to the cliometric revolution 
Once we recognize the polarized nature of these accounts, we can start 
considering other factors that could not fit within a Figure 2.2 vision of events. 
Extra Methodenstreit factors have been suggested by non-participant historians 
                                                   
37 Robert Fogel (2004), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, via telephone, Chicago, 
February 2004; Douglass North (2004), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, via 
telephone, St Louis, February 2004. 
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such as Coats (1980), Lamoreaux (1997) and Schabas (1995).  Each wove a 
multidimensional narrative, pointing to a variety of causes that could have made 
the cliometric revolution more likely to happen in the U.S. in the early 1960s. 
Coats’ essay started with a contrast between Europe and the U.S. and 
asked why cliometricians had been more successful in America than in Europe, 
particularly Britain (whose economic history profession he knew well). His 
explanatory factors were: youth, size of profession and different cold war 
politics. There were many more economists in the U.S. – in particular young ones 
– who needed to make a name for themselves. Thus, Coats argued, it might be 
expected that some of them would turn to economic history as their field of 
specialization (as they could have turned to labor economics or econometrics). 
Their initial rhetorical verve and eagerness to downplay earlier contributions 
was both a manifestation of their youth and of an increasingly competitive 
profession. 
Instead of attributing their use of mathematical models and statistical tests 
to the superiority of new methods and theories, Coats made reference to Cold 
War politics to explain why these young economists should have been so 
successful in moving economic history away from literary forms of expression. 
Technical language was obscure not only to older scholars; it was also 
impenetrable to a wider audience. This could be an advantage in the immediate 
post-McCarthy era:  
 
”Broad, vague, potentially sensitive themes like the history of capitalism, 
the social consequences of industrialism and the nature and causes of 
poverty were eschewed in favor of politically safe exercises deploying 
positivistic techniques and orthodox neoclassical models.”38 
 
                                                   
38 Coats (1980), 203. 
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Curiously, Coats was writing in 1980 – a few years after the explosive public 
controversy on slavery spurred by Fogel and Engerman’s cliometric study Time 
on the Cross.39 Yet Coats’ description of “safe” scholarly exercise is inconsistent 
with the public outcry their conclusions generated (in spite of the fact that they 
were expressed mathematically and substantiated statistically). Hence it was not 
so clear that a desire for safety and isolation from public scrutiny explained 
American economists’ proclivity to do history in a statistical and theoretical way. 
If anything, a strong desire to participate in the increasingly popular 
conversation about underdevelopment and economic growth seemed to be at the 
root of their interest in history. As we shall see in chapters 4 and 6, there was 
considerable overlap between economist-history and development economics in 
the 1960s.   
Naomi Lamoreaux focused less than Coats on the social and political 
context of the American 1960s, and started with the methodological arguments 
caricatured in Figure 2.2. However, as Kadish did for late 19th century U.K., she 
argued that events in economic history had to be situated with respect to 
scientific trends in economics and in history. She reminded us that cliometrics 
was not the only instance when scholars called for quantification, greater 
objectivity and use of social science theories in history (she cited Annalistes in 
France as another example of such scientific historians).40 Seen from this 
perspective, cliometricians’ difference lay in the theory they adopted - only 
economics – as opposed to other scholars for whom other social scientific 
theories could be used. Thus she reinterpreted the “old” v. “new” economic 
history disputes as a battle between Parsonian sociologists and neoclassical 
economists, rather than the no-theory v. theory battle depicted by participants in 
their anecdotal histories.  
                                                   
39 Engerman Stanley and Robert Fogel (1974). 
40 Lamoreaux (1998), 59. 
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She substantiated this point by looking at the work cliometricians 
dismissed as “old” (in particular the work being done at the Harvard Center for 
Entrepreneurial history) and gave concrete examples of the disagreements that 
surfaced between the groups. For example, while the “old” historians explained 
technological change as the result of the personal actions of key entrepreneurs or 
the features of the entrepreneurial system, the cliometricians explained it as a: 
 
 “response to demand-side stimuli: changes in relative factor prices (…) 
As an automatic response to the successful expansion of industries in an 
acquisitive society under competitive market conditions. [Thus] if X had 
not invented the cotton gin, someone else would have.”41  
 
By placing cliometrics in a larger debate about the relationship between theory 
and history, Lamoreaux opened up fresh perspectives, and invited new 
questions. Who really were these “old” economic historians: fellow economists, 
sociologically minded historians? What were they really arguing about: the 
proper role of high theory, the proper kind of high theory? What might have 
made explanations based on entrepreneurial spirit and initiative unacceptable to 
young 1960s economists? 
 Schabas’ analysis of the cliometric revolution also started from the 
methodological debate, though she placed it in the larger context of the post-war 
transformation of American economics, and the progressive disappearance of 
certain types of economists in favor of a much more homogeneous neoclassical 
practitioner.42 One of the important lines of division between these new and old 
economists was their willingness to accept the universality of the laws, models 
and principles they developed. According to Schabas, the young neoclassicals 
were convinced that individual and social behavior could be explained by the 
                                                   
41 Ibid, 61. 
42 Schabas (1995). 
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same causes in all times and places. Whereas many earlier economists rejected 
this proposition outright, arguing instead that different times followed different 
laws. Schabas’ study reminded us that cliometrics was not a battle among 
entrenched, unchanging opposed factions of economists, or between economists 
and historians but rather the manifestation of changing standards of 
“scientificity” in the economics profession at large. This encourages us to take 
another look at the debates that raged among cliometricians and non-
cliometricians, and relate them to wider debates taking place in economics, 
acknowledging that all these debates had both epistemological and rhetorical 
dimensions. 
 The explanatory factors mentioned by Kadish, Coats, Schabas and 
Lamoreaux seem convincing enough to encourage us to include them into any 
account of the cliometric revolution and consider their counterpart in other 
episodes of mid 20th century economist-history. For example, to borrow Coats’ 
questions, we can ask whether a particular feature of the late 1940s political 
landscape shaped economists’ desire to study entrepreneurial history? Or to 
consider Schabas’ explanation, we may search for changes and tensions within 
economics in the late 1930s that might explain why certain economists felt the 
need to set up a journal and an association for a separate economic history? If we 
were to adopt Lamoreaux’ point of view, we might look at differences between 
the core theories (explanations of human behavior) espoused by different 
economic historians.   
 These are all good questions, and this thesis will explore each of them. 
However, they don’t provide an exhaustive view of economists’ changing 
relationship to historical study, and seem rather like a list that critical readers 
may be tempted to add to (how about the religion, ethnicity, ideologies, scientific 
reputation etc.). In other words, we are still left with the challenge of framing 
mid 20th century economist-history in more operational terms. Can we develop a 
framework that helps us think about the origins of a separate economic history in 
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mid 20th century America and its transformation into cliometrics less than two 
decades later? The following section surveys landmark texts in the history of 
science to suggest a few clues for thinking systematically about the relationship 
between knowledge (science) and society (context). 
 
4 Perennial debates and their temporary resolutions  
4.1 Perennial debates 
Certain scientific debates recur because they are never solved. This was 
Peter Novick’s claim in his insightful analysis of 20th century American 
historians, and their perennial debates about “objectivity”.43 According to 
Novick, changes in the historical profession could usefully be understood as 
changes in the consensus about whether or not historians could depict the past 
“objectively”. According to Novick, this question recurred because it was, in 
large part, unanswerable, and generations of historians’ efforts to wrestle with 
the “objectivity” question did not result in any meaningful progress or solution 
to the issue; yet the debate fundamentally changed the profession every time it 
erupted. 
To account for eruptions and temporary solutions to this long-standing 
issue, Novick highlighted the links between the epistemological resolution and 
the political, economic, demographic and social composition of professional 
historians. He argued that the latter were the key to understanding the former.  
For example, while late 19th century American historians hardly questioned their 
potential for objectivity, post WWI historians became increasingly uncomfortable 
with a professional rhetoric that blindly accepted the difference between “fact” 
and “interpretation”. Much of this interwar skepticism was grounded in the 
growing heterogeneity of academic historians, in terms of age and political 
disposition – and the most memorable critiques of pre-WWI epistemology came 
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from young, radical (or at least meliorist) scholars like Charles Beard and Carl 
Becker.  They awakened doubts among their colleagues, whose self-confidence 
had been seriously undermined by the propagandist nature of much historical 
work published during WWI.  They argued for a confrontational mode of 
discovery, where historians firmly critiqued each other and could collectively 
provide an objective depiction of the past. This commitment to argumentation 
contrasted sharply with what Novick described as a strikingly homogeneous late 
19th century white, male, politically and religiously conservative profession, 
which had believed that each individual historian could provide a “true” picture 
of the past.44  
Novick’s work is relevant to this thesis inquiry in two separate ways. The 
first is as a template for studying the history of social science.  His insistence that 
certain debates (be they methodological as in his study, or over specific issues, 
like the question of whether or not man has free will) resurface periodically, are 
never intrinsically solved, but settle on consensus points reflecting the context in 
which they emerged, seems pertinent to our investigation.  In earlier sections we 
encountered many debates about the proper role of economic history in 
economics, and they seemed to overlap in more than one way. For example, 
there is an obvious parallel between Figures 2.1 and 2.2, as if economists had 
always been divided between those who favored an approach that started from 
universal principles and those who wanted to start from the systematic 
observation of their world. Though we may want to highlight nuances in both 
these positions, and acknowledge that they had a strong rhetorical component, 
they were nonetheless recurrent (and did correspond to different overall 
dispositions about proper scientific method).  
The second way Novick may be of use is via parallels between our 
economic history debate and the “objectivity question” raised by historians.  As 
we shall discover as early as in chapter 3, debates that troubled economic 
                                                   
44 Ibid, 111-250. 
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historians originated in economics, rather than history (and Novick’s own 
account has very little information on the protagonists will we encounter in 
subsequent chapters), yet the problem of whether or not the analyst could 
provide an “objective” depiction of reality (and of the past) was very much a part 
of the debates around economic history. As with Novick’s historians, economists’ 
notions of what constituted an “objective” statement changed throughout the 
20th century and was frequently a matter of dispute. 
The question of the proper place of history in economic investigation 
seemed to have originated in the 19th century, at least as far back as John Stuart 
Mill, possibly the most influential writer on the subject. Mill had set up the terms 
of the debate in his 1836 treatise On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the 
Method of Investigation Proper to it.45  His starting point was that economic reality 
was intrinsically complex, by which he meant that every phenomenon was the 
net result of multiple causes exerting their influence at once. Unfortunately, 
economists - like astronomers - could not run controlled experiments with the 
phenomenon they studied, and could thus not rely on observation to draw out 
the nature and relative importance of all these causes. Consequently, as Mill 
argued, the only scientific way to reason in economics was to start with simple, 
verifiable first principles about the individual and deduce the aggregate social 
consequences. 46 For example, Mill started with “universal” truths he had 
obtained from introspection – namely that man desired wealth and that this 
pursuit was systematically impeded by the aversion for effort and the preference 
for present enjoyment – and deduced certain necessary consequences about the 
nature of economic behavior in society.  However, Mill insisted on the fact that 
the “laws” linking cause and effect could only ever be formulated as contingent 
laws (as opposed to universal ones), usually described as “tendency laws”: 
                                                   
45 Mill (1986). 
46 This methodological argument became one of the three standard “philosophical” 
readings for economists. The two others were Koopmans (1947); Friedman (1953).  
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statements about one variable’s tendency to cause another, but interference from 
the many other factors that affect human life made these predictions necessarily 
inexact.47  
As De Marchi has shown, Mill struggled for a decade before writing this 
methodological tract - and was never entirely comfortable at having rejected 
empirical evidence as a source of demonstration, or reliability in economics. If 
anything, Mill was an able user of “fact” to make arguments about the likelihood 
that one event had been caused by another – for example he did this admirably 
in a study of the relationship between true testimonies and oath taking, 
analyzing dozens of court cases. Were oaths a sufficient guarantee that a witness 
would speak the truth? Mill showed that truth was only obtained when oaths 
were combined with a strong judge and a strong popular interest in the trial, 
whereas false testimonies were more frequent when only the oath was operative. 
Thus, he concluded that truth could not be obtained by the swearing of oaths.48 
According to De Marchi, Mill was content with such a reasoning, provided it did 
not require 100% certainty on the part of the economist: induction could only 
produce statements about the particular situation that had been observed, and 
these could not straightforwardly extend to other contexts (other countries, other 
epochs). Yet, Mill was deeply committed to creating a science that had 
“certainty”– i.e. a degree of scientific respectability that he thought the natural 
sciences had earned. Considering the impossibility of experimentation, and the 
consequent contingency of empirically derived generalizations, economics could 
only be a hypothetico-deductive science. 
According to De Marchi, Mill’s progressive distancing from empirical 
work was the product of his repeated attempts to evaluate the scientific bases of 
history – a process that culminated in his rejection of history as a model for the 
social sciences. Not only was it plagued with the shortcomings of all empirical 
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work (namely the impossibility of generating sure statements) but it worked 
with incomplete material: one could never know the past as well as one knew the 
present. De Marchi explained Mill’s reasons for believing this: 
 
 “This is a matter of not having the necessary information. A 
contemporary observer has access to numerous facts of common 
experience, but these are rarely thought significant enough to record. 
What tends to be recorded is the exceptional occurrence. Sometimes an 
imaginative historian might infer the rule lying behind a recorded 
exception, but in this way history also becomes beholden to 
happenstance.”49  
 
This quote hints at the overlap between the issue of whether an economist 
can or should observe, and whether some observations are better (more 
objective) than others.  From Mill’s conclusion, one might think that in 1836, 
history was removed from the economist’s legitimate working materials. 
However this was not the case. Several generations of economists openly 
disagreed with Mill’s methodological recommendations and his sacrifice of 
relevance for certainty. The most famous of these were the German historical 
economists who launched the Methodenstreit. As we saw earlier, they opposed 
both Mill’s conclusion that general statements derived from empirical 
investigation were inadequate, and his belief that historical evidence was 
somewhat inferior to contemporary evidence. As may be gleaned from 
Schmoller’s stance, his reasons for encouraging historical monographic work 
were not in defiance of Mill’s point that they could only produce contingent 
knowledge but rested on the conviction that the multiplication of monographs 
and careful comparison among them would strengthen results that had 
previously relied only on correlation of factors within a single monograph.  Thus 
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where Mill had recommended tendency laws and the hypothetico-deductive 
method, the German historicists advocated a much vaster empirical enquiry. 
The divide was consequently not between strict inductivists who believed 
that facts would spontaneously speak to them and deductivists who completely 
ignored reality but between scholars who had different degrees of commitment 
to observation and how much time they should devote to it.  Schmoller’s group 
was made up of people who continued to think about useful ways of observing. 
Thus, for example, historical economists contributed disproportionately to 
importing statistical techniques and statistical theory into economics in the late 
19th and early 20th century (at the NBER, for example).50  Note that they often 
presented this emphasis on quantification as a means of obtaining more objective 
pictures of the economy. 
The issue of “whether, how and how much to observe” was, in principle, 
larger than the issue of whether or not to do historical work, though in effect 
these issues overlapped quite considerably. However, there were other facets to 
the historical question, most of which stemmed from certain scholars’ 
commitments to stage theories or evolutionary views of social change. Many 19th 
century political economists had explained the wealth of nations in historical 
perspective, with reference to a set of stages that each economy needed to 
undergo in its path towards prosperity (or harmony). This view of social 
development went hand in hand with the belief that each stage followed its own 
laws and that economists needed to spell these out (in particular to aid countries 
who were in earlier stages of their development, hence did not operate along the 
same lines as 19th century Britain). In Germany, one of the more vocal defenders 
of these views was Friedrich List (1789-1846).51 A related, though perhaps less 
relativistic view was the belief that human societies could only be understood in 
the long term, with reference to their historical development. In other words, 
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51 His most famous work was the National System of Political Economy (1841).  
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studies of the present could not be divorced from studies of the past. This 
roughly characterized Wilhelm Roscher’s work and that of many American 
Institutionalists, like Commons or Veblen.  
As we shall see in chapters 4 , 5 and 6, these ontological commitments to 
history (stageism, evolutionism) overlapped, but did not necessarily exhaustively 
cover all economists’ impulse to write history. In many cases, the driving factor 
was the belief that long-term observation was more useful than just limiting 
oneself to contemporary facts. Thus, for the sake of our perennial debate 
framework, the question can usefully be limited to “whether, how and how 
much to observe” and forms a sub question of the much larger issue of 
“scientificity” in economics.  
The issue of scientificity in economics (what does it take to be a scientific 
economist?) and the related “observation” question seem to be characterized by 
the principal features of a perennial debate. They resurfaced on numerous 
occasions (so far we have encountered at least three episodes in the U.S. – “new” 
versus “old” economists in the late 19th century, the creation of a separate 
economic history in 1941 and the cliometric debates – and the thesis will uncover 
several more); they remained unanswered (unanswerable?) and the truces 
appeared to be temporary. Given this recurrence, we may want to inquire into 
the factors that favored mid 20th century debates around these positions.  
 
4.2 Content and Context 
If we agree with Novick that changes in science are usefully 
conceptualized as lasting debates temporarily opened and closed by changes in 
the broad political context and the demographic and ideological makeover of the 
profession, we still want to look for a tighter conceptualization of the ways in 
which these external changes may have acted upon the nature and outcome of 
the methodological disputes. Otherwise we may hit the same wall that Novick 
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encountered, when he admitted to have written an extremely long book, for the 
sake of covering every possible issue he found to be relevant in the evolution of 
the American historical profession.52  This relates to our earlier point that loose 
narratives like those produced by Coats and Lamoreaux run the risk of being 
perceived as selective, since there is no obvious way of ranking all the different 
potential factors’ influence on scientific practice.  
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s wonderful study of the emergence of 
experimental science in 17th century Britain may give us clues for developing a 
tighter narrative of the relationship between the internal factors (perennial 
debates) and external features, between knowledge and society. According to 
them, the explanation of Robert Boyle’s “victory” over Thomas Hobbes and the 
subsequent spread of experimentation within scientific communities lay less in 
the supposed superiority of Boyle’s epistemological position, and more in the 
better fit between Boyle’s model for scientific practice and general 17th century 
Restoration society.  
Shapin and Schaffer carefully showed that Hobbes had legitimate doubts 
about the laboratory’s supposed capacity for creating unambiguous “matters of 
fact”. Having thus established that the Hobbes-Boyle debates opposed two 
meticulous defenders of logically incompatible visions of science, the authors 
showed that Boyle’s model for scientific practice (specifying how science is 
organized among its practitioners and its place in society) was more consistent 
with British Restoration ideals. Indeed the type of knowledge Boyle and his 
colleagues produced could help the clergy (and thus the king) put an end to 
religious and civil dissent, as they were willing and able to use experiment to 
address religious issues.  By design, knowledge obtained in a laboratory was 
                                                   
52 “My own deepest methodological commitment is to the “overdetermination” of all 
activity, including thought. Therefore, for me, explanation and understanding 
necessarily involve the exploration of the widest variety of overlapping influences and 
this book straddles both the internalist versus externalist, and cognitivist versus 
noncognitivist divisions: explores them all, and does its best to integrate them (…) This 
is the principal reason why the book is so long” - Novick (1988), 9. 
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consensual – freely visible and acknowledgeable by all, regardless of education 
or social status (at least in principle).  This contrasted with pre-revolutionary 
modes of knowledge where the Bible and its interpretation had been accessible 
only to a few. But it also contrasted with revolutionary beliefs that God’s 
teaching was directly available to all and a source of much civil unrest, as 
experimentation involved the participation of an experiment designer, an 
intermediary between “nature” and her “facts” (“disputed knowledge produced 
civil strife”).53  On the other hand, Hobbes’ model for science - where knowledge 
was the privilege of the very few minds capable of thinking in purely logical 
terms (like geometry) - was perceived as excessively authoritarian, and would 
have been a much riskier model to adopt in the newly restored monarchy.54  
This relationship between epistemologies and different models for the 
organization of science was the lynchpin between internal features 
(epistemological debates) and external factors (changes in the political 
landscape), and Shapin and Schaffer insisted on the two-way nature of the 
relationship. The ways in which scientists produced and disseminated 
knowledge were contingent on ways in which society at large set its priorities (in 
particular in the political sphere). Conversely, the production of scientific 
knowledge reinforced certain patterns of decision and authority in society. 
Shapin and Schaffer’s strongpoint was to focus on the fit between the division of 
labor at work within the scientific community and patterns of authority outside 
of science as the principle motor of this two way process. 
This two-way causality has been a favorite theme in recent histories of 
social science. For example, Theodore Porter and Alain Desrosières have shown 
that the rise of private and national accounting practices (cost benefit accounting, 
national income accounting) was triggered by the requirements of international 
political alliances, yet contributed to alter the world that gave birth to these 
                                                   
53 Shapin Steven and Simon Schaffer (1985), 283. 
54 Ibid, 323-331. 
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methods: arbitrary concepts invented by economists were appropriated by 
individuals to define their identity (for example the category “white collar 
worker” was appropriated by a subset of the French population, “les cadres”).55   
All these elements contain clues for our own investigations. Shapin and 
Schaffer remind us that epistemological views on good scientific practice have an 
organizational counterpart, and that this organization may be more or less 
favored by environmental factors (resources, but also public opinion). They also 
suggest that certain outside groups, like the clergy, can have high stakes in the 
production of scientific knowledge. Desrosières and Porter remind us that events 
in the social scientific realm can have tangible consequences on the real world. 
The following figure represents an attempt to apply these insights about context 
and contingency to the forces at play in American economist-history. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.3 changes in economics could be broken down 
into two driving forces, symbolized by the two double-headed arrows. Their net 
effect resulted in modifications in the emplacement of the economics area within 
the broader social-science space, and scholars who were once “insiders” could in 
principle be pushed outside the profession as a result of these changes. 
                                                   
55 Desrosières (1990); Porter (1995); Desrosières (2000). 
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Figure 2.3: Perennial debates and contingent outcomes in economist-history 
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By using a cartographic metaphor to describe scientific activity, we acknowledge 
that much of this activity did consist in erecting borders, frontiers separating 
acceptable from unacceptable practice, though the porosity of these lines of 
demarcation and their actual emplacement are seldom as clear as on a map. In 
other words, it can be very useful to bring to light the efforts that scientists made 
to define and enforce who was in or out, though it would be simplistic to assume 
that all their activity was single-mindedly strategic, without acknowledging the 
contingency linked to the external context these scientists did not control.  
 Starting from the bottom of Figure 2.3, the first double arrow symbolizes 
the “scientificity” debate that recurrently involved and opposed economists. 
While all wanted to be “scientific” they tended to gather around two poles – 
represented by clusters of words on either side of the circle. These clusters reflect 
the relative heterogeneity of the men and women who gathered around each 
pole, reminding us that there never was a meaningful or sharp distinction 
between “inductivists” and “deductivists” and that the participants were best 
seen as groups of people who shared one or more epistemological disposition, 
but not necessarily all (for example some economists might have insisted on 
“observation” without necessarily thinking that it had to be “historical”). 
Because of this heterogeneity, the distinction between the clusters was not clearly 
defined or enforced. Indeed the proximity between terms like “generalize” and 
“tendencies” suggests that it was not impossible for economists from different 
poles to collaborate. Importantly some words belonged to both sides, like the 
term “laboratory” for example. As we shall see in chapter 3, while some 1940s 
economists believed that history could be a lab for testing theories, or for 
running controlled experiments, others believed that mathematical models and 
their econometric manipulation were economists’ best chance to have a lab. Thus 
while some words might have sounded radically opposed they actually 
corresponded to a relatively non-conflictual reality, while other words that 
looked identical might have hid a very strong degree of non-compatibility. We 
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should keep this in mind in subsequent chapters, when we sift through the 
evidence of recurrent methodological debates.  
 The second double headed arrow symbolizes the “external factors” that 
were at the origin of the eruptions and quelling of internal debates – Coats’ Cold 
War politics for example. The link between these two arrows, represented by the 
thin line  (barely visible) suggests that there existed a relationship between them, 
that this relationship could potentially go both ways, but that there is no easy 
way to conceptualize this link. In Shapin and Schaffer’s study this link was the fit 
between organization within science and external factors. Throughout the thesis 
we shall see that time – i.e. how much time an economist or group of economists 
should spend collecting data – played an important role in these debates. 
Chapters 3, 5 and 6 will show that officers from philanthropic foundations were 
instrumental in configuring and changing economist-historians’ time horizons, 
thus privileging certain points of consensus, though we will not identify a strong 
group, like Shapin and Schaffer’s clergy, or a clear political agenda. 
 Instead we shall study economists’ mid 20th century debates around 
history to get a better grip on the external and internal factors that shaped post-
war economics. In Figure 2.3. economic history is depicted as a borderland – a 
place that is both inside and outside of economics. This can be interpreted in two 
ways. Either we focus on the insiders: economist-historians who were recognized 
by other economists as members of the profession, yet held a special place as 
their area of specialization led them to interact with representatives of other 
disciplines, in particular history, but also sociology and political science. In this 
case, the discussions between economist-historians and other economic historians 
can yield information about the bounds of permissible behavior that defined who 
was in and who was out of economics. The other interpretation is to think of 
economic historians as a group of scholars who were not recognized by other 
economists as “insiders”, yet managed to stake a claim on economics via their 
area of study. In this case, an examination of the motivations that pushed these 
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outsiders into trying to colonize economics, and of their interactions with 
insiders also yields information about the nature of economics in a particular 
point in time.  
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, both interpretations are useful: 
cliometricians’ controversies with other economic historians said something 
about the education and socialization of young economists in the 1950s, just as 
French Annalistes’ claims on economic history and on social science at large can 
help us understand the ways in which mainstream economics was becoming 
increasingly orthogonal to other visions for social science.  Thus we will use 
changes in economist-history as a window into certain key features of the mid 
20th century transformation of American economics.56  
Now that we have developed a framework that will hopefully aid the 
reader in thinking about the factors that drove economists’ interest in history, 
and periodical changes in the nature and form of this interest, we are faced with 
the challenging task of applying it. To put flesh on our conceptual framework we 
can rely on two frequent aids used by historians of science: controversy and 
comparison. 
 
4.3 Controversy and Comparison 
As the reader will soon discover, this thesis revolves around scholars and 
their disagreements. On the American scene, you will read about Arthur Cole 
versus Simon Kuznets; Simon Kuznets versus Walt Rostow; Alexander 
Gerschenkon versus David Landes; Robert Fogel versus Walt Rostow; Louis 
Hacker versus Robert Fogel etc. In France, you will read about Jan Marczewski 
versus Pierre Chaunu and Pierre Vilar; Ernest Labrousse versus François 
                                                   
56 We alluded to this transformation earlier, when discussing Schabas’ article; and it will 
be further developed in chapters 6 and 7. For an excellent collection of essays that 
grapple with the nature and timing of this transformation, see Morgan Mary and 
Malcolm Rutherford, Ed. (1998). 
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Perroux; François Perroux versus André Piatier etc.  There is a strong tradition in 
the history and philosophy of science, following Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn 
to consider controversy as the driving force in scientific change and progress. For 
Kuhn “anomalies” and the conflicting interpretations they invited were the 
trigger point for paradigm shift. For Popper, good scientists were those who 
constantly questioned their own and others’ hypotheses, making sure to leave no 
rival interpretation unturned. 57 
Recent scholars have offered slightly adjusted interpretations of the role 
controversies actually do play in scientific activity. Marcello Dascal for example 
has argued that controversies are times when proponents of rival ontological 
views get a glimpse of the distance that separates them from others. This does 
not result in the victory of one paradigm over another, but in a therapeutic 
recognition of the conditions and limits of one’s own scientific thinking.  
According to Dascal, this breech into a world that is habitually left unspoken by 
scientists, and often causes them to talk past each other rather than to each other, 
is fundamental to scientific progress. It creates an opening for new ways of 
thinking. In common parlance, it’s a time when the scholars engaged in the 
controversy can genuinely “think out of the box”.58 For historians, controversies 
are immensely valuable as they shed light on what scholars have “taken for 
granted” at a particular period of time.  
The expression “taken for granted” is borrowed from Shapin and Schaffer. 
According to them controversies are windows into “the taken for granted quality 
of [each man’s] preferred beliefs and practices” and “display the artifactual and 
conventional status of those beliefs and practices”.59 While Dascal, Shapin and 
Schaffer all agree that certain types of scientific disagreement shed light on the 
things that are often kept “below water level”, they differ on what the historian 
                                                   
57 Kuhn (1962); Popper (1963). 
58 Dascal (1998); Sergio Cremaschi and Marcelo Dascal (1998). 
59 Shapin and Schaffer (1985), 6.  
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might want to bring up to the surface. For Dascal, the important features are 
discursive: the historian must focus on what each opponent said, look at the 
rhetorical spin, and the ontological underpinnings, and help the reader see the 
deep epistemological differences that separate the scholars (which in this thesis, 
we might call the perennial debate elements). 60 For example, in Cremaschi and 
Dascal’s study of debates between Malthus and Ricardo on corn laws, they 
brought to light these economists’ deep divide along whether economics should 
be “formalist and abstract” or “realist and complex”.61   
In light of our earlier discussion on Mill and the ensuing perennial debate 
in economics, we may be tempted to say that controversies in economics are 
always spurred by the same deep factors (disputes about what constitutes good 
scientific practice), regardless of what the issue appears to be (corn laws, free 
trade or slavery for example). Yet Shapin and Schaffer cast a broader net: they 
want to use controversy to revive the thickness of scientific life, its existence in a 
strongly influential social context, and thus document the many other factors 
(not just questions of methods) that make scientific life. In this thesis, we will 
encounter many factors that spurred controversy: financing from philanthropic 
foundations, the experience of Anglo-Saxon economists during WWII, the Cold 
War and ensuing demand for economic development theories and rhetoric. 
Economic historians opportunistically used some of these factors to mobilize 
resources and deny them to others, and these factors shaped their scientific 
choices.   
                                                   
60 Dascal and Cremaschi were looking for controversies in which the historian could 
unearth each scholars’ “style”: “a constellation of positive doctrines, policies, 
philosophical assumptions, explicitely formulated methodological theses, theological 
underpinnings, political outlooks, and argumentative preferences and a cluster of basic 
metaphors.” Cremaschi Sergio and Marcelo Dascal (1998), 248. 
61 According to Cremaschi and Dascal, this is “an opposition that social science seems to 
be unable to escape from ”Ibid, 230.  This seems to confirm the notion of recurrence and 
perenniality of certain debates.  
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While the study of controversy can help paint a multidimensional picture 
of scientific activity, the process of selecting the dimensions that promoted 
change or enforced the status quo can be aided by comparative analysis – a 
comparison with France and the U.S. as Lamoreaux did. Indeed, events in these 
countries seemed to have been diametrically opposed: while the U.S. had several 
generations of economist-historians, France seemed to have very few economists 
who wrote history; while America had a “cliometric revolution”, there was none 
in France. If we can establish that the basic features of the perennial debate were 
active in both countries in the mid 20th century, the difference in outcome can 
help us identify the external factors that played a crucial role in the U.S.  
The reasons for the non-emergence of economist-historians in France are 
not clear, and remain quite controversial.  Recent accounts produced by 
cliometricians, or economic historians who did not identify with the Annales 
movement have tended to emphasize institutional barriers that supposedly 
isolated economists from historians and incited historians to attack economists 
who entered their territory. George Grantham’s 1997 survey of French cliometric 
work started with French economists’ attempts to contribute to Simon Kuznets’ 
retrospective national accounts initiative. According to Grantham, their foray 
into economic history was halted in the early 1960s, when hegemonic Annalistes 
severely reprimanded the economist-historians, largely because they did not 
understand what the economists were doing as they were not equipped with the 
concepts to follow their computations. As Grantham wrote: 
 
“Institutionally economic history belonged to history rather than to 
economics, which meant that candidates for the national examination 
selecting candidates for posts in the national teaching and research 
establishment did not have to study economics.” 
 
He also blamed very different ideological backgrounds: 
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“ The left had also appropriated the right to define the history of post-
Revolutionary France, and it placed a socialist narrative on that history 
which had little in common with questions about economic growth 
addressed by Kuznets.”62  
 
These were strong claims and they have been re-iterated since.63  
Historians of the Annales movement would generally disagree with this 
diagnostic.64 As might be expected, there is a colossal literature in the history of 
Annales, and most histories explored the movements’ relationship to social 
sciences, including economics. 65  They reminded us that many Annalistes 
grounded their historical work on the conviction that man and society could only 
be studied in time, and they considered themselves to be partaking in the same 
knowledge quest as other social scientists. As a result, Annalistes  paid attention 
to developments in these neighboring sciences, and while they may not have 
been masters in econometric techniques, they were certainly not ignorant of basic 
statistical devices, and were thus equipped to make sense of most retrospective 
accounting work (as we shall see in chapter 5). 
 As Gemelli (1995) and Mazon (1988) have shown, Annalistes’ social 
scientific aspirations were real enough to attract sizeable American funding in 
the social sciences. For American funders, Annalistes were not “historians” in any 
antiquarian sense of the term. Mazon cited a telling anecdote from one 
Rockefeller Foundation officer’s diary:  
 
                                                   
62 Grantham (1997). 
63 Crouzet Francois and Isabelle Lescent-Giles (1998). 
64  Coutau–Bégarie (1983) used the word “phenomenon” rather than “movement” to 
denote the heterogeneity of this school – see chapter 5.  
65 Coutau-Bégarie (1983). 
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“[He] told me about an association for the history of civilization he created 
which I did not pay attention to before he mentioned what it was about. 
Behind a name he chose in order to attract traditional scholars, as he told 
me with an amused look, lies a body of social science researchers whom 
he encourages to move beyond a purely philosophical tradition towards 
more empirical study.”66  
 
Such views encourage us to move away from interpreting French economic 
history as a field controlled by “historians” and closed to “economists”, and to 
focus rather on the features that defined both these groups, realizing that the 
disputes involved different models of scientificity.  Could we think of Annales 
historians as social scientists wanting to penetrate economics from the left side of 
the circle (see Figure 2.3)? If we can, how do we interpret the fact that they 
controlled economic history in 1960s France, at the same time that their 
counterparts were losing economist-history to the cliometricians in the U.S.? We 
can focus on the differences, in part ideological, in part ideational, in part 
institutional to suggest factors that played the greatest role in creating different 
outcomes in each country. In general, this thesis will rely on cross-temporal and 
cross-spatial comparisons to bring to light both the perenniality of the 
scientificity debates and the contingency of their outcomes.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In chapter 1 the thesis question was presented as: why did mid 20th 
century American economists’ display such interest in history, and why did the 
nature and shape of this interest radically change in the early 1960s? As we 
progressed through chapter 2 we operationalized this question into two 
complementary steps. The first was whether we could trace lines of recurrence 
                                                   
66 Mazon (1988), 89. 
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and similarity in the numerous debates around economist-history (perennial 
debate). The second was whether we could tie lasting consensus and moments of 
eruption to features and changes in society at large (external factors). Each of the 
subsequent chapters is built around these two questions. For example, chapter 3 
brings us back to the 1940s and shows that the creation of separate institutions 
for economic history in the U.S was spurred by economists with a strong 
commitment to “observation”, a critical view of most abstract work in the field 
and that their efforts were greatly facilitated by Rockefeller Foundation officers’ 
conviction that America needed a scientific explanation of its economic success 
as part of their country’s ideological defense against mounting totalitarianisms in 
Europe. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
 
 
 ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC HISTORY IN THE U.S. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the actions of a small yet influential group of 
American economists who, in the 1940s and early 1950s, sought to claim 
economic history for themselves and use it as a springboard to launch a wider 
transformation of economics. These events have not, until now, been carefully 
studied, in part due to the post 1960s popularization of the view that earlier work 
in economic history was obsolete – as reflected in the common use of the 
expression “old economic history” to describe it, as opposed to “new” or 
“cliometric” studies.1  This justified an almost complete lack of interest in both 
the work and the motivations of pre-cliometric economic historians.  
This neglect was particularly strong when it concerned “old” economist-
historians – i.e. scholars whose identity was intimately tied to the economics 
profession, yet chose to write history. 2 Once one recognizes that these “old” 
                                                   
1 For further analysis of the origin and dissemination of this label, see chapter 2.  
2 An example of this profession wide neglect appears in a 1968 survey of economic 
historians’ contributions to the study of American economic growth, published by the 
“new” economic historian William Parker (1919-2000), in which he highlighted the work 
of Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard, with no mention of the economists that 
feature in this chapter. His 1st footnote mentioned that some of his readers had 
expressed concern about this omission: “The most important of the criticisms concerns 
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economist-historians were the founders of the Economic History Association, the 
Journal of Economic History and Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 
(subsequently renamed Explorations in Economic History), in other words, the 
founders of the institutions that still support American economic history today, 
one is entitled to wonder about the reasons of this neglect and whether the 
context of creation of these institutions did not have a lasting impact on the 
evolution of American economic history.  
Historians of economics have recently portrayed the interwar period in 
the U.S. as one of pluralism in economics. Yet they have also highlighted the 
growing polarization of the discipline in those years and the emergence of 
separate groups (institutionalists, neoclassicals, econometricians for example) 
and their battles for control of the field. They also pointed to the crucial role 
played by patrons of the discipline in deciding the fates of these competing 
claims.3 In this context, one can ask why the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) – then 
America’s largest patron of economics – supported a large economic history 
initiative? Indeed, in 1941, the RF’s Social Science Division started financing 
economic history and continued to do so for fifteen years, a period that coincided 
perfectly with Joseph Willits’ tenure as Social Science Director.  Why did 
economic history get “created” by the RF as an independent field in the 1940s? 
How does this episode relate to conflicting beliefs about “scientific” economics? 
If historical economists had been present in the U.S. since the late 19th century, 
why did they feel the need to define a new space for economic history at the eve 
of WWII, and not earlier?  
                                                                                                                                                       
the roles of Beard and Veblen, and my neglect of the empirical tradition stemming from 
E.F. Gay”. He judged that “the neglect of [Gay’s student’s work] is a serious omission in 
my paper”, though did not do much to correct it. The timing of these remarks (1968) 
indicated either that the collective memory had already erased the actions of the 
founders of the Economic History Association, or that the battle for erasing was still 
raging, and Parker was more or less consciously taking part in it.  
3 See the collection of essays in Morgan and Rutherford, Eds. (1998). 
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Following an account of the place of economic history in the U.S. before 
1941 (section 2), section 3 examines the role and beliefs of the RF officers who 
sponsored economic history (Anne Bezanson and Joseph Willits).  Section 4 
examines the grant’s results, namely the research and institutions it supported. 
The last section  (section 5) investigates the advent of entrepreneurial history and 
considers implications of this episode for our understanding of change and 
mobilization in mid 20th century American economics. Throughout, this chapter 
argues that the creation of a splinter group inside economics, self-consciously 
opposed to the increasing formalization of economics, was made possible by an 
opportune connection with officers of the RF, but was in turn shaped by this 
connection with private American patrons. 
 
2 American Economic History before 1941 
2.1 Early American economics, “historicism” and “economic history” 
As shown in chapter 2, economic history first emerged as a separate 
activity in late 19th century Europe, in the wake of the German Methodenstreit.  
However, its genesis cannot be reduced to an inevitable division along 
supposedly irreducible methodological lines (so-called inductivism versus 
deductivism), but must be understood with reference to the professionalization 
of economics in those years. As Alon Kadish showed for Britain, for example, 
economic history emerged as a separate activity from economics due, in large 
part, to Cambridge department rivalries.  
This is an important hint to understand the emergence of a separate area 
of economic history in the U.S. several decades after Germany, France, or the 
U.K. Part of this difference in timing was due to the much more favorable status 
enjoyed by historical economists in early 20th century U.S. The issue of 
“historicism” in early American economics has been the object of numerous 
studies, many of which overlap with investigations of German “influence” on 
American academia. Without a doubt a very large fraction of late 19th and early 
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20th century American social scientists studied in Germany, and many were 
exposed to historicism.4 However, what they brought home and how they 
adapted it to the American context is a matter of much debate.5 One prominent 
obstacle to drawing any generalization about the impact of the German 
Historical School onto American social science was the fact that Schmoller-
inspired men came home to be historians, sociologists, political scientists, and 
economists, rather than members of one neat disciplinary group.6 This meant 
that methodological stances traversed many disciplines, creating stronger ties 
across fields than among members within a field, thus rendering problematic any 
strict definition of “historical economics” in early 20th century U.S.  
That said, the carriers of a piecemeal appropriation of historical precepts 
did contribute to spread the view that proper research in the social sciences, 
including economics, needed to rest on an empirical basis, an examination of 
things as they were or had been. This assertion encouraged economists to think 
deeply about the conditions in which observation was possible, and 
quantification and statistics flourished as a result of this reflection.7 The German 
experience also contributed to reinforce a strong sense of advocacy and the 
conviction that social scientists had a duty to formulate “economic and social 
policies and reforms.” For example, a large number of historical economists 
studied labour conditions (Edwin Seligman, John R. Commons). Finally, the 
historical current in America reinforced interdisciplinary dialogue and defended 
a multi-layered view of social phenomena involving interaction between 
cultural, political, and economic variables.  
                                                   
4 Herbst (1965), 1-8; Diehl (1978), 148 and 130-1. 
5 Carl Diehl used an interesting expression to denote the ambiguity of the effect German 
historicism may have had on these young scholars: “the anxiety of influence” - Diehl 
(1978). 
6 Herbst (1965), ix. 
7 Novick showed that many American historians doubted whether they could really 
show reality as it had been - Novick (1988). Not all social scientists were so perplexed by 
the act of observation - Herbst (1965), 141. For a statement of the virtues of quantification 
for observation, see Usher (1932). 
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In the 1880s and 1890s these “new” economists often derided the 
methodological precepts of those they considered to be “old”. Their main 
laughing stock was Simon Newcomb, whose training in astronomy had 
convinced him that economics could only be a science of immutable laws and 
eternal principles – to which he added acute political and social conservatism.8 
Though the debate was often needlessly polarized – i.e. forced many historical 
economists to issue much harsher judgments about analysis and abstraction than 
they otherwise would have – it did contribute to spread the historical view of 
“scientificity” in economics.9  Historical economists were the founders of the 
American Economic Association (AEA) in 1885 – under Richard T. Ely’s radical 
leadership - and their general scientific outlook progressively blended into a 
widespread movement that would officially be recognized as American 
Institutionalism after 1918.10 
However, this should not be read to mean that American economics was 
neatly divided along one methodological line, with historicists advocating a 
strictly homogeneous methodology and recipe for professional behavior. 
Actually, many prominent American economists engaged in both sustained 
historical enquiry and theoretical reflection (for example John Clark, Commons, 
Frank Taussig, and Seligman), and differed strongly in their political stances.11 
The difference between the Harvard economist Taussig and the Johns Hopkins 
(then Wisconsin) economist Ely was a good example of the many shapes and 
sizes of this historical blend. Though Taussig contributed to historical 
                                                   
8 Furner (1975), 40-42. 
9 Ibid; Coats, Ed. (1992), chapter 18. 
10 Schumpeter asserted that American Institutionalism could be understood as an 
offshoot of German historicism, though he never wrote the pages on Instititutionalism 
that would have figured in his section on “German Historical School Influence Outside 
Germany” - Schumpeter (1954), 819-20. The relationship between historicism and 
institutionalism was quite complex, largely due to the many faces of American 
Institutionalism. However, Rutherford has highlighted American Institutionalists’ 
consistent interest in history (of events and ideas), see for example Rutherford (2004b). 
11 Furner (1975), 60-80 and 97-9. 
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investigations of the state’s involvement in international trade, he accepted the 
basic principles of classicism and marginalism, and believed that economists 
should only interfere with public life on technical matters. 12 Ely on the other 
hand was a fervent reformer and constantly derided any attempt in abstract 
economic theorizing, though he too had marginal analysis in his textbook.13 And 
at one time or another both men bore the label “historical”.  
Given this late 19th century continuous spectrum stretching from “old” 
Newcombian to “new” Ely–type economics, one might wonder whether the label 
“economic historian” was ever introduced. It was, and it was not. William J. 
Ashley, a prominent British historical economist, appointed to the first chair of 
economic history in the Anglo-Saxon world, at Harvard, inaugurated “economic 
history” as a label in America in 1893. In his acceptance speech before the 
Harvard faculty he drew the broad outlines of the Methodenstreit, calling for a 
truce to let each side pursue its program for 20 years, and asked that results be 
compared after that time only. He had no doubt that the historical branch, whose 
work for the next decades would be in “economic history” of a monographic and 
ultimately synthetic kind, would emerge victorious.14  However, Ashley’s 
references to the rivalries opposing historical and deductive economists were 
more a reflection of his British rhetoric than a correct analysis of the situation in 
America. After all, Harvard economists had invited him to join their faculty, and 
historical work was far from being marginalized in the rest of the country. If 
anything, it was on the ascent. This begins to explain why no American 
economist was attempting to claim “economic history” as a separate space for 
historical economists; they would rather have “economics”!  
Ashley stayed at Harvard until 1901, when he was called back to Britain to 
start the first department in Commerce in the U.K. (Birmingham). The following 
                                                   
12 Cole (1974); Furner (1975), 98-100, 138, 190. 
13 Furner (1975), 84-6, 94-6. 
14 Ashley (1893). 
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year he was replaced by Edwin F. Gay who had just returned from a decade 
spent studying in Europe, principally in Germany. The circumstances that led to 
Gay’s appointment were indicative of economic history’s general status in the 
U.S. in the early 20th century, and the many lines of division (not just 
methodological) that separated American economists. While Harvard economists 
expressed no doubt about the need to fill Ashley’s position, they found it very 
difficult to find someone to take his place. The problem could not have been a 
lack of American economists with an interest in the past (Commons had been 
training many young scholars in this vein at the University of Wisconsin for 
example).15 Something else seemed to thwart Harvard economists in their quest 
for a historical colleague. 
Furner has identified the period from 1880 to 1905 as the time that set the 
parameters for acceptable professional behavior in American economics. One of 
the main factors of debate and division was the appropriate degree of public 
involvement and advocacy. According to Furner, Harvard was always on the 
more conservative end of the scale, favoring discrete and remote economic 
professionals, rather than scholars involved in generating interpretations for 
concrete political questions (in particular involving labour). This general 
conservatism kept all Harvard economists from participating in the early AEA.  
While the historicism of the new association appealed to some of them (like 
Taussig for example who was tempted to join), the leftist rhetoric (“socialist”) of 
Richard T. Ely and his followers frightened them.16  Thus, when it came time to 
find Ashley’s replacement, the issue was not the dearth of potential economist-
historians in the U.S., but finding one that wasn’t an advocate, and certainly not 
a leftist advocate! This explained their choice of Edwin F. Gay, in spite of his lack 
of publication record and absence of scientific recognition in the U.S. 
                                                   
15 Coats, Ed. (1992), chapter 18. 
16 Furner (1975), 77. 
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2.2 Edwin F. Gay (1867-1946) 
Before Edwin Gay heard Gustav Schmoller lecture in Berlin in 1893 on 
political economy and economic history, he was on track to becoming a religious 
historian. Raised in Michigan, Edwin Gay had displayed precocious interest in 
two fields: botany and religion. The practices he learned in botany (observing 
and cataloguing) appeared to have set a precedent for his notions of good 
scientific procedure. His protestant upbringing convinced him that he had a 
general duty to improve society. He studied history, philosophy (with John 
Dewey) and literature in college, but in his early 20s he was still hesitating 
between becoming a doctor or a teacher of history. He settled on the latter and 
his professors told him to go to Europe for graduate training, as was habitual for 
American academics of his generation. 17 
Gay’s choice came from his conviction that man in the present could not 
be understood without reference to humanity in the past. He chose to write a 
dissertation on religious ideas, as he wanted to refute Marx’s views that the basic 
infrastructure of society was economic, and argue instead that it was political 
and moral.18 However, his encounter with Schmoller led him to reconsider this. 
Schmoller first appealed to him on a general level. As Gay’s biographer, Herbert 
Heaton, wrote:  
 
“[Schmoller represented] the things [Gay] believed in: the devotion to 
history as the key that might unlock many doors (….) ; [the attempt to 
grasp] the interaction of all manifestations of the human spirit, economic, 
legal, political, social and intellectual; the rigorous criticism of evidence 
                                                   
17 Heaton (1952), 21-23. 
18 Ibid, 33. 
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[and] the hope that from it all would emerge a science of economics which 
would serve as a sure guide for policies of social betterment.”19  
 
But Schmoller also convinced Gay on a more specific level. He converted him to 
the belief that economic factors were the foundation of all human events and to 
the epistemological view that all knowledge required preliminary observation.  
 Gay chose to write his thesis on the enclosure movement in Tudor 
England. He spent many years on the problem, accumulating masses of 
quantitative data to establish whether variations in agricultural productivity 
could be conclusively linked to levels of tenancy and to the pace of the enclosure 
movement. His goal was to put Tudor opinion under critical scrutiny (in 
particular repeated assertions that enclosures had had dramatic consequences for 
the overall countryside) by recreating a tableau “county by county, of the acreage 
enclosed and converted from arable land to pastoral use, the percentage of each 
county affected, and the number of houses of husbandry that had decayed, of 
persons displaced, of plows rendered idle”.20 Gay completed his Ph.D. in 1902 
and returned to the U.S. to take his first job. He entered Harvard as an instructor 
in economic history at the age of 35. During the next decade, he taught medieval 
economic history, modern economic history of Europe, American economic and 
financial history (which he took over from Taussig in 1906) and 19th century 
German economic thought. By 1907 he was full Professor and chair of the 
economics department (which only had 7 professors). In 1908, Harvard’s 
president asked Gay to become Dean of the newly created Graduate Business 
School.  
With the outbreak of WWI, he left the university. He spent the war 
helping provide relevant statistics for planning (restricting imports, reducing 
                                                   
19 Ibid, 39. 
20 Ibid, 55. “Husbandry” means employment in crop cultivation. For a sample of his 
statistical tables, see Gay (1903). 
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exports, using ships more economically etc.) and his success in the war 
administration led to several job offers in peacetime. He chose to run the New 
York Evening Post from 1919 to 1924. These years also saw him help create the 
National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER), and he remained an active 
fund-raiser for the NBER for several decades. In 1921, he created the Council on 
Foreign Relations; in 1923 he helped set up the Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC). When the newspaper went bankrupt (it had been losing readers when 
Gay took it on, but he was unable to turn it around), he went back to Harvard, as 
Professor of Economic History.  He taught and directed graduate students 
continuously from 1924 to 1936.21   
 
Figure 3.1: Edwin F. Gay22 
 
                                                   
21 Heaton (1952), 186-225. 
22 Scanned from Ibid. 
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Heaton argued that, while Gay had written very little, his administrative 
skills and his students were indications of his overwhelming presence in 
American economics. According to Heaton, Gay created the economic history 
legacy at Harvard: “the result [of his presence] was that Harvard became one of 
two or three places in the world for the systematic study of economic history and 
the training of economic historians.”23 Gay certainly had a great many students. 
His Festschrift contained an impressive number of contributions – 24 scholars 
who claimed to have learned from him, and his actual list of students was even 
greater.24 Among the contributors were people who taught in economics (J.S. 
Davis, Arthur Cole, Chester Wright, Abbot P. Usher, Earl J. Hamilton), English 
constitutional history (W.E. Lunt), history (H.L Gray, Arthur L. Dunham, Louis 
C. Hunter), European history (C. Perkins), and business schools (C.O. Ruggles, 
N.S.B Gras, M.T. Copeland).  
The Festchrift contained many clues about the message that Gay gave his 
students. First, the sheer number of them was indicative of Gay’s belief that 
scientific economics would be a long process, to be passed on from generation to 
generation of researchers. As Heaton wrote:   
 
“[Gay] was confident that the great laws of social life, of historical 
development and of economic behavior could (…) become known if a 
sufficient number of scholars worked at the job hard enough for many 
generations.”25 
 
This long term, large-scale strategy was consistent with many of his other 
projects for social science like the NBER. Gay was building legacies and 
institutions for his kind of scientific economics. Second, his diverse students were 
                                                   
23 Ibid, 2. 
24 Cole, Dunham and Gras, Eds. (1932). 
25 Heaton (1952), 8-9. 
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indications of his multidisciplinary views. Gay read widely, incorporating 
evidence from many fields; one of his students remembered him as “an 
exceedingly important part of the bridge between the social sciences and the 
humanities”.26 Finally, he inspired many of them to do historical work, having 
convinced them that the past was key to understanding the present.27 
 
2.3   The International Committee on Price History 
Among the students he trained, Gay seemed to build privileged relations 
with a subset of them, and their repeated collaboration gradually developed into 
a sturdy network that enabled the creation of the Economic History Association 
in 1941 (see section 3 below). An important moment in this network creation was 
their collaboration on the International Committee for the History of Prices 
coordinated by the NBER. It was a historical initiative to gather data on prices 
and wages in as many countries and over as many years as possible. Jointly 
sponsored by Gay in the U.S. and William Beveridge in the U.K., this 
quantitative empirical project involved Anne Bezanson (who worked on prices in 
Philadelphia), Arthur Cole (who served as the group secretary and participated 
                                                   
26 Ibid. 
27 One of the more interesting outgrowths of Gay’s commitment to history was the “case 
study” in Business education. During his deanship at the Harvard Graduate School of 
Business Administration, he pioneered this instruction method based on a detailed 
examination of real life situations that students could “learn” from. As one of Gay’s 
students would later comment: “It is not difficult to trace the effects of [the German 
historical school] upon the present methods of teaching and of analyzing economic 
problems. In many of our business schools, the use of the ‘case system’ has been 
recognized as one of the latest and best developments. Under this system specific 
examples are taken from the experience of business men (…) Letting his class see the 
flow of cause and effect from the past, through the present, to the future, in the case in 
hand, the instructor then leads his students to form their own conclusions as to what 
should be done under these particular circumstances (…) The thing to be sought 
through such studies is, not the accumulation of a series of precedents to guide future 
action under similar conditions, but the ability to think through the problem with a 
balance and sanity of judgment which arise from taking into account basic principles as 
they have operated through the recent past and are likely to operate in the immediate 
future”- Jackman (1932), 5.  
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in the investigation of American prices), and Earl Hamilton (who did the price 
series for Spain). As seen in Figure 3.2, all three were Gay’s students, having 
studied economic history with him at Harvard. Other participants in the Price 
History Project included Ruth Crandall, George R. Taylor, Thoman Berry, 
George Warren and G.A. Pearson in the U.S., Henri Hauser for France, Bujak for 
Poland, Pribram for Austria, Ernst Wageman and Moritz Elsas for Germany, 
Posthumus for the Netherlands – nearly 20 in all.28  
In recalling his responsibilities as secretary, Arthur Cole mentioned that 
most communication was done in German, reflecting young American scholars’ 
lasting commitment to German scholarship, though they were the first 
generation not to need to travel to Europe for their studies. The project was 
financed by the RF, and lasted 5 years: 1929 to 1933. The RF awarded $50,000 a 
year to be spent recruiting collaborators in various countries, and had to make an 
emergency grant in 1933 to cover the International Committee’s debts. 29 
Research was much more costly and progressed less quickly than expected. 
When the initiative was shut down in 1933, the work had not been completed – 
the only result was the publication of individual monographs on various 
countries’ price history (which took several more years to appear in print) and 
not the comparative study that had been hoped for. 
                                                   
28 Mills (1936), 289-91; Heaton (1952), 213-5; Cole and Crandall (1964); Dumoulin (1990). 
29 The total outlays were thus $250,000 + $75,000 = $325,000 - Cole and Crandall (1964). 
Chapter 3 – Establishing Institutions for Economic History in the U.S.  
 79
Figure 3.2. Edwin F. Gay’s Lineage at Harvard and in American economic history 
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In a 1964 article, Arthur Cole and Ruth Crandall reflected on the reasons for the 
project’s failure, and identified two central obstacles. The first was “ideational”: 
certain scholars wanted meticulous comparisons of standards of living (which 
required additional series) - he cited the Austrian economist Pribram as an 
example - while others “chose to deal rather broadly with cause and 
consequence” – he cited Hamilton’s work on Spain as an example.30 Hamilton 
had developed an argument about the relationship between price levels and gold 
and silver supply in 16th and 17th century Spain.31 Hamilton’s outlook seemed to 
have been common to many of Gay’s students. This was certainly the nature of 
Anne Bezanson and her colleagues’ work on Philadelphia prices.  They built 
indices of prices from 1720 to the mid 19th century, to bring out the general 
cycles and trends in the time series. Having identified a periodicity in the cycles 
and a secular break in the trend, they suggested a list of causes (based on 
correlation), but made no reference to an overall theory of the price system, citing 
only one theorist of prices, who incidentally was an NBER economist (Frederick 
C. Mills).32  
The second reason for failure cited by Cole and Crandall was, on the 
surface, logistical. Individual researchers seemed to hit one of two walls: either 
they had not expected the overwhelming masses of data they found in archives 
and had no rule of thumb to identify the more useful or relevant prices; or they 
found that the data were very scarce and irregular, and that they had no means 
of bridging series.  Yet this logistical problem was fundamentally a 
methodological one. Gay and Beveridge’s researchers were discovering that 
empirical work without much of a pre-established framework (theoretical or 
conceptual) ran the risk of spiraling out of control, or of ending with relatively 
inconclusive statements. At least one contemporary economist made this point. 
                                                   
30 Ibid, 383. 
31 Hamilton (1934). 
32 Bezanson, Gray and Hussey (1935); Bezanson, Gray and Hussey (1936). 
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In a 1936 article in Econometrica, F. C. Mills, surveyed progress in price data and 
theory, showing that a better theoretical understanding of the price system was a 
prerequisite to running useful empirical studies which, until now, had yielded 
inadequate generalizations. His main point was that the price system was not 
homogeneous (through time, space or category of commodities) – hence 
conclusions drawn from various samples were unlikely to apply to the entire 
system. According to Mills, the problem of devising more representative samples 
was essentially a theoretical one.33  
Yet, this general experience did not seem to discourage Gay or his 
students. By the time he retired, Gay had grown optimistic about the distance 
travelled in American economics, thanks to the initiatives he had helped 
establish. When his students elected him as first president of the Economic 
History Association and invited him to contribute to the first “Tasks” issue of the 
Journal of Economic History (see section 3 below), he wrote that their mission as 
economic historians was to further the empirical, factual work that the German 
historical economists had once called for. He also reminded his pupils that the 
controversy launched by their forebears was no longer timely, given the 
tremendous “progress” economists had made: 
 
“As the nineteenth century has moved on to the twentieth, economics has 
increased the range and depth of its contemporary observation; its use of 
the deductive method has become more guarded, its analysis more subtle 
and in the hands of such masters as Wesley Mitchell, inductive research 
has notably developed.”34  
 
Thus, the slow pace and difficulties of empirical, historical research did 
not dissuade Gay or his students from the necessity of their mission. As seen in 
                                                   
33 Mills (1936). 
34 Gay (1941), 14. 
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their price history work, this mission consisted in extending the horizon of 
observation beyond their personal experience and using quantification to extract 
general trends that typified the system at work. They could then issue 
descriptive and sometimes causal statements. To establish causality they relied 
principally on correlation - a practice that was becoming increasingly 
problematic, as new voices were rising in economics to argue for a different view 
of science and knowledge. The loudest voice came from the econometricians, 
who created their society in 1930 and journal in 1933 and were beginning to 
make critical statements about the statistical work done at the NBER, and 
attempting to bridge the data-theory gap in a way that did not entail the 
complete rejection of ex-ante theory.35   
This is the context in which Gay ‘s students (depicted in Figure 3.2) moved 
to organize economic history as a recognizable, relatively independent activity – 
in contrast with the « blended » existence it had enjoyed since the founding of the 
AEA (at least within economics). As early as 1937, Hamilton appealed to other 
students of Gay’s.  He wrote to Gay, Gras, Cole and Bezanson, to share his fear 
that economic history would soon be written off the AEA agenda and to enjoin 
his colleagues to create their own separate association. To Anne Bezanson, he 
wrote: « I hope that the idea of the society will appeal to you. As one of the 
leaders in the field, you will be able to do a great deal toward the realization of 
this ‘plan’ » .36 However, nothing came of Hamilton’s 1937 attempt, evidence that 
there was very little momentum for a seperate economic history in the U.S at that 
time. It took Bezanson’s appointment to the RF, two years later, to effectively 
mobilize their network. 
 
                                                   
35 Morgan (1990), 158-9. 
36 Letter from Hamilton to Bezanson, 1937. Hagley Museum and Library, Archives 
(hereafter Hagley), Accession 1479, Folder 6. 
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3  Rockefeller Foundation Officers and their priorities for American 
economics (1939-1954) 
3.1 Anne Bezanson and Joseph Willits 
Joseph Henry Willits was Director of Social Science at the Rockefeller 
Foundation (RF) from 1939 to 1954. During this time, he was arguably one of the 
most influential men in American social science. As the head of a large private 
philanthropic fund, in an age when economics was not yet sponsored by public 
appropriations, he had the unmatched ability to push research and priorities in 
directions he saw fit. 37 Within months of his appointment to the RF, Willits 
invited Anne Bezanson to join him, as part-time consultant, where she stayed 
until 1950.   
Willits and Bezanson had met many years earlier at Wharton (University 
of Pennsylvania). In 1921 they had co-founded the Industrial Research 
Department (IRD), an institute devoted to understanding industrial labour 
problems. Willits had earned his Ph.D. (1916) in economics from the University 
of Pennsylvania. His thesis was on unemployment in Philadelphia and on the 
parameters for establishing a city unemployment office. He had drawn a grid of 
the entire city, calculating the average distance that separated employers and 
employees from unemployment offices (by walking these distances), and argued 
that higher frequency and better distribution of offices would decrease the 
duration of unemployment. He took his responsibility as a labour and industrial 
expert seriously. From 1913 to 1921 he served as the vice president of the 
Philadelphia Association for the Discussion of Employment Problems. 38 His 
                                                   
37 For a brief overview of the main sources of funding for American economists in the 
first half of the 20th century, see Rutherford (2005). See also “How much was that?” 
interlude before chapter 8.  
38 See documents in Biography files: “Joseph Willits” at Rockefeller Foundation 
Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (hereafter RAC-RF). 
Bezanson’s Ph.D. was on “Earnings and Working Opportunities in the Upholstery 
Weaver’s Trade in 25 Plants in Philadelphia”. She completed it in 1929, and earned her 
degree from Radcliff; see hand written notes in a the form for her Who’s Who entry, 
1940s. Anne Bezanson Papers, held by her niece, Doris Souza, Boston, Massachusetts. 
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subsequent career moves were consistent with this commitment to social reform 
and empirical work: he became Professor of Industrial Economics at the Wharton 
School of Business in 1921; from 1933 to 1939 he was Dean of the Wharton 
School, and president then Executive Director of the NBER. 
Bezanson directed the IRD’s first project: a survey of employee turnover in 
Philadelphia. To do this, she built a sample of measures of labour turnover for 
1921 and 1922, using data from dozens of Philadelphia firms, big and small, 
across various sectors. She wanted to see if there were common trends and if she 
could find their causes. By building monthly indices of turnover, she established 
that the ups and downs were very similar across firms, in spite of different 
industry, size and management practices. The similarity was confirmed by 
graphical representations and letting the naked eye observe correlations. From 
these correlations, Bezanson deduced that turnover was not the result of 
individual management practices but of larger trends in local markets. She listed 
several features of these markets (for example a boom in the building trade) and 
used more indices to establish their correlation with turnover rates, but she did 
not stipulate the relative order of importance of these causes, nor any overall 
theoretical relationship among them. Her conclusions were directed at business 
leaders, who were encouraged to discriminate between different types of 
turnover, to establish the limits of what they could personally control and 
improve.39  
Overall, these projects were indicative of Willits and Bezanson’s vision of 
economists’ role in society: to examine, understand and help alleviate the main 
causes of discontent and instability.  In a 1922 interview, Bezanson emphasized 
her belief that solutions to the U.S.’s labour problems could be found via 
systematic scientific research. 40 Provided all parties could agree on the causes of 
                                                   
39 Bezanson (1923). 
40 The North American: “University of Pennsylvania investigation to stabilize labour 
conditions: a project to improve employment conditions”. University of Pennsylvania 
Archives and Records Center (hereafter U. Penn Archives), UPB5.9 IR, Box 1. 
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labour instability, a solution acceptable to all could be found. Indeed, the 
purpose of such scientific preliminaries was to generate “facts” everyone could 
presumably accept. Their faith in science rested on the premise that certain facts 
would be recognized by all, and would be a prerequisite for agreeing about the 
best solution.  
 
Figure 3.3. Anne Bezanson and Joseph Willits 
  
Anne Bezanson (1881-1980) 41 Joseph Willits (1889-1979) 42 
 
3.2 The Willits years at RF – moral and philosophical dimensions 
By the time they joined the RF in 1939, Willits and Bezanson’s strong 
expectations for social science had been reinforced by the experience of the Great 
Depression and its political consequences in the U.S. and in Europe. This 
“historical crisis” as they called it demanded more from social scientists, who 
now needed to partake in the grand battle of ideals that America began fighting 
                                                   
41 Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University (hereafter 
Duke Archives), American Economic Association Records, Box 1129. 
42 Joseph H. Willits, Biography File. RAC-RF.  
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in WWII. The issue was now much bigger than alleviating industrial tensions; it 
was about finding a scientific justification - one based on fact, not fiction - for 
defending what they saw as the few remaining liberal societies. 43 
 Such heavy responsibilities required financial support, as the economist’s 
task was far from easy. Willits and Bezanson had always stressed the complexity 
of social reality and the consequent difficulty of apprehending it scientifically. To 
them, the social scientist was in a perpetual “race against complexity”. 44 
Unfortunately as the complexity grew, so did the tendency to subsume it under 
some simplistic scheme, rather than try to struggle with it and comprehend it. 
According to them, many “ideologies” exploited this urge for simplicity and 
trivialized the search for cause and effect. As early as 1922, Willits had written 
Bezanson to decry the blindness of those who followed the communist creed: 
 
“What a comfortable philosophy it is to be able to believe that all our 
troubles come from a few “bad” people - other people of course. Then, 
every time trouble arises it is so easy to point out their sins and flaws as 
the cause of it all. It, by inference, makes us seem so holy, it makes the 
problem so simple. All we have to do is to snatch ‘Control’ away from 
their hands, and the problem is solved. It’s a quitter’s philosophy [his 
emphasis]. ” 45 
 
As the international situation worsened in the late 1930s and early 40s, 
Willits and Bezanson reinforced their commitment to social science as a weapon 
against dogma. They were consistent in this fight against simplistic ideologies as 
they discarded all types of easy rhetoric, including more conservative ones. Thus 
                                                   
43 Willits to the Board of Trustees, 1940. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S, Box 396, Folder 
4700. 
44 Letter from Willits to Warren, April 24th 1941. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 3, Folder 
17. 
45 Letter from Willits to Bezanson, June, 28th 1922. U. Penn Archives, UPB5.9, IR, Box 1, 
Folder “administration/IR history file, 1922-24”.   
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Willits also spoke against those who argued that society should be left to the 
spontaneous coordination of self-interested individuals, calling them: “a public 
that desires special pleading, propaganda, and a veneer of scientific 
rationalization for selfish ends”.46  It seemed that Willits’ appreciation of various 
social theories was not so much grounded in his general political disposition 
(though he was fervently anti-communist, a trait he manifested early and 
embraced more fully with age), but in the conviction that society was complex, 
hence difficult to comprehend. 47 To counter this tendency to simplify, Willits 
and Bezanson were determined to help social scientists develop a “philosophy” 
(a word they used to contrast with “ideology”, philosophy being implicitly more 
subtle). 48  
 
3.3 The Willits years at RF – epistemological dimensions 
Joseph Willits was the third Director of Social Sciences at the RF. As 
emphasized by most studies of his directorship, he continued his two 
predecessors’ (Beardsley Ruml and Edmund Day) vision.49 The agenda had been 
roughly set by Ruml who had favored social science aimed at producing 
knowledge that could be “used for social improvement”. Ruml’s conception of 
useful knowledge was intimately tied with ideas of proper scientific method: to 
be useful, social science had to follow the “natural science mode” – be empirical, 
                                                   
46 Letter from Willits to Warren, August 24th 1942. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 3, 
Folder 17. 
47 In 1946 he spent several weeks in Paris. His diary for that period revealed his general 
interest in the level of influence Communists had in French politics and society and his 
total distrust of “Party men”. See RAC-RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Box 70, Joseph Willits, 5 
volumes. 
48 In the spring of 1941 Willits exchanged numerous letters with Robert Warren, in 
which they shared their angst about the direction economics was taking, in particular 
the way the profession attracted technicians with no “philosophy”.  They also worried 
that mistaken ideologies would lead nations down a miserable road. See for example, 
Letter from Warren to Willits, February 8th 1941. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 3, Folder 
17.  
49 Craver (1986); Fisher (1993); Rutherford (2005). 
Chapter 3 – Establishing Institutions for Economic History in the U.S.  
 88
objective, and realistic. The first step in Ruml’s makeover of social science 
required extensive basic, empirical research. RF’s long-term commitment to the 
NBER fit within this “scientific” vision. 
However, halfway through Day’s tenure (1929-1937) this emphasis on 
basic work had become increasingly difficult to defend. Indeed, the urgent social 
and political problems of the 1930s had led the RF board of directors (under 
Raymond Fosdick) to request a more concrete, problem-based strategy.  The 
Social Science Division’s status became even more precarious in 1936, when 
Fosdick was appointed President of the RF and began voicing doubts about the 
overall merits of supporting social science. Day resigned in 1937. In spite of this 
potential crisis for social science at RF, Day’s chosen successor (Willits) did not 
mark a departure from the vision pushed by his predecessors. Thus the Willits 
years have been interpreted as a precarious time for social science at the RF, but 
also as a last chance for “humanist” economics. 
In describing Willits’ years at the RF, Rutherford (2005) emphasized the 
latter’s commitment to a certain type of economics - which Willits contrasted 
with an increasingly popular “bad” type. Quoting from Willits, Rutherford 
described this “bad” type as a tendency to: 
 
 “(…) ‘retreat from science’, to ‘retreat from reality’ and to ‘retreat from 
humanism’. The ‘retreat from science’ he illustrates by the work of 
Keynes’ more ardent disciples and their  ‘tendency to substitute a new 
dogma for an old with neither based on systematic verification nor 
observations’. The ‘retreat from reality’ he illustrates with the work of the 
econometricians who focus too much on the building of mathematical 
models and too little on ‘the study of actual situations and the motivations 
essential to real understanding’. The ‘retreat from humanism’ he sees as 
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coming from a loss of historical perspective and the substitution of 
mathematics for an understanding of the broader institutional setting.”50 
 
Though the grant papers Rutherford relied on for this analysis dated from 1947, 
Willits’ ideas about good and bad economics were not noticeably different in the 
early 1940s. In a 1942 letter he had described the projects he would prefer to 
fund:  
 
 “(…) research preferably that does not consist merely of jiu-jitsu with 
symbols of symbols of reality, but has such relation to a modest reality 
that the results of research may always be checked against it.”51 
 
Thus Willits purposely limited funding to the “jiu-jitsu” types (the most 
renowned being the econometricians at Cowles) and focused on scholars who 
shared his beliefs. 52  
Rutherford (2005) showed how this conjunction in belief between Willits 
and economists such as Mitchell, Kuznets and Arthur Burns accounted for the 
privileged status held by the NBER within the profession until the end of WWII. 
He even argued that the history of the NBER almost perfectly followed the 
chronology of its relationship with various funding agencies. This conclusion 
may also hold for the fate of economic history in the 1940s and 50s. Just as RF 
officers’ relationships with NBER men served to secure a status for this 
                                                   
50 Rutherford (2005). 
51  Letter from Willits to Warren, August 24th 1942. RAC-RF, RG 2, Series 910, Box 3, 
Folder 17. 
52 Several recent studies have stressed Willits’ overall disapproval of work done at 
Cowles. The RF funded the Cowles Commission for a few years, but these were small 
amounts - Mirowski (2002), 217-9. Rutherford (2005) also emphasized Willits’ dislike of 
Cowles. To explain the RF’s regular, but small contribution to Cowles, he cited a 1951 
letter from Willits to Sir Henry Clay: “I have brought myself to recommend grants for 
[men who are not close to what really happens but engage in a most adroit game of 
formal logic or higher mathematics] because I do not feel that the RF should be limited 
to my narrow prejudices, but I must confess that I find it harder and harder to do so”.  
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organization, so did their relationship with economic historians allow for the 
emergence and entrenchment of economic history in the U.S.   
 
3.4 RF 1940 roundtable for economic history and subsequent grant 
One of the first projects Willits and Bezanson launched at the RF was a 
survey of economic history. Within weeks of her appointment Bezanson was 
busy organizing a round table on the state and future of the field: the “first ever” 
meeting of economic historians in the U.S. 53 As can be seen in Figure 3.4 (which 
draws on elements from Figure 3.2), among the twelve people present at the 
September 1940 meeting, seven were directly linked to Gay - Bezanson, Cole, 
Gay, Hamilton, Harold A. Innis, E.A.J. Johnson and John Nef- one was Willits 
and Bezanson’s colleague at U. Penn and the NBER - Simon Kuznets; one was an 
economic historian who had emigrated from Britain and become so close to Gay 
that we would ultimately write his biography - Herbert Heaton; and three were 
silent staff of the RF - Willits, his assistant Stevens, and Walter Stewart 
(Chairman of the Board of Trustees, but also a student of the American 
“institutionalist” Walton Hamilton and a firm believer in empirical economics).54 
The connection with Gay depicted in Figure 3.4 hinted at a likely communion of 
beliefs, in particular as it pertained to scientific method in economics (empirical, 
historical, principally quantitative). Earlier sections of this chapter brought to 
light the other forums in which these scholars had interacted (NBER, price 
history) and the opportunity for deeper ties among them. In general, they 
seemed to share a view of their responsibility in society, not unrelated to their 
protestant progressivism.
                                                   
53 See Grant Application, October 1940. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 396, Folder 4700. 
54 Minutes of the meeting, September 1940. RAC-RF, RG3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42; 
for a presentation of Walton Hamilton and his students see Rutherford (2004b). 
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Figure 3.4: Participants at the 1940 RF roundtable and their connection to Edwin Gay 
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Gay was raised along Methodists and Unitarian principles, Willits was a Quaker, 
Innis and Bezanson were raised in a Canadian protestant rural environment.55  
Yet, when asked to define a concrete, specific agenda for economic history 
in the U.S. scholars present at the roundtable seemed at a loss. Neither the 
preliminary report commissioned by the RF (and delivered by Herbert Heaton) 
nor the minutes of the September 1940 meeting contained any mention of what 
economic history was or why one might wish to study it. 56  Even when Simon 
Kuznets raised questions during the meeting, calling for a more specific 
definition and plan, this did not trigger a general discussion of purpose or 
strategy.57 From their answers to his question one sensed that the economic 
historians were torn (as a group, but also individually) between being primarily 
“fact collectors” and moving towards a more interpretative, possibly theoretical 
role. Gay repeated the need for more “facts”, by which he meant work like the 
price history project, with emphasis on more qualitative material that could help 
contextualise the data and establish causal claims. He never addressed Kuznets’ 
general point about the need for a pre-defined framework - a point that echoed 
F.C Mills’ 1936 concern about the methodology of the international price project. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Johnson wanted to promote the economic 
historian as the ideal government advisor (hence an evaluator/interpreter). He 
seemed to think that it was time for economic history to get involved in the 
                                                   
55 See Heaton (1952); Evans and Elderton (Undated). Conversation with Doris Souza, 
Anne Bezanson’s niece. 
56 Minutes to meeting, September 1940. RAC-RF, RG3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42. 
57 Though Simon Kuznets voiced his doubts at the September 1940 meeting and 
subsequently in a long letter to Willits, his objections were ignored. Overall Kuznets 
shared Willits’ outlook for “good” economics and was one of Willits’ most trusted 
advisors. Willits asked him to sit on the Committee for Research in Economic History, 
which he reluctantly did - though he asked to resign as early as 1942. See chapter 4 for a 
detailed narrative of Kuznets’ agenda for economic history and the roots of his 
disagreement with Edwin Gay’s students. 
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political decision making process. He personally made this jump a few years 
later, when he joined the Foreign Service in 1943. 
In spite of Johnson’s call for a more activist economic history, the majority 
of participants opted for Gay’s agenda, indication of his stature among them and 
of their shared view that the groundwork still needed to be laid. They settled 
upon “any attempt at coordinated work in economic history should be designed 
to promote and encourage monographic research”. 58 Hence they concluded on a 
series of projects (listed as examples) for economic historians to study: history of 
banking, of enterprise, of economic ideas, of specific industries, of the 
relationship between state and economic activity etc. They did not specify the 
exact relationship between these different themes. This apparent failure of a 
priority to emerge did not discourage the economic historians from applying for 
funds. Not surprisingly their application contained no solid statement of purpose 
aside from a vague feeling that the economic history of the U.S. could be used to 
uncover the roots of economic change - a process that could only be understood 
historically, i.e. over time.59 
In spite of this overall vagueness, the application was successful. On 
December 3rd 1940, the RF awarded the newly created Committee on Research in 
Economic History (CREH) $300,000 to be spent in a period of four and a half 
years (from February 1st 1941 to June 30, 1945). The money was officially 
transferred to the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), as the economic 
historians were expected to organize under this existing institution’s tutelage. 
This was a relatively standard procedure for the RF – who awarded large grants 
to committees rather than individuals, and preferred to sponsor inter-university 
initiatives. The SSRC – which Ruml had created with Rockefeller money in the 
                                                   
58 RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42. The word “monographic” referred to 
studies that did in-depth investigations into one specific facet of economic activity – for 
example, carpet manufacturing in North-Eastern U.S. in the late 19th century. This was 
the type of work Gay’s students had learned to do under his guidance – see for example, 
Cole (1928). 
59 Minutes of meeting, September 1940. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 396, Folder 4700. 
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early 1920s – was thus a frequent home for their grantees. 60 This was a large 
grant – in the same range as Gay and Beveridge’s earlier international initiative. 
However, it was for research in the U.S. only, thus representing an even more 
generous appropriation. In 1940, Willits’ division had awarded $1.5 million 
(approximately 15% of the RF’s total grants for the year) and the CREH’s grant 
represented 20% of this expenditure. 61 Thus, while this grant may have been 
awarded to work that could seem eclectic to readers today (and certainly was 
perceived as such by people like Kuznets), its size suggested that it was an 
integral component of Willits and Bezanson’s vision for good economics.  
 
3.5 Economic history and “good” economics 
One of the reasons that participants in the 1940 roundtable did not push for 
a common definition of economic history was that the forces that united them 
were mostly built around what they considered to be “bad” practice in social 
science. Most of them had a very clear vision of what economics ought not to be. 
This vision could be gleaned from the casual remarks they made at the meeting 
and in subsequent letters and reports. In general they shared a suspicion of 
theoretical, abstract economics. For example, Harold Innis (1894-1952) who had 
studied at the University of Chicago with Chester Wright – one of Gay’s first 
students - and written a thesis on the Canadian railroad, wrote to Joseph Willits 
in 1941: 
 
                                                   
60 For a discussion of the hidden control exercised by RF officers on American social 
science via the SSRC, see Fisher (1993), chapters 5 and 6.  
61 This money was transferred in one lump sum to the SSRC- whose director was 
responsible for dispensing it to the Committee, on a yearly basis. The above calculation 
may be misleading, as the $300,000 were not apportioned for one year- but for 4 years. 
Hence it might be more relevant to compare it to the total outlay for 4 years. The verdict 
of “importance” still holds, as the economic history grant was singled out as one of the 
noticeable ones for the 1941 RF Annual Report. For a more general reflection on the 
buying power of this grant, see “How much was that?” interlude.  
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“It was good of you to write to say that funds have been made available to 
support this project we had in mind, you are to be congratulated in 
bringing to a successful conclusion a most promising venture. It raises 
ones’ hopes that a sense of balance can yet be given to the social sciences 
and that a corrective can be introduced in the bias of mathematics which 
has begun to blight the subject”. 62 
 
In alluding to the “bias of mathematics” Innis was referring to the 
complaint that united RF officers and all members of the CREH (from Kuznets to 
Cole): that mathematical, technical economists would take over the discipline. 
They worried about multiple features of this “bad” economics, but the one they 
singled out as theirs to fight was a lack of “perspective”, an incapacity to set 
current problems in their historical context. 63 Combined with other outlets for 
“good” economics like the NBER, the economic historians’ work could contribute 
to redefine the economics profession’s goals and methods, tilting the balance in 
favor of Willits and Bezanson’s vision. Thus, economic history was not envisaged 
as the only form of good practice, but a potentially very promising one, as it was 
worthy of the complexity of society. It earned this advantage from its 
combination of empiricism and multi-disciplinarity. 
Economic history was empirical insofar as it dealt with facts of the past. 
These facts could be quantitative or qualitative, preferably both. Indeed, to 
interpret data series, one needed to set them in context, using facts of a more 
qualitative nature: description of beliefs, laws, policies, technologies, 
international events and their evolution over time. This recognition that causal 
statements could only be developed within such detailed pictures may have been 
a result of Gay’s students’ experience in price studies. It may have convinced 
                                                   
62 Letter from Harold Innis to Joseph Willits, December 19th 1940. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 
200 S, Box 396, Folder 4700. 
63 RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S, Box 396, Folder 4700. 
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them that there was a missing element in the general division of scientific labour: 
putting flesh on the statistical skeleton.  As Bezanson wrote in 1945:  
 
“the NBER in pushing backward their studies of fluctuations, prices and 
financial series felt that the time had come for supplementing the methods 
of inductive research with those of historical research.”64   
 
However economic history was empirical in another sense as well: it 
wasn’t just about collecting information, it was also about providing a forum for 
experiment. For economic historians, the past was a laboratory where one could 
test hypotheses: “since in the social field we can’t try laboratory experiments, 
and must test our ideas against the backdrop of experience”. 65 This association of 
the past with a lab was probably not an innocent one. Indeed, in the early 1940s, 
Cowles econometricians were presenting their work as a form of 
experimentation for economics - a forum that Willits et al. disapproved of 
(remember the quote on jiu-jitsu). 66 Thus in their opinion, the economic 
historians were proposing to use a better (more realistic) laboratory. 
If economic historians were to be testers of hypotheses, they would need a 
source for these hypotheses. As mentioned earlier, Willits et al. were quite 
suspicious of those formulated ex-nihilo, in some abstract, speculative way. 
Rather, the type of hypotheses they were looking for were generated from a 
careful examination of the quantitative and qualitative facts that the first stage of 
empirical investigation had yielded. Recall Bezanson’s Philadelphia price study. 
She had made no mention of existing theories of prices, preferring rather to 
explain the observed cycles and trends with factors she found in the historical 
                                                   
64 Review of the 4-year performance of the economic history grant, RAC-RF, RG 1.1, 
Series 200. Box 396, Folder 4705.  
65 Letter from Willits to Warren: February 27th, 1942; RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 3, 
Folder 17. 
66 See Morgan (1990), 251-3. 
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record – many of which had been proposed by contemporaries (for example 
many local merchants were convinced that the number of ships loading at a 
given time would affect the price of bread, and she suggested this was a 
reasonable explanation). Economic history would generate, test and refine its 
own hypotheses - using “facts” derived in the first step of research. Such a 
process was empirically based at all stages, and thus, in their minds, scientific.  
The superiority of economic historians’ hypotheses lay in their 
multidisciplinary nature. Economic historians trained by Gay seemed to share 
Willits’ concern for complexity. Gay reminded them that this was a lesson they 
had learned from the German historical economist, Schmoller, who used to tell 
his pupils: “Es ist alles so unendlich compliziert”.67  To account for this complexity, 
hypotheses had to reflect several levels of analysis: social, political, international, 
and psychological - not just economic. Only then could the interpretations and 
generalizations be of any use.  Their conviction that useful generalizations would 
involve these many dimensions was reflected in the choice of Committee 
members: for example, when time came to appoint a new member after WWII 
they chose the sociologist Leland Jenks. 
 
4 Economic history: 1941-1950 
4.1 Forging Institutions for Economic History in the U.S. 
As a result of the grant, economic history found a place and a status in 
American academia. By early 1941, a few months after the roundtable meeting, 
economic history had an entirely new infrastructure: a research committee, an 
association, and a journal. The relationship between RF’s actions and the 
simultaneous formation of the Economic History Association (EHA) and Journal 
of Economic History (JEH) deserves to be highlighted, as it is little known. As can 
be seen in Figure 3.5, the EHA was officially incorporated in 1941. A few years 
earlier, in 1939, Anne Bezanson had helped set up a Steering Committee of 26 
                                                   
67 “Everything is so infinitely complicated”, Gay (1941). 
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delegates whose job was to define the prospects for an association of economic 
historians (presumably in response to Hamilton’s 1937 letter). The heart of this 
prospecting committee was made up of Edwin Gay’s students (see Figure 3.2), 
but it also contained representatives of other existing professional associations: 
the Business History Society (N.S.B. Gras), The Industrial History Society, the 
Agricultural History Association, and the AEA (F.C.  Mills), to make sure that 
this initiative was not seen as an attempt to encroach onto already defined 
territory. Negotiations within the Steering Committee that occurred before the 
RF roundtable suggested that the idea of an EHA was not congenial to many of 
these representatives. 68  However, by December 1940, when the time had been 
set to hold votes and draw pledges from potential members, it seemed that the 
tides had turned and were now in favor of the soon to be RF grantees. 
In December 1940, Gay’s students brought the idea of an EHA to the 
annual meetings of the AEA and of the American Historical Association (AHA). 
While Bezanson and Hamilton were sent to New Orleans to speak to economists 
and gather their votes, Cole and Heaton were in New York doing the same with 
historians of the AHA. 69  Timing was crucial: the December votes happened 
three months after the roundtable, one month after the application, and a few 
days after the informal notification of acceptance (the importance of timing 
appears as a clutter of events in Figure 3.5 around 1940). Thus, the prospects of a 
large grant gave the Gay network the self-confidence to rally other economists 
and historians to their cause. It also turned them into the controlling nucleus of 
economic history institutions for years to come. 
                                                   
68 See responses to Arthur Cole, April 1940. Hagley, Accesion 1479, Folder 9. For 
example, letter from Bezanson to Gay, June 19th 1940: “for a time it did look as though 
we would be confronted with some very serious animosities and either have to abandon 
our plans or get a number of ineffective specialty groups organized in economic 
history.“ 
69 See minutes of the New Orleans December 30th meeting, and New York December 29th  
meeting. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 18.  
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Figure 3.5: Forging institutions for American Economic History 
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Figure 3.6 illustrates their controlling position in the field of American 
economic history until the early 1960s.  First, notice the overlap between 
members of the Steering Committee and those invited to the RF roundtable: 
nearly 1 in 3 members of the Steering Committee attended the roundtable 
meeting (7 out of 26).  But also notice the overlap between membership in the 
Steering Committee and membership in the CREH (i.e. right to vote on projects 
that would get funding). Of the 17 people who served the CREH, 11 of them had 
helped found the EHA. But the most striking connection was the overlap 
between attendance at the RF roundtable and presidency of the EHA. The first 6 
presidents were all RF roundtable attendees: Gay (1940-42), Innis (1942-44), Cole 
(1944-46), Bezanson (1946-48), Heaton (1948-50) and Hamilton (1950-52). Among 
the next 5 presidents, 3 were Edwin Gay’s students: Kirkland (1952-54), F.C. Lane 
(1956-58) and Johnson (1960-62).70 Also note that many of JEH editors were 
members of the CREH: this was the case of Cochran (from 1943 to 1957) and F.C. 
Lane (from 1943 to 1951). 
Hence the RF grant operating via the CREH had important side effects, as it 
permitted and sustained the existence of crucial professional institutions. This 
was certainly the opinion of the people involved in the process. In the early 
1950s, Harold Innis wrote to Arthur Cole:   
 
“It can be argued that the expenditure of a large sum under the conditions 
of the grant was the most effective way of securing important, intangible 
results. The establishment of an association, improvement of textbooks in 
the field and more general recognition of the significance of work in 
economic history can be attributed to the grant.” 71 
 
                                                   
70 The two others were Carter Goodrich (1954-56) and Thomas Cochran (1958-60). 
71 Harold Innis to Arthur Cole, Confidential Memorandum on operations of the 
Economic History Committee, 1952, p. 1-2.  Harvard University Archives, Arthur Cole 
Papers, Folder “Correspondance: a-c”. 
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Figure 3.6: Overlap between CREH members and EHA founding members72 
 
 
Red (dark) is for people who attended the 1940 RF roundtable and were members of the 1939 EHA Steering Committee. Green (pale) is for 
members of the EHA Steering Committee only. Stars indicate presidency of the EHA.
                                                   
72 Undated document (1963?). Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 7. After 1960 the name changed from Committee to Council on 
Research in Economic History.  
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One should not interpret Innis’ words to mean that RF money went to finance 
the EHA. Actually, no RF money was ever used for the association or for the JEH. 
From its first year, the EHA ran a balanced budget, and paid for the journal in 
full from membership fees – thus publishing only as many issues as it could 
afford. The JEH only became quarterly in 1951.73 In addition no CREH member 
ever received a salary for sitting on the Committee.74  Instead, Innis’ statement 
and the evidence of this overlap could be interpreted in one of two ways. It was 
consistent with the view that Gay’s students were united in a strong and tight 
network. But it also fit with a picture of an overall weak economic history in the 
U.S., with very few scholars to come and challenge the institutions, resources and 
honors Gay’s students had created. Actually, both scenarios were at play. 
 
4.2  The CREH’s activities 
The CREH found it very difficult to identify promising economic historians. 
In the same memo Innis sent to Cole in 1952, he mentioned his overall 
disappointment with the CREH’s actions and results. According to him, the 
reason for the mediocre performance was “too much money yet no established 
field”, hence the pressure to spend money relatively quickly (the RF usually 
requested that all funds be spent within the agreed time period) had led to large 
grants to graduate students! It’s not clear why CREH members should have been 
surprised about this dearth of candidates. They certainly were aware that only a 
few centers trained economic-historians, and certainly economist-historians in the 
U.S. Already in 1929, the Harvard economist-historian A.P. Usher (one of Gay’s 
first students) had contributed a short article for one of the first issues of the 
French journal Annales, in which he had presented the economic history 
landscape in the U.S. He had mentioned that there were less than a dozen 
professors in the field - and only 3 were actual professors of economic history, the 
                                                   
73 JEH accounts. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 6. 
74 Cole (1970). 
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others holding chairs in history, economics or political economy.75 He lamented 
that in other institutions (he numbered 44 institutions of higher education in the 
U.S.), economic history was at best a “side job” (and quite often, totally 
inexistent).76  A decade later, Heaton’s report to the RF roundtable had not struck 
an appreciably different note. He had painted an ailing field, where there was 
“less than a dozen teachers of senior status giving their whole time to economic 
history”. 77 Heaton had emphasized that no new chairs in economic history had 
recently been created, while some were vanishing for lack of adequate 
replacement.78 In other words, the CREH should have been prepared for a small 
number of recruits. 
By 1952, a decade after the RF grant was awarded,  it was obvious to most 
members of the CREH that their actions had not resulted in any radical increase 
in the quantity or quality of work in economic history. The CREH had spent its 
money on a collection of relatively ad hoc grants, which fit under their original 
categories (history of banking, government, economic ideas, enterprise) but had 
no links among them. CREH members themselves conducted a few studies, for 
example Edward Kirkland’s work on transportation. 79 But the bulk of the money 
                                                   
75 Usher listed three professorships: two in economics (Harvard and Columbia) and one 
in History (Minnesota). Though he did not give names, the Harvard economist- 
historians were Edwin Gay as professor and A.P. Usher as associate professor. The 
Columbia professorship was in European Economic History held by Simkhovitch until 
1944, and in 1930 Carter Goodrich was hired to develop American economic history. 
Usher also listed three professors who did economic history without holding chairs in 
economic history: Illinois (economics), Mount Holyoke (history) and Yale (political 
economy). Interestingly he did not mention Chicago, where Chester Wright (also Gay’s 
student) had been teaching economic history in the 1920s, and John Nef (also Gay’s 
student) had just been hired in 1929. The other institutions he mentioned where 
economists did serious history were Berkeley, University of Illinois and Northwestern. 
For information on economic history at Columbia and Chicago see Rutherford (2004a); 
Rutherford (Forthcoming). 
76 Usher (1929). 
77 Minutes of the meeting, September 1940. RAC-RF, RG3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42. 
78 Heaton’s picture was not contradicted by any scholar in the room. Many seemed 
disappointed with the state of existing research in economic history. 
79 Kirkland (1948).  
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was distributed to relatively young and often completely unknown scholars. 
Among the more promising grantees were Oscar and Mary Handlin who worked 
on the role of government, Louis Harz, who worked on the impact of economic 
and democratic ideas, and Louis Hunter who worked on steamboats.80 The 
CREH financed several initiatives in the study of individual businesses or 
industries; for example Warren Scoville’s work on glass manufacturing and a 
study of the Brown family of Rhode Island.81  In total they provided financing for 
19 book-length studies, though not a single synthetic piece that might have 
attempted to summarize and link these various findings.82   
However, in spite of this disappointment, they remained somewhat 
optimistic. Innis’ 1952 memo did indeed end with the hope that some “failures” 
might turn out to be successes, but that this would require time – as, in his 
opinion, economic history was a field made up of lone scholars working for a 
decade or more. Many other CREH members agreed that the fruit of their 
investment would only appear with time. In their minds, the generalizations that 
economic historians promised to deliver were well worth the wait. As Arthur 
Cole wrote in 1948: 
 
“Amongst the social scientists, only the economic historian is acutely 
conscious of the time element (…) Economists prefer to think - or 
unconsciously assume - the world, its institutions, social classes and 
patterns of thought to be static and unchanging. The economic historian, 
however, imbibes from all his study the sense of change, a consciousness 
of time. (…) Herein lie the potentialities of breaking new ground in the 
social sciences (…) Perhaps the name and surely the connotation of the 
term ‘economic history’ will slough away as did ‘natural philosophy’ a 
                                                   
80 Handlin (1947); Hartz (1948); Hunter (1949). 
81 Scoville (1949); Hedges (1952). 
82 For a list of all CREH sponsored works, see Cole (1970), 738-9. 
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few decades ago. At least the content of the awakened and organized 
subject would be better suggested by the phrase ‘economic dynamics’.”83 
 
This big picture was at the root of Willits and Bezanson’s continued support to 
the economist-historians, in spite of disappointing results. 
  
4.3 RF’s continued support 
Willits and Bezanson had to work hard to keep funding economic history. 
They had to cover up for the fact that members of the CREH did not have a 
unifying plan according to which they sought and selected research projects. 
This lack of a road map was apparent both in minutes of the CREH meetings and 
early publications of the Journal of Economic History (in particular the annual 
“Tasks of economic history” supplements): each scholar seemed to be pushing 
for his own hobby-horse. 84 Bezanson took it upon herself to be the CREH’s 
spokesperson and shadow defendant.  Though she was not a member of the 
CREH, she attended every meeting and reported back to Willits. 85 When 
criticisms of the CREH’s activities reached Willits’ desk he would forward them 
to her, and rely on her opinion. Though, at times, she agreed with the specifics of 
the critique, she always placed it in a larger framework, thus minimizing it. For 
example, in 1944, she countered criticisms he had received from Robert Crane 
(director of the SSRC) and Robert Warren (a Princeton economist sitting on the 
                                                   
83 Arthur Cole in “A report on economic history”, April 1948. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 
200, Box 397, Folder 4708. 
84 See Journal of Economic History, Vol. 1 and 2 supplementary issues “Tasks of economic 
history”. Neither spells out the overall purpose of economic history in the division of 
social scientific labour. 
85 For an example of her reports, see March 1945. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S, Box 397, 
Folder 4705.  
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CREH), both of whom wondered if the CREH was really producing anything 
worthwhile. 86 In defense of her protégés, Bezanson wrote: 
 
“Unless one starts with a concept of what the Economic Historians are 
trying to achieve I do not see a way of judging their work. Their problem 
is (…) [to find] better ways of framing the questions to be answered and 
an understanding of the processes in North American development and 
its peculiar contribution to the development of Western Civilization.” 87 
 
From this perspective, she could weave their apparently eclectic portfolio 
of research topics into a well thought out strategy. 88 Thus she told Willits and the 
RF that the economic historians’ plan consisted in understanding American 
economic development, but that before they could look at the specifics of growth, 
they needed to survey the various types of ideas and policies introduced in 
America’s early years - and trace their impact on every day economic activity. 
Once the nature and influence of these beliefs had been understood, they would 
look at the actual mechanics of growth. She was making a case for a building 
block vision of empirical research that would take time to bear fruit. Her actions 
and support in 1945 directly resulted in a 5-year extension of the initial grant - 
which had been scheduled to expire in 1946, but was now extended to the early 
1950s. 89 Willits trusted Bezanson’s judgment and implemented her 
recommendations, as he shared her general impression that it would take time 
before any tangible results could be obtained.  
The notion that proper research in the social sciences would require time 
and money was a constant feature of Willits’ administration. In his old age, in 
                                                   
86 Letter from Warren to Willits, May 7th 1945. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S, Box 397, 
Folder 4705. 
87RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S, Box 397, Folder 4704. 
88RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S, Box 397, Folder 4704. 
89 RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S, Box 396, Folder 4700. 
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one of the many letters he wrote to an even older Anne Bezanson, he contrasted 
the work being done by the RF in the 1970s to the foundation he once knew. He 
lamented what he considered to be current directives – “subjects will be selected 
that promise quick show” – comparing it to: 
 
 “Walter Stewart’s wise statement to the board: RF does not need to be in a 
hurry. Nearly everybody else is. But we don’t need to be. We should act 
with the conviction that if we do what we should do now, twenty five 
years from now something will happen that would not otherwise have 
happened and we could not have foreseen.”90 
 
That said, it would be inaccurate to say that Willits and Bezanson were not under 
any pressure to show results. As mentioned earlier, social sciences were in a 
delicate position at the RF.  During the period of the CREH grant, they found a 
compromise by moving their support away from economic history in general 
towards entrepreneurial history in particular. 
 
5 Entrepreneurial History 
5.1 The switch to entrepreneurial history 
As mentioned earlier, Willits and Bezanson had arrived at the RF in 1939 
with the intention of helping social scientists develop a “philosophy” for the 
western world. Willits became convinced that the origin of this philosophy could 
be found in the meticulous examination of the U.S.’s success in becoming and 
remaining a free and prosperous society:  
 
“If the United States is to be the center of the liberal democratic culture 
and development, it would seem to be important to know thoroughly and 
                                                   
90 Letter from Willits to Bezanson, January 16th 1974.  Anne Bezanson Papers – held by 
her niece Doris Souza, Boston Massachussets. 
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realistically the story of our own economic development - the 
development of the most modern industrial nation in the world and the 
one which exerts the greatest economic force of all.”91 
 
The study of American economic history thus appealed to him as it could 
generate the “story” the U.S. so urgently needed for itself and to explain its 
position in an increasingly bi-polar world. Of course, the type of story Willits 
was looking for was not any story- it was one that squared with his essentially 
liberal beliefs. 92  
Bezanson had similar aspirations for American economic history and she 
focused on one of the CREH’s projects as the most promising theme for the 
philosophy she and Willits sought. In the mid 1940s she turned her attention to 
studies of the “entrepreneur” and his role in bringing about freedom and 
prosperity. Within the CREH, Arthur Cole (1889-1980) had introduced the theme. 
Cole was one of Gay’s first students (Ph.D, 1916) and a professor of economic 
history in the Harvard economics department until the 1930s when he moved to 
the Business School (to become librarian of the Baker Library). In a 1942 
contribution to the JEH, Cole called for a systematic study of entrepreneurship. 
Bezanson immediately grasped the potential of this research area. In 1943, she 
wrote Cole: 
 
“You are confronted with an economic development, especially an 
industrial and economic development, which was the marvel of the 
known world. Was it made possible by reason of lack of restrictions both 
                                                   
91 RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200 S. Box 396, Folder 4700. 
92 Willits’ beliefs are well described in the following quote: “I believe that the necessary 
degree of effective economic interdependence (I dislike the word unity, it implies in 
advance a totalitarian unity) can be achieved without bondage being necessary or 
preferable to the individual. My prejudice is in favor of any organization - family, state 
or church - which distributes responsibility as widely as possible.” Letter from Willits to 
Warren, August 24th 1942. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 3, Folder 17. 
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governmental and customary or was there any special stimulus to 
creativity evident in our entrepreneurial group? (…)  
Somewhere in the development we hit upon a different division of labour 
than they used in Britain. Surely such an innovation can be explained.”93 
 
In her hastily drafted comments, one read the excitement at having identified 
both a fruitful research avenue and one that corresponded nicely to the American 
creed she and Willits were searching for. Willits realized its potential to pacify the 
board. In a 1948 memo to the RF president – Fosdick - he wrote: 
 
“I think that one of the most significant things that has come out of the 
Committee on Economic History has been the emphasis upon and 
approach to the study of entrepreneurship which is unique. The thought 
that appears over and over again in one form or another is the lack of a 
philosophy about our society as a whole - political, economic and social - 
which characterizes our people. We have no clearly thought-out and 
articulate scale of values that fits our society, although the Fascists, the 
Communists, the Nazis and the Socialists all pretend to have one. It’s 
much more complicated than just sitting down and writing a statement 
about the American way”.94  
 
Thus Willits was weaving together his favorites themes: a complex 
society, the battle against simplistic ideologies and an American creed to be 
constructed from scientific study. In addition, the emphasis on the 
entrepreneurial spirit was surely meant to appeal to the RF Board. As Fosdick 
and the Board were not naturally inclined to view empirical, humanistic social 
                                                   
93 Letter from Bezanson to Cole, July 26th 1943. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 396, 
Folder 4702.  
94 RAC-RF, RG 11, Series 200 S, Box 397, Folder 4708. 
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science as an end in-itself, Willits tended to emphasize other arguments that he 
thought would appeal to his constituency, thus interacting with them on a “big 
picture” level they could understand. This was a skill he had previously honed, 
having served on the NBER executive board (as a fund raiser) and as Dean of the 
Wharton School of Business. If Willits’ objective was to insure the survival of his 
type of economics he would have been keen to keep private funders on his side, 
an increasingly important ally given the post-war advent of new sources of 
financing for the “other” type of economics via the Military and State.95 Thus the 
focus on entrepreneurial history could well be interpreted both as an outgrowth 
of the CREH’ s relatively eclectic brainstorming and as the element deliberately 
chosen from that experience by Willits and Bezanson to appeal to their funders. 
Bezanson encouraged Cole to use the CREH as a springboard for his 
chosen entrepreneurial theme. When it became clear that this was not an efficient 
forum for such a project, she backed his decision to create an independent 
Research Center for Entrepreneurial History (RCEntrepH) at Harvard. 96 Cole 
managed to gather enough interest to set up a temporary center in 1948 and 
started soliciting RF help shortly thereafter. 97  Bezanson and Willits managed to 
obtain temporary grants to pay for salaries of key researchers at the RCEntrepH, 
and in 1952 the RCEntrepH was awarded $30,000 a year for 5 years. By the end 
of 1956, RF had awarded $219,000 to Cole’s Center. 98 This represented a shift in 
Willits and Bezanson’s alliances from the CREH to the RCEntrepH. Indeed, in 
1950, the Foundation had declined the CREH’ s application for another 5-year 
                                                   
95 Mirowski (2002). 
96 Principally due to the fact that not all CREH members were equally enthused by the 
theme’s potential. See Letter from Cole to Committee members, August 5th 1943, RAC-
RF, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 396, Folder 4702. 
97 According to Cole, the Center was informally started as the “East Coast Institute of 
Entrepreneurial History”, after his 1947 Presidential Address to the EHA. It was then 
officially chartered in September 1948, see Cole (1970). 
98 “Harvard University Research Center in Entrepreneurial History, 1948-1956”. RAC-
RF, RG 1.2, Series 200S, Box 514, Folder 4386. 
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term. 99 The field of promising economic history had just shifted from American 
economic history at large to entrepreneurial history at Harvard. This switch 
revealed what Willits and Bezanson wanted economist-historians to accomplish 
– though the focus on historicism and the desire to better understand the process 
of American economic growth  were still there, the emphasis on “facts”, in 
particular of a quantitative nature, had given way to a much vaguer feeling that 
the entrepreneurial system was the key to their philosophy. 
 
5.2 Business History at Harvard 
By creating a center for historical studies of entrepreneurship at Harvard, 
Cole was certainly not entering virgin territory. Harvard had an existing body of 
business history, inaugurated before WWI by Gay at the Business School. This 
tradition was officially entrenched in 1926, with the creation of the Business 
History Society, and a short-lived journal: The Journal of Economic and Business 
History (which ceased publication at the onset of the Depression). N.S.B. Gras, 
also one of Gay’s students, was one of the founders of the society and the first 
president.  He benefited from the support of Gay’s successor at the Harvard 
Business School – Dean Wallace B. Donham – who helped him create the society, 
raised funds to endow a chair in Business History, and encouraged Baker Library 
to build a historical collection.100  
The founders of the EHA had attempted to rally Gras to their cause, in the 
late 1930s (recall that he was on the Steering Committee), but he never got 
involved in any of their activities. 101 This was certainly due to their rather 
unfavorable judgment of his work, which they considered to be un-analytical.102 
Yet, when Cole started the RCEntrepH he solicited Gras again and some 
                                                   
99 This did not spell the death of the CREH, which continued to exist (albeit not under 
SSRC guidance but under the auspices of the EHA) for several decades. However, its 
lack of funds turned it into a much smaller player on the economic history scene. 
100 Cole (1974). 
101 Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 9. 
102 See Cole (1970), 728. 
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communication occurred via their students. The other, more recent influence for 
entrepreneurial studies at Harvard was Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), who had 
arrived from Austria in 1932. Schumpeter had written a favorable report for 
Cole’s application to the RF in the late 1940s, and he participated in RCEntrepH 
activities until his death (i.e. he really only participated for 1 or 2 years).103 
Thus the RCEntrepH was able to graft itself onto these Harvard traditions, 
but considerably amplified them, as these earlier currents had no official 
funding. RF money allowed for the creation of a research center (a physical 
meeting place), a journal (Explorations in Entrepreneurial History) and funds. This 
resulted in the temporary reunion of two branches of economist-history: 
economic history and business history. Until then, they had led relatively 
separate existences and they would diverge again in the 1960s.  Figure 3.7 
illustrates these two lineages stemming from Gay’s presence at Harvard – note 
that generation 3 students were not Gay’s students, but came to business history 
via Cole and his colleagues at the RCEntrepH. 
As seen in Figure 3.7 the key protagonist of the temporary unification of 
business and economic history was Arthur Cole, though other members of Gay’s 
second-generation students also took part (notably Bezanson, Lane and 
Kirkland).  Their enthusiastic participation in the research life of the RCEntrepH 
attracted young talent.  Among the contributors to Explorations, one found many 
of their colleagues (Nef for example), their EHA and CREH friends (Shephard 
Clough, Leland Jenks and Thomas Cochran), their students and protégés (Oscar 
and Mary Handlin, Louis Hartz, Hugh Aitken, David Landes, Fritz Redlich, John 
Sawyer) 
                                                   
103 Ibid. 
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Figure 3.7: Edwin Gay’s lineage in economic and business history 
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but also the prominent sociologist Talcott Parsons, reputed foreign scholars 
(Peter Mathias, H.J. Habakkuk, Alain Touraine), and economists whose names 
would subsequently be associated with the cliometric movement (Alexander 
Gerschenkron, Henry Rosovsky, William Parker, Doug North, John Meyer, 
Lance Davis for example).104 
 
5.3 Entrepreneurial history = economic history = economics 
If one takes participation and activity as indicators of a research center’s 
popularity and performance, the Harvard RCEntrepH’s first decade was a 
success. In 1949 the first issue of Explorations in Entrepreneurial History was 
published and it garnered enough interest and submissions to come out nearly 
monthly. The bulk of the articles were monographs on particular businesses, 
industries or entrepreneurs, but there was also a fair amount of methodological 
pieces and several attempts at the sociology of entrepreneurship, identifying 
trends and features of the general “population” of business entrepreneurs (for 
example the contributions of Jenks, Parsons and Redlich cited above). The 
driving theme was the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and 
economic change and growth.  
As Cole envisaged it, the study of the entrepreneur was not just one of 
many themes one could investigate, it was the unifying, umbrella theme, under 
which issues of change, growth, development and economic order could all be 
subsumed. Ultimately, it would be a “theory”, in the sense of a coherent, 
comprehensive way of understanding and perhaps influencing the economic 
world. He made this explicit in the late 1950s:  
 
                                                   
104See for example: Bezanson (1952); Redlich (1952); Gerschenkron (1953); Parker (1954); 
Rosovsky (1954); Sawyer (1954); Meyer (1955); Aitken (1956); Handlin (1956); Parsons 
and Smelser (1956); Davis (1957); Jenks (1957); Parker (1957). 
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“Economic historians [must achieve] somehow the reputation of being 
theorists. I am sticking out my own neck in my new book; the final 
chapter is an attempt to state a theory of economic development in terms 
of entrepreneurial capacities.”105 
 
This “theory” was Cole’s attempt to synthesize the growing number of 
biographies, company histories and studies of foreign entrepreneurship. One 
example of this synthetic work could be found in his 1959 Business Enterprise in 
its Social Setting, where he argued that the chief explanation for the varying 
wealth of nations was their differing stages of entrepreneurial sophistication.  He 
was not so much concerned with individual entrepreneurs as he was with the 
“entrepreneurial system”: a set of rules of behavior and tools available to the 
risk-taking individual. According to Cole, mid 20th century U.S. stood out from 
other countries in so far as entrepreneurship was not the work of one man, but of 
an executive team assisted by a large number of consultants (legal advisers, 
strategy advisers, accountants, advertising agents etc…) and knowledge 
producers (business schools and business scholars!). To substantiate these claims, 
he used references to sociological studies of the relationship between individual 
and environment (often citing Talcott Parsons) as well as anecdotal references to 
concrete cases (drawn from the scholarship of Gras’ group and of CREH 
grantees, but principally by the researchers affiliated to the RCEntrepH).106  
Having argued that this evolutionary force from crude to sophisticated 
entrepreneurship was the main motor of growth, Cole went on to examine the 
forces that favored or inhibited this evolution, pointing to various directions for 
future research. For example, he wondered how specific historical economic 
opportunities (Italian exploration of the Mediterranean basin, the discovery of 
                                                   
105 Arthur Cole in a memo to the Sub-Committee on Future Policies to the Trustees of the 
Committee on Research in Economic History, 1959. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 99. 
106 Cole (1959), chapter 3. 
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the new world) affected the supply of entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurial 
system. He also asked about the geographical patterns of entrepreneurship and 
their relation to immigration patterns. In defining such questions, Cole was 
setting out a research agenda that put entrepreneurial history at the heart of 
economics – in line with his definition of economics: “[to be a social science, 
economics must be] concerned with the impact of cultural forces upon the 
formation and performance of social groups out of which flow the goods and 
services desired by society.”107 His tight association between entrepreneurial 
studies and economics at large led him to make extreme claims. For example, as 
he told Business Week in 1952: “if you could transplant some of the thinking of 
American businessmen, you might be able to speed the development of, say, 
Brazil or Indonesia.”108 
Critics started pointing to the very speculative nature of the work that 
came out of the Center. In 1954, Willits’ successor (DeVinney) interviewed a 
young British graduate student, who had spent a year with Cole at Harvard. The 
latter said he thought that the scholars were too willing to play around with 
ideas, and not enough facts: 
 
 “He illustrate[d] his point by referring to an entertaining paper presented 
by a young historian from Yale that economic development in the U.S. 
during the past century depended in large degree on the over-optimism of 
the entrepreneurs… It turned out that this was merely an idea that this 
young man dreamed up and a very lively discussion went on for a 
considerable period of time entirely on theoretical and hypothetical 
                                                   
107 Ibid, chapter 4.  This is a far cry from Lionel Robbins’s 1932 definition: “Economics is 
the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between given ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses”. 
108 Business Week (April 12, 1952). 
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grounds. The student contrasted this with the situation in Britain, where 
people did not stray so far away from evidence.” 109   
 
If one recalls the RF’s insistence on funding studies based on extensive 
observation, it might not come as a huge surprise that DeVinney, the new social 
sciences director at RF, did not renew the RCEntrepH grant. In 1956, he turned 
down an application for a 6-year renewal. 110 In 1958 the center ceased operations 
and shut down Explorations. Some of its research migrated to Columbia, where 
Carter Goodrich had been running a research center on “state governments and 
economic development in the U.S.” since the mid 1950s.111 Recall that the 
influence of state policies on economic development had been one the themes 
proposed in the early brainstorming sessions of the CREH, and Goodrich’s work 
in this area was in line with studies conducted by the Handlins for example.112  
The specific focus on entrepreneurship and the stronghold of Gay’s network 
were not upheld at Columbia.  
At Harvard, generation 3 students (depicted in Figure 3.7) held on to their 
interests in entrepreneurial themes, but soon moved to other institutions to take 
their first academic jobs (Sawyer went to Yale, Chandler went to MIT for 
example). Business history continued to exist within the business school, and 
would provide the seat for a renewal of business research in the mid 1960s, when 
separate institutions for business history were resurrected and reinforced, as we 
shall see in chapter 7.113 It thus took a change in the directorship of Social 
Sciences at the RF to bring an end to the continuous funding of Gay’s lineage. 
This abrupt change confirmed both Willits’ power in choosing his grantees and 
his growing fear that his type of economics would not survive in the long term. 
                                                   
109 From DeVinney diary, December 9th 1954. RAC-RF, RG 1.2, Series 200S, Box 514, 
Folder 4386.  The graduate student was not named. 
110 RAC-RF, RG 1.2, Series 200S, Box 514, Folder 4387.  
111 Cole (1970). 
112 Cole (1974). 
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6 Conclusion 
In 1958, when the RCEntrepH closed down, American economic 
historians were in an unstable situation. On the one hand, they had lost their 
connection to direct sources of funding, but on the other they had forged what 
appeared to be lasting institutions. In 1958, the EHA had a little over 1400 
members; at least 1000 had an American address, up from approximately 300 in 
1941. This can be compared to the AEA, whose domestic membership tripled 
from about 3,000 in 1941 to a little over 9,000 in 1958.114 Both the JEH and the 
EEH were regular periodicals, and the JEH seemed to have an increasingly 
healthy rejection rate: George Rogers Taylor (editor from 1955 to 1961) 
remembered accepting 40% to 50% of the articles, which was more selective than 
what Cochran and E.A.J. Johnson recalled of their 1940s editorships (the war was 
a particularly dim time for journals).115   
 These scholars’ ability to put economic history on the American academic 
map was the result of both need and opportunity. The need seemed to emerge 
from a change in the interwar economics landscape, leading many social 
scientists to worry about the direction economics was taking, away from 
humanism and their type of empiricism.  The opportunity came from the relative 
strength and cohesion of their network, based on a common lineage, and shared 
philosophical and epistemological views. Anne Bezanson’s strategic placement 
as consultant at the RF gave them resources to act. Their dependence on the RF 
lifeline tended to push this self-generated demand towards more American, 
more conservative themes. Entrepreneurial history gradually emerged as an area 
that could combine their thirst for empiricism, multi-disciplinarity and 
                                                   
114 For EHA membership, see Treasurer’s Reports, Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 23-27. 
AEA numbers can be found in Siegfried (1998). 
115 See Parker Questionnaire and Answers, in Hagley, Accession 1479, Carboard Box, 
Folder “JEH Parker”. 
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commitment to long term research with the RF’s growing suspicion that social 
sciences were not in any shape to yield concrete, usable knowledge. 
Though they did not succeed in checking the tide of tool-based economics, 
they did manage to create a quasi independent “home” for economic history, 
with its own institutions and enough visibility to become worthy of 
consideration by the next big patron: the Ford Foundation. 116  This had 
important implications for the future of the discipline. For one thing, it gave the 
cliometricians something to take over. For another, this institutional inertia 
seemed to have set the themes and questions that ensuing generations of 
American economic historians would continue to tackle, thus effectively defining 
patterns for the field’s evolution. This occurred in spite of the subsequent 
“revolution” in methods, changes that were creeping in from many directions, as 
we shall see in chapters 4 and 7. American economic historians held on to a 
fascination for banking, railroads, key industries, and other motors of American 
economic growth, even if they presented their work as essentially revisionist of 
these “old” interpretations. In addition, they rarely broke free from the view that 
economic history was principally an activity for economists interested in growth 
and the successful development of nations. As we shall see in chapter 5, this 
contrasted sharply with the situation in other countries, France for example, 
where economic history never stood apart from social history and investigations 
were seldom related to economic growth. 
 
 
                                                   
116 In 1957, the Ford Foundation organized a round table on economic history to take 
over from RF – see chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
 
 
MEASURING THE PAST THROUGH  
NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
One of the most striking differences between economic history as it was 
practiced by CREH scholars (see chapter 3) and post-1960 cliometricians was the 
evolution of the meaning of “empirical”. For the founders of the EHA, the word 
covered a wide range of evidence, quantitative or not, whereas for 1960s 
cliometricians, to be empirical was to be quantitative. 1 It has sometimes been 
assumed that this increase in the use of quantification in economic history was 
the result of the application of neoclassical economic theory to historical 
questions, as mathematical expression presumably forced cliometricians to look 
out for numerical counterparts in their body of evidence.2 Yet, such 
                                                   
1 In 2003-2004, I conducted interviews with a dozen scholars who were either graduate 
students or rising academics in the 1960s and early 1970s (the height of the “cliometric 
revolution”). I asked them to comment on the word “empirical” for this time period; 
they all associated it with “quantitative” (including Paul David, Lance Davis, Richard 
Easterlin, Robert Fogel, Claudia Goldin, Deidre McCloskey, Hugh Rockoff, Peter Temin 
and Gavin Wright). A notable exception was Douglass North who was the only one to 
associate “empirical” with quantitative and qualitative information. Most respondents 
indicated that their views had since changed, and that they now willingly and 
explicitely relied on numerous types of evidence . See Easterlin’s response as an 
example: “subsequently, I’ve come to realize that this sort of micro level evidence, 
diaries and, you know, various historical records are an important empirical source.” 
2 For a discussion of this assumption, see Whaples (1991). 
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interpretations are inconsistent with two features of the historical record. First, 
there was much quantification before the advent of theoretically driven 
economist-history (recall Gay, Hamilton and Cole’s work mentioned in chapter 
3). Second, the spread of quantification seemed to have antedated the spread of 
mathematization. Robert Whaples’ has studied the evolution of articles 
published in the JEH and shown that the number of tables printed per page – his 
indicator for quantification - increased tenfold between 1941-45 and 1966-1970 – 
the big discontinuity occurring in the late 1950s, early 1960s, before cliometricians 
had gathered momentum as a self-identified revolutionary group, whereas 
mathematization of the JEH happened five to ten years later. 3  This suggests that 
the history of quantification in American economic history does not quite 
overlap with the history of the cliometric movement and that we may benefit 
from a closer examination of the types of quantification in economic history, and 
of their evolution over time.  
Quantities and quantification have been the object of much study among 
historians and philosophers of social science.4 They have examined the role 
numbers played in the edification of social scientific knowledge and they have 
brought to our attention the existence of many different types of numbers – 
whose descriptive, representational, rhetorical and analytical power vary. 
According to them, not all numbers carry equal weight and much of their power 
depends on the method by which they were obtained. Theodore Porter for 
example has shown that the types of numbers that most increased social 
scientists’ legitimacy in the 19th and 20th centuries were the ones generated by 
“standardized quantitative rules”. According to Porter, numbers defined by 
fixed rules (and supported by bureaucracies that could monitor and enforce 
these rules) became an increasingly important feature of public and scientific life. 
Cost-benefit accounting, for example, was rapidly adopted in public 
                                                   
3 Ibid, 293. 
4 Morgan (1990); Porter (1995); Desrosières (2000); Porter (2001). 
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administrations to monitor and distribute tax revenues, thus reshaping lobbyists 
and legislators’ interactions.5  
The general field of accounting, and national accounting in particular, has 
often been used as an example of the complexities and rewards of building these 
“standardized quantitative rules”, or “measuring instruments”, as some 
historians prefer to call them.6 Though these histories do not specifically consider 
retrospective accounting (building national accounts for the past) in their 
analysis, there is a case for examining the impact on economic history of a 
national accounting view. At the heart of this connection lay Simon Kuznets, 
whose work inspired generations of economist-historians.7 The contrast between 
the rapid dissemination of his retrospective accounting project (rewarded with a 
Nobel prize in 1971) and the sudden end of Gay and Beveridge’s International 
History of Prices initiative invites us to ask: what were the differences between 
national accounting quantifications and other numbers, like the prices and price 
indices used in the International Price History Project? Did the former have any 
conceptual or organizational advantages over the latter? Did Simon Kuznets’ 
influence entail a significant change in the meaning of evidence for American 
economic historians and did this alter the terms of the perennial debate around 
the proper status of observation in economic science? 
This chapter begins with an investigation of the roots and course of Simon 
Kuznets’ disagreement with the “old” economic historians. Section 3 then delves 
into the conceptual and organizational factors that permitted the rise and spread 
of retrospective accounting. Section 4 uses a disagreement between Walt Rostow 
                                                   
5 Porter (1996), 39-43. 
6 Morgan (2003). 
7 Easterlin explicitely made the connection between “empirical = quantitative” and 
Simon Kuznets. To the question: “what did the word “empirical” mean to you in the 
1960s?” he replied “well, I think the way I would have interpreted it and the way 
Kuznets interpreted it had to do with the construction of time series estimates of income 
and labor force and population and all kinds of things of that sort.” Richard Easterlin, 
Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, San Diego, January 2004. 
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and Simon Kuznets to spell out the implications of this accounting view for 
American economic history, in particular the ways in which it changed the 
notion of reliable empirical evidence. Throughout, the chapter argues that Simon 
Kuznets’ efforts to frame the past in a national accounting framework were 
greatly enhanced by the situation in post-WWII  U.S., as he was able to leverage 
the demand for growth and development knowledge and piggy-back on the 
establishment of national accounting offices in numerous countries. This 
successful combination of conceptual (though not necessarily theoretical) and 
organizational features contributed to marginalize economist-historians who 
relied on more traditional forms of evidence (quantitative or not) to derive 
arguments about the origin and dynamics of economic growth.  
 
2 Kuznets and the “old” economic historians 
2.1 Kuznets’ reasons for attending the 1940 Rockefeller Foundation (RF) 
round-table meeting 
As mentioned in chapter 3, Kuznets was the only participant at the 
September 1940 economic history roundtable organized by RF not to belong to 
Edwin Gay’s network of students and colleagues (recall Figure 3.4). Born in 
Ukraine in 1901, Simon Kuznets had emigrated to the U.S. in the early 1920s and 
began an academic career under Wesley Mitchell’s guidance at Columbia 
University. He had earned his degrees with impressive speed (BA-1923, MA-
1924, Ph.D.–1926), indication that he already was a fine social scientist when he 
landed on American soil. Before leaving the Soviet Union he had worked in the 
Ukranian bureau of labor statistics, where he had acquired solid foundations in 
empirical and statistical work.8 Kuznets’ family also seemed to be well versed in 
                                                   
8 Easterlin (1971) believed that Kuznets’ methodological dispositions were developed 
prior to his arrival in the U.S.  Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman (1995) cited more specific 
evidence for this claim: they mentioned two papers that he wrote as an economics 
student at the University of Kharkov. The first was on money wages of factory workers 
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the general area of social science – his older brother Solomon was on track to 
becoming a well-known statistician, and the Russian economist Kondratieff was 
a “family friend”.9 
When Kuznets graduated from Columbia, Mitchell invited him to join the 
staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), where he began a 
long career (1927-1961) in the study of business cycles, national income and 
capital accumulation.  The NBER had only been founded a few years earlier 
(1922) and Kuznets soon became recognized as one of the most accomplished 
scholars in Mitchell’s team of economic measurers. As most economists affiliated 
to the Bureau, he worked on aspects of the business cycle, and his first major 
contribution to scholarship was the identification of long term swings (20-25 
years) which he uncovered from a historical study of the American economy – 
these subsequently came to be known as “Kuznets cycles”.10 Though the bulk of 
his work was oriented to empirics and measurement, he showed some 
willingness to generalize from the evidence – for example, he established that the 
consumption to investment ratio was stable throughout time, thus refuting the 
theoretical proposition that the aggregate marginal propensity to consume 
declined as national wealth increased.11  In 1930 he obtained his first academic 
post and became Professor of Statistics at the University of Pennsylvania, where 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Khrakov; the second was on Schumpeter’s theory of innovation. Both the quantitative 
empirical work in the first paper and the interest in Schumpeter’s ideas seemed to stick 
to Kuznets throughout his lifetime. The authors stated that Kuznets’ main argument in 
the Schumpeter essay was that the later had great insights but untestable propositions. 
Already the importance of measurement as a pre-requisite for testing and proper 
scientific work was a part of Kuznets’ method; as we shall see in his debates with 
Rostow.  
9 Angus Maddison recalled that Kuznets told him Kondratieff was a “family friend” and 
that the Kuznets family had tried to bring the great Russian economist to the U.S.; 
Angus Maddison, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Compiègne, France, March 2004. 
10 Easterlin (1979); Fogel (2000). 
11 Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman (1995). 
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he remained until 1954, when Johns Hopkins awarded him a full professorship 
in Economics.12  
Among his U. Penn colleagues, Joseph Willits and Anne Bezanson appear 
to have been two of his closest acquaintances.13 Kuznets’ presence at the 1940 RF 
roundtable was a testimony of this friendship and collegiality. Anne Bezanson’s 
subsequent home visits to Kuznets to convince him to join the Committee for 
Research in Economic History (CREH), and his acceptance in spite of his 
objections to their general program, further reflected their mutual respect and 
support.14 While Kuznets seemed to have a more personal link to Bezanson, he 
certainly was not unfriendly with Joseph Willits, who held the Russian émigré in 
high esteem and consistently solicited his scientific opinion on many initiatives 
the RF was considering funding. In 1940 Willits wrote the RF president that: 
“Kuznets is the man who has contributed more in economic research in the last 
ten years than any other economist.”15 
Kuznets’ presence at the 1940 RF roundtable was both an indication of his 
closeness to Willits and Bezanson, and of his general interest in the broad 
                                                   
12 Some of Kuznets’ biographers have suggested that his U. Penn appointment was not 
as prestigious a post as a professorship in economics, and that Kuznets’ Judaism may 
have been the reason he was not invited to join the U. Penn Economics Department - 
Ibid, 1534-7. They added that Kuznets’ subsequent appointment at Johns Hopkins was 
slowed down by a notoriously anti-semitic Dean. Mark Perlman, Interviewed by Cristel 
de Rouvray, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, June 2003. The general impression that 
American academia was not congenial to outsiders like himself may have been one of 
the reasons Kuznets so energetically helped the State of Israel develop its own academic 
landscape after WWII.  
13 Recall from chapter 3 that both Willits and Bezanson were also at the University of 
Pennsylvania in the 1930s. Willits was Dean of the Wharton Business School and 
Bezanson was director of the Industrial Research Department at Wharton from the late 
1930s to the mid 1950s. 
14 Both may have felt like outsiders at U.Penn; Kuznets because he was Jewish, Bezanson 
because she was a woman. Bezanson told her niece that she had to take up smoking, to 
encourage her male colleagues to drop by her office!  
15 Memo from Willits to Fosdick, October 25th 1940. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 10, 
Folder 86. 
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initiative they were considering – namely a grant in economic history. As he 
would tell Mitchell in 1943: 
 
“As you may remember, interest in [the comprehensive analysis of the 
longer term economic trends] was one of the main reasons why I was eager 
to serve on the Committee on Research in Economic History (where my 
views had a thorough airing and negligible, if any, effect).”16 
 
Kuznets’ study of history was tied to his interest in long-term phenomena 
and to their “comprehensive” observation, by which he meant a description and 
understanding of the general aspects of economic growth. Kuznets’ commitment 
to history and to the long term were the cornerstones of the work he would 
produce in the decades following WWII, and they were most cogently expressed 
in the crowning synthesis of decades of research, namely his 1966 Modern 
Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread.  As he explained in the first chapter, 
he wanted to highlight the features and dynamics of modern economic growth, a 
phenomenon he deemed historically distinct from earlier periods of economic 
activity, even from earlier periods of capitalism (such as medieval merchant 
capitalism).17  Establishing the distinctiveness of this new stage of economic 
activity was one reason for studying the history of developed nations. But 
modern economic growth was not an exclusively mid 20th century phenomenon. 
According to Kuznets, it dated at least as far back as the late 18th century, and 
the context of its emergence and the dynamics of its evolution were crucial to 
understanding its present shape (in particular if one was concerned with the fate 
of less developed nations).  
                                                   
16 Kuznets to Mitchell, September 24th 1943. Harvard University Archives, Accession 
88.10, Box 2, Folder: “Comparative Economic Growth: Conception and Exploration”. 
17 Kuznets (1966), 7. 
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In other words, in order to describe and understand economic growth 
appropriately, one needed to apprehend it over the long term – only then would 
the generalizations derived from empirical study stand any chance of explaining 
it.  Kuznets presented this argument in statistical terms: the sample needed to be 
big enough (across space and time) to generate enough variability to establish 
reliable causal knowledge.18 Those who did not embrace a sufficient time span 
produced inadequate conclusions.19 As he reminded his colleagues in his 1955 
presidential address to the AEA, economists had a “natural tendency (…) to 
generalize from what little experience is available - most often the short stretch of 
historical experience within the horizon of the interested scholar”. He tied this 
dubious instinct to legacies from the Classical School (generalizations from 
British historical record which were limited by “the brevity and exceptional 
character of that period and place”) and Marxism (“overgeneralization of 
imperfectly understood trends in England”). For Kuznets, the only check to these 
tendencies was “the observation of a greater variety of historical experience and 
a recognition that any body of generalizations tends to reflect some limited 
stretch of historical experience”.20 The recognition that previous generations of 
economists had failed to cast a wide enough net in their investigations only 
served to strengthen his conviction that economic growth needed to be urgently 
studied, defined and explained, given the increasing popularity of the concept in 
the post war world.  
 
2.2 Kuznets attempts to convince the CREH economic historians to adopt his 
approach to historical study 
While the participants of the 1940 meeting all agreed that economic 
history was an indispensable area of study for the economist, this did not entail 
                                                   
18 Ibid, 487-90. 
19 Ibid, 9. 
20 Kuznets (1955). 
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any agreement on the framework and method of study. Kuznets offered his 
critique of the direction Gay and his students were taking in a lengthy report he 
sent to Willits a few weeks after the 1940 meeting. 21 In this report, he stated that 
the proposal Cole, Gay and Johnson had put forth lacked “a basic framework 
within which [individual] studies will be evaluated and cumulated into a 
significant story of the historical development of this country’s economy”.  This 
worried Kuznets because although he agreed with the basic motivation of the 
grant - an explanation of “economic change in its chronological succession… to 
reveal the factors that govern [it]”- he had strong beliefs about the means that 
would make such an investigation successful.  For Kuznets, this project had to be 
comprehensive, comparative and precise.   
A comprehensive view – According to Kuznets, the first step was to draw “a 
cogent (…) picture of the economic development of the whole country”, rather 
than immediately zoom in on factors that were deemed important ex ante:  
 
“The crux of understanding secular or long term changes is in visualizing 
their continuous interplay in the economic system (that is why we call the 
economy an economic system) (…) The breaking up of the area among 
industries or separate aspects of the economy runs the danger of missing 
the whole in the study of parts.” 22 
 
Indeed the CREH economic historians had no plans to deliver an overall view of 
the system: having already established the areas  (banking, legislation) and actors 
(entrepreneurs, government) they wanted to examine, without any stipulation 
about the ways in which these areas specifically related to each other.  
                                                   
21 Kuznets’ Comments on the Report on Projects of Research in American Economic 
History, October 1940. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42. 
22 Comments on the Report on Projects of Research in American Economic History 
(p.12), October 1940. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42. 
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A comparative view – In his 1940 memo, Kuznets reminded Willits that one 
could not generalize about the U.S. without a reference point: 
 
“I agree (…) that the emphasis is to be placed upon the study of the 
American economy (…) It is of prime importance to study the economic 
development of this country (…) we should also try to see whether the 
pattern of temporal changes which this country revealed in its historical 
past is not similar to the pattern of temporal changes in other countries of 
similar economic structure (i.e., countries of developed industrial 
capitalism, such as Great Britain or Germany).” 23 
 
In contrast, the economic historians were committed to an in-depth exploration 
of American economic history, and had not presented any rationale for carefully 
or systematically comparing it to other countries. 
A precise view – According to Kuznets, one could not assess the relative 
importance of various economic factors without measuring them. Though 
Kuznets acknowledged that not all meaningful data could be quantified, he 
insisted that the first step was necessarily quantitative: 
 
“Above all the framework needed should comprehend a quantitative and 
analytical study of the character of these temporal changes of various 
description that would permit us to distinguish the groups of factors of 
primary importance to each.” 24  
 
Kuznets’ commitment to measurement and quantification had been well honed 
at the NBER. Though NBER economists gathered numerous types of information 
                                                   
23 Comments on the Report on Projects of Research in American Economic History (p.8), 
October 1940. RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42. 
24 Comments on the Report on Projects of Research in American Economic History (p.3) 
RAC-RF, RG 3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 42. 
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(qualitative and quantitative) they synthesized it all into numbers. Importantly, 
all final analysis was grounded in tables and charts, which were the heart of 
Wesley Mitchell’s “rigorous” work (and he insisted that most other work in 
economics was unscientific and speculative).25  
Gay’s students were certainly not newcomers to data collection and 
quantification (recall that Gay had been one of the original visionaries for the 
NBER) but they did not have Kuznets’ training in measurement nor did they 
have his statistical knowledge. The disagreement between them seemed not to be 
“whether or not to quantify” – but rather “how” and “why” one should quantify. 
If one compared Bezanson’s 1930s work on prices in the Philadelphia region to 
Kuznets’ proposed plan for a comprehensive, precise and comparative view of 
the past one began to sense the difference between these strategies for 
quantification.26 Bezanson’s prices of individual commodities, and even her price 
indices (compounds that were supposed to reflect the overall evolution of all 
prices) constituted a string of available facts with very few clues as to where 
these facts fit in the broader context of American economic development. Even if 
she had further developed her causal analysis of the origins of price trends and 
fluctuations, her conclusions would have been hard to relate to questions about 
industrialization, productivity, sectoral growth: questions which were beginning 
to emerge as focal points in the American economics profession. Kuznets on the 
other hand wished to build a long-term view that could be used to answer such 
questions.  
In essence, Kuznets laid out a much more structured view of the research 
project he thought the RF should finance, and cautioned against ad hoc 
apprehensions of the past. His recommendations were not taken into account 
when the RF allocated funds to create the CREH. As is evident in the studies they 
commissioned, their notion of useful research had a very different focus than 
                                                   
25 Morgan (1990). 
26 Bezanson, Gray and Hussey (1935). See chapter 3 for a description of this work.  
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Kuznets’. They funded studies of micro and macro events (for example studies of 
one north-eastern banking system as well as a study of the first federal bank and 
the national capital market) and of a qualitative and quantitative nature (for 
example a study of the Brown dynasty in Rhode Island as well as a study of bank 
reserves and interest rates). In general they had no stipulations as to which type 
of empirical evidence came first, and their standards of reliability rested on the 
critical examination of the sources rather than on a reflection on how useful any 
particular piece of information would be in the general picture. Kuznets and the 
“old” economic historians did not specifically confront each other on the matter 
of what and how to observe, yet they certainly held different views on what 
constituted reliable and useful empirical data. 
Kuznets repeated his dissenting opinion on numerous occasions, yet was 
not listened to. 27  He resigned from the CREH in 1943 – though RF officers had 
enjoined him to stay until the end of the war. During his two-year tenure, he was 
a reluctant participant and minutes of meetings show his absence and lack of 
influence. 28 This disagreement would last for years. For example, in a 1951 paper 
in the Economic History Review Kuznets defended his rationale for using 
aggregate measures to capture historical change. He contrasted the potential 
completeness of numerical data to what he deemed to be the necessarily limited 
scope of qualitative analysis: 
 
“To illustrate: total production of cotton cloth by the textile industry in 
Great Britain in 1925, or over a period extending from 1860 to 1938 can be 
measured quite readily. Contrast this with the difficulty of giving a 
complete account of ‘entrepreneurial activity’ (…) in the same industry 
during that same period.”29  
                                                   
27 See for example, Kuznets (1941b). 
28 See for example letter from Cole to Willits, September 9th 1942. RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 
200, Box 397, Folder 4701. 
29 Kuznets (1951), 267. 
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The reference to the entrepreneur was probably not entirely innocent. It reflected 
Kuznets’ disagreement with the agenda Arthur Cole and his colleagues had put 
forth. 
 
3 Building the measuring instrument 
3.1 The conceptual basis 
Though Kuznets did not describe a specific framework in his 1940 report 
to Joseph Willits (where he wrote in very general terms), there was much 
evidence that he was already organizing his own view of the past within a 
national accounts perspective. National accounting had a long history (dating as 
far back as the work of French and British civil servants in the 17th century), yet 
the mid 20th century witnessed an acceleration of the development and 
deployment of national accounts worldwide.30 Kuznets was one of the main 
actors in this process. In the early 1930s he had headed the construction of the 
first official accounts for the U.S. (estimates for 1929, 1930 and 1931). Prior and 
subsequent to this involvement with the Department of Commerce he had 
worked on the theory and measurement of national income accounts, having 
taken the lead of the NBER’s project on U.S. National Income – a responsibility 
he held for 15 years (1931-1946).31 In 1933, he had contributed an article on 
national income for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, which served as a 
theoretical guide for decades.32  
As part of the NBER initiative, Kuznets built accounts for past periods - 
pushing American series back to 1919 and then to 1869.33  In doing this he was 
not breaking new conceptual grounds, but improving estimates made by W.I. 
                                                   
30 Studenski (1958). 
31 Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman (1995), 1531. This article had been commissioned by 
Kuznets brother, Solomon, who advised the editor of the Encyclopedia.  
32 Fogel (2000), 8-9. 
33 Kuznets (1941a); Kuznets (1946). 
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King and pushing them as far back as the civil war. The idea of apprehending the 
past via national income was not new. However, the idea of creating a consistent 
set of estimates, pushed as far back as possible, and leveraging the power of the 
accounting balances to fill in the missing gaps was arguably quite innovative, 
and Kuznets certainly was one of the first to do it at such a scale. 34 
Kuznets was not only calculating an aggregate national income statistic 
for each year or each period; but he was building national accounting tables, 
bringing to light all the different parts of the macro-economic system. His 
favored metaphor was the human body: national accounts were the anatomical 
view of the economic system; the first step in making sense of the dynamics and 
causal relationships he wished to uncover.35 Thanks to this systemic view that 
related all variables to each other in an unambiguous way (the accounting 
equations), Kuznets had a means to cross-check the consistency of his data (and 
consequently its validity) and impute missing variables where he could not find 
the relevant micro-economic data (because it did not exist in archives or 
almanacs). For these reasons it may be useful to think of retrospective accounts 
as a measuring instrument, as the framework could be used to generate new data 
that had not been found in any existing record (the instrument created numbers 
both by aggregation - from the sum of different inputs - but also by imputation). 
For example to create the consumption accounts, and break them down 
according to category of goods (there were four categories: perishable, semi-
durable, durable and “all other goods” which included services) Kuznets could 
start from the highest level of aggregation (total consumption could be 
established from the national income figure obtained via the production accounts 
due to the accounting equations that related income to production and 
                                                   
34 At about the same time, Colin Clark was attempting a similar exercise in the U.K.- 
published as Clark (1940). However his series did not go as far back as Kuznets’ did, and 
as we shall see in section 3.2 he did not have Kuznets’ phenomenal organizational 
talents that insured the comparability of international data. 
35 Kuznets (1955). 
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consumption to income); then he could individually estimate each of the three 
large consumer categories where data was available (perishable, semi durable 
and durable); to finally “derive” a figure for all other consumer goods. This last 
figure was obtained by computing the “residual” (“subtracting from national 
product independently estimated final product categories except services”).36 As 
we see from this example, the national income framework was conceptually 
strong (the researcher had to start out with fixed equations relating one variable 
to another) but theoretically weak (there did not need to be any presuppositions 
about the ways in which one factor affected another via the agency of individuals 
or institutions). Significantly, Kuznets was not a Keynesian.  
By 1940, when Kuznets attended the RF roundtable he had been working 
on U.S. retrospective accounts for nearly a decade and seemed to have developed 
the conviction that this project could significantly add to economic knowledge if 
it could be turned into an international, comparative study of growth. His 
decision to attend the roundtable meeting was prompted by his desire to find a 
sponsor, and he was simultaneously probing the CREH and the NBER as 
potential donors. Both turned him down.  It is unclear why Mitchell did so.37  He 
was nearing the end of his career (he would retire in 1946) and Arthur Burns had 
been designated as his chosen successor. There was known rivalry between 
Burns and Kuznets (who had been the other possible candidate for succession), 
and this may have been a reason why the NBER decided not to house Kuznets’ 
long-term study.38 Yet, there may also have been more substantive reasons for 
the rejection.  
The first such reason may have been was different degrees of eagerness to 
generalize from empirical work, a difference prompted by differing degrees of 
pragmatism and sensitivity to urgency. When comparing Kuznets to Mitchell, 
                                                   
36 Kuznets (1946), 77. 
37 Kuznets to Mitchell, September 24th 1943, Harvard University Archives, Accession 
88.10, Box 2, Folder: “Comparative Economic Growth: Conception and Exploration”. 
38 Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman (1995). 
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some biographers have highlighted that the former’s “thrust towards theoretical 
generalization was much stronger than Mitchell’s”.39 By the 1940s this 
divergence may have become increasingly difficult to accommodate, as the 
NBER was under growing pressure to defend its “empirical only” commitment. 
It was harder for them to continue claiming that economics needed a sound 
empirical basis before any generalizations could be risked, as they had been 
accumulating evidence for two decades, with very little general propositions to 
show.40 Thus Kuznets’ greater willingness to take the generalization step may 
have been perceived as a slight threat, or at least a counterculture move. This 
reminds us to be careful in indiscriminately labeling economists as “empiricists”, 
when this apparently homogeneous term masked acrimonious differences. This 
may be one way of interpreting a confidential letter Kuznets sent to Willits when 
his project was turned down: 
 
“My own feeling is that the National Bureau is becoming all together too 
narrow minded, and that it would have been well to experiment with the 
[growth project] as a departure that might open way to types of research 
different from the kind pursued at the Bureau now.”41    
 
 Kuznets’ greater willingness to use national accounts to develop a theory 
of growth went hand in hand with a certain degree of pragmatism regarding 
available data and its quality. His students and colleagues were always 
encouraged to make the best with what they had, rather than shun the task 
altogether because the data was too patchy or too rudimentary. He reminded 
them to learn about the ways in which the data had been produced (i.e. about the 
                                                   
39 Fogel (2000), 6. 
40 Mitchell himself acknowledged and somewhat regretted the delays in producing his 
second masterpiece on business cycles; see Morgan (1990). 
41 Kuznets to “Joe”, undated. Harvard University Archives, Accession 88.45, Restricted 
Letters. 
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past institutions that collected and preserved it) to extract meaningful 
information from the numbers, in spite of their obvious flaws. The knowledge set 
needed to make such imputations was another reason for encouraging his 
students to study economic history.42 This disposition towards data quality 
definitely clashed with Mitchell and Burns’ general philosophy on useful 
empirical evidence, which may have been a second explanation for the NBER’s 
rejection. According to Burns, retrospective data in the U.S. (and perforce in 
every other country) was simply not reliable enough to be used in any 
meaningful way.43   
Kuznets’ answer to this conservatism was to underline the importance of 
the study’s final goal. To those who had a “tendency to shrink from long-term 
estimates [and rationalize it] by references to an increasing inadequacy of the 
data as one goes back in time”, he replied: “we patently need tested information 
about our past, and hence about the conditions that govern our choices today”.44  
According to him, there always were ways around poor data. Sometimes it 
simply meant that one had to change the order of magnitude – data that was 
insufficient to depict a country’s evolution on a year-to-year basis, could still be 
useful for a decade-by-decade analysis. In Kuznets’ view, the latter was much 
better than nothing, as the economist had a responsibility to decision makers 
around him.45  
Kuznets’ personal experience measuring U.S. income for the 19th and early 
20th centuries armed him with the conviction that this was a potentially 
rewarding project, but that it would require sustained work on the conceptual 
and organizational level to carry out satisfactorily. On the conceptual level he 
reflected on the representational value (i.e. the “realisticness”) of each accounting 
                                                   
42 Fogel (2000), 18-20. 
43 Burns would sometimes accuse Kuznets of being a sloppy data collector as recalled by 
Mark Perlman (interview, June 2003). 
44 Kuznets (1952). 
45 Ibid. 
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item. But Kuznets soon came to realize that these conceptual issues were less 
crucial than the necessity to establish reference points from which to draw 
conclusions – hence the need to study more than one country and to do so in a 
standardized way. To some extent it was more important to gather comparable 
data from one country to the next than to strive for representational accounts of 
each place (which may be difficult to compare, as each nation had its institutional 
idiosyncrasies). In other words, his project required a large degree of 
organization and coordination across multiple countries – a goal that would 
either require lots of money or some money and a favorable international 
situation.  
This invites us to reflect on the historical and philosophical literature on 
measuring instruments. Morgan has agreed with Porter that the most powerful 
quantifications are those produced with relatively standardized procedures, yet 
she insisted that this was only a necessary and not a sufficient condition. 
According to her, they must also have representational value, i.e. have a 
counterpart in human beings’ experience. She compared business cycle 
measurements to national income measurements, to show that lack of conceptual 
clarity and representational fit in business cycle indicators accounted for their 
relatively small popularity and dissemination, certainly compared to national 
income accounting concepts like GDP – which were completely taken for granted 
within a few years of their introduction.46  
Seen from this perspective, Kuznets’ advantage should have principally 
come from his instrument’s conceptual fit with reality. Yet his failed attempts to 
convince either the “old” economic historians or NBER economists to go along 
with his vision invites us to go beyond the representational power of national 
income accounting and inquire into the more tangible factors that permitted the 
collection of standardized, comparable data. We must consider the context in 
which Kuznets managed to build an organization, a network and a pattern of 
                                                   
46 Morgan (2003). 
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division of labor. In other words, as Shapin and Schaffer showed in their analysis 
of the air pump and the emergence of experimental culture, one cannot 
understand the power of a measuring instrument without attention to the culture 
and the organizational model it required and promoted.47 
 
3.2 The Organizational Basis 
As can be gleaned from the time line depicted in Figure 4.1, WWII 
temporarily interrupted Kuznets’ work on retrospective accounting.  
Kuznets’ war-time experience appeared to strengthen his conviction that the 
accounting framework was a particularly useful way of depicting the world. In 
1942 he was recruited to the War Production Board by one of his former 
students, Robert Nathan.48 Nathan and Kuznets’ central contribution was to set 
up material procurement in a national accounting framework.49 In doing so they 
established the possibilities and sources for increasing and streamlining 
production. This systematic approach led Kuznets to re-evaluate the Military’s 
post Pearl Harbor plan and suggest ways in which they could avoid exerting 
undue pressure on the civilian economy.50    
Use of national accounts at the War Production Board and in its British 
counterpart was one of several events that turned national income accounting 
into an indispensable tool for economic organization and planning in North 
America and Europe after WWII.  
                                                   
47 See chapter 2 for a discussion of Shapin and Schaffer’s work.  
48 Robert Nathan had been appointed head of the Military Requirements and Industries 
Studies in the Defense Commission in 1940 – this group later changed its name to War 
Production Board; Fogel (2000), 11. 
49 Studenski (1958), 149-54. 
50 Fogel (2000), 11. 
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Figure 4.1: Time line depicting Kuznets’ interest in economic history and retrospective accounting 
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The history of the development and spread of national accounting is a 
multifaceted and fascinating tale that weaves both theoretical and operational 
strands: the growing popularity of Keynes’ ideas, the success of national 
accounts for solving war problems, its adoption by the United Nations as a 
universal communication tool, and its association with the Marshall Plan as an 
obligatory vehicle for accountability are but a few of the tales that have been 
extensively investigated in this rich history.51  
In the late 1940s economists and politicians who wanted to organize 
economic understanding and cooperation between nations on a standardized 
basis pushed for national income accounts. This international standardization 
was principally conducted by American and British economists - Richard Stone 
earned a Nobel prize for his work in this area.52 They succeeded in turning this 
framework into a universally accepted depiction of reality, in a relatively short 
time span.53 This was all the more impressive that there was quite a bit of 
discussion and disagreement about the actual set of concepts that best depicted 
the national economy (their representational value). For example, they held 
protracted discussions on what should and should not be included in 
“income”.54 Yet the main scholars and politicians involved in these discussions 
agreed that the debates needed to be settled and that the standardization of 
accounts was the most pressing issue. With this in mind, they created the 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW) in 1947. 
The IARIW was meant to “bring active scholars working in the field of national 
income and social accounting analysis into organized contact with each other.”55  
                                                   
51 Some of the major contributions are Studenski (1958); Desrosières (2000); Vanoli 
(2002). 
52 Studenski (1958), 160. 
53 Fourquet (1980); Bogaard (1998); Suzuki (2003). 
54 For example, should non-remunerated household work be included in income?  
55 Lundberg, Ed. (1951), v. 
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Kuznets participated in these general conversations on accounting 
concepts and methodology. 56  Yet, his main interest seemed to be slightly 
tangential to the stated goals of the association. He wanted to use this 
organization to do comparative long term, retrospective accounting: 
 
“(…) assembly, review and analysis of estimates of national income, 
wealth and their components for countries for which adequate data 
extend over at least half a century and thus permit observation of longer-
term trends.”57 
  
His stated purpose was to understand “why and how did the different national 
units grow at different rates during the last century”.58 Notice that this was not a 
historical question, for the sake of an historical answer – but a necessary 
historical investigation to understand the present day.  
As can be seen on the time line (Figure 4.1), the IARIW marked the 
beginning of the retrospective accounting initiative. In 1949, Kuznets helped 
create a new SSRC Committee: the Committee on Economic Growth (other 
members included Hoselitz, Spengler and Webbink). 59 He was Chairman of this 
Committee into the late 1960s, and used it along with the IARIW to coordinate 
his international project. He also used the SSRC Committee to raise funds. In 
1953 he obtained a relatively small grant from RF ($7000 per year, for 5 years) to 
help finance research outside the U.S.60 That same year, the Committee on 
Growth also obtained more sizeable funds from the Ford Foundation (FF) who 
                                                   
56 For example he held strong opinions against including government expenditure in 
national income, arguing that this would amount to double counting – see Vanoli (2002). 
57 Kuznets (1952). 
58 Memo written by Kuznets, April 10th 1945. Harvard University Archives, Accession 
88.10, Box 2, Folder “Comparative Economic Growth: Conception and Exploration”. 
59 Minutes from October 8th 1955 meeting. RAC- SSRC, Special collection, Box 143, Folder 
791. 
60 RAC-RF, RG 1.2, Series 200S, Box 554, Folder 4741.  
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kept financing it until 1965. 61  In the early 1960s, Kuznets and Moses Abramovitz 
put forward a request for a post-war comparative growth study: here again 
framed in national accounts. 62 The FF granted their request, awarding $300,000 
for 3 years - ultimately extended to the late 1960s. 63 In 1960 Kuznets helped draft 
a proposal (with other notable national accountants and economists) for a large 
research center on the quantitative aspects of economic growth. The center was 
established at Yale and FF gave it $2 million for ten years. The center sponsored a 
larger version of the IARIW project, including retrospective and current accounts 
for developing nations. 64   
In the period 1950-1958, the SSRC Committee received nearly $370,000 
from Ford and $70,000 from Rockefeller.65 With the additional $300,000 for the 
Abramovitz post-war economic growth project, this amounted to $740,000 
dollars – though this second wave of studies was arguably less historical than the 
first (since it relied mostly on income figures that had been computed by 
statistical offices since WWII).  As we shall see in the “How much was that?” 
interlude Kuznets’ pre-1963 funding was smaller than earlier economist-history 
initiatives. In 2003 dollars, it represented approximately $2.9 million, which 
amounted to about $175,000 per year. Compare this to Gay’s International 
Committee for Price History that had received $4 million in 2003 terms – i.e. 
$780,000 per year.  Kuznets’ grant was also smaller than the CREH grant, and not 
much bigger than the money given to run the RCEntrepH.66   
                                                   
61 Ford Foundation officers had as high an opinion of Kuznets as their Rockefeller 
predecessors: “give Kuznets carte blanche for any work he chooses to do in this field, 
within reasonable dollar limits, of course. I think he is a great man”; Memo from 
Harkavy to Carroll, July 16th 1954. FF, PA 55-28. 
62 Report stating mission of EDA (1962). FF, PA 1429. 
63 This was an important grant and the largest for 1963 (In the annual report they listed it 
as one of 4 most important grants in 1963 – 2 of them were less than $150,000 and one 
other was $300,000). 
64 Yale University Grant for Growth Center, FF, PA 61-42. 
65 Letter from Kuznets to Neil Chamberlain, July 1st 1958. FF, PA 55-28. 
66 For details to these calculations, see the Interlude before chapter 8 in this thesis.  
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Considering the size of Kuznets’ project, and the number of people/teams 
he coordinated with worldwide, this was an impressively efficient use of 
resources. It also revealed the fact that Kuznets was benefiting from the IARIW, 
and a growing number of publicly funded statistical offices – piggy backing on 
their resources. For example, Edmond Malinvaud, who was solicited by Kuznets 
and Abramovitz in 1963 to analyze post-WWII French accounts, recalled that the 
bulk of the costs were carried by l’INSEE (the French national statistical office).67 
This was all the more important given that such data collection exercises 
could be either very expensive, or very time consuming. This had been 
demonstrated in an earlier retrospective initiative in France. As we can see on 
Figure 4.1, Kuznets made three seperate attempts to find the right French project 
manager. In the early 1950s, he had established contact with François Perroux 
who ran an independent research institute in Paris (Institut de Sciences 
Economiques Appliquées - ISEA).  Kuznets had commissioned a survey of all 
national accounting data available in France, with comments on its validity and 
reliability. 68 Perroux had presented these results at a 1951 IARIW conference. 
The report had concluded that 18th and 19th century secondary sources could not 
be trusted, so numbers needed to be computed from disaggregated data. This 
was a large endeavor – which began in 1956, when Kuznets found both the funds 
and a full time project manager, Jan Marczewski. Marczewksi was given enough 
money to hire a couple of junior scholars to help with data collection and 
assembly. They started with production accounts: agriculture (published in 
1961), then industry, and finally services. SSRC funding ran out in the late 1950s, 
                                                   
67 His work was published as Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud (1972).; Edmond 
Malinvaud, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Paris, January 2004.  
68 Perroux and Kuznets had probably been introduced by Richard Stone, whom Perroux 
visited in the late 1940s, and to whom he sent one of his junior collaborators, Jan 
Marczewski; Interviews with Jean Claude Toutain, March 2003; Jacques Mayer, October 
2003 and Andre Vanoli, October 2003.  
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and the partial funding they obtained from the ISEA was not sufficient to forge 
ahead rapidly. The final accounts were only published in the late 1980s!69  
The SSRC could only spare relatively small amounts of money per 
country, as Kuznets was recruiting scholars in a dozen separate places. By the 
mid 1950s he had collaborators (or concrete prospects of collaborators) in ten 
countries: the U.S. (Kuznets, Robert Gallman), U.K. (Phillys Deane, H.J. 
Habbakuk), France (Perroux, Marczewski), Italy (Barberi), Japan (Henry 
Rosovsky), Germany (Mueller, Walter Hoffman), the Netherlands (Jan 
Tinbergen), Sweden (Erik Lindahl), Norway (Central bureau of statistics) and 
Denmark (J. Bjerke). 70 By 1966, when he published his overall results, he had 
data from ten countries in Europe, “four or five overseas offshoots of Europe” 
and Japan.71 
Kuznets chose his collaborators carefully, as the task was not only one of 
measurement (technical) but of organization and interpretation. On the 
organizational side, Kuznets used most of his funds to put together regular 
meetings. One of the regular venues was the annual IARIW conference, but he 
also organized separate events: 
 
“Much of the analysis would depend for its relevance and validity upon 
the comparative aspects of the study (in the sense that finding the factor X 
responsible for economic growth in country A could be checked to see 
whether that factor was also present in county B and did not produce 
growth). It is therefore important that at certain phases in the inquiry, 
particularly in the early stages of planning, in the formulation of 
explanatory hypotheses, in devising of tests for the latter, in the evaluation 
                                                   
69 Chapter 5 will show that this delay was not principally driven by missing resources.  
70 Minutes of October 8th 1955 meeting of the Committee on economic growth. RAC-
Special, RG SSRC, Box 143, Folder 791. 
71 Kuznets (1966), 505. 
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of the future bearing of the factors there be adequate communication 
among scholars in the several countries.”72 
 
On the interpretational side, he required his scholars to be “imaginative” and 
well read: 
 
“The assembly, review and interpretation [of the data] require familiarity 
not only with the basic economic and other statistics of the country, but 
also with… its economic history, which is the background against which 
inferences suggested by the imperfect data can be checked.”73  
 
This need to rely on qualitative information to understand sources and interpret 
the data was well recognized by all national accountants, and sometimes led to 
pessimistic scenarios about the value of retrospective accounting. As Jacques 
Mayer, a mathematician and active participant in France’s early national 
accounts said when reflecting on the feasibility of retrospective study: 
 
“You know a great many things that are not in the accounts, and that give 
these accounts a great depth, and that enable you – though you use and cite 
only numbers – to speak sentences that the straightforward reading of 
numbers would not have allowed. A few years later- very few – all this 
disappears… which shows how difficult and misleading it is to reconstruct 
a past epoch using numbers, and how limited our interpretations should be 
even if we have many precise numbers.  There is a terrible loss of 
information. This was obvious to someone like me, who literally lived with 
numbers.”74  
                                                   
72  General outline of study, Kuznets, March 6th 1963. FF, PA 1429. 
73 Kuznets (1952), 9. 
74 “Vous savez énormément de choses qui ne sont pas dans les comptes, qui donnent à 
ces comptes une très grande richesse, et qui - tout en vous appuyant sur les chiffres, en 
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For scholars like Mayer, the reason present-day accounts were useful was 
because they were implicitly supplemented by tacit knowledge about the 
economy. The accountant did not only construct aggregates; he also partook in 
the general life of his nation, and used this extra information when interpreting 
numbers. There was a crucial hidden component to an accounting representation 
of the world – which was a core part of the accountant’s activity.   
Yet recognizing the need to put flesh on the numbers did not entail much 
collaboration with local economic historians. If anything, Kuznets’ collaborators 
seemed to be suspicious of existing historical accounts of economic growth. In 
France, Perroux, then Marczewski worked in complete isolation from the 
growing number of Annales economic historians. And in the U.K. Deane seemed 
to be avoiding the work of British scholars: 
 
“Phyllis Deane of the Department [of applied economics at Cambridge] is 
the British member of the Kuznets empire… she says she has gotten very 
little help from the standard economic history materials, finding that 
economic historians either misused or ignored the available statistics.”75 
 
As we shall see in section 4 of this chapter, this lack of collaboration and general 
disregard of much of the work produced by other economist/economic-
historians was an indication of how much they differed on their appreciation of 
reliable evidence.  
                                                                                                                                                       
ne citant pas d’autres chiffres que ceux qui sont là-dedans - vous permettent de dire des 
phrases que la simple lecture de ces chiffres seuls ne vous auraient pas permis de dire. 
Quelques années plus tard – un petit nombre – tout ceci disparaît… ce qui montre à quel 
point la reconstruction d’une époque à l’aide d’une information chiffrée est trompeuse et 
difficile, et à quel point il faut se contenter, même si les chiffres sont nombreux et précis, 
d’interprétations assez générales. Il y a une perte d’information terrible. Pour moi qui, 
vraiment, vivais au milieu de ces chiffres, ça a été frappant.” Fourquet (1980), 365-7. 
75 From Kermit Gordon’s report to the Ford Foundation (p. 17), visit to Europe, March-
May 1957. FF- unprocessed accession, Box 14501.  
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4 The impact of a National Accounting view on economic history 
4.1 The Perennial debate at work: Rostow v. Kuznets 
One way to understand the disagreements between Kuznets and other 
economic historians is to relate them to a long lasting debate about the proper 
nature of observation in economics. This connection clearly came out at a 1960 
meeting in Konstanz, Germany, that regrouped numerous economists interested 
in historical examinations of growth.  As we shall see in an analysis of the 
debates, though there was some discussion around whether and at what stage 
one should use “evidence” (i.e. discussion between sides of the circle depicted in 
Figure 2.3), the most bitter disputes occurred among scholars who could all be 
placed on the left side of the figure.  
Kuznets organized the conference with the stated purpose to discuss Walt 
Rostow’s recently published book The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-
Communist Manifesto. Rostow argued that economies transitioned from 
traditional to modern stages via a twenty-year growth spurt, which he called the 
“take-off”. These decades were crucial, as a country could fail to use this 
momentum to launch sustainable growth. To reach this desirable final stage, the 
country’s population needed to be psychologically predisposed to take 
advantage of risk and opportunity and follow the lead of the most dynamic 
sectors.  
Rostow had been developing his theory for nearly a decade and Kuznets 
had been arguing with him for as many years. For Kuznets, Rostow’s ideas were 
the epitome of unfounded generalizations based on fuzzy concepts and 
inadequate empirical investigation. In 1951 they had exchanged several letters 
reflecting this disagreement.  Kuznets acknowledged their shared interests, but 
treated Rostow much as he had viewed the CREH historians: good intentions did 
not suffice and were potentially more dangerous than no historical work at all. 
He expressed this in a 1951 letter to Rostow: 
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Figure 4.2. Walt Whitman Rostow (1916-2003)76 
 
 
 
 
“I am in full sympathy with the attempt that you are undertaking to fuse 
economic analysis with economic history. But it is perhaps because of 
such sympathy and keen interest in the task, which I also have been 
                                                   
76 Walt Whitman Rostow was born in NYC in 1916, from Jewish immigrant parents. He 
went to Yale, Oxford (Rhodes Scholar) and back to Yale for his Ph.D. He served during 
the war (at the Office of Special Services, which later became the CIA) then taught at 
Oxford and Cambridge (with an interruption to work for the Marshall plan) before 
returning to the U.S., where he held a chair at MIT. He joined the Kennedy 
administration in 1960, and was not invited to resume teaching duties at MIT in 1968, 
when he left politics. Picture from 
http://texana.texascooking.com/gifs/news/rostow.gif 
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attempting intermittently, that my feeling of the shortness of the distance 
that the present discussion succeeds in advancing is so strong.”77 
 
 Kuznets was acknowledging their similar commitment to empirical work 
leading to a theory of growth and this made him all the more critical of Rostow’s 
hasty generalizations. Kuznets found most of Rostow’s concepts (for example the 
notion of “propensities to innovate, to emulate, to take risks” and certainly his 
concepts of different stages like the take-off, or the mass-consumption nirvana) 
very vague, hence un-observable (by which he meant un-measurable). In 
response, Rostow asserted that his theory of propensities and stages arose 
“directly from such knowledge as I have of history” – thus claiming that his 
theory was empirically based.78 Kuznets found this empiricism to be no better 
than Classical or Marxist hasty generalizations. Yet their epistolary exchanges 
did very little to convince either man to change course. Rostow stuck to his 
theory (which he published in 1960), and Kuznets continued – in a very NBER 
fashion – to live in hope of theories that would appear from the evidence, 
provided it were gathered systematically.  
 Rostow’s work obviously continued to irk Kuznets, and he displayed this 
annoyance fully at the 1960 meeting. Thirty-seven scholars were in attendance. 
The minutes of their discussions were transcribed at the end of the conference 
proceedings, edited by Rostow in 1963.79 Among the participants, Kuznets was 
the most vehement anti-Rostowian. He had urged his retrospective accounting 
teams in at least 5 separate countries to bring the adequate statistical material to 
prove that there had been no such thing as “take-off”. Of the sixteen scholars 
who presented papers at the 1960 conference, six were directly linked to his 
                                                   
77 Kuznets to Rostow, June 25th 1951. Harvard University Archives, Accession 88.10, 
Box1, Folder “Correspondence 1940s-1950s”. 
78 Rostow  to Kuznets, June 18th 1951. Harvard University Archives, Accession 88.10, 
Box1, Folder “Correspondence 1940s-1950s”.  
79 Rostow, Ed. (1963). 
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“empire” (Kuznets, Habakkuk, Deane, Cairncross, Hoffman and Marczewski). 80 
They seemed to be responding to a shared task - to confirm that they could not 
find a relatively brief period of time during which the rate of investment had 
doubled and during which national income had grown at an accelerated rate 
(according to Kuznets, these were the only precise and thus testable features of 
“take- off” in Rostow’s text).81  
The statistical data presented by Marczewski (for France), Deane (for the 
U.K.), Hoffman (for Germany) and Cairncross (for Canada) were not consistent 
with Rostow’s definition nor with his dating of the take-off in each of these 
countries. Instead their data displayed a rather continuous and gradual increase 
in capital formation throughout the period of study. Kuznets’ paper presented a 
multi country synthesis relying on evidence from additional countries - Sweden 
(where his collaborator Johansson’s data showed that the ratio of investment to 
income doubled in eight decades, not just two or three), Japan (where Rosovsky’s 
data showed that it took four or five decades of erratic movements to double the 
ratio) and the U.S. (where he cited his student Gallman’s work) - and promised 
that he would have extensive data on at least 12 countries in the near future.82  
Having tested what he considered to be the only testable features of Rostow’s 
hypothesis on so many countries he concluded “that the available evidence lends 
no support to Professor Rostow’s suggestions”.83  
Kuznets enjoined the members of the conference to go back to the 
drawing board and locate the key decades of modern economic growth for each 
country. They could then focus on these crucial periods to bring to light the 
causes of long-lasting economic success, without any a-priori assumptions about 
                                                   
80 Habbakuk, Deane, Hoffman and Marczewski were mentioned in section 3. The 
Scottish economist Alec Cairncross was a member of the IARIW who took interest in the 
retrospective project. Though he was not financed by the SSRC, he partook in many of 
the IARIW retrospective discussions. 
81 Rostow, Ed. (1963), 30-35. 
82 Ibid, 34. 
83 Ibid, 35. 
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what to look for.84 In other words, Kuznets discarded all of Rostow’s work as 
unscientific; though the energy he consecrated to doing this – compared to his 
rather hands-off disregard of the CREH’s work – is an indication of how much 
more threatening Rostow’s work was to him.  
Kuznets was not the only person at the 1960 meeting to call Rostow’s 
work unscientific.  Robert Solow, a rising star in growth economics was also 
dubious of the foundations of Rostow’s theory.85  Unlike Kuznets, he was not so 
much concerned with the empirical foundations of the theory, as he was with its 
logical underpinnings. He followed Popperian lines, arguing that Rostow’s 
hypothesis was un-testable. 86 He found that Rostow’s tendency to evade 
Kuznets’ specific counter-tests, by referring to untestable psychological 
dispositions of the population at large, and the inspirational impact of “leading” 
industrial sectors for example) was evidence that Rostow’s concepts were too 
flexible, hence unscientific. Several decades later, Solow would recall his 
participation at the meeting as having been motivated by uneasiness: 
 
“I had great doubts that what Walt [Rostow] was doing was unambiguous 
enough to be a basis for theorizing about economic growth. I thought that 
his concepts were too elastic, too capable of being redefined to fit any set 
of facts. That is not a good way to do theory. What you need are ideas that 
are refutable, that you could say these are inconsistent with the data.”87 
 
                                                   
84 Ibid, 35-7. 
85 Robert Solow was born in 1924 – he earned the 1987 Nobel Prize for “his contributions 
to the theory of economic growth”.  By 1960 he was well known for his groundbreaking 
theoretical article on the sources of economic growth - Solow (1956). 
86 Solow argued in favor of a Popperian criterion of scientificity: if there was no event 
that was inconsistent with Rostow’s outlook – as this conference seemed to have shown - 
then it was not a scientific theory; see “Final Session” in Rostow, Ed. (1963). 
87 Robert and Barbara Solow, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Boston, June 2004. 
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 Though Solow and Kuznets both had doubts about the scientificity of 
Rostow’s work they disagreed about the diagnosis and the remedy. Kuznets 
disputed Rostow for doing inadequate empirical work. The remedy was more 
careful and systematic empirical work. Solow on the other hand warned Rostow 
against vague, un-testable generalizations. The remedy was more rigorous 
abstract, logical work. As he recalled in a 2004 interview: 
 
“ I don’t think that my take on all that was like Simon’s [Kuznets] (…) 
Simon wanted to say, well here is this punctilio, and that punctilio and 
Rostow does not get that right. But we are not to be critical of each 
punctilio, it’s the main design. Rostow’s general point did not seem to 
have any logical basis and did not correspond to the broad outline of 
growth.” 88 
 
Solow’s own work on growth theory was indication of his views on proper 
scientific method: he developed macro-economic models (expressed in 
mathematical terms) and tested them on available data. For this second step, he 
was immensely grateful to Simon Kuznets and his students - “if you are 
interested in long term growth, then you need long runs of data” – but he did not 
expect the “reasonable” and “logical” theories to organically emerge from the 
data. He further developed this point by suggesting that Rostow and Kuznets 
were perhaps more alike than Kuznets had been willing to acknowledge:  
 
“The interesting thing about Simon of course, was that he too was capable 
of making broad generalizations that were not accurate in every detail. 
Take for example the Kuznets environmental curve - in the early stages of 
development societies paid a lot of attention to the environment, then in 
the course of industrialization, they diminished this attention but paid 
                                                   
88 Robert and Barbara Solow, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Boston, June 2004. 
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more attention as they got richer (…) So he did a lot of generalizing at a 
very high level from just a selection of facts, without asking really for a 
logical basis, without asking why a reasonable person would believe this 
to be a true statement.”89 
 
Thus Solow was confirming the fact that “scientificity” debates could rage as 
hard within the “empirical” side of the circle, as between so-called empiricists 
and more deductive, logic driven economists.  
 These debates may have become more acerbic as a result of this proximity, 
yet their existence seemed to be tied to stakes that went beyond the community 
of economist-historians. Indeed, the fact that Rostow’s book could have spurred 
such disagreement and effort (it had cost Kuznets’ teams time and money to test 
Rostow’s hypothesis; and these resources could have been used to pursue the 
comparative work that was supposed to generate knowledge on the causes of 
growth) was an indication of the growing popularity of development economics 
and growth studies after WWII. Participants at the meeting included 
representatives of development agencies, like the U.N. or Brazilian Institute of 
Economics – a sign that economic historians were partaking in a high stakes 
conversation and that their knowledge and conclusions were being solicited and 
used.  
Growth and development themes had quickly become the raison d’être of 
economic history. As early as 1947, for example, the EHA’s annual meetings and 
JEH Tasks issue was built around a “growth” theme. 90 In some ways, economic 
historians were jumping on a popular bandwagon, as student demand for classes 
in these areas created opportunities that savvy job seekers would not have failed 
to recognize, and by 1960, young economic historians were being hired to teach 
                                                   
89 Robert and Barbara Solow, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Boston, June 2004. 
90 Economic History Association (1947). The contributors included Schumpeter, 
Spengler, Kuznets, Usher and Gerschenkron. 
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development economics. 91 Yet the connection was not just opportunistic - there 
was a scientific justification for studying growth through time, thus through 
history. This historical material could be used in various ways. For some 
researchers, past economic events were used as a laboratory in which one could 
establish the relative role of various factors for economic growth. 92  For others, 
successful nations (namely Britain and the U.S.) could reveal the secret recipe for 
industrialization. 93 For others, failures or delays to industrialize could also be 
used to identify crucial factors. 94  
Foundation officers recognized the connection between growth and 
economic history. As a Ford Foundation officer said in 1960: 
 
“[I was sent] to visit a number of universities in the U.S. to get some idea 
of what work was being done in the field of economic development. After 
staff discussions the feeling was unanimous that (…) the basic research in 
economic development seems more and more to be research in economic 
history. I should say, indeed, that work in economic history has high 
priority in the social sciences program and that this has been true for at 
least three years.”95 
 
In recognizing it, they contributed to spread this connection between economic 
history and development economics, as we shall see in chapter 6. As the stakes 
                                                   
91 Paul David recalled having been hired at Stanford in the early 1960s for this reason. 
Paul David, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Palo Alto, January 2004.  
92 Recall from section 3.2 that Kuznets’ project was supposed to ultimately approximate 
controlled experiments by comparing crucial factors from one country to the next and 
eliminating those that did not really matter. 
93 The « old » economic historians were operating under the hypothesis that there was 
something special about American economic history – see chapter 3.  
94 Alexander Gerschenkon made a huge impact on the discipline by studying nations 
that had undergone late or incomplete industrialization and suggesting that 
governments could make up for “missing pre-requisites” – see chapter 6. 
95 Letter from EWM to Landes, March 1st 1960. RAC-RF, RG 1.2, Series 200, Box 566, 
Folder 4846. 
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grew higher, various schools of economist-historians were pushed into disputing 
each others’ findings and methods – this may be one of the “outside factors” that 
explained Kuznets’ eagerness to discredit Rostow and the focus on scientificity 
debates at the 1960 meeting. 
 
4.2 Kuznets’ legacy to American and world-wide economist-history 
With hindsight, Kuznets’ agenda for economist-history lasted much longer 
than Rostow’s. In 1960, Kuznets’ teams had already been active for a decade and 
they would be going strong for several more. In 1971, Kuznets was awarded the 
Nobel Prize for his “empirically founded interpretation of economic growth”. 
Yet the most telling example of the retrospective accounting initiative’s success 
was its transformation into a research program that went well beyond Kuznets’ 
direct involvement. The tasks he had defined were taken up by generations of 
subsequent economists. In Lakatosian terms, Kuznets had defined the 
methodological “hard core” (overall, quantitative and comparative work), but 
the “periphery” was subject to constant renewal and slight adjustments.96 There 
were new countries to add from the developed and underdeveloped world. Also, 
researchers could always go further back in time. When Purchasing Power Parity 
calculations were developed in the 1960s, there were opportunities to make 
international data more comparable etc… The size of this program can be 
gleaned from a quick review of the bibliography in Angus Maddison’s latest 
volume of historical statistics. He has seven pages of bibliography just for studies 
of national income and population in Western Europe. For the GDP series, there 
are more than 40 separate sources of historical quantitative work produced 
between 1949 and 2001, with an average of 3 per country.97 In other words, 
Kuznets’ project gave a lot of people a lot of work! 
                                                   
96 Lakatos (1983). 
97 Maddison (2003). 
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 Kuznets also impacted American economic-history through his students. 
Figure 4.3 not only highlights the connection between Kuznets and some of the 
greatest contributors to American retrospective accounts (Robert Gallman, 
Richard Easterlin and Moses Abramovitz), but also his connection with many of 
the most prominent cliometricians – in particular with Robert Fogel and 
Douglass North, who received the 1993 Nobel Prize for “renewing research in 
economic history”. Fogel was Kuznets’ Ph.D. student at Johns Hopkins 
University; and Douglass North spent two years at the NBER, where he made 
weekly visits to Kuznets at Johns Hopkins.98 Also notice the connection with 
Lance Davis and Duncan McDougall, who organized the first cliometric 
meetings at Purdue University in the early 1960s, as we shall see in chapter 7.  
Though the connection between Kuznets and cliometrics existed at this 
genealogical level, it is harder to establish it at a more substantive level. Indeed, 
the cliometricians’ greater reliance on theoretical models seemed to be at odds 
with Kuznets’ general suspicion of abstract reasoning. Chapter 7 will provide a 
closer examination of the differences between Kuznets and the cliometric 
movement via an analysis of Robert Fogel’s work. In this chapter, without fully 
tackling the relationship between Kuznetsian retrospective accounting and 
cliometrics we inquire into the immediate ways in which Kuznets’ work seemed 
to have changed work in economic history and analyze the factors that gave his 
program such power among economist-historians.
                                                   
98 Douglass North, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray via phone, St Louis, February 
2004.   
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Figure 4.3. Kuznets’ Lineage in American economist-history 
 
 
 
4.3 Kuznets’ impact (1): A systemic view of the past 
In practically every conversation that Kuznets had with other economist-
historians he highlighted the necessity to apprehend the past in an overall, 
systemic way, rather than relying on piecemeal pictures that would have to be 
assembled later. He had done this at the 1940 RF roundtable on economic history 
and he did it again at the 1960 “take-off” conference. In this respect,  Kuznets’ 
retrospective accounts were a real innovation in economic history – and 
constituted a radical departure from views predicated on index numbers of a 
particular product or price, or on a constellation of monographs about 
entrepreneurs, or even on a description of the evolution of the entrepreneurial 
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system. 99 For many of Kuznets’ collaborators, there was something very 
appealing to this macro-economic view of the past, not only because it was 
aggregative, but also because it helped visualize the relationships among various 
sectors of the economy.  
The conceptual power of this view is illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 – taken 
from the first report on French retrospective accounts, published in 1952.100 These 
figures represented snapshots of the French economy in 1788 and 1845 – showing 
the system, and the anatomical breakdown of parts. Representations like those 
depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 were a powerful descriptive tool. The author 
fitted the data he had accumulated from various historical sources into a simple 
accounting model (figures on charts corresponded to millions of pounds, 
“livres”). In this model, there were three classes of consumers, defined by the 
source of their income – salariés or wage earners, rentiers or people with private 
means and revenus mixtes, i.e. all other consumers. There were three sources of 
production (agriculture, industry and services), and their accounts could be read 
in the tables preceding these diagrams, though the author had chosen to merge 
them into one large production box in the drawings. Other sectors included the 
state (Etat) and foreign lands (Exterieur), and all Investment (Inv-sst) amounted to 
buying goods from the productive sectors. Arrows between the boxes 
symbolized flows of money or goods from one category to another. Figure 4.5 
had more arrows than Figure 4.4, reflecting changes in the general structure of 
the French economy. For example, the arrow connecting salariés to Etat (with the 
number 50) was meant to reflect wage-earners’ savings, a phenomenon that had 
only reached noticeable scale in the 19th century.  
                                                   
99 As mentioned earlier Kuznets did not “invent” retrospective accounting, but he 
certainly was the first to ‘diffuse’ it in the profession (hence the term innovation, rather 
than invention). 
100 Mayer (1952). This was a revised version of the original report presented by Perroux 
at the 1951 IARIW meetings. 
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Figure 4.4 The French economy in 1788101 Figure 4.5 The French economy in 1845102 
  
                                                   
101 Ibid, 121. 
102 Ibid, 123. 
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These time shots of the French economy at 50-year intervals (there was a 
third set of accounts for 1890) could yield a quick sense of the growth of the 
French economy in the interim (the boxes and arrows in each chart were bigger 
than the previous). It is revealing that the authors felt compelled to add drawings 
to their tables, as if there were something intrinsically “visible” about the 
accounts. This may have been a French idiosyncrasy, linked to the legacy of 
François Quesnay’s Tableau Economique.103 As accounting tables became more 
frequently used, the visual intermediary was abandoned, perhaps because it was 
less useful (the “view” was now available to them in the tabular form, due to 
habit), though tables always made it difficult to think in terms of stocks 
(depicting only annual flows).  Kuznets for example only relied on tables, and his 
1966 opus magnum (Modern Economic Growth) did not have a single chart or 
diagram.  
Though the French model was a simplified version of reality, and 
contained certain assumptions about what may be most useful for understanding 
the origins and dynamics of economic growth, it did not carry much causal 
weight. Indeed, it was not tied to any specific theory of growth. Yet it could 
easily feed into macro-economic theories of growth and to a great extent called 
for them. Indeed the comparison between such snapshots invited the question 
“why”: why and how had the French economy grown? Was one of the boxes, or 
one of the arrows depicted in the chart responsible for this growth? Alone, 
national accounts could not answer this question. However, they could if they 
were combined with Keynesian theory (as they were in the 1940s) or 
macroeconomic growth theory (as they were in the 1950s and 1960s). The power 
of this overall, systemic view was precisely the fact that it combined a strong 
descriptive value with theoretical flexibility: economist-historians could use the 
                                                   
103 The French “physiocrat” Quesnay (1694-1774) produced one of the first visual 
depictions of flows of income and wealth among different groups and sectors 
(agricultural, landlords, workers) between 1758 and 1767.  
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accounting view in tandem with a theory of growth or as a stand-alone means of 
investigating the past. This latter strategy was Kuznets’ preferred method, and 
he continuously expressed his doubts about the relevance or utility of most 
theories of economic change.104 Kuznets preferred to use the accounting view of 
the past to generate his own generalizations like the environment curve 
mentioned by Robert Solow, or the famous “inverted U” curve that was meant to 
describe the evolution of income inequality in developing nations.  
Compared to an entrepreneurial view, or even Rostow’s leading sector 
view, the accounting view had a distinct advantage. It was systemic (which the 
entrepreneurial view was not), though it was conceptually precise, by itself it 
provided no account of the causes of growth (which Rostow’s leading sector 
view did, as leading sectors were by definition agents of economic growth) and it 
provided the raw materials to test popular growth and development theories 
and to generate hypotheses.  
 
4.4 Kuznets’ impact (2): Changing the relative value of different types of 
evidence 
The spread of the retrospective accounting mindset entailed changes in 
economist-historians’ notions of reliable evidence. This battle of the evidences 
surfaced at the 1960 meeting, indicating that there already was a clear distinction 
between Kuznets type economic history and the work done by other economist-
historians (Rostow, or students who had trained at the Harvard Center for 
                                                   
104 See for example his refutation of the commonly held belief that the structure of 
human wants necessarily entailed a shift in overall production capacities away from 
agriculture towards manufactured goods. This hypothesis was based on Engel’s “law” 
that the propensity to consume food-stuffs decreased with income - as individuals, and 
nations got richer, they spent a decreasing proportion of their revenue on agricultural 
goods. According to Kuznets, one could find many other explanations for the shift 
towards industrial goods, not least differential rates of invention and innovation across 
sectors. In any case, he found no convincing evidence that Engel’s law did indeed exist 
and was at play, Kuznets (1966), 101-4. 
Chapter 4 – Measuring the Past through National Income Accounts  
 162
Research in Entrepreneurial History like David Landes), even though cliometrics 
had not yet made a public appearance (though it was about to, as we shall see in 
chapter 7).  
One striking feature of the 1960 Konstanz discussions was the near 
immediate division of participants into two camps: those who argued in favor of 
aggregate views of the past and those who argued against it, privileging instead 
studies of particular sectors (like the textile or transportation industry). This 
divide overlapped with people’s assessment of how to evaluate Rostow’s theory: 
the aggregate people wanted to see statistical evidence of the so-called “take-off” 
period, while the sectoral people were more interested in detailed studies of a 
particular “leading sector” and the way in which it may have influenced other 
sectors up and down the industrial chain. As Rostow clearly put it: “to confine 
growth analysis to [aggregates] is to play the piano while wearing mittens”. 105 
For several conference participants, the idea that certain dynamic sectors had 
changed the way Western economies functioned was very compelling – and even 
members of Kuznets’ “empire” tried to substantiate it. Hoffman, for example, 
studied the effects of railroad construction on overall growth, tracing its 
downstream influence to mining – and willingly acknowledged that both had 
been “leading” sectors for Germany in the mid 19th century.106  
The macro-micro divide overlapped with notions of quantification. 
During the conference, Rostow repeatedly alluded to the example of the 
American railway, stating that its  “forward and backward linkages” could not 
be reduced to calculation. 107 David Landes worried that quantified aggregate 
views could miss crucial changes. He used Deane and Habbakuk’s paper as an 
                                                   
105 Rostow, Ed. (1963). 
106 Hoffman (1963). 
107 The choice of railroads was ironic: at that exact time (early 1960s), Kuznets’ student 
Robert Fogel was following the former’s lead and measuring the impact of the railroad 
on the 19th century American economy, an endeavor that would trigger enduring 
controversy among economic historians. Chapter 7 explores this controversy in more 
detail.  
Chapter 4 – Measuring the Past through National Income Accounts  
 163
example, saying that they had paid insufficient attention to technological 
innovation in late 18th century England: 
 
“Professor Landes suggested first that it was a mistake, in view of the 
small place of iron, and even manufacturing industry as a whole, in a 
largely agricultural economy, to expect changes in one sector, however 
revolutionary, to have a massive and immediate impact on overall 
national income. Second he wanted to stress the qualitative importance of 
these changes, which went well beyond what the authors had said in the 
paper. For example, in iron there was the whole development of puddling 
and rolling techniques… indeed one could say that a whole new system of 
production on the use of machines and mechanical power was being 
introduced.”108 
 
Kuznets immediately disagreed with Landes: 
 
“ Professor Kuznets said he would quarrel with Professor Landes about 
the revolutionary technical changes at the end of the eighteenth century. 
These were revolutionary in retrospect, but would not have appeared in 
this light at the time. The crucial question was whether one regarded a 
change as important when it was first introduced, and when people were 
impressed by it, or at the date when the change actually became important 
because of its weight in the economy.”109  
 
Kuznets was clearly saying that a change that did not register on the national 
accounts tables was not worthy of the economic historian’s attention. This was a 
strong claim considering that much of the data he and his collaborators relied on 
                                                   
108 Rostow, Ed. (1963), 335. 
109 Ibid, 336. 
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was rather patchy. Compared to the evidence Landes was using (contemporary 
testimonies from individuals who had witnessed the invention and deployment 
of new technologies for example) there certainly could have been disagreement 
about which was more reliable for painting a tableau of late 18th century 
England.  As we shall see in chapter 5 economic historians were disputing the  
relative merits of “found” (in an archive, in a text) versus “created” (by a 
measuring instrument) data.  
 One may be tempted to ascribe the Kuznets-Landes disagreement to 
differences over the relative merits of quantified v. qualitative evidence. Yet this 
may miss the central bone of contention. Indeed, Kuznets was equally critical of 
Rostow’s evidence, which was to a great extent made up of quantities, and 
tables. When we compared Kuznets’ use of numbers to Anne Bezanson’s prices 
and price indices earlier, we insisted that the difference was not quantification 
but rather the systemic nature of Kuznets’ evidence, and the national accounting 
framework’s ability to create data. It may thus be more useful to think of various 
types of evidence in these terms, rather than focus solely, or principally on 
quantified v. qualitative features of the data.  
The following table compares different types of evidence used by various 
groups of economist-historians. When one compares the entries in the table 
below, the two striking features are the power of the national accounts data to 
check the validity of each individual piece of evidence (a power that the other 
groups did not have) and its related ability to create evidence: to make estimates. 
This double validation and creation power is better understood in the 
comparison with Rostow. While Kuznets was correct in saying that the CREH, 
“old” economic historians did not have a systemic view of the past, this critique 
was incorrect when applied to Rostow. Indeed, as Rostow had himself pointed 
out:   
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“when [sectoral analysis] is done systematically the sequence of growth 
becomes not merely a matter of movement in the aggregates, it becomes a 
succession of surges, in clustered sectors, linked in turn to the sequence of 
leading sectors.”110 
 
Figure 4.6: Different Types of Evidence 
 Type of Evidence Means of assessing its Validity 
“Old” 
Economic 
Historians:  
eg: 
Bezanson, 
Cole, Landes 
Piecemeal; Quantitative; 
Qualitative: 
eg: prices, index numbers, 
testimonies from individuals 
(diaries), business account 
books 
Critical examination of sources; 
triangulation of evidence 
Kuznetsians:  
eg: Kuznets, 
Deane, 
Gallman 
Systemic; Quantitative: 
eg: all initial data aggregated 
into industrial, sectoral or 
national figure; averages; 
estimates 
Cross checking data using accounting 
equations and construction of separate 
accounts (production, consumption 
and income) 
Rostow  
 
Systemic; piecemeal; 
quantitative; qualitative 
eg: market share of leading 
sector; growth rates of 
national income; evidence of 
innovation and business 
practices being spread from 
leading sector to other sectors. 
Piecemeal data is assessed via critical 
examination of sources; no way to 
check validity of the evidence that is 
supposed to show the relationship 
from one sector to all others, except by 
checking its consistency with the 
general causal account. 
 
Thus Rostow had an overall view of the past, and one that may well have 
fit into a clearly defined conceptual framework, like a Leontief Input-Output 
table for example. Had he built Input-Output tables for a sequence of years, on 
regular intervals, he may well have been able to observe these clusters and 
movements in a systemic way, and even benefited from the data creation power 
of such a strong conceptual view. It would also have had the advantage 
described in section 4.3 of being theoretically weak: there would have been 
                                                   
110 Ibid, xvii. 
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opportunity to revise the leading sector view, while retaining a sectoral analysis, 
as input-output tables were neutral with respect to causality (to build them, you 
did not need to know which sector had presumably driven the economy). 
The contrast between this imaginary input-output view of the past, and 
the actual retrospective accounting view that Simon Kuznets developed is 
informative on several levels.111 First it highlights the power of a conceptually 
strong, but theoretically neutral framework, both to check and to create data. 
Second it reminds us of the important resource and organizational elements that 
underlay these economist-history initiatives.  As Robert Solow said in response 
to a question about the feasibility of retrospective input-output analysis in the 
1960s: 
 
“It was very expensive – in terms of time. I don’t think that the median 
economic historian had those resources. It is not a starter for an economic 
historian, or a team; way too much number crunching.”112 
 
Retrospective accounts may have been slightly less resource-heavy, and more 
easily amenable to time-series analysis.113 Yet Kuznets’ central contribution was 
to make them feasible  - to piggy-back on the IARIW, to leverage the demand for 
development knowledge, and to use the ever growing number of statistical 
offices and national income accountants. This organizational element was the key 
to ensure feasibility and sufficient standardization for the ensuing comparative 
and causal analysis of growth.   
                                                   
111 Some economist-historians had attempted to build input-output views of the past, see 
for example Meyer (1955). This was not very common, possibly because of the greater 
effort and data requirements for this type of retrospective (and contemporary) exercise. 
For a discussion of the relative merits of contemporary NIA and Input-Output views, 
see Vanoli (2002).  
112 Robert and Barbara Solow, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Boston, June 2004. 
113 Whereas input-output tables have to evolve with the economy, reflecting the birth of 
new activity, and the death of old ones – this potentially complicated comparative 
analysis. 
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5 Conclusion 
The spread of a national accounting view of the past contributed to 
marginalize types of evidence that did not register on this measuring instrument 
and promote those that did. This resulted in a wider adoption of systemic 
(aggregate, macro-economic), quantitative and estimated data, while economic 
historians who used other types of evidence were pushed into “history”, thus 
erecting previously inexistent barriers inside economic history. As we shall see in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7, the bearers of different types of evidence (piecemeal, found, 
whether quantitative or qualitative) clashed against this new generation of 
Kuznetsian economist-historians, in particular over the issue of estimation, and 
the configuration of the economic history space was altered to reflect these 
battles over what constituted legitimate evidence. 
The conceptual, but perhaps even more importantly the organizational 
effort that Simon Kuznets deployed to spread retrospective accounts are 
paramount for understanding the success of this initiative. It also depended on a 
favorable international situation that could provide the resources for such a large 
project. In a century long debate that had pitted observers versus abstract 
thinkers, Kuznets was able to leverage the long promised empirical-comparative 
method thanks to an international organization that could support the standard 
procedures to insure the comparability of the data. Thus, there is no determinism 
in this story – had it not been for the proliferation of national income accounts in 
the 1940s and the growing demand for knowledge about economic development 
Solow’s point about the dissuasive cost of input-output tables may well have 
applied to Kuznets’ plan. Though Simon Kuznets’ measuring instrument did 
have the superiority of theoretical flexibility, there were other ways of 
representing the economy that appealed to economist-historians and buttressed 
their objections to his project. As we shall see in chapter 5, the question of 
evidence, and of what constitutes reliable evidence in economic history was not 
easily closed in France. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
 
 
ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN ECONOMISTS AND HISTORIANS  
IN FRANCE: 1950s -1960s 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
  The history of economic history in 20th century France is a vast and complex one, 
not least because it weaves into the story of Annales - an episode in French social science 
and humanities that defies any easy classification. But the story of mid 20th century 
French economist-history is not the history of Annales or of economic history at large, 
but of a much smaller set of events, that can be roughly characterized as encounters 
between « economists » and « Annales historians ». Indeed, French economists who 
sought to do history inevitably ran into this increasingly well-established group of 
economic, social and cultural historians.  
For French economists, the task of setting up an economist-history separate from 
Annales proved to be impossible. The difficulties stemmed from several factors. Among 
them was the fact that the empiricist and historical vision that had motivated 
economists like Arthur Cole or Simon Kuznets to create economic history in the U.S. 
had already been largely appropriated by the Annales movement. Though these scholars 
belonged to history departments, they favored an explanatory history aimed at 
understanding man in society. In other words, the movement may well have been 
fulfilling many historically inclined economists’ wishes, thus precluding the need for 
any separate economist-history. 
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In principle, the fact that certain economists shared Annalistes’ views should not 
have hindered collaboration, and did make it possible for some economists to join the 
Annales interdisciplinary bandwagon. Yet, these economists were inevitably led to 
accept the view that all social phenomena were essentially multifaceted, and that 
consequently it made little sense to study them in disciplinary isolation. Economic 
history was not a stand-alone field for Annalistes but rather symbiotically tied to social, 
cultural and to some extent political history. Economists who did try to erect it as a 
separate activity ran into Annales’ well-articulated conviction that it was impossible and 
useless to do so.  
Encounters between French Annalistes and economists in the decades following 
WWII provide a glimpse of the ways in which scholars defined who was “in”, and who 
was "out” of their respective fields – and how they adjusted these parameters based on 
events occurring outside science. This window is particularly useful for understanding 
French economics after WWII, a time of phenomenal change for the discipline. 
Economics was gaining emancipation from the curriculum of law departments, 
mathematicians and engineers’ prestige was growing, and traditional, literary 
economists were loosing grounds and influence. The issues at stake were much broader 
than the mathematization of the discipline, and included economists’ status in the 
university and in society.  By looking at French economists’ motivations for writing 
history and their consequent run-ins with Annalistes in the decades following WWII, we 
can examine the following questions: what did certain French economists have in 
common with Annales scholars? How did this evolve and what processes consolidated 
the change? Specifically, how did so-called “economists” and “historians” differ in their 
appreciation of useful and reliable evidence?  
To answer these questions this chapter begins with an overview of the Annales 
space since its creation in the late 1920s. Section 3 then explores the factors that turned 
the movement into an exceptionally dynamic field after WWII. Section 4 looks into 
several economists’ attempts to engage with economic history. Section 5 analyzes these 
encounters in light of diverging interpretations on what it meant to be « empirical », 
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thus showing that economists were drifting away from Annales methodologies in their 
increased use of estimation. Throughout, the chapter argues that differences between 
French “historians” and “economists” are more usefully conceptualized as differences 
between different types of “economists” and that certain scholars’ increased willingness 
to use non –primary source (i.e. estimated) data seemed to reflect an evolution in their 
sense of time, as if a feeling of urgency encouraged them to work at a faster pace.  
 
2 Economists, History and Historians before WWII 
2.1 Social Science and History in early 20th century France 
Gustav Schmoller’s vision for an empirical social science, based on detailed 
historical study had a rough counterpart in France, in the work of Auguste Comte 
(1798-1857). The French philosopher had encouraged social scientists to imitate the 
experimental method in the natural sciences, and had insisted that social phenomena 
were all fundamentally sociological, meaning that they could only be explained with 
reference to groups of human beings, their interactions and mutual constraints. The 
reliance on groups and institutions gave a special emphasis to diachronic studies, as 
only a historical perspective could show how institutions came into being.1 His 
philosophy came to be known as the “positive and unified” view of social science.  This 
was a broad creed subject to much interpretation, though its role in shaping a demand 
for economic and social history in France was somewhat narrower and can be usefully 
grasped in the career and beliefs of the French philosopher, economist and sociologist 
François Simiand. 
In the late 19th and early 20th century, Simiand (1873-1935) contributed a great 
deal to disseminating the Comtian/Durkheimian view of a positive and unified social 
science.2 Imitating what he considered to be a proven method in the natural sciences, 
                                                   
1 For a general presentation of Comte’s philosophy see Berthelot, Ed. (2001), 215-222, 358-363. 
2 Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) is credited by many as being the father of modern sociology. He 
extended the Comtian proposition that there were such entities as “social facts” – as opposed to 
individual actions – and brilliantly illustrated it with a study of suicide rates, which he found to 
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Simiand began with observation. Social phenomena needed to first be described, with 
as little mediation (from theory or hypotheses) as possible. These phenomena became 
interesting and useful once they could be identified as social objects, namely repeated 
facts, whose cause could be extracted from the comparative analysis of similar 
outcomes occurring in different contexts.  This comparative handle would help 
establish general scientific propositions. 3 He applied this method to his research on 
wages in France, to develop a theory of wages, prices and money supply. 4   His study 
of price history was the most extensive, as he collected and analysed commodity price 
series from the 16th to the 19th centuries.5  
Economic history held a special place in Simiand’s views. In general, he believed 
in the historical nature of all social phenomena and in the corollary methodological 
proposition that events could only be studied in time, as this was the only way to 
observe both their repetition and evolution. Within history, economic history held a 
special status, as it was more amenable to statistical study (as many economic 
phenomena were quantifiable). For Simiand, statistics were the prime tool of scientific 
observation, as they made sure the analyst focused on the common features of a 
particular event (those that were liable to repetition) rather than getting distracted by 
peculiarities. However, he warned his contemporaries about giving too much 
importance to correlation and maintained that causal analysis required careful 
examination of all possible links, not just the most prominent ones. Thus he argued in 
favor of the symbiotic relationship between a statistical and more literary economic 
history.6  
                                                                                                                                                                    
be constant within a given community. He thus claimed to have shown that, for each social 
group, there is a specific tendency to suicide that can be explained neither by the psychological 
disposition of individuals nor by the nature of the physical environment; and is consequently a 
collective phenomenon, that depends on social causes - Durkheim (1897). He started the journal 
Année Sociologique in 1898. 
3 Cedronio, Ed. (1987), 9.  
4 Simiand (1932a). 
5 Simiand (1932b). 
6 Simiand (1932a), vol.1, 68-79, 96-110, vol. 2, 541-556. 
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Not surprisingly, Simiand held Schmoller’s work in high esteem. Though 
Simiand rarely had a kind word to say about contemporary social scientists he was 
quite enthusiastic about the German Historical School.7  When Schmoller’s first volume 
of the Grundrisse der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre came out in 1900, Simiand made a 
point of agreeing with the German scholar that: 
 
“The tasks of a rigorous science are 1) to observe precisely, 2) to define and classify 
and 3) to find typical forms and general causal explanations.” 8  
 
He specified that this had nothing to do with a schematic division between induction 
and deduction: 
 
“This process involves deductive reasoning as much as it does inductive 
reasoning. The inductive method contains many deductive steps: however it 
constantly emphasizes the need for verification and confrontation with reality. 
The deduction that we criticize is the arbitrary one that starts from vague and 
unfounded premises.”9 
 
This last sentence reminded his readers of Schmoller’s battle with the Austrian 
economist Karl Menger, and of Simiand’s own critique of what he considered to be 
simplistic, deterministic schemes in political economy. It was also an indication that the 
“scientificity” debate was at work among French economists.   
                                                   
7 Simiand thoroughly critiqued the work of sociologists, economists and historians in his 
column in Durkheim’s journal l’Année Sociologique, Cedronio, Ed. (1987).  
8 “Les devoirs d’une science rigoureuse sont 1) d’observer exactement, 2) de bien définir et de 
classifier, 3) de trouver les formes types et d’expliquer causalement.»  
9 “Dans ce travail, le raisonnement déductif a place autant que le raisonnement inductif. La 
méthode inductive comporte beaucoup d’opérations déductives : seulement le souci de la 
vérification et de la confrontation avec la réalité y domine toujours. La déduction critiquée est la 
déduction arbitraire partant de prémices vagues et mal assurées. » F. Simiand, “L’Ecole 
Historique Allemande”, in Année Sociologique, 1900, cited in Cedronio, Ed. (1987), 275-6.  
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Simiand’s academic career picked up in the early 1920s. In 1923 he was awarded 
the chair in political economy at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers; in 1924 he 
began teaching economic history and statistics at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes; 
and in 1932 he became Professor at the Collège de France where he held the chair in 
Labor History until his death in 1935. These were prestigious posts, but he held them 
only briefly. When Simiand died he had not achieved any noticeable reorganization of 
social science in France, which continued to be practiced along various methods and 
ideological lines while many historians were still committed to political, event-based 
history.10 As we see in Figure 5.1, Simiand spent a decade on methodological writings in 
the early 20th century, but did not resume this task after the first world war. 
 
                                                   
10 For biographical information on François Simiand, see Frobert (2000), 5-22. 
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Figure 5.1 : Timeline of Events before WWII 
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2.2 Origins of the “Annales” movement 11 
Though French social science in the mid 1930s did not correspond to the positive, 
historical view envisaged by Comte or Simiand, there had been one noticeable new 
arrival on the scene, the journal Annales Histoire Economique et Sociale (AHES), which 
seemed to be pushing in this direction. The journal had been founded by Lucien Febvre 
(1878-1956) and Marc Bloch (1886-1944) in 1929, when they were teaching at the 
University of Strasbourg in eastern France (see Figure 5.1). As relatively young scholars, 
both “normaliens”, successful candidates at the “Aggrégation d’Histoire” (the French 
license to teach at secondary and university levels with the option to start writing a 
thesis) and authors of monumental Thèses d’Etat  (a ten-year work of scholarship that 
would earn the author a full professorship) they were following a typical route to 
tenure in France, which consisted in taking jobs in provincial universities in the early 
years of one’s career, with the intention of returning to Paris once experience and a 
good publication record would allow. 
Throughout their careers, they had both expressed frustration at the state of 
French historiography, which they considered to be overly focused on political 
chronologies and exceptional individuals – an “event” based history, that seemed to 
ignore the discipline’s potential for generating knowledge of a more explanatory 
nature.12  For example, Lucien Febvre had written his Ph.D. thesis on  
”Philippe II et la Franche Comté” – the title suggesting that a geographical region 
(Franche Comté) could have as much “agency” as a traditional political figure (Philippe 
II) and that geography placed real constraints on human activity.13   From the outset, 
their vision was to usher in a new era for history and for the social sciences, along lines 
                                                   
11 English readers may be more accustomed to seeing the expression “Annales School”, rather 
than “movement”. However, the long life of Annales, and its numerous twists and turns have 
incited many French scholars to wonder whether there really were core epistemological 
propositions that united all scholars that were associated with the movement; see for example 
Coutau-Bégarie (1983), xx-xxviii; Revel (1986). 
12 Burke (1990), chapters 1-2.  
13 The parallels with the title and basic explanatory structure of Fernand Braudel’s first work are 
striking; Braudel (1949). See sections 3 and 4 for more information about Fernand Braudel. 
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that were not unrelated to Simiand.  Bloch and Febvre’s basic idea was to provide an 
alternative to overly deterministic frameworks by introducing contingency via history 
(“see necessity nowhere and possibilities everywhere”).14 Thus they privileged the 
study of “collective and anonymous” trends.  The name they chose for their journal was 
indicative – Annales, Histoire Economique et Sociale. Economic and social impersonal 
phenomena were their favored subjects for investigation.   
This bold shift away from political and diplomatic history was supported by a 
greater collaboration with like-minded social scientists. Their editorial board reflected 
this multi-disciplinary commitment: an economist (Charles Rist), a political scientist 
(Andre Siegfried), a sociologist (Maurice Halbwachs) and a geographer (Albert 
Demangeon) sat on the eight-person committee. 15 This was also apparent in their 
selection of articles, which were written for historians, economists and sociologists. For 
example, in 1929, the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs wrote an article reviewing 
Aftalion’s Cours de Statistique, where he gave a mathematical explanation of ordinary 
least squares regression. This constituted relatively advanced statistical knowledge for 
the 1920s, and suggested that contributors spoke a similar language and could 
understand each other’s tools – or at least that they were eager to learn from each other 
and keep abreast of developments in other social sciences.16 
While the editors called for greater communication among the disciplines, which 
in principle contained no implicit hierarchy among them, historical approaches were 
defended as being necessary to nearly all investigations in social science. Consider, for 
example, the conclusion of a 1929 article by Sayous on 16th century Spanish currency 
exchange:  
 
                                                   
14 Delacroix, Dosse and Garcia (1999), 112. 
15 As we saw in chapter 3, the founders of the EHA in the U.S. also shared this multi-
disciplinary desire.   
16 For information about the state of early 20th century statistical knowledge in the social 
sciences (and the emergence of probabilistic reasoning) see Morgan (1990). 
Chapter 5 - Encounters between economists and historians in France 
 
 177
“Historical method uses the past to tell us more about the present; more 
generally it allows, or will allow – once preliminary studies will be numerous 
enough to permit synthesis – a better grasp of fundamental economic flows. The 
true historical method for political economy does not consist in asserting the 
relativity of economic theories (as liberal economists have claimed with disdain); 
but seeks to uncover the nature of economic institutions via their history. Let’s 
take an example. In the last few years, exchange rates have become increasingly 
important, without us knowing their laws in times of great instability. By 
studying the history of exchange rates in Spain and its American colonies in the 
16th century, we discovered a period that was quite different from ours but 
underwent equally serious disturbances, and we uncovered economic principles 
that are identical to those that took much observation to spell out. Had we had a 
better grasp of economic history, the contemporary situation would have been 
understood more rapidly.”17 
 
While Sayous’ methodological stance was not identical to Bloch and Febvre’s more 
sophisticated ideas (they did not really believe in “lessons” from history) it certainly 
was not contrary to their views. In the introduction to the first year anniversary issue 
(1930), Bloch and Febvre made reference to Sayous’ article, and subtly amended his 
manifesto to make a more general claim: 
                                                   
17 “La méthode historique […] éclaire le présent par le passé; d’une facon générale, elle permet, 
ou plus exactement permettra, à mesure que des études préparatoires donneront des bases plus 
solides aux synthèses, de saisir les grands courants économiques. La vraie “méthode” historique 
en économie politique n’est pas du tout celle qui affirme la “relativité” des doctrines 
économiques (ainsi que les économistes de l’école libérale se sont plu longtemps à le dire avec 
un certain mépris): c’est celle qui cherche à indiquer la nature des institutions économiques par 
leur histoire. Apportons un exemple. Au cours des dernières années, les changes ont pris une 
énorme importance, sans que l’on ait entrevu d’abord quelles étaient leurs lois en période de 
perturbations très graves. En étudiant l’histoire des changes en Espagne et dans les relations de 
l’Espagne avec l’Amérique au XVIe siècle, nous avons rencontré une période d’un caractère très 
différent, mais agitée par des troubles aussi sérieux, ou l’on a dégagé des principes 
économiques identiques à ceux que l’on n’a pu établir chez nous qu’après de longues 
observations. Si on avait mieux connu l’histoire économique, la situation contemporaine eut été 
élucidée plus rapidement.” Sayous (1929), 175-6. 
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 “Why should we speak of past and present? Reality is one. Today, as yesterday, 
the Annales’ goal is to make this unity tangible.”18  
 
Thus Bloch and Febvre added an appreciation for contingency and the need to study 
change: “history”, they claimed “studied men in time, not in the past”.19 
 Sayous, Bloch and Febvre’s defense of the historical method was framed in terms 
of rival conceptions of scientific social science and though Bloch and Febvre’s claims 
aimed at broader goals than the reform of economic knowledge, their critiques may call 
to mind arguments made by Schmoller and his American followers (Edwin Gay for 
example). This parallel serves as a reminder that 19th and early 20th century social 
science seemed to be traversed by recurrent debates about “scientificity” - whose 
origins were not obvious, and whose closure was never guaranteed. To use the 
terminology developed in chapter 2, methodological debates on « good method » were 
at work in early 20th century France, reconfiguring the lines between « insiders » and 
“outsiders” across disciplines. 
Annalistes acknowledged their debts to Simiand on many occasions. 20  This 
suggests that labels such as “historian”, “economist” or even “sociologist” may be 
misleading starting points in an investigation of scientific change. Simiand for example 
was sometimes labeled “sociologist” and at other times “economist” (today he is mostly 
remembered as a “sociologist”).21 Yet he may have had more in common with Bloch 
and Febvre than he did with many economists teaching in early 20th century France, 
just as the Annalistes may have had much more in common with him than with many 
French historians.  
                                                   
18 “Mais pourquoi parler du passé et du present? La réalité est une. En faire toucher du doigt, à 
tous, l’unité - ce sera demain comme hier le but de nos Annales”, Bloch and Febvre (1930), 3. 
19 Delacroix, Dosse and Garcia (1999), 127. 
20 For example, in 1960, they re-edited a set of Simiand’s early methodological statements: 
Simiand (1960). 
21 Chartier and Revel (1979). 
Chapter 5 - Encounters between economists and historians in France 
 
 179
While there were strong similarities between the vision and work of Simiand, 
Bloch and Febvre, the latter accomplished much more than the former. Bloch and 
Febvre’s dissenting views may not have been genuinely new, yet Annales was 
undoubtedly one of the most successful attempts to change scholarship in French 
history, and arguably French social science. This contrast confirms Novick’s views that 
recurrent debates were not uniformly influential in the history of the discipline: only 
some of them had effects on the general course of research and activity. Simiand’s 
methodological pronouncements had little, if no direct effect, while the Annales created 
a movement that enjoyed phenomenal success throughout the better part of the 20th 
century. Indeed, as we see on the time line (Figure 5.1) within a few years of the 
creation of their journal, Bloch and Febvre were called back to Paris and appointed to 
extremely prestigious jobs. In 1933, Febvre was given a chair at the Collège de France, 
where he taught economic and social history, with a growing emphasis on religious and 
cultural trends.  Bloch returned to Paris in 1936, to take over the Sorbonne chair in 
Economic History (Figure 5.1). Both these posts were held by Annales scholars for 
decades to come (Febvre’s successor was Fernand Braudel; while Bloch’s post-WWII 
successor was Ernest Labrousse), and the movement grew stronger from year to year – 
as more and more scholars came to identify with the movement. 
  
2.3 Designing a hybrid space 
 What made this success possible in light of Simiand’s earlier failure? WWI and 
the devastating effects it had on Comtian/Durkheimian followers certainly was an 
important factor. Keylor has argued that French sociologists could have been the 
initiators of the empirical, contingency movement associated with the Annales. 
However, by the end of WWI, Emile Durkheim and the vast majority of his disciples 
had died – many on the battle-field.22 Yet, this does not give fair weight to the 
pioneering dimension of the Annales project. Bloch and Febvre innovated on one crucial 
                                                   
22 Keylor (1975). 
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dimension: they created a new space, which was first sustained by the journal, but 
subsequently came to be embodied in real physical institutions.23 Instead of laboring to 
change each social science from within, they created a new area that did not really 
belong to anyone before. 
What was this new space? Broadly speaking, it was economic and social history 
in the symbiotic sense of the term. But more specifically, a more narrowly defined 
economic history, drawing contributions from statisticians, economists and historians, 
seemed to emerge as the most viable meeting point for these various scholars. Economic 
history, as the study of wages, prices, money, and commerce in the past was not new in 
the late 1920s. There were economic historians in France prior to the Annales – for 
example Emile Levasseur, Henri Hauser or the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne - but 
among historians, economic history was neither a main nor a separate activity.24 What 
seemed to be new, or gaining momentum, was an economic history seen as a pillar of 
social science. In addition, the space they created had obvious appeal for non-historians, 
in particular economists. Thus from the outset, there was a tension between the 
founders’ view of a symbiotic social and economic history, and a fraction of their 
contributors’ inclination towards a more specifically economic history (studies of prices, 
exchange rates, use of statistical formulae for example). In other words economic 
history gradually emerged as the most sustainable place for interdisciplinary dialogue 
and exchange.  
The federative, fundamentally interdisciplinary nature of Bloch and Febvre’s 
creation is illustrated in the evolution from figure 5.2A to 5.2B. Figure 5.2A shows 
Simand’s effect on social sciences in France: though he called for a federative model 
where economists, sociologists, statisticians etc. all adopted a positive, empirical and 
unified method, the only scholars who actually applied this view were Durkheimian 
sociologists. In other words Simiand and like minded social scientists had only 
                                                   
23  See subsequent sections in this chapter.  
24 Delacroix, Dosse and Garcia (1999). Recall from chapter 3 that Henri Hauser was Gay and 
Beveridges’ collaborator on the International Committee for Price History – and that they had 
been very disappointed with his work - Dumoulin (1990).  
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succeeded in erecting another demarcation line between scientific and un-scientific 
research (adding a circle to the constellation of existing “in” and “out” borders). 
Contrast this to figure 5.2B. Annales did not have a forceful agenda to reform any 
discipline from within; instead the founders invited like-minded scholars to publish in 
their journal. Editors and contributors found that they communicated most easily on 
topics of economic history (as opposed to cultural, religious, military or even social 
history as these other areas did not draw much participation from economists and 
statisticians). Economic history thus emerged as the most vibrant area, drawing most of 
the contributors’ attention – rather than having been decreed as such. This mix of 
purposeful and spontaneous hybridity proved to be a very successful strategy after 
WWII, when the radical changes that befell the French university gave a few scholars 
the opportunity to push forward with their methodological vision.  
The reader may recall from chapter 3 that Gay and his students had also created 
a relatively hybrid space in the U.S. using similar tactics – a new journal and a new 
association. The founders of the EHA may have principally been economists but they 
increasingly opened their doors to members from other disciplines; for example the 
CREH funded numerous students in History Departments (Louis Hacker and the 
Handlins) and they invited the sociologist Leland Jenks to join their ranks. 
Subsequently, the RCEntrepH was a remarkably interdisciplinary affair. These 
organizational similarities are hints of the deeper ties that united American “old” 
economic historians and Annalistes. 
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Figure 5.2 : The Social Science space in France before and after Annales 
A : Social Science Space in France in the 1920s, before Annales25 
 
 
B : Social Science Space in France in the 1930s, after Annales 
 
 
                                                   
25 This is not an exhaustive picture of all players in French social science in the 1920s—each “circle” is here to illustrate the general 
point that there were many claims to what constituted proper social science (more or less explicit claims) and that Simiand’s goal 
was to reach out and convert them.  This picture of relatively watertight circles is confirmed by Alain Desrosière’s overview of 
French social science in the inter-war period; see Desrosières (2000), 98. 
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3 A new space for social science in France 
3.1 The ideological spectrum of post-war France and its implications for economic 
history 
The experience of war and defeat terribly shook France, though the extreme 
desire for change was counterbalanced by the pragmatic realization that not everything 
could be radically altered. Retrospectively it does seem that the French university 
system underwent some of its greatest mutations at this time – yet, these were not 
uniformly spread across disciplines. So it may be more useful to think of the decades 
following WWII as having had high potential for change, with variable results 
depending on scholars’ motivation, their access to limited resources and their ability to 
create or meet demand for their services. The story of the creation of the VI e Section de 
l’Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes and of the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, both Annales 
achievements, constitutes a case where these factors were successfully brought together, 
thus creating a new space for social scientists in France.  
Let us begin with the last factor: a “demand“ for scientific and explanatory 
economic history. We saw in chapter 3 that in the U.S., the demand had been generated 
by the scholars who had attended the 1940 Rockefeller round-table though it had been 
reinforced by growing Americanism during WWII. In France, it seemed to have been 
driven rather by the context.  Generally, there was a strong demand for economic and 
social knowledge spurred by the need to understand the military defeat. The hunger to 
explain France’s demise led numerous young men to study economics. For example, the 
mathematical economist and econometrician Edmond Malinvaud remembered that: 
 
“My generation had bitter recollections from the interwar years and the 
unhappiness of war (…) we were convinced that we could do better than what 
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we had lived through (…) we belonged to a group that believed in studying 
economics to make things work better“.26  
 
This was echoed in the economic historian, Maurice Lévy-Leboyer’s concern:  
 
 “I chose economic history because I had lived through the 1930s, and I saw what 
an economic crisis did ; I lost my father in 1937, I saw the country collapse. It was 
natural to study economics to understand how a country could be so poorly 
managed (…) My generation was very frustrated to see this respectable country 
collapse. It was scandalous. The French showed themselves to be  
incompetent.“27 
 
In particular, demand for a systematic economic history seemed to arise from the 
ideological spectrum of post-war Europe. The decades following WWII had different 
political flavors in France and the U.S. It may be quite impossible to generalize about 
the ideological landscape of a nation yet, to caricature, while the French population 
(and to a great extent government) flirted with socialist ideals and ideas, the Americans 
vigorously rejected them.  For example, both countries had a very different relationship 
to “planning”: the French built and administered five year indicative plans, whereas the 
idea of such direct government intervention was eradicated from American politics at 
                                                   
26 “Ma génération avait mal vécu, avait un souvenir vivant de l’entre-deux guerres et des 
malheurs dûs à la guerre (…) Nous avions cette vision qu’il était possible de faire mieux que ce 
que nous avions vécu (…) Nous appartenions à un groupe qui était motivé par travailler 
l’économie pour faire en sorte que ça marche mieux» ; Edmond Malinvaud (2004), Interviewed 
by Cristel de Rouvray, Paris, January 2004.  
27 “J’ai choisi l’histoire économique parce que j’avais vécu dans les années 30, et j’ai vu ce 
qu’était une crise économique, j’ai perdu mon père en 1937, j’ai vu ce pays s’effondrer. C’est très 
naturel de s’intéresser à l’économie pour comprendre comment on peut si mal gérer un pays. 
(…) Ma génération a été très frustrée de voir un pays respectable s’effondrer. C’est scandaleux. 
Les français se sont comportés comme des imbéciles”;  Maurice Lévy-Leboyer (2003), 
Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Paris, November 2003. 
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the end of the war (at least at the rhetorical level).28 Among academics, the picture was 
similar (and equally un-amenable to generalizations). In France, as the historian 
François Furet argued, the immediate post-war saw the apex of communist ideologies 
in intellectual circles - a strong commitment that persevered in spite of bad news from 
the Soviet Union and satellite states.29 In the U.S., McCarthyism and its aftermath made 
it difficult, if not impossible for American academics to openly express their non-
conformist political views, or engage in scientific discussions of Marxism.30  
There were obvious connections between Marxism and economic history. 
Marxism was a historical theory where social evolution proceeded in stages, each mode 
of production entailing radical changes in social arrangements. This had two 
implications for economic history: Marxists would want to write economic history, and 
historians – whether they were Marxists or not – would have to react to this. Both 
trends brought people into the field (at least temporarily) for reasons that had very little 
to do with perennial debates on scientificity. For example, the French mathematician 
and economist, Jacques Mayer, whose career was mostly spent in national statistics and 
planning, wrote several early papers on Marxist themes, which involved historical 
analysis. In the early 1950s, he produced studies of cotton and coal industries in France 
over several centuries (1709-1914) to test the “law of the falling rate of profit”. 31  
Yet, such studies were rather exceptional among French economists, who, for the 
most part, did not write history. This was certainly true of economists who belonged to 
law departments, and whose work combined relatively abstract propositions illustrated 
by occasional empirical references. Since the late 19th century political economy had 
been a sub-field of law departments and these shared premises tended to reinforce 
                                                   
28 In the decades after WWII, indicative or interventionist plans were proposed for many non-
communist European countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway; see Bogaard (1998). For 
the fall from grace of planning traditions in post-WWII U.S. see Balisciano (2000). 
29 Furet (1995). 
30 Morgan and Rutherford (1998), 14-15. 
31 Jacques Mayer (undated, though probably 1952-55) “L’Accumulation du Capital dans Deux 
Industries Françaises: la Filature de Cotton et la Fabrication de la Fonte (1709-1914)”, ISEA 
Working Paper. Lent to C. de Rouvray by Jacques Mayer.   
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abstract, moral and rather conservative reasoning.32 This was an obstacle to the 
adoption of a “positive” and historical view of economics – reinforced by the relatively 
negative perception of the German Historical School, which had not been well received 
(largely because it was “German”, and relations between the countries were very 
strained in the first half of the 20th century). 33  
A notable exception among French economists willing to write history was 
Ernest Labrousse, whose youthful Marxism inspired his initial commitment to 
economic history. He was appointed to the Economic and Social History chair at the 
Sorbonne in 1946  (replacing Marc Bloch who was shot during WWII).  Labrousse held 
this influential post for over 20 years and oversaw hundreds of students.34 Considering 
the relatively strict guidelines he enforced, this gives a measure of his influence in the 
field. In 1974, one of his students, Pierre Chaunu declared, perhaps with only a slight 
exaggeration: “today, the entire French historical school is Labroussian”.35  
Labrousse’s research was marked by a continued interest in the origin of social 
crises and revolutions. He had developed a theory that linked political crises to 
economic ones, and economic crises to cyclical variations in agricultural prices. He had 
applied this general model to account for the French revolutions in 1789, 1830 and 1848, 
showing how variations in the price of key agricultural commodities had had different 
impacts on the standard of living of different social classes. Yet Labrousse did not 
develop monocausal accounts, recognizing that agricultural crises were necessary 
though not sufficient conditions for upheaval. This is where he made the transition to 
social, cultural and political history arguing that crises were also rooted in class conflict 
                                                   
32 For information on the circumstances in which political economy was annexed to law 
departments, see Le Van - Lemesle (1978). 
33 For an overview of most 1950s economists’ (in law departments) opinions on economic 
history, see Morrisson (1988).  For an example of the evaluation of the German Historical School 
by a French law department economist, see Gonnard (1947), 421-429. 
34 Daumard (1988). 
35 “Aujourd’hui toute l’école historique française est labroussienne “ Cited in Coutau-Bégarie 
(1983), 130. 
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and political contestation.36 In other words, Labrousse’s work was a tribute to Marx, but 
also to Simiand and Bloch. 37 From Marx he borrowed economic determinism and an 
analysis based on social class. From Simiand he inherited the general idea of linking 
agricultural prices to wages, and used the same statistical methodologies. From Bloch 
he adopted the view that all history should be “total” – i.e. should weave the economic, 
political, cultural facets of a phenomenon into one unified account.   
Labrousse had trained as an economist – as a student in the Facultés de Droit, 
separate from the Facultés de Lettres, where Bloch, Febvre and Braudel had trained. He 
wrote a thesis for the economics department, Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des 
revenus en France au XVIIIe siècle (1932), then attempted to pass the ”Aggrégation” in 
economics, but failed - most probably because he was openly communist and the 
Facultés de Droit were famously conservative. 38 Labrousse successfully completed his 
“Aggrégation” in history in the late 1930s, and remained in humanities departments 
thereafter, having completed a second thesis -La Crise de l’économie française à la fin de 
l’Ancien Régime et au début de la Révolution (1943) - which earned him the chair at the 
Sorbonne. There, he continued to apply quantitative and statistical reasoning to 
historical problems. His students followed in his steps, producing regional monographs 
of 18th and 19th century France with special attention to variations in prices and their 
social and political consequences.39  
Labrousse and his students very seldom attempted to bridge their findings with 
more general statements about economic growth and development – rather, they 
favored conclusions about the social and political consequences of economic cycles 
(crises, revolutions, distribution of income for example).  This was a telling omission, 
and an indication that different themes fascinated French and American social scientists 
                                                   
36 Labrousse (1948). 
37 Delacroix, Dosse and Garcia (2003). 
38 Labrousse was an editor at l’Humanité (a communist newspaper) from 1919 to 1924, 
Labrousse (1980). A common saying at the time was “Facultés de Droit, facultés de droite”, 
which roughly translates to « Law departments are right-wing departments ».  
39 Labrousse’s most famous student was Emmanuel Le Roy-Ladurie; his thesis work on 
Southern France was published as Les Paysans du Languedoc; Le Roy-Ladurie (1966). 
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in the mid 20th century. As we saw in chapter 4, in the U.S. the 1950s increasingly gave 
way to talk of economic development and an interest in the economic past of developed 
nations for the sake of drawing lessons for developing ones. This view that economic 
history had something important to say about development was intimately tied to a 
claim that general scientific propositions could only be derived from long-term 
empirical study. Neither belief was predominant in France at that time. Concerns with 
growth and development were less pronounced, and many Annalistes were loath to 
draw explicit “lessons” from the past (recall Bloch and Febvre’s hesitations).  In spite of 
these differences, American philanthropists saw a connection between French 
scholarship and knowledge pertaining to growth and development. 
 
3.2 American Foundations show interest for French social science 
Fernand Braudel proved to be much more gifted than Labrousse when it came to 
exploiting this connection. His own work embodied what many considered to be the 
Annales’ potential for producing broad statements about change in the economic and 
social realm. His study of economic and social trends of the Mediterranean region in the 
late medieval period had earned him the reputation of being a great synthesizer: 
someone who could start from an abundance of historical detail and turn it into a 
persuasive causal account of the way in which “structures” (slow trends in climate, 
geography, fertility) and “conjunctures” (political events, technological inventions, 
territorial discoveries) both exerted weight on social and human destinies. 40 Braudel 
was arguably a geographic determinist. He always began with considerations of 
topology and climate, as prime movers in human events. However, he would 
                                                   
40 Fernand Braudel (1902-1985) is remembered for two massive contributions to European 
economic history – La Méditerranée and Civilisation Matérielle, Economie et Capitalisme, Braudel 
(1949); Braudel (1979).. Legend has it that he met Febvre on a boat crossing the Atlantic in 1937. 
During WWII, Braudel was imprisoned in Germany, and wrote his thesis on the Mediterranean, 
sending drafts to Febvre in Paris. This Herculean feat laid the grounds for the legendary stature 
Braudel acquired soon after his return to France. For more biographical information, see Burke 
(1990), 32-56. 
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subsequently amend this strict determinism with differences from one human 
community to the next, thus acknowledging culture and other man-made constraints.41 
Though Braudel’s research interests lay principally in the medieval and late medieval 
periods, his non-Marxist analysis of the origins and nature of capitalism, and his 
enduring interest in the wealth of nations convinced many of his readers and colleagues 
that he had something interesting and important to say about their contemporary 
world.42 This certainly seems to have been the opinion of several officers at the 
Rockefeller and Ford foundations who made the connection between Braudel’s work 
and issues of economic growth and development. 
As we see in Figure 5.3, the long collaboration between American foundations 
and Annales had begun in 1947 when Febvre had obtained the creation of the VI e 
Section de l’Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (VI e Section) thanks to American funding.43 
This new branch was officially the social science division of an Ecole dedicated to 
specialist research. Febvre died in 1956 and Braudel inherited Febvre’s academic 
positions: both the professorship at the Collège de France and the directorship of the 
brand new VIe Section. The RF renewed funding for the VI e Section in 1952 - by then the 
French government was covering all operating expenses and RF money was attributed 
to cross-disciplinary conferences and economic history only.44 
 
 
                                                   
41 See for example the first 50 pages of Braudel (1979). 
42 Though Braudel acknowledged Marx, his main reference for explaining and theorizing the 
origin and likely future of capitalism was the German historicist Werner Sombart. See for 
example, Ibid, 206. 
43 The grant was not huge - $30,000 for 3 years. Compare this to a 1947 grant of $130,000 for 2 
years to Charles Rist’s economic institute in Paris. Mazon specifies that this grant was only 
sufficient to cover one fourth of the VI e Section’s annual expenses. She also mentions that the VI 
e Section got a lot of bad press for using “millions from America”- Mazon (1988), 91-96. 
44 This second grant was smaller than the first: $13,500 for 2 years - Ibid, 81-115. For a measure 
of the relative size of this grant, see « How much was that ? ». 
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Figure 5.3: Time Line of events after WWII 
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When the Ford Foundation took over in Europe in the mid 1950s, it continued 
conversation with Annalistes (the main correspondent having changed from Febvre to 
Braudel). In December 1959 it awarded $1 million for the establishment of the Maison 
des Sciences de l’Homme (MSH) - a grant that was explicitely aimed at fostering social 
science in France.45 The French government matched this grant with approximately $2 
million.  
The process by which Febvre, then Braudel managed to convince American 
foundations that historians should be important players in social science has 
mesmerized more than one historian of ideas.46 Gemelli has argued that Braudel was 
able to seduce foundation officers, as his values and agenda were very similar to the 
ones held by interwar American economists: namely, they all shared a vaguely 
“progressive” commitment to social science (Braudel was certainly more conservative 
than Labrousse!).47 Yet, this is a difficult argument to make, considering the great 
variety of economists in the U.S. at that time (including for example statistical 
economists, narrative institutionalists and formal mathematical scholars, all of whom 
had different political stances) but it can be recast in a slightly different light to account 
for the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and Ford Foundations (FF)‘s interest in the Annales. 
Instead of comparing Braudel to American interwar economists at large, it may be more 
useful to compare him to Willits, Bezanson and the economic historians described in 
chapter 3. 
 It seems quite plausible that Braudel’s rhetoric of multi-disciplinary, integrative 
and empirical social science (which he borrowed from the founders of Annales) would 
not have gained such favor with American foundations had they not recognized a 
                                                   
45 See Ibid, 157. Mazon cited the grant justification: “Les progrès rapides de l’industrie française 
de l’après-guerre et la détermination de nombreux dirigeants des secteurs publics et privés dans 
l’accélération du processus de modernisation entraînent une demande d’économistes, de 
sociologues et autres spécialistes des sciences sociales (FF, PA 60-437, Compte rendu du Conseil 
d’Administration de la Fondation du 11 Déc. 1959).” For a measure of the relative size of this 
grant, see « How much was that ? ». 
46 Coutau-Bégarie (1983); Mazon (1988); Gemelli (1995). 
47 Gemelli (1995), 256. 
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certain congruence between economist-historians in the U.S. and Braudel’s work. This 
begins to explain both the foundations’ interest in “history” (in spite of the fact that 
foundation officers were often reminded that history was part of humanities, not social 
science) and their willingness to overlook the fact that much French economic history 
was Marxist! 48 Indeed, RF officers were aware of this, yet had been swayed by a 
rhetoric they were sensitive to, namely an argument that favored “empirical 
economics”, in particular as it involved economic history. They were not opposed to 
financing mathematical economics (which was on the rise in France), but they saw no 
objection (quite the contrary) to investigations that started with “observation”, in 
particular historical observation.49 Thus they had no difficulty seeing economic history, 
and consequently Annales, as a form of empirical social science.   
It is indicative to note that many foundation agents sent to France on behalf of 
social science divisions were “old” economic historians or their friends (Joseph Willits, 
Frederic Lane, Frances Sutton and David Landes for example, see Figure 5.3). 50 For the 
modern reader, considering the prominence of mathematical and technical economics 
today, it might be difficult to understand how someone like Frederic Lane (who earned 
a doctorate in history at Harvard in 1930) could have been given such a job. This is yet 
another reminder that these disciplines were not so far from each other, though by the 
1950s they were in the process of growing further apart. Lane’s Ph.D. may have been in 
                                                   
48 American foundations did actually sponsor communist researchers in France - largely 
because it was very difficult to selectively pick out and not fund radical scholars. However, 
insofar as they could refuse sponsorship to left-minded social scientists, the foundations did. 
This was certainly true of Willits, as mentioned in chapter 3. Concretely, this resulted in 
suspension of certain grants in the early 1950s, for example to the CNRS - see Mazon (1988), 126. 
49 Diary entries for 1946. RAC-RF, RG 12.1, Box 70, “Joseph Willits”.  
50 Willits spent several months touring Europe in 1946. As the RF main European office was in 
Paris, he spent a sizeable part of his time there – Diary entries for 1946. RAC-RF, RG 12.1, Box 
70, “Joseph Willits”. Lane was sent by the RF as Associate Director of Social Sciences to run the 
European office from 1951 to 1954 - Gemelli (2003). Sutton and Landes were friends when they 
were students at Harvard. Sutton was a full time officer at the FF, gradually rising to Executive 
Vice President of International Affairs. In his early years of employment he worked on the MSH 
grant and often asked the advice of his friend David Landes, who lived in France as a Ph.D. 
student and young scholar – Frances Sutton (2004), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, New 
York City, June 2004.  
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“history”, and he may have taught in the History Department at Johns Hopkins, yet he 
had been Gay’s student, one of the first members of the CREH in the early 1940s, and 
president of the EHA in 1956-58. Recall from chapter 3 that both the CREH and EHA 
had been spun as efforts to change economics, not history.   
There was a long-standing association between Annales and American “old” 
economic historians. Usher, for example, had contributed two articles in the first year of 
AHES (1929). Subsequently, Lane played an important role in maintaining the 
connection. He had met Braudel in Venice before WWII and they had remained good 
friends.51 Braudel was also quite intimate with Earl J. Hamilton, who, as the reader 
recalls from chapter 3 was also part of the Gay lineage. 52 These connections were 
passed on to the younger generations: Braudel and Labrousse’s students were made 
aware of the American economic historians’ work.  Pierre Chaunu for example wrote 
Earl Hamilton in 1956 to acknowledge his debt to the method and purpose Hamilton 
embodied.53 When Landes came to France he befriended Chaunu and his wife and 
colleague, Hugette Chaunu.54 These friendships were eased by deep epistemological 
connections that united Annalistes and “old” economic historians. When Braudel 
presented his vision, Lane recognized arguments that had been put forward by his 
friends (Bezanson, Cole, Innis, Hamilton etc.) a few years earlier to justify the creation 
of the CREH.    
Yet, there was a fundamental tension between Lane’s commitment to Braudel 
and the MSH and the activities of many scholars affiliated with Annales. This tension 
came out in Lane’s opinion of Labrousse: 
                                                   
51 Ibid. 
52 Earl J. Hamilton’s papers hold many examples of personal and professional letters between 
Braudel and Hamilton. See for example, Letter from Braudel to Hamilton, 6 août 1946, Duke 
University, Earl J. Hamilton papers, Box 2, Folder “Correspondance/papers (1930s-1970s)”.  
53 “Je m’empresse de vous dire combien nous sommes redevables à une oeuvre qui est, entre 
autres, responsable de notre commune passion, pour une histoire économique, dynamique et 
quantitative, dont nous nous plaisons de reconnaitre ici, en vous, le maitre incontesté”; Letter 
from Pierre Chaunu, 13 novembre 1954, Duke University, Earl J. Hamilton papers Box 3, Folder 
“Correspondance - Personal; 1930s-80s”. 
54 Pierre and Hughette Chaunu (2004), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Caen, November 
2004. 
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“Because I know his work in economic history, I wanted to meet him, although 
his own kind of research seemed likely to be more within the field of the 
humanities than of the social sciences division. My talk confirmed this 
impression (…) He is glad to have economic history attached to the historical 
section of the Facultés de Lettres, even though that cuts it off completely from 
instruction in economics, because his main interest is infiltration into general 
history of his kind of economic interpretation.”55 (My italics) 
 
Notice how Lane presented history taught in humanities departments as being outside 
his responsibilities in France (he insisted that his meeting with Labrousse had been 
motivated by personal interest rather than professional duty). By Labrousse’s “kind of 
economic interpretation” Lane was referring to the latter’s Marxism. In Labrousse’s 
writings, capitalism and markets were unstable and auto-destructive institutions. This 
contrasted with Lane’s work and that of his colleagues at the RCEntrepH (which was 
going strong in the 1950s, as the reader should recall from chapter 3), for whom 
capitalistic institutions could prove quite virtuous if they were associated with the right 
sort of individual liberties and incentives.  
Lane’s opinion of Labrousse went beyond ideological dispositions: he also 
seemed to regret the fact that Labrousse was not actively engaging in dialogue with 
economists, which was a defining feature of economic history in the U.S. (the kind he 
personally contributed to). In spite of these differences, Lane did not consider 
Labrousse to be a threat to the overall potential of the MSH, and trusted that Braudel 
held a vision similar to his on the intimate relationship between economic history and 
“good” social science.  As a result of this trust Annales benefited from a large fraction of 
the resources allocated to French social science (coming both from the foundations and 
from the French government). 
 
                                                   
55 Diary entry for November 7th 1951. RAC-RF, RG 12.1, Box 70, “Frederic C. Lane”. 
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3.3 Economic history emerges as a strategic place 
The spread of Marxist scholarship and American foundation money both 
contributed to turn Annales economic and social history into a growing activity in 
France – adding to the momentum that had already been built by the hybridity of Bloch 
and Febvre’s journal. Fernand Braudel’s ability to formulate and embody a scientific, 
explanatory history was also crucial to this success.  In his mind Annales research was 
meant to contribute to a better knowledge of man and society. This was confirmed by 
the names he chose for his institutions. The journal was now Annales: Economies, Sociétes, 
Civilisations.  By dropping the word histoire, Annalistes were making bold claims, 
further embodied in the name of the MSH: “sciences of man”. This term was not the 
same as “humanities” (which in French is lettres) and Braudel had insisted on adopting 
a label that included all social sciences. In a 1955 letter to his friend Hamilton, he said 
that he was attempting to build an institution “like the London School of Economics”. 56 
When he became director of the VI e Section, he began recruiting the ablest scholars in 
all fields: a majority of historians, but also anthropologists, sociologists, economists and 
even mathematicians and engineers.57 The VI e Section experienced phenomenal growth; 
history departments fared particularly well in French university in general. 58 
While Braudel strove to maintain the appearance of hybridity in the Annales 
project, he also let it drift (and pushed it) towards an even stronger historical stance, 
and increasingly presented history as the ultimate social science. In a 1958 article he 
made a strong case for history as the unifying science: its focus on time, on the 
                                                   
56 Letter from Braudel to Hamilton, 17 Mai 1955, Duke University, Earl J. Hamilton papers, Box 
2, Folder “Correspondance - misc; 1919; 1920s-1970s and n.d”. 
57 Malinvaud (1996). 
58 Scanning through the Annuaires (yearly summaries of activities and classes taught) of the 
EHESS (current name of the VI e Section), I obtained a rough estimate of the number of faculty 
(all posts combined). It went from just over 50 in 1956-57 to over 130 ten years later (i.e. 160% 
growth). A full collection of these Annuaires is available from the archivist at l’EHESS, 54 Blvd. 
Raspail, 75006, Paris. From 1928 to 1966, the total number of academic chairs (all 
schools/universities in France) increased by 130%. Historians’ chairs increased by 150%, while 
all other social sciences combined increased only by 120%. Absolute numbers are also 
indicative. In 1966, there were 130 chairs in History and only 40 in all other social sciences 
combined- see Keylor (1975), 163-8. 
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succession of events, on repetitions and on discontinuities made it alone capable of 
highlighting long-term trends at work, the identification of which was crucial for our 
understanding of the social world: 
 
“Whether we are in 1558 or in 1958, whomever wants to grasp the world must 
define a hierarchy of flows, individual movements and then combine them in an 
overall constellation (…) The world of 1558 was not born in that year, neither 
was our year born in 1958. Every present day combines movements of different 
origin and rhythm: today’s time is also yesterday’s time, the day before 
yesterday’s and the olden days’ time.” 59  
 
For Braudel there was no explanation of the present without an understanding of 
the past, of the events that led to our current day, and of the slow moving forces, like 
climate, that shaped human evolution. This was not a “stageist” or relativist view of 
history, but rather a statement about the influence of the past on the present. This 
heightened commitment to history in general, and economic history in particular, 
effectively downplayed the contribution of other disciplines. The journal no longer 
contained as many articles written by or for non-historians. The editorial board 
changed, now consisting of only three people and two of them were historians. 60 While 
pre-war issues had presented recent developments in economic statistics and methods, 
the post-war journal published very few articles of this nature, featuring instead an 
article that qualified recent econometric developments as useless, without really 
explaining them. The author – Jean Domarchi - an economist from a law department 
                                                   
59 “Qu’on se place en 1558 ou en l’an de grâce 1958, et il s’agit, pour qui veut saisir le monde de 
définir une hiérarchie de forces, de courants, de mouvements particuliers, puis de ressaisir une 
constellation d’ensemble (…) Le monde de 1558  (…) n’est pas né au seuil de cette année (…). Et 
pas d’avantage (…) toujours notre difficile année 1958. Chaque “actualité” rassemble des 
mouvements d’origine, de rythme différent: le temps d’aujourd’hui date à la fois d’hier, 
d’avant-hier, de jadis”, Braudel (1958), 735. 
60 Fernand Braudel and Charles Morazé. The third was the sociologist Georges Friedmann. 
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had concluded that “econometrics is not the beginning and end of our science. In the 
current state of affairs, literary economists have nothing to worry about”. 61   
Thus the 1950s witnessed the preservation of Febvre and Bloch’s hybridity 
within the newly created institutions (VI e Section and MSH) but also saw the 
progressive solidification of Annales scholarship into a watertight space, where certain 
empirical methods and theoretical frameworks were becoming entrenched, to the 
exclusion of other approaches (in particular new methods of empiricism developed by 
statisticians, national accountants and econometricians). In other words, the appearance 
of inter-disciplinarity was maintained, but only superficially. Historians held a 
privileged seat and controlled the institutions (via Braudel’s unchallenged authority).  
This process of sealing the borders, and clearly defining who was in and out did 
not happen overnight. The 1950s and early 1960s were still unstable times, largely due 
to the necessity of obtaining American funding and thus keeping open the dialogue 
with other social sciences – the regular appearance of green dollar signs on Figure 5.3 
should be a reminder of many groups’ dependence on American funds. This porosity 
and the stakes tied to economic history made it an attractive space to scholars outside 
Annales. Several of these challengers (or band-wagoners) were French economists. In the 
same letter where Braudel had compared the VI e Section to the LSE, he added that “he 
was battling with economists”.62 Though he gave no names, the pressure could have 
come from two different categories of economists at the VI e Section. Either they were 
mathematical economists like Guilbaud and Malinvaud, whom Braudel had hired to 
run small seminars, but more likely they were professors in law departments like 
Domarchi, who still had control over the economics curricula and diplomas. Unlike the 
                                                   
61 “Je désire seulement indiquer que l’économétrie ne constitue en rien l’alpha et l’oméga de 
notre science. Dans l’état actuel des choses, les économistes littéraires ne doivent contracter 
aucun complexe d’infériorité”, Domarchi (1958). Domarchi seemed to have found an audience 
for his complaints in post-WWII Annales ESC.  This suggested that literary economists might 
have been seeking refuge with the relatively strong Annalistes, a diagnosis further developed in 
this chapter.    
62 Letter from Braudel to Hamilton, 17 Mai 1955, Duke University, Earl J. Hamilton papers Box 
2, Folder “Correspondance- misc; 1919; 1920s-1970s and n.d”. 
Chapter 5 - Encounters between economists and historians in France 
 
 198
first, this second group had real incentive to negotiate with Braudel, as many could 
sense their growing marginalization in a changing national and international economics 
landscape. 63 
 
4 The battles for economic history 
4.1 Economics after WWII: François Perroux’s unusual position 
Section 3 has highlighted the numerous factors that turned economic history into a 
valuable space in France in the 1950s. Notice that the argument is about economic 
history, and not economic and social history, or Annales at large, though there was 
considerable overlap. The value of this space was confirmed by non-Annales attempts to 
take hold of it, in the late 1950s, early 1960s. These attempts were principally conducted 
by economists, who, for one reason or another felt marginalized by the changes that 
occurred after WWII.   
The post-WWII situation in French economics has been schematically described 
as being divided between three general areas. The first area was made up of professors 
in Law Departments. Their influence in France (and certainly outside France) was on 
the wane, and the youngest among them were painfully aware of their lag with the 
Anglo-Saxon world. The two other areas were much more dynamic, and were made up 
of engineers who ran the nationalized companies (gas, electricity, coal) on the one hand, 
and on the other, engineers and mathematicians who worked for ministries and central 
government (INSEE, Ministry of Finances, Planning agencies).64 Though these three 
types of economists were not new arrivals on the French scene, their comparative 
prospects had radically altered. While those in the universities had enjoyed growing 
prestige since the creation of economics chairs in law departments in the late 19th 
century, their authority and legitimacy was rapidly challenged after the war. The great 
majority of innovation and initiative in French economics then came from the last two 
                                                   
63 Economics was permanently removed from Law Departments in the late 1960s reform of the 
French University system.    
64 Etner (2000), 329-30. 
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groups outside university – some of whom contributed to the mathematization of the 
discipline and earned international acclaim (for example Malinvaud, Allais and 
Debreu).  
Not all French economists neatly fit this classification and the career of the 
notably non-categorizable François Perroux tells us a lot about the reconfiguration of 
the discipline after WWII. Much can be gleaned from his interactions with Annalistes.  
Though he did not initially do work in economic history, Perroux was an important 
player in an increasingly contiguous space: development economics. Shortly after WWII 
he had created the Institut de Sciences Economiques Appliquées (ISEA) – with the explicit 
aim of doing more empirical research than was habitual in Law Departments. Perroux 
was also a theorist. He had developed theories on the origin and processes of economic 
growth that he encapsulated in the notion of “pôles de croissance”.65 To convey his 
theories, he made drawings of these motors of economic growth on maps, representing 
them as points of attraction and economic dynamism (some of these maps looked like 
seismic drawings, with epicenters and various intensities of radiation). The basic idea 
was that the wealth and long-term success of a region depended on the existence of 
such driving “pôles” and that economic performance was not evenly distributed across 
national space.66   
Perroux had been quick to recognize the importance of development economics, 
and he tried to build an international reputation in this field, both for himself and for 
the ISEA. This probably explained why Kuznets looked to him first as a collaborator on 
French retrospective accounts before turning to Marczewski and then to Malinvaud (see 
chapter 4). Perroux had recruited young economists with the profile sought by Kuznets: 
numerically literate and historically sensitive (as many of them were Marxist). Jacques 
Mayer was a typical example of these new recruits: a student of mathematics with an 
interest in Marxism, he had decided to become an economist – and the work he did for 
                                                   
65 For biographical information on Perroux see de Margerie (1980). 
66 For a collection of his writings see Perroux (1982). 
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the ISEA had been spun under the general theme of “historical investigations in French 
economic growth” commissioned by Simon Kuznets (recall section 3.1).  
After his initial contact with Kuznets, Perroux made sure to keep a historical 
team at the ISEA (see figure 5. 4 featuring a picture of Francois Perroux talking to 
Jacques Mayer and Colin Clark, presumably on the topic of retrospective national 
accounts).  L’ ISEA’s work in development economics and economic history became 
bargaining chips in his negotiations with the RF and FF, which had begun in 1946, 
during Joseph Willits’ visit to France. Willits had been intrigued by Perroux and 
impressed by his collaborators (in particular by the mathematician Guilbaud, whom 
Braudel would later recruit at the VI e Section). 67 The ISEA obtained funds from RF 
starting in 1949, and was awarded a terminal grant in 1958. These grants averaged $10-
15,000 per year.68  
Perroux’s claim on growth studies gradually became his last connection to the 
world of economics. He could sense changes in the French academic landscape, and he 
was conscious of the fact that he did not really fit into any of the emerging categories.  
Though he had attempted to contribute to the wave of mathematical economics, 
principally by hiring young mathematicians, by the end of the 1950s, they had almost 
all left. Their departures were motivated by various reasons (some of them personal, 
due to Perroux’s difficult character; but many because they had been recruited 
elsewhere, and the alternatives were more attractive than the ISEA). Perroux could 
sense that his lack of mathematical training made him look outdated to these young, 
up-and-coming economists. And while many still considered him to be a great thinker, 
he was finding it difficult to identify a niche in which he could incontestably be 
recognized as an expert. 69   
                                                   
67 Diary entries for October 11th, October 14th and October 17th 1946. RAC-RF, RG 12.1, Box 70, 
“Joseph Willits”. 
68 Gemelli (1995). 
69 Many of the people I interviewed mentioned Perroux’s frustration at not being able to 
contribute to the mathematization of economics and his consequent decrease in stature and 
influence. See for example Jacques Mayer (2003), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, October 
2003.  
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Figure 5.4: Picture of Perroux and his young collaborators at ISEA, early 1950s70 
 
 
The instability of his situation had serious consequences for his reputation in 
France. For example, it led to his progressive departure from the national accounting 
scene, a field he considered to have pioneered: he was not invited to help design and 
implement the French national accounts infrastructure.71 Perroux might have found a 
place among Law Faculty economists (who were also threatened by the increased 
mathematical nature of the discipline – recall Domarchi’s rant against econometrics) in 
spite of their methodological differences, had it not been for his ideological dispositions: 
he was not conservative enough to please them. 72 His overall position was certainly not 
                                                   
70 Pictures dates from 1951. RAC-RF, Photograph Archive, 500S, #227185. I added the names 
onto the photograph (they were inscribed on the back of the photograph). 
71 Fourquet (1980); Vanoli (2002). 
72 In 1951 Marczewski talked to Lane, and told him that “Rist, Rueff and Baudin [are] ‘liberals’ 
and anti-Keynesians who consider Perroux a heretic”. The men he cited were traditional, 
literary economists who taught in Law Departments. Diary entry for October 18th 1951. RAC-
RF, Series 12.1, Box 70, “Frederic C. Lane”. 
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aided by rumors that he had collaborated with Maréchal Pétain’s regime, though these 
claims were apparently not founded.73 
As time went by, l’ISEA found it increasingly difficult to obtain American funds 
– this worried Perroux as his Institute was not officially part of the French University, 
hence was not covered by the Ministry of Education budget.  The precariousness of his 
situation became worse when Willits left the RF in 1954. His successors agreed to a 
terminal grant in 1958 both because he overwhelmed them with letters and because he 
played the “growth” card, to which they were very sensitive. 74 When the FF took over 
in France, in the mid 1950s, they established contact with Perroux. This led to a $50,000 
grant in 1955, which was never renewed – and seemed to be a “mercy” grant!75 Thus, at 
about the same time that Braudel was building a vibrant MSH, l’ISEA’s future was 
looking somewhat bleak. 
 
4.2 Economists covet the VI e Section: Perroux versus Braudel 
Perroux’s precarious position seemed to have led him to challenge Annales on the 
latter’s own territory: economic history. This was a difficult position to navigate, as both 
Braudel and Labrousse’s influence were on the ascent. However, by the late 1950s, the 
VI e Section was Perroux’s last chance to secure status and lasting influence: a space 
where he could hope to find support and funds for his type of economics. Braudel 
seemed willing to collaborate with Perroux up to a certain point, though he may not 
                                                   
73 The bases for such claims were that Perroux had remained head of the Institut Alexis Carrel 
(Carrel was known for his work in eugenics) until 1944 and that he had authored several papers 
on communal work plans that had apparently pleased Pétain, and possibly inspired him for his 
“Charte du Travail”; see de Margerie (1980). 
74 $50,000 in January 1958 for 6 years – Grant Report, 1958. RAC-RF, Series 1.2, RG 500S, Box 17, 
Folder 153. The ISEA actually got small subsequent grants, though these corresponded to RF’s 
new interest of sponsoring work in developing countries (ISEA had opened offices in North 
Africa that qualified for this funding). 
75 Grant Report. FF, PA 56-18. The grant was for growth studies, for approximately three years. 
For a measure of the relative buying power of this grant, see “How Much was That?”. 
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have held the economist in high esteem.76 He had invited Perroux to teach at the VI e 
Section, and had set up a privileged relationship with the ISEA. Yet, he did not come to 
help ISEA economists when Labrousse’s students criticized and greatly slowed down 
the work they were doing for Kuznets. 
As seen in Figure 5.5, the debate erupted publicly in 1964, with Pierre Chaunu 
and then Pierre Vilar’s virulent critiques against the first installations of Jan 
Marczewski’s efforts to reconstitute French national accounts for the 18th and 19th 
centuries.77 These critiques had a devastating effect on Marczewski’s team– making it 
very difficult, if not impossible, for them to draw funds and other researchers into their 
venture.  As seen in Figure 5.5 it took J.C. Toutain, the first and last collaborator on the 
project, over 30 years to publish his first estimate of French historical GDP series 
(combining the work of his colleagues who progressively dropped out of the project), as 
compared to the five to seven years that it took other Kuznets collaborators, for example 
Deane and Cole in Britain.78 
 
 
                                                   
76 In 1951, in a meeting with Lane, Braudel had some very harsh words for Perroux’s work and 
his ability to revive French economics: “His words about Perroux were too sharp for me to risk 
recording them from memory. He thought [him] way behind the time and lacking sense of 
economic reality”. Diary entry for October 19th 1951. RAC-RF, Series 12.1, Box 70, “Frederic C. 
Lane”. 
77 Emmanuel Le Roy-Ladurie and François Furet issued subsequent critiques, though these were 
published in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the dialogue between historians and 
economists had effectively been closed. 
78 Deane and Cole (1962); Toutain (1987).  
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Figure 5.5 : Retrospective accounts’ long ordeal in France 
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Before these debates erupted in print, Braudel had apparently attempted to 
instantiate collaboration between “historians” and “economists” who worked on the 
18th and 19th centuries. Toutain recalled that in 1960 Braudel had organized a joint 
meeting between Perroux, Marczewski and Labrousse. He remembered a total lack of 
communication between two men who wanted to dominate the scene: Labrousse and 
Perroux. He described the latter as a “new-born in economic history”, but someone with 
a wide culture and a broad view of things (like Braudel, he added). Labrousse, he 
claimed, was a narrower-minded specialist. Toutain acknowledged that there were 
“theoretical discordances” during the meeting (Perroux was not a Marxist) but he felt 
that the real obstacle was competition for leadership. Both Perroux and Labrousse were 
in favor of the creation of an institute for quantitative economic historians, provided 
they personally, and independently headed it: “It was a brawl, as both men had strong 
characters. Consequently, no association was created. Only bad feelings.”79  
Yet, Perroux did not give up, and made many parallel efforts to insure that his 
type of economics would be represented at the VI e Section. His survival strategy seems 
to have been to make sure that all studies on growth and development were attributed 
to him personally or to the ISEA (a strategy that was not impossible considering that 
these themes were not of major interest to French social scientists at that time). This led 
him to challenge Braudel on several occasions. For example, in early 1960, Perroux 
wrote a fiery letter to the director of the VI e Section (Velay), asking him why the VI e 
Section had just published a book that touched on issues of economic development. He 
reminded Velay and Braudel that the ISEA had a monopoly and international 
reputation in this field.80 In general Perroux was very suspicious of Braudel’s plans:  
                                                   
79 J.C. Toutain (2003), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Paris, March 2003.  
80 “Je te rappelle que l’ISEA, qui fonctionne depuis 15 ans, s’est depuis 10 ans consacré, en 
France, à l’étude du développement, de la croissance, du progrès et des progrès (…) Il n’est pas 
question que la VIe section choisisse unilatéralement les travaux qui l’intéressent chez nous, et 
soutienne d’une façon plus que proportionnelle, des travaux et des initiatives pour lesquels 
nous nous sommes acquis, dans l’ordre international, une position qui n’est contestée par 
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“Not one day goes by without me hearing of something new in the VI e Section, 
testimony of both a total lack of coordination and a lack of honesty concerning 
the collaboration between the VI e Section and the ISEA.”81 
 
This led to frictions with other economists, who were also trying to gain resources from 
Braudel. For example, the law department economist André Piatier eagerly solicited 
Braudel and volunteered to turn the latter’s vision into a concrete organizational plan 
for social science in France (thus completely surrendering to a vision of history as the 
ultimate synthesizer, and accepting a relatively accessory role for economics, provided 
he be a part of it). Figure 5.6 is the copy of a drawing he made in the early 1960s – an 
indication that he had understood Braudel’s grand plan for social science, and that he 
wanted to be the spokesperson for a collaborative type of economist.  At the time Piatier 
had just started a center for research in economic development at the VI e Section, which 
had greatly annoyed Perroux, and suggested that he was not the only French economist 
who was trying to use development themes to gain resources from the increasingly 
popular Annales. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
personne”. Letter from Perroux to Braudel, 25th July 1960, EHESS Archives, Folder “ISEA (1958-
1960)”. 
81 Letter from Perroux to Braudel, 25th July 1960, EHESS Archives, Folder “ISEA (1958-1960)”. 
He was referring to efforts by André Piatier and Charles Bettelheim - both traditional 
economists from law faculties who had found a home at the VIe Section – and were both 
constituting centers for research on « development » (and planification, in Bettelheim’s case).  
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Figure 5.6: Andre Piatier’s representation of the VI e section agenda for social science (1960)82 
 
  
Copy of original hand-drawn chart Reproduction 
                                                   
82 Letter from Piatier to Velay, 29 August 1960, EHESS Archives, Folder “ISEA (1958-1960)”. 
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In Figure 5.6 Piatier had labeled blue lines (small arrows on the lower plane) to stand 
for “specific studies within each discipline”, the red lines (thick vertical lines) as an 
example of interdisciplinary study (whatever project he had in mind, it required a 
sociologist and an economist to collaborate on a problem specific to the Middle East) 
and the green lines (thin dotted vertical lines) symbolized networks that linked 
individual disciplines to various regional specialties.  The area studies (espaces culturels) 
were a relatively new development in the methodological thinking of Annales 
(principally driven by Braudel, but also by his friend and colleague Clemens Heller) 
and were being installed at the MSH as the embodiment of a commitment to social 
science and interdisciplinarity. In reality however, historians principally drove these 
regional studies.83   
Piatier’s chart was an interesting mix between a conceptual diagram and an 
organizational map for the VI e Section. This is a reminder that views about good science 
have methodological, but also social implications, in so far as they imply a hierarchy 
and division of labor within the scientific community (a general point we developed in 
chapter 2). The divergence between this ideal map, and the actual division of labor and 
power within the VI e Section are also a hint that the organization of scientific activity is 
a matter of negotiation and controversy, and that scholars recognize the importance of 
gaining peer recognition for their particular skills.84  In a 1960 letter to Velay, Piatier 
explained the motivation for this chart: he worried that historians from area studies 
were not attempting systematic collaboration with economists and sociologists. In other 
words, he wanted to secure an official place for his type of economist and justify it with 
appeal to Braudel’s vision. 85 
Piatier’s chart was never publicized but it did represent the eagerness certain 
economists displayed towards the alternative Braudel and his patronage now 
represented. Such alliances were just one facet of the larger strategic behavior at work 
                                                   
83 The relationship between Braudel and Heller, and the genesis of area studies is fully explored 
in Gemelli (1995). 
84 Bourdieu (1984). 
85 Letter from Piatier to Velay, 29 August 1960, EHESS Archives, Folder “ISEA (1958-1960)”. 
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and the competition it triggered. As represented in Figure 5.7, the frontier between 
economics and history was still porous enough to let certain individuals lay claim to an 
inter-disciplinary space that overlapped with various methodological calls for 
“empirical” social science.  
The fact that people on this chart could compete was indicative of their many 
similarities (in terms of epistemology, professional networks and vision of their role in 
society).  The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu neatly represented this proximity in a 1967 
survey of Parisian academia. In his graphical depiction of faculty members in 
humanities and social sciences, no one is closer to Perroux than Braudel and vice versa. 
In Bourdieu’s graph, the vertical axis represents a positive-negative range: the 
scholars higher up on the chart have the most honors (Legion of Honor; Who’s Who 
citation for example). This tends to overlap with age, though not necessarily. For 
example, Braudel and Perroux are much higher up than Labrousse – who was seven 
years older than them. Malinvaud and Le Roy-Ladurie’s southern position is linked to 
their youth – a similar study 10 years later would have put them in a much higher 
position. 
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Figure 5.7: Economic History in France: clashes and collaboration (1950s and 1960s) 
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Figure 5.8: Humanities and Social Science Space in France in 196786 
 
                                                   
86 Bourdieu (1984), 290. The colored boxes are not on Bourdieu’s original charts, they were 
added to make it easier for the reader to identify protagonists mentioned in this chapter. For 
reference I have also highlighted names of a famous economist in Law Departments (Marchal) 
and a rising star among young Annales scholars (Le Goff).  
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The horizontal axis represents the different types of power (“social capital”) 
available to academics, on a range from intellectual and popular prestige to pure 
academic power. The former is defined as the ability to reach a wide and broad 
audience (in particular an international audience) and includes scholars who were 
heads of research laboratories, of an editorial board, or had high media visibility; while 
the latter defines professors who held key positions in the University (appointment 
juries), thus exerting much influence on the evolution (or reproduction) of higher 
learning institutions in France. The axis represents a relative measure, so scholars with 
relatively more intellectual prestige are on the left of the chart (as Perroux and Braudel). 
Conversely, further right on the chart, you find those who have relatively more 
academic power. As this study was conducted in 1967, by which time Labrousse had 
retired from the Sorbonne, his name appears on the left – an earlier study would have 
depicted him very far on the right.  
Notice that all our protagonists are on the left side of the chart. We recognize 
names of Annales historians (Braudel, Le Roy-Ladurie, Le Goff), economists from law 
departments (Marchal, Piatier) but also rising stars in mathematical economics 
(Malinvaud). This south-west quadrant would probably also have featured the names 
of Chaunu and Vilar, though their youth and the fact that Chaunu’s first appointment 
was in Caen and not in Paris precluded them from being featured in this study. 
Bourdieu’s choice to limit his sample to Parisian professors was justified by the fact that 
academic powers of all kinds were centralized in the capital. Note that Marcweski’s 
professorship was also in Caen. 
The closeness between Perroux and Braudel, measured on several dimensions 
(not just their scholarly work) seems to confirm the analysis made throughout this 
chapter. Indeed Braudel was much closer to Perroux than to Labrousse, reflecting his 
conviction that Annales history was a path towards better social scientific knowledge, as 
Lane had pointed out. Following Bourdieu’s line of thought, we can argue that Perroux 
and Braudel were both well positioned to stake a claim on empirical-historical social 
science – having both earned the reputation of being broad scholars with collaborators 
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they could rely on for the more meticulous monographic accumulation. Both had 
created research institutes, thus constituting a veritable exception in an otherwise state-
run system. The fact that they had been able to skirt the traditional rules of the French 
academic game and play a riskier one (this is one interpretation of a north-west 
position) was indicative of the tremendous potential for change that existed in French 
academia in the 1950s.  But it was also indicative of the stakes at play – both on the 
upside, and on the downside. The stakes were financial, embodied in their relationships 
to American foundations; political, embodied in the different ideological views that 
motivated each scholar (Marxism , Keynesianism etc.); and they were professional, 
embodied in the changing landscape for economics in France. They were also 
epistemological, as is best seen in the debates that opposed Marczewski’s team to 
Chaunu and Vilar. 
 
5 The many meanings of “empirical” 
5.1 Marczewski versus Chaunu and Vilar 
Both Marczewski’s team and Labrousse’s students claimed to be doing 
“empirical” work, yet they had very different interpretations of what this meant. In his 
1961 methodological manifesto (see Figure 5.5), Marczewski - a polish émigré and war 
veteran who had become a national accounts specialist in France – had argued along 
Kuznetsian lines in favor of a framework that could provide a comprehensive and 
precise view of the past.87 Much like Kuznets, he argued that the superiority of this 
approach lay in the fact that it provided a systemic view (the best one currently 
available) for apprehending the many direct and indirect links that connected economic 
variables: « an instrument capable of measuring, however roughly, the movements of 
interaction taking place in the [modern] economic world. »88 According to him, with 
                                                   
87 Marczewski (1961), 5-7. For Marczewski’s work on National Income theory, see Marczewski 
(1946); Marczewski (1949).  
88 Marczewski (1968), 184. I use this English summary of his 1961 manifesto, to avoid translating 
the French text. There is no noticeable difference in the core methodological views expressed in 
these texts.  
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this framework, the historian could be sure not to let his personal biases enter in the 
selection of facts, or be swayed by witnesses’ views of what had been important in their 
day – thus contributing, in Marczewski’s opinion, to a greater objectivity.89  While 
Kuznets’ methodological statements had always been formulated for economists – i.e. 
by stating why his type of historical study was crucial for economics - Marczewski 
seemed to be addressing both economists and historians. He acknowledged the 
necessity for economists to study dynamic phenomena, in particular growth, in 
historical perspective, but he also highlighted ways in which the national accounts 
framework could aid historians in their investigations.90 He used the term “quantitative 
history” for this second, historical usage, which he defined as a more comprehensive, 
precise and “objective” history.  
Many Annalistes were infuriated by Marczewski’s complete disregard for earlier 
work in quantitative economic history. The first round of critique came from Chaunu 
and Vilar (Figure 5.5). Their reactions have tended to be understood as part of the larger 
issue of French economic historians’ disregard for formal economic theory (of which 
one recent manifestation has been the issue of understanding why there was no 
cliometrics in France).91 Forster (1978), for example, has argued that the Annalistes’ 
reaction to Marczewski was epitomic of “a French aversion, not only to mathematical 
model building, but also to [the study of] growth itself, especially industrial growth”.92 
This lack of interest in growth was true to some extent. Recall that Labrousse’s 
ideological framework invited him to see changes in the scale of production and 
consumption as short-term cyclical variations (which he believed were becoming 
increasingly unstable), rather than manifestations of long-term growth. On the other 
                                                   
89 Ibid, 186. 
90 Though the scholars he made reference to were principally economists – many were Anglo 
Saxon - indication that he was very new to French scholarship in economic history. He 
referenced Kuznets, Rostow, North, Gerschenkron, Leontief, Burns, Mitchell, Perroux, Jean 
Lhomme, Jean Marchal and A. Barrère. Among historians, he only mentioned Simiand and 
Labrousse. 
91 See for example Grantham (1997); Crouzet and Lescent-Giles (1998). 
92 Forster (1978), 68. 
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hand, Marczewski and Toutain were committed to explaining economic growth, an 
interest spurred by their Keynesian ideas. They were motivated by a desire to confirm 
Keynes’ insights on French historical record. As Toutain recalled: “for us theory was 
Keynes, and that was it. We had to refine and illustrate him”.93 
Yet, analyses of the debate should not end here if we are interested in finding the 
emerging lines of demarcation between French “economists” and “historians”. These 
did not appear to be principally or unambiguously ideological. Indeed, there was no 
ideological homogeneity on either side. Among the economists who had partaken in 
Kuznets’ commission for French retrospective accounts there were Marxists (Mayer, 
later Fontvielle), Keynesians (Marczewski, Toutain) and those with their own macro-
economic theories (Perroux).  Among historians, Labrousse and Vilar may have been 
Marxists, but Chaunu certainly was not (a protestant whose ideals were not far from 
social Catholicism). 
In reality, rather than being ideological, the debate seemed to focus on the 
trustworthiness of Toutain’s data. Both sides had very different notions of what 
constituted a reliable number. Chaunu made the clearest case for their different views 
on quantification. He reminded Marczewski that economic historians had not waited 
for him to do “quantitative history” – and agreed to call this earlier work “serial 
history”.94 According to Chaunu, the issue was not whether or not to quantify. It wasn’t 
either about fitting the data into a broader framework – Chaunu liked the national 
accounts framework, and Vilar even admitted that while the search for other 
frameworks should continue, this one wasn’t a bad start.95 Proof that national accounts, 
as a framework was not the crux of the disagreement could later be found in Braudel’s 
second edition of La Mediterrannée , in which he mentioned that it would be interesting 
to draw the accounts of the entire Mediterranean region: 
 
                                                   
93 “(…) et pour nous la théorie c’était du Keynes point final. Il fallait affiner Keynes et 
l’illustrer», Toutain, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Paris, March 2003. 
94 Chaunu (1964). 
95 Vilar (1965). 
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“We would like to have accounts for the 16th century Mediterranean area, not to 
establish its relative mediocrity or modernity but to determine the essential 
relationship among its clusters of activity.” 96 
 
Instead the issue seemed to be the quality of the data. For Annalistes, the 
challenge was to provide real, detailed data and rely on no estimates, or as few as 
possible.  In contrast Marczewski had argued that the capacity to fill-in data where it 
could not be found was one of the virtues of the accounting view, and that these created 
data were equally or more objective than other numbers, as they were the inevitable 
product of a pre-defined framework, and not the result of an individual scholars’ 
choice. From his manifesto, and from Toutain’s work on agricultural production, both 
published in 1961, one could glean at least three different types of estimation.  The first 
was conceptual, based on deducing unknown variables from accounting equations (for 
example, obtaining Consumption, from the difference between Income and Investment; 
C=Y-I – recall Kuznets’ work discussed in chapter 4). The second was derived from 
experience with contemporary accounts: aggregates tended to vary slowly (unless there 
was an obvious historical crisis), so linear interpolation between two points was a 
reasonable approximation of intermediary values.97 The third was more properly 
described as order of magnitude work: for example, estimating the grain production of 
an entire region from a multiplication of known production on a given farm times the 
number of such farms that could have fit in the entire area.98 
These different forms of estimations did not convince Annalistes, and they 
certainly did not buy the claim that these numbers were intrinsically “more objective”. 
To the first they replied that if the estimates for income and investment were not 
reliable (which they often were not, given the sources Toutain used), then neither was 
                                                   
96 ”Nous voudrions faire les comptes de la Méditerranée du 16e, non pour juger de sa médiocrité 
ou de sa modernité relative, mais pour déterminer les rapports essentiels de ses masses 
d’activités les unes par rapport aux autres”, cited in Braudel, Ed. (1966). 
97 Marczewski (1968), 177. 
98 Toutain (1961). 
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the estimate for consumption – i.e. it was always a problem of sources, with or without 
the framework.99 To the second type of estimate (linear interpolation) they replied that 
short cycles actually did exist, and had tremendously important social consequences, as 
Labrousse’s entire career was dedicated to proving.100 To the third they reacted 
violently, claiming that this was simply non-sense, and worse than having no data at 
all: 
 
“Either the work follows the cautious rhythm of those who build indices of 
activity, or it desperately strives to fill in its columns, relying principally on the 
village idiot. In doing so, it contributes to hide reality, and rather than moving us 
forwards, moves us back.”101 
 
In general, Annalistes made a clear distinction between found and estimated data 
suggesting that these held different epistemological status. For example, in his work on 
16th and 17th century Atlantic trade, Pierre Chaunu always carefully distinguished 
between numbers that he had found in the Seville archives, and numbers that he had 
had to estimate.  As we see in Figure 5.9 representing the monetary value of traffic 
between Spain and the New World (third chart from the top), data for which he had an 
archival source was colored in black, while data he had estimated was colored in white. 
In these charts, Chaunu was using the ad valorem tax paid at departure to compute the 
total value of yearly shipments (the X axis is chronological, from 1540 to 1640, the Y axis 
is value in millions). To compute the value of goods on ships whose tax payments he 
knew, he multiplied their payment by 50 or 100 (the rate went from 1 to 2%, as seen in 
the second chart from the top). To estimate missing data (he did not have proof of 
payment from all ships) he approximated their cargo with similar ships for which he 
                                                   
99 Chaunu (1964), 175. 
100 Vilar (1965), 309. 
101 “Ou bien [le travail] adopte le rhythme prudent des constructeurs d’indices d’activité, ou 
bien [il] remplit, coûte que coûte ses colonnes en recourant largement à la folle du logis. En 
agissant ainsi il contribue à masquer la réalité. Elle n’avance pas, elle recule“, Chaunu (1964), 
175. 
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had data.  Yet, he wanted his reader to be aware of the ratio of estimated to found data 
for every year. According to Chaunu, this ratio was the measure of certainty.102 
Compare this to Marczewski and other retrospective accountants for whom the 
principal measure of certainty was the internal consistency of the data (i.e. cross 
checks), and not the proportion of “found” versus “made” data. Thus Chaunu and 
Marczweski had diametrically opposed ways of checking data validity: the more 
Chaunu “guessed”, the least confident he felt; while the more Marcweski estimated, the 
more consistent his data set, hence the more confident! 
 
Figure 5.9: Showing the difference between “found” and “estimated” data103 
 
 
One may be tempted to interpret these diverging levels of trust in estimates to 
the possession or non-possession of models.  In other words, one could ascribe 
Chaunu’s caution and Marczweski’s zeal to the fact that the latter had a systemic model 
of the economy, while the former did not. This was to some extent true, yet recall that 
neither Vilar nor Chaunu had criticized the general idea of a systemic model. For these 
                                                   
102 “L’ecart entre les deux courbes fournit une presomption, quant a l’exactitude du chiffre 
global”, Arbellot, Bertin and Chaunu (1957), 56. 
103 Ibid, 58. 
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scholars, models were fine in principle, as long as they were used to organize data that 
was found independently– as soon as they intervened to generate data, Annalistes 
seemed to raise their eyebrows.  
  
5.2 Pre-war and post-war economists: questions of time 
The reader may also be tempted to ascribe these different levels of tolderance 
and reliance on estimates (or guesses) as defining traits of members of different 
professions : historians are inherenly more scrupulous and source oriented than 
economists, who have always been more casual about exact values, as they are 
principally concerned with relations between variables or evolution through time ! Yet, 
such characterizations do not fit scholars like Simiand, who seemed to share many of 
Annalistes’  views of quantification and may have treated Marczewski’s work with 
much the same attitude. As Vilar reminded Marczewski in 1964 :  
 
“When Simiand established the strict rules for observation of prices and wages, his 
main contribution was to highlight the circumstances in which a number written on 
a document was an objective fact. He requested that we check, via rigorous 
inspection, not only the guarantee of authenticity, veracity etc., using the historian’s 
habitual checks, but also that we make sure that it was not an opinion, an 
appreciation or any other subjective assessment. Numbers had to be the involuntary 
product of a sucession of decisions or actions (…) It is necesasry that the chosen 
quantitative expression objectively reflect a reality that does not depend on he who 
wrote it down, or he who read it . “104   
                                                   
104 “Quand Simiand posa les strictes règles de l’observation des prix et des salaires, son 
principal mérite fut de montrer sous quelles conditions le chiffre, écrit noir sur blanc dans un 
document, etait une donnee objective. Il exigeait qu’on s’assurât, par une rigoureuse critique, 
non seulement des garanties d’authenticité, véracité etc… , par les contrôles habituels de 
l’historien,  mais aussi qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’opinion, d’appréciation, toutes données 
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By citing Simiand, Vilar was defending a notion of “objectivity” – by which he 
meant standards for data collection - that differed from Marczewski’s in so far as it 
relied on the critical examination of sources and the collection of numbers (as opposed 
to the creation of numbers, though averages and indexes built from micro-data were 
commonly used by Annalistes so the issue really was the quality of the inputs). It is 
certainly true that Chaunu and Vilar investigated topics that were inherently more 
“historical” than Simiand or the retrospective accountants (if only because they took 
place earlier than the 18th century), yet one should be cautious not to attribute their 
dispute to intrinsic differences between “historians” and “economists”- rather it would 
seem that their arguments overlapped with tensions within economics on the nature of 
“objective”data, on the issue of proper and reliable observation, or fact. In this conflict, 
the main issue was not quantification, but estimation.  
French retrospective accountants and Annales scholars did not see eye to eye on 
the legitimacy, credibility and use of estimates. If one considers the implications of both 
positions, one can admit, as the British economic historian Patrick O’Brien recently did, 
that each side had a point.105 Even from our contemporary vantage point (that tends to 
think that all facts are inherently “constructs”, and hence never truly “found”) there is a 
case to be made for the higher legitimacy of exhaustive measures (like total population 
counts), as opposed to estimates based on samples or models (like theories of 
population growth). However, there is also a case for developing new ways of 
establishing and checking estimates -Toutain’s willingness to use sources that historians 
were very suspicious of, and his decision to produce rough estimates were just a first 
step in a sequence of critical evaluations that he, Marczewski and their colleagues 
                                                                                                                                                                    
subjectives. Le chiffre devait être la résultante involontaire d’un complexe de décisions ou 
d’actions (…) ce qu’il faut c’est que l’expression quantitative retenue traduise objectivement une 
réalité qui ne dépende pas ni de celui qui l’a inscrite, ni de celui qui la lit“, Vilar (1965), 307. 
105 Patrick O’Brien, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, LSE, Fall 2003. 
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would subsequently refine. Indeed, in later publications they performed robustness 
analysis and reflected on the overall quality and consistency of the data. 106    
 If both sides had a point, but proved incapable or unwilling to acknowledge their 
opponent’s position, one could be tempted to ascribe this choice to pure strategic 
behavior: Labrousse and his students did not want economists treading on their 
territory. But such views, doubtless true to some extent, keep us from digging further. 
What could have made post-war economists like Marczewski and Toutain, more eager 
and willing to use rough estimates? Could it be a question of resources? 
 Let’s recall from chapter 2 that scientific debates and their outcomes are often 
better understood when they are evaluated both on epistemological grounds and 
according to the social organization they entail. This may provide a clue about the 
origins of Chaunu and Marczewski’s differing opinions. When we consider the 
organizational models implicit behind each man’s empiricism we notice that” time” 
was an important feature of the debate. Both sides appeared to disagree about the 
amount of time it could and should take to obtain these numbers. Perroux’s colleagues 
seemed to feel more pressure than Annalistes to deliver results within a relatively short 
period of time. As Chaunu stated: 
 
“Toutain succeeded in assembling a massive amount of evaluations that we had 
access to before him, but that no one had put together or organized before him. 
Where twenty historians aware of the difficulty of the task would have taken 
twenty years, Toutain, with very little means took three years.” 107   
 
And Marczewski replied that he had to choose between: 
 
                                                   
106 See for example Marczewski (1965).  
107 “Toutain a réussi le tour de force de rassembler sur la France du 18e une masse d’ 
évaluations que nous connaissions, certes, avant lui, mais que personne n’avait réussi à 
rapprocher d’abord, à ordonner ensuite. Là ou vingt historiens soucieux de la difficulté auraient 
mis vingt ans, Toutain, avec des faibles moyens, a mis trois ans“ , Chaunu (1964), 172. 
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“Limiting his work to sources validated by historians, even if this meant pushing 
publication of the first volume of France’s quantitative history to the year 2000 
[or accepting that] a rapid extension of historical knowledge had become 
absolutely indispensible for the progress of economics.“ 108 
  
In these comments one gets the distinct impression that Chaunu and Vilar did not feel 
pressed for time, while Marczewski et al. did. These diverging views on the 
opportunity cost of time may have originated from several factors. As mentioned 
earlier, by the early 1960s, Annales historians did have access to more publishing, 
research, and assistance support via the MSH. This may have served to reinforce a 
model of long-term research –10 year Thèses d ‘Etat were still going strong in French 
history departments.  Compared to this relatively lavish research environment, the 
ISEA was running on tighter funds: Kuznets had only given funding for three years.  
Yet there may have been an element that went beyond financial resources, and 
was rather linked to the different places each group held, or aspired to hold in post 
WWII France. For the most part, Annalistes did not believe in straightfoward «lessons 
from history », whereas Marczweski clearly presented his work in light of a pressing 
need to understand growth for the sake of developing nations. Such statements may not 
have been a realistic description of the importance of his own work, but they may well 
have reflected the general disposition held  by many rising economists – be they Anglo-
Saxon accountants around Richard Stone and Simon Kuznets, or French accountants 
around Claude Gruson, Pierre Uri, Malinvaud. As we saw in chapter 4, it seemed that 
Kuznets had a much tighter research schedule than earlier NBER projects, certainly 
than Labrousse type projects. Thus the fact Kuznets had given them funding for only 
three years constrained Marczewski and his team’s behavior, confronting them to 
                                                   
108 “Limiter aux sources confirmées par la recherche historique, quitte à remettre la publication 
du 1er volume de l’histoire quantitative de la France à l’an 2000 [mais] une extension  rapide 
des connaissances historiques est devenue absolument indispensable aux progrès de la science 
économique“, Marczewski Ibid, 178. 
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changes in time horizons that were occuring in a much broader playing field – 
international economics to aid public decision making.  
Yet, in spite of Marczweski and the ISEA’s nominal connection to Kuznets and 
National accounting, French national accountants did not come to their defense in the 
Vilar/Chaunu debates. Recall from chapter 4 that Malinvaud had been sollicited by 
Abramovitz in 1962 (just as the Kuznets/Abramovitz post-war growth project was 
picking up) to take on the French part of the study.109 The  fact that he did not feel the 
need to come to Marczewski’s side was an indication of the tremendous self confidence 
of established mathematical economists in the 1960s.110 It was also a reflection of the 
divide that seperated academic from governmental researchers in France (Malinvaud 
taught at the VI e Section but his main affiliation was L’INSEE). 
 
6 Conclusion 
Encounters between post-war French economists and historians proved to be 
blind men dialogues, so this chapter was not “influences” from one discipline to the 
other.111 Rather we used these debates to emphasize the different views these groups 
had of empirical work, and invited the reader to look beyond issues of quantitative 
versus qualitative data, or theory versus no theory to see that battles on the legitimacy 
and reliability of different types of evidence principally revolved around the issue of 
estimation. Different scholars committed to empirical, historical work did not 
necessarily agree on the value of estimates, and their willingness to do so seemed to 
depend on their sense of time and urgency. 
                                                   
109 Figures 5.5 and 5.7 make note of his final product, published as Carré, Dubois and 
Malinvaud (1972). In a January 2004 Interview, Malinvaud confirmed that Abramovitz 
contacted him in the early 1960s – because they had met at Berkeley, when Malinvaud was 
visiting there in 1961.  
110 When asked about the Chaunu/Vilar versus Marcewski debate, Malinvaud did not recall 
having heard about it – though he did say that he had taken a look at Toutain and Markovitch’s 
work and that he was rather suspicious of their data. Edmond Malinvaud, Interviewed by 
Cristel de Rouvray, Paris, January 2004. 
111 Actually, economists seem to have had very little influence on Annales, and the more fertile 
connections tended to be with demographers, anthropologists and geographers.  
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As an outcome of these debates, economist-historians appropriated most 
estimation devices and techniques, and those who held on to “found” data preferred to 
be called historians. Yet these different relationships to estimation were not intrinsic to 
either field – earlier economists, like Simiand, had developed standards for evaluating 
historical data that were not much different from those used and enforced by Annales 
historians. In other words, it may be useful to think of the frontier between Annalistes 
and Perroux’s economists as one within social sciences, within economics, rather than 
one across different disciplines. The fact that Annalistes became entrenched, and were 
remembered as “historians” – when Braudel had done his best to institutionalize them 
as social scientists - was a result of such encounters, rather than its cause. 
This French story also sheds light on events in the U.S. In chapter 4, we saw 
Kuznets spread his model for economist-history. In stark contrast, Marczewksi was not 
able to convert many scholars, and most economic historians did not accept his macro, 
systemic view of the past as the most scientific, objective way to study dynamic social 
phenomena. This reminds us of the contingency at play in epistemological debates. 
Kuznets had leveraged a feature of American academia that was simply not widespread 
in France: the conviction that the past of developed nations (in particular the U.S. and 
the U.K) held the keys to growth theory. In its stead one found a much more vibrant 
Marxist tradition that used to past to study social and class relations – where macro 
views were simply not as relevant.   
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THE GERSCHENKRON, CONRAD AND MEYER PARADOX 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have looked into multiple attempts to add a 
historical component to economic research. Yet, none has been defined as 
cliometrics. Even Simon Kuznets’ work, in spite of his affiliation with numerous 
cliometricians (as depicted in Figure 4.3) and their willingness to cite him as one 
of their forefathers, did not fit this label.1  Chapter 1 offered a broad definition of 
cliometrics as the art of “applying economic theory, models, measurement and 
inference techniques to historical questions”. Implicit in this definition is a 
contrast with scholars who founded the EHA and the RCEntrepH, Kuznetsians 
and Annalistes for whom economic theory did not have much (or anything!) to 
bring to historical investigation (though they may have been measurers). Quite 
the contrary, their main mission seemed to have been to use historical evidence 
and analysis to change economics.  As this narrative enters the 1960s and the 
official appearance of cliometrics on the American scene we are thus faced with 
the task of explaining how economist-historians came to think that economics 
was “good for” history, instead of the earlier prevailing belief that history was 
“good for” economics.2 
                                                   
1 For examples of cliometricians citing Kuznets as a forefather see McCloskey (1978); 
Easterlin (1993).  
2 Though of course, positions were rarely this extreme - rather it was a question of 
balance. For example, Kuznets certainly used concepts from  economic and accounting 
theory to frame his historical research, but overall, he expected historical perspective to 
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The anecdotal histories we deconstructed in chapter 2 may provide clues. 
Indeed among key people and events they cited Alexander Gerschrenkron and a 
1957 meeting where two young Harvard economists presented a paper on the 
profitability of slavery in early 19th century U.S.  Alfred Conrad and John Meyer 
argued that slavery was a profitable activity in all southern regions – either 
because of cotton farming or slave breeding.3 The paper was remembered for 
having caused quite a stir in the economic history community and for having set 
an exemplar in the budding cliometric community. As Barbara Solow recalled, 
“if you had to name a single thing you would chose Conrad and Meyer (Robert 
Solow nods in agreement). That’s the fons et origo of cliometrics”.4   
Conrad and Meyer were Gerschenkron’s students and close acolytes. 
Gerschenkron had played a key role in organizing the 1957 meeting where they 
presented their slavery paper (and another methodological paper). In the late 
1950s he was actively soliciting philanthropic foundations to sponsor economic 
history at Harvard, and more generally in the U.S.  This is evidence enough to 
warrant further investigation into his “influence” on American economist-history 
– a phenomenon that may seem paradoxical to any reader familiar with both his 
writings and subsequent contributions from cliometricians. One would be hard 
pressed to describe Gerschenkron’s work as “cliometric”.  He did not use 
econometric techniques to test hypotheses, nor did he develop economic models 
and apply them to specific historical situations. In so far as he used any of the 
economist’s tools, they tended to be relatively old adages (for example, that men 
follow their own economic interest) or non-probabilistic statistical techniques (for 
example, index numbers, not unlike the 1930s price historians described in 
chapter 3). Generally, his writings were more on the “history is good for 
                                                                                                                                                       
provide better theories. Compare this to Conrad and Meyer for whom capital theory 
helped reframe and solve a specific historical question.  
3 Conrad and Meyer (1958). 
4 Robert and Barbara Solow (2004), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Boston, June 
2004.  
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economics” side of the spectrum. Thus we may want to know more about the 
relationship between Conrad, Meyer and Gerschenkron. What happened at the 
1957 meeting? Did the slavery paper trigger the cliometric movement? What role 
did Gerschenkron actually play in the advent of the cliometric revolution?  
This chapter begins by exploring Gerschenkron’s path to economic 
history, his first years at Harvard and his adversarial relationship with other 
Harvard economic historians (section 2). Section 3 describes the legendary 1957 
Williamstown meeting and Conrad and Meyer’s performance. Section 4 
examines the multifaceted economist-history landscape of the late 1950s, the 
rivalries that existed among different “reformist” minded groups and the crucial 
role the Ford Foundation played in choosing among these claims. The last section 
(section 5) explores Gerschenkron’s Harvard Workshop and suggests reasons 
why his agenda proved to be more powerful than his competitors’. Throughout, 
the chapter argues that, like Kuznets before him, Gerschenkron was able to 
leverage the relatively new and extremely profitable connection between 
economic history and development economics to push his agenda and 
marginalize competing ones. To do so, he brought into economic history a new 
generation of economists, effectively changing the relationship between 
economics and economic history and moving the field in a direction he had not 
entirely foreseen. Yet, the triggering point was not Conrad and Meyer’s 1957 
performance but rather the critical mass of young economist-historians that 
Gerschenkron brought into the field thanks to his post 1959 workshop.  
 
2. Gerschenkron and Economic History 
2.1. Alexander Gerschenkron’s path to economic history 
It is nearly impossible to read any biographical essay on Alexander 
Gerschenkron or the recent book authored by his grandson without being 
thoroughly impressed by both his exceptional breadth of knowledge and the mix 
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of turmoil, luck and adversity that was his life.5 Born in Ukraine, in 1904, 
Gerschenkron lived a quiet, comfortable childhood. His adolescence was 
considerably less idyllic, bathed in the increasing political unrest of the Bolshevik 
revolution, culminating with a two-year civil war on the streets of Odessa (from 
1918 to 1920). In 1920, when earning a profit was made illegal, Gerschenkron’s 
father, a successful businessman, chose exile. He fled with his family to start 
anew in Vienna. Gerschenkron thus spent most of his education in the strict 
Austrian schools and University. He had to teach himself German, but soon 
excelled – in particular in humanities and Slavic languages, which he had first 
intended to pursue as a career.  
Upon entering University Gerschenkron changed his mind and chose to 
study economics and political science.  He earned his doctorate in “rerum 
politicarum” in 1928 and held several jobs – including manager of a motorcycle 
factory and associate at the Austrian institute of business cycle study - before his 
forced exile in 1938. Gerschenkron’s father had converted from Judaism in the 
late 19th century, and though his son was not a practicing Jew and had married a 
Christian woman this was sufficient to make the family situation perilous in 
post-Anschluss Austria. They moved to England, and then to the U.S., where 
Gerschenkron took a job as research assistant for a professor of Economics at 
Berkeley (Charles Gulick, who was writing a book on Austria).  He spent six 
years in California before being called to Washington D.C. to work for the 
Federal Reserve Board, as a Soviet expert.  
In 1948 he was offered an appointment by the Harvard Economics 
Department to teach both economic history and Soviet studies. According to 
Dawidoff, this double expertise was crucial for getting Gerschenkron the job at 
Harvard. He was not their first choice as an economic historian (apparently they 
had first asked Rostow to replace A. P. Usher but he had declined), but his two 
                                                   
5 Erlich (1979); Rosovsky (1979); Fishlow (1987); McCloskey (1992). Gerschenkron’s 
grandson’s recollections were published as Dawidoff (2002). 
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“hats” made it easier for the slightly reluctant faculty to take him in.  Indeed 
Gerschenkron did not have the most extensive record as an economic historian, 
having published only one book, Bread and Democracy in Germany (1943), where 
he attacked the landed class (Junkers) for exploiting the rest of the German 
population and the consequent failure of democracy.6 The book was to a large 
extent historical (examining the origins and evolution of the relationship 
between junkers and state) but clearly aimed at understanding a present concern 
(fascism in Germany). Like Willits and Bezanson, Gerschenkron’s path to 
economic history was born in the presentist concern of a failing world, though 
his worries had been much more concretely experienced during his last years in 
Vienna.  
While Bread and Democracy had earned him the respect of many peers, it 
was not habitual for Harvard faculty to invite scholars with such a thin 
publications record to join their ranks. Yet, they seemed committed to re-staffing 
the economic history slot – which had now become a pillar of undergraduate and 
graduate education - so they hired Gerschenkron.7 With the perspective we have 
gained from chapter 3, their choice was even more puzzling. Recall that Harvard 
had been the breading ground for a relatively large group of economist-
historians who had earned their Ph.Ds with Edwin Gay in the late 1920s. Among 
them at least three of them - Earl Hamilton (Duke University), Harold 
Williamson (Northwestern) and John Nef (Chicago) - were now tenured 
professors, not yet 50 years old. Could Harvard not have enticed one of them to 
move? Perhaps they were looking for a younger scholar, so why did they not 
turn to the CREH (now operating for 7 years) and hire one of the young 
                                                   
6 Gerschenkron (1943). 
7 Recall from chapter 3 that this was not the first time Harvard economists had trouble 
finding their economic historian – even though they were now embarking on their 5th 
decade of economic history and it had definitely become part of the Harvard economics 
culture. John Meyer, who was a graduate student in the early 50s recalls that history was 
very much a part of an economist’s education. He described the department as having a 
three legged stool philosophy: theory, statistics and history - Meyer (1995). 
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economic historians they were financing? By 1948 , the RCEntrepH  was just 
getting off the ground – could Cole not have found Usher’s replacement? 
Considering that all these initiatives were somehow tied to Harvard, it is 
surprising that Usher was not replaced with someone closer to this clique. 
Gerschenkron was certainly no stranger to the founders of the EHA. Early 
records of the EHA suggest that he started attending the annual meetings 
relatively soon after his move to the East coast, and that he quickly became a 
prominent member of the association. 8  Yet, as we shall see in this chapter, this 
was not evidence that he fit in well with other notable American economic 
historians.    
As time went by, Gerschenkron steadily strengthened his reputation as a 
phenomenal scholar. His early years at Harvard were spent revamping the 
Soviet Studies interdisciplinary center. This effort fit into his status of foremost 
Soviet expert, his major contribution being studies of Soviet industrial output 
commissioned by the RAND corporation in the early 1950s and summarized in 
his 1955 article for the Review of Economics and Statistics.9  Yet, after 1956 
Gerschenkron stopped teaching Soviet economics and ended his formal 
involvement with this area of study. Part of the reason for this withdrawal was a 
weak heart that led him to cut back on his workload (he suffered a relatively 
severe heart attack in the mid 1950s). Yet, an apparently greater reason was his 
determination to change economic history at Harvard (and by extension in the 
U.S.): a determination that seemed to grow stronger with every obstacle that was 
put in his way.   
 
                                                   
8  For example, there is a 1947 picture of him with Louis Hunter, Usher, Bezanson and a 
senator from Vermont at the annual EHA meetings, published in the New Haven Sunday 
Register (Volume CV, number 253) Sunday Sept 14th 1947, 2 - Hagley, Accession 1479, 
Folder 74. 
9 Gerschenkron (1955). 
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Figure 6.1: Alexander Gerschenkron (1904-1978)10 
 
 
 
2.2.  Gerschenkron disagrees with the Harvard economic history 
establishment (1948-1957) 
Gerschenkron’s first years at Harvard were tumultuous. It does not seem 
that he was well integrated in the Economics department, and he maintained a 
rather aggressive relationship with Harvard economic historians affiliated to 
Arthur Cole’s RCEntrepH. It seemed that much of this friction stemmed from the 
Harvard Economics Faculty’s efforts to keep Gerschenkron at bay, while they 
paved the way for their favored resident economic historian - the junior scholar 
John Sawyer. Their hope was to give him enough time and freedom to produce 
                                                   
10 From Rosovsky, Ed. (1966). 
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the publications that would enable his promotion to Associate Professor. They 
also wanted Rockefeller Foundation (RF) funding, which meant keeping alive the 
RCEntrepH, which they hoped Sawyer would take over from Cole, when the 
latter retired. This relatively complex strategy was revealed to RF director Joseph 
Willits in 1952, during a series of conversations with Arthur Cole, Arthur 
Smithies (chair of the Harvard Economics Department) and Paul Buck (Provost). 
The latter justified their choices in the following way: “Sawyer is the man we 
have been building up to succeed Cole [at RCEntrepH] and carry on. He has 
personal, intellectual and administrative qualities that Gerschenkron lacks”. 11 
Smithies elaborated by saying that he had: 
 
 “problems with Gerschenkron, who is a continental European with a narrow 
idea of economic history” and “talked highly of Sawyer and said he has his 
associate professorship to make (…) and he was the one who should succeed 
Cole. He said that they would want the funds for economic history granted, 
they did want economic history to develop, and that they did not want 
Gerschenkron in charge but hoped that Sawyer might take over in three years 
when Cole retires.”12 
 
This quote suggested that the Harvard economists’ dislike for Gerschenkron 
stemmed from many sources, not least his fiery personality, very well 
documented in Dawidoff’s biography. However there seem to have been two 
additional factors that truly constrained their relationship with him. The first was 
what they called “Gerschenkron’s narrow view of economic history”; the second 
was the RF’s background presence and the faculty’s efforts to hold on to RF 
funding. 
                                                   
11 Friday April 11th 1952, meeting with Paul Buck. RAC-RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Box 70, 
Joseph Willits, 5 volumes. 
12 Friday April 11th 1952, meeting with Arthur Smithies. RAC-RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Box 
70, Joseph Willits, 5 volumes. 
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Figure 6.2: Time line of events in sections 2, 3 and 4 
 
 
Chapter 6 - The Gerschenkron, Conrad and Meyer Paradox 
 235
As seen in Figure 6.2 Smithies’ remark was made only 4 years after 
Gerschenkron had joined the Harvard faculty. 1952 was an important year for 
Gerschenkron, not only because Harvard faculty were plotting behind his back! 
That same year, he had published the first version of Economic Backwardness in 
Historical Perspective – a contribution that would subsequently shape his legacy to 
economic history.13 In this essay he argued against the Marxist view that all 
societies followed an economic development template, that “the industrially 
more developed country present[ed] to the less developed country a picture of 
the latter’s future”.14 Instead he urged economic historians to consider the fact 
that “backward” countries had access to the more advanced nations’ experience 
and know-how – an advantage that had changed (and could continue to alter) 
the pace and path of their economic development. According to Gerschenkron 
the backward countries could use (and had used) this social and technological 
knowledge to proceed faster and avoid the pioneering countries’ mistakes. After 
formulating this general hypothesis, he proceeded to validate it with numerous 
historical illustrations from European economic history - from 16th century 
German mining engineers to 19th century British textiles or Russian laborers.  
Already in 1952, Gerschenkron sensed the importance of this contribution. 
As Dawidoff reminded us: 
 
“Gerschenkron saw his historical synthesis of industrial development as the 
great proof of his scholarly supremacy. Nobody else had such an approach to 
economic history. Intellectually it made [him] his own man. He was not a 
                                                   
13 Published in Gerschenkron (1952). 
14 Karl Marx, Das Kapital (1st ed.), Preface; cited in Gerschenkron (1962), 6. Notice that the 
Marxist view of a stage based economic development would be retained by Rostow, 
whose 1960 work substituted virtuous capitalist stages to Marxist more pessimistic ones 
(at least insofar as Marx envisaged necessary squalor and revolution before happier 
communist times). In other words, Gerschenkron’s views would have also been hard to 
reconcile with Rostow’s stage theory.  
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Marxist or a Keynesian, nor was he obviously indebted to John Stuart Mill or 
Max Weber. He was the advantages of backwardness [sic].”15 
 
Strengthened by the elegance of this hypothesis, Gerschenkron boldly 
questioned the merits of the approach chosen by scholars at the RCEntrepH, in a 
1953 article published in the Center’s main organ: Explorations in Entrepreneurial 
History.16 What subsequently became known as the Gerschenkron-Landes 
controversy started with Gerschenkron’s deconstruction of the sociological role-
theory most economic historians related to the RCEntrepH had been using in 
their recent work. They had argued that much of a nation’s entrepreneurial 
activity was a function of the rewards (monetary and other) granted to such 
endeavors in different cultures, and that these different value judgments towards 
commercial risk taking and money making were at the heart of differential 
wealth, development and growth patterns.  
Gerschenkron’s critiques were not only addressed to David Landes (who 
had famously argued that French entrepreneurship had failed in the 19th century 
for cultural reasons, as the high echelons of society looked down upon those who 
made a profit), but also to Arthur Cole, Leland Jenks, Thomas Cochran and John 
Sawyer.17 While Gerschenkron did not discard the hypothesis that 
entrepreneurial behavior varied from country to country, and that this variation 
could explain some degree of economic backwardness, he wondered whether it 
accounted for most (or even a lot) of this difference. More critically, he 
questioned whether sociological theories were the best way to account for the 
variation in entrepreneurial activity. Thus, instead of relying on the expectations 
of entrepreneurs, as they were enforced or undermined by the surrounding 
values of their peers, he suggested that the analyst use plain old economic 
                                                   
15 Dawidoff (2002), 186. 
16 Gerschenkron (1953). 
17 Landes (1949). 
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insight. What if entrepreneurial activity was best understood by looking at 
means and opportunities such as individuals’ response to the relative price of 
land, labor and capital: 
 
“The very simple assumptions of economic interest and profit 
maximization which underlie the usual reasoning in economic theory 
would seem perfectly sufficient to understand the attitudes in question, 
and references to role expectations appear to be hardly more than a 
gratuitous adornment.” 18 
 
Overall, one got the sense that Gerschenkron thought that the RCEntrepH was 
not pursuing a particularly important agenda. Cochran, Sawyer and Landes 
responded to Gerschenkron’s doubts.19 Sawyer’s reply was the most scathing, as 
it reprimanded Gerschenkron for having presented this paper at a meeting of the 
International Economics Association (in the summer of 1953), thus allegedly 
harming the Center’s international reputation.20 Gerschenkron was bitter in his 
reply to Sawyer, testimony of the great animosity that now existed between the 
men, evidence that Cole and Smithies’ antipathy went both ways. 21   
Landes’ objections were more substantial. 22 He held on to the idea that 
different types of entrepreneurial behavior, or spirit, accounted for much 
                                                   
18 Gerschenkron (1954), 111. 
19 Cochran (1953); Landes (1954); Sawyer (1954). 
20 “I cannot concur in language that at times reflects adversely upon the character of the 
work that has gone on at the Center”, Sawyer (1954), 273. Gerschenkron had indeed 
presented this paper at the international conference in Europe – according to him he had 
been invited to do so by Professor Léon Dupriez of Louvain. He claimed that the 
published paper contained only slight modifications from his oral presentation.  
21 Note that by winter 1953 Sawyer had taken a job at Yale. Dawidoff mentioned that 
Gerschenkron “not so privately regarded Sawyer as an intellectual lightweight”, 
Dawidoff (2002), 184. 
22 When Landes wrote his reply, he was at Columbia, where he had moved in 1953. He 
had first met Gerschenkron in 1949, while finishing up his thesis at the RCEntrepH as a 
student affiliated to the Harvard History Department. Landes was one of the few who 
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variation in economic development. Arguing much as Gerschenkron did (via the 
synthesis of numerous historical cases) he cited, for example, “many instances 
when, given comparable endowments, one country invented, stole patents much 
more aggressively than another”. Such examples enabled him to assert the 
importance of “business attitudes” and “socially conditioned entrepreneurial 
behavior”.  According to Landes, this was justification enough to encourage 
further work by scholars at the RCEntrepH. 23  
 One might be tempted to ascribe much of this disagreement to different 
ideological backgrounds. Chapter 3 emphasized the relationship between 
entrepreneurial themes and the RF, suggesting that the popularity of such an 
approach to economic history was in part the result of Bezanson and Willits’ 
need to please the RF Board of Directors. Given this connection, it was not 
entirely surprising that Gerschenkron would have regarded the RCEntrepH as “a 
building that was only slightly less reprehensible than a Republican social 
club”.24 This was an unfair assessment, as very few scholars at the Center 
engaged in hagiographical work of particular entrepreneurs. Following Jenks 
(who was greatly inspired by the sociologist Talcott Parsons), most of them were 
interested in social attitudes to business activity and the way in which these 
values could condition roles in society.25 Gerschenkron, on the other hand, 
seemed to prefer explanations of human behavior that relied principally on 
rational behavior and action triggered by economic opportunity.  
In addition, Gerschenkron combined a profit-maximizing picture of the 
individual with a macro-economic view of development. According to him, 
                                                                                                                                                       
could keep up with Gerschenkron’s tri-lingual mastery of economic and literary sources 
– he cited German and French with much ease.  
23 Landes (1954) 
24 Dawidoff (2002), 184. 
25 Talcott Parsons was a professor of Sociology at Harvard since 1927. Born in the U.S. he 
had studied at the LSE with Malinowski, and in Heidelberg with followers of Max 
Weber. In the early 1950s, he was systemizing his thought about individual action, and 
its relationship to representation (i.e how people see their world and act accordingly). 
See for example Parsons and Shils (1951). 
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economic change was the consequence of systemic changes – sometimes spurred 
by state intervention and legislation - not the initiative of a few individuals. Note 
the parallel between Kuznets’ and Gerschenkron’s “ideology”. Both men 
emphasized the State and were quite suspicious of Schumpeter’s work. As 
Dawidoff writes: “he thought that Schumpeter had vastly overstated the impact 
individuals could have on development”.26 In addition there probably was a 
cultural rift separating Gerschenkron from the scholars at the Center (all of 
whom, except for Fritz Redlich, were born American) – remember Provost Buck’s 
comment on Gerschenkron’s “central Europeanness”. Gerschenkron’s part 
Jewish heritage may also have added a layer of difference between him and other 
Harvard economic historians.  
Yet, differences in culture, religion and ideology were perhaps only 
fodder to a much more tangible set of differences: namely very different agendas 
for economic history and ones that were not compatible for both theoretical and 
organizational reasons. The “advantages of backwardness” might have 
constituted what the Harvard economists had called a “narrow” view of 
economic history, but it was actually a relatively powerful framework for 
organizing and directing research in the field; and one that competed with theirs 
for resources. Both Gerschenkron and the RCEntrepH had plans for relatively 
resource heavy research programs: the investigation and validation of their 
respective hypotheses required laborious empirical work – the accumulation of 
numerous monographs, case studies of business attitudes in 19th century France, 
or catch-up policies in 19th century Russia and Japan, and of course studies of 
American experience – either in terms of entrepreneurial abilities, or in terms of 
technological catch-up with Britain.  Each group needed economic historians to 
collectively focus on their particular hypothesis, otherwise it would be difficult to 
make any progress in assessing its merits and validity. In other words, there 
                                                   
26 Dawidoff (2002), 184.  
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were simply not enough economic historians, and not enough resources to 
pursue both agendas at Harvard, and possibly not in North America! 
These resource requirements, and consequent rivalry between the two 
research programs could be gleaned in both Gerschenkron and Landes’ 
comments.  As Gerschenkron claimed, their disagreement lay in different 
attitudes about where the economic historian should start: ”How shall we 
unravel the skein in our attempts to explain the processes of change? Where shall 
we start and what factors shall we select?” 27 His position could be summarized 
as objecting to the fact that so many economic historians started with the private 
entrepreneur and with social attitudes to business. He preferred a discussion that 
started with investigations of relative degree of backwardness, or at least 
considered macro-economic features. This was no small matter, as economic 
historians who wanted to explore either hypothesis would have to devote 
tremendous resources to test these claims empirically. The conflict boiled down 
to who could convince the greater number of economic historians to test and 
further their hypothesis. In 1952-54, when the controversy raged, the RCEntrepH 
was in the advantageous position. By the end of the 1950s, the tables had turned 
in Gerschenkron’s favor. The next section explores the reasons for this change in 
fortune.  
 
3. The 1957 Williamstown meeting 
3.1. Conrad and Meyer’s performance at the Williamstown meeting 
Gerschenkron must have been quite aware of his relatively weak position 
at Harvard, and he strove to find support elsewhere.  One of his natural allies 
was Simon Kuznets, whose vision of the relationship between economics and 
economic history was certainly closer to Gerschenkron’s than to the 
                                                   
27 Gerschenkron (1954). 
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RCEntrepH.28 In 1957, they co-organized a meeting to push forward their vision 
for the nexus between economics and economic history. Gerschenkron had been 
appointed by the EHA as the main coordinator for the 1957 annual meetings, 
which he began organizing in the fall of 1956.29 Instead of the habitual two day 
EHA annual affair, Gerschenkron was able to put together a three-day joint 
meeting with Kuznets’ Conference on Research in Income and Wealth.  This 
Conference had been established by the NBER in the 1930s and was an annual 
project aimed at coordinating measures of American income and wealth – it was 
the ancestor, and to some extent the model for the IARIW described in chapter 4. 
The 1957 meeting was principally aimed at regrouping scholars working on 
measurements of the 19th century American economy in a national income 
accounts framework. For example, session titles included “U.S. and Canadian 
Income and Investment” or “Meaning of economic growth as measured by 
secular estimates of national income and product”. 30 The meetings were held at 
Williamstown, Massachusetts, in September 1957. They were attended by 
members of both the EHA and the Conference: nearly 150 participants 
(approximately 70 were affiliated to the EHA).  
One of the striking features of this three day conference was the roster of 
participants, and the high concentration of individuals who were later credited 
for helping or effecting the cliometric revolution: Kuznets, Gerschenkron, 
Conrad, Meyer, North, William Parker, Anna J. Schwarz, Harold Williamson, 
Abramovitz, Easterlin, Stanley Lebergott and Goran Ohlin. There seems to have 
been some contact between Gerschenkron’ s students and colleagues (Ohlin, 
Meyer and Conrad) and Kuznets’ crowd (North, Schwarz, Abramovitz, Easterlin, 
                                                   
28 Remember his unfavorable assessment of the work and vision of the Entrepreneur 
scholars described in chapters 3 and 4. 
29 For evidence that Gerschenkron was in control of much of the agenda setting for these 
meetings see documents in Harvard University Archives, HUG FP45.12, Folder: 
“Economic History Convention, 1957” and Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 64.  
30 Preliminary Program of conference. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 64. 
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Gallman).31 Both Easterlin and Gallman, for example, recalled attending the 
NBER session where Conrad and Meyer presented their slavery paper.32  
Officially, there was only one overlapping session, called “the integration 
of economic theory and economic history”, a methodological daylong session 
that Gerschenkron had insisted on holding.33 The session was chaired by Simon 
Kuznets and attended by an impressive panel of discussants, including 
Hamilton, Ohlin, North, Smithies, Evsy Domar (an MIT growth economist) and 
Martin Bronfenbrenner (a notable “generalist” who taught at Wisconsin but was 
in constant conflict with most of his “institutionalist” colleagues there).34 Only 
two papers were scheduled for discussion; the first was Rostow’s paper on “The 
Interrelation of Theory and Economic History”.35 The second was Conrad and 
Meyer’s paper on “Economic Theory, Statistical Inference and Economic 
History”.36 The bulk of the discussion revolved around methodological themes, 
in line with Gerschenkron’s intention and his injunction that much of economic 
history could be reconsidered in light of basic economic principles.  
In their paper, Conrad and Meyer went significantly beyond basic 
economic principles. They began by arguing for a probabilistic approach to 
causality in history. Shrinking away from the extreme positions of total 
randomness (they cited Benedetto Croce), or total determination (they cited 
Marx, or rather his interpreters) they proposed that economic historians rank 
statements about the past according to their probability of being true.37  In 
arguing for a midway position, they made extensive reference to historians and 
                                                   
31 For depictions of the links between Kuznets and his students see Figure 4.3; for 
Gerschenkron and his students see Figure 6.3. 
32 Gallman (1992); Easterlin (1993). 
33 Letter from Gerschenkron to Jerry Blum, History Department, Princeton, November 
21st 1956. Harvard University Archives, HUG FP45.12, Folder: “Economic History 
Convention, 1957”. 
34 For biographical information on Bronfenbrenner, see Goodwin (1998). 
35 Rostow (1957). 
36 Notice that this Conrad and Meyer paper was not the one frequently cited as the 
founding stone of cliometrics. 
37 Conrad and Meyer (1957), 542. 
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philosophers of science (from Leopold von Ranke to Karl Popper), testimony that 
they were not ignorant of the difficult debates about causality in history; and 
perhaps indication of Gerschenkron’s ability to stimulate philosophical reflection 
among his students. Conrad and Meyer had both been graduate students at 
Harvard in the early 1950s. Conrad was one of Schumpeter’s last students – and 
had finished his thesis with Leontief. Meyer had written on business investment 
decisions and developed an early focus on econometrics, industrial organization 
and corporate finance.38 By the mid 1950s they had both begun teaching 
economic history. Meyer had stayed at Harvard, having done some graduate 
work with Gerschenkron, and been asked to take over John Sawyer’s lectures on 
American economic history, as the latter had just left for Yale. 39 Conrad had 
gone to Northwestern where he taught American economic history for Harold 
Williamson. According to Meyer, their similar duties and Gerschenkron’s stature 
had prompted lunchtime conversations around economic history and stimulated 
them to write the two Williamstown papers.  
Just as the roster of philosophical allusions denoted their affiliation to 
Gerschenkron’s erudite mind, the second part of their methodological paper was 
indication of their own interests. The authors broke away from their survey of an 
ongoing debate in the philosophy of history, and introduced very recent material 
from econometrics. They cited Herbert Simon and his now famous “causal 
ordering” condition: if one could show that changes in one variable triggered 
changes in another, and that the relationship was not reversed, then one had 
good reasons to believe that the first variable caused the second. This was subject 
to the effect of additional “random” interferences (the error term in a regression 
model), and the requirement that one exhaustively spell out the relationship 
between all relevant variables in the system.40 They cited Simon’s rain, wheat 
                                                   
38 Meyer (1995). 
39 Meyer’s 1955 paper applying Input-Output analysis to 19th century Britain had been 
written as a term paper in Gerschenkron’s graduate course; Meyer (1955). 
40 Conrad and Meyer (1957), 528. 
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and price example: changes in precipitation levels could affect both crop yields 
and wheat prices; just as crop yields could affect wheat prices; but changes in 
prices could not affect rain, and could only affect yields if new relations were 
introduced into the system (like farmer incentives, use of fertilizers for eg.) Using 
Simon, they argued that he had found a convincing way to establish causality 
and circumvent the obstacle faced by all social sciences (and history), namely the 
lack of experimentation. Provided one could find enough variation in the 
presumed causal factor, and provided one had a hypothesis (driven by a theory, 
or generalization); econometric techniques could be used to make probabilistic 
statements about this hypothesis and increase our belief in a given historical 
interpretation. 
They then cited their own work on the profitability of slavery, and the 
related hypothesis that slave breeding had occurred in southern states where 
land was not fertile. Having said that traditional historical analysis could not put 
an end to the debate about whether or not certain owners bred slaves (because 
diary entries could be interpreted as the truth or bad faith, not as reliable 
evidence – recall the disagreement between Kuznets and Landes), they claimed 
to be able to test this allegation on demographic data of slave population in 
different southern states: if the demographics differed greatly from one region to 
the next (i.e. if the plantation states had many more young males while the non-
plantation states had many more very young and very old people) then there 
was good reason to believe that slave breeding was occurring.  
Implicit in this test was the general proposition that men acted according 
to their economic interest, and that so-called genteel norms against slave 
breeding had little real impact on actual economic activity. This proposition tied 
back to Gerschenkron’s point that behavior should be explained in terms of 
economic interest, not cultural pressures.  Conrad and Meyer found that there 
were different demographic patterns, but they only showed this by reporting 
average numbers, rather than exploiting the probabilistic reasoning they 
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expounded in the methodological paper. Generally, there was actually very little 
connection between their methodological paper and the supposedly illustrative 
study on slavery. The slavery paper was not built around an econometric test, or 
even a probabilistic argument. Instead, it proceeded by estimating (in a very 
rough and not always convincing way – resembling “order of magnitude” 
exercises we will encounter in chapter 7) the average price of a male field hand, 
the average cost of land per slave and the average cost of working capital and 
maintenance per slave – then plugged these numbers into a yield equation to 
establish the average rate of return on owning a slave. They then compared this 
rate to interest rates on capital markets and concluded that they were similar 
enough to justify the belief that slavery had indeed been profitable.  Their 
argument was not probabilistic (in the econometric sense) as the “similar 
enough” verdict was not established in statistical, or significance terms, but by 
simply comparing averages (with no discussion of variance). 
Actually, the only consistent line through both papers was a certain 
disregard for the current state of scholarship in economic history. In the 
methodological paper, this came out as a rather open dismissal of  “studies 
conducted under the heading of entrepreneurial research“, and the authors 
accused these un-named culprits of focusing on supposedly exceptional events 
and individuals.41 Considering Conrad and Meyer’s connection to Harvard, this 
was clearly a jibe at the RCEntrepH.  In 1957 Meyer served as editor of the 
Center’s Explorations in Economic History (Figure 6.2). He had used this 
opportunity to publish several articles that not only completely avoided the topic 
of entrepreneurship but also used relatively complex economic theory to test a 
historical hypothesis. For example, Michael Lovell used interest rate theory to 
                                                   
41 Conrad and Meyer (1957), 523. This verdict was unfair. As seen in the previous 
section, historians at the RCEntrepH were quite willing to acknowledge regularities in 
human behavior, though these were contingent on the particular social atmosphere of 
the time (i.e. norms and customs mattered). Notice the parallel between this critique and 
the 1900s and 1920s accusations Simiand, then Bloch and Febvre made against 
traditional historians. 
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establish that the Bank of England has acted as a lender of last resort in the 18th 
century, much earlier than most historians of Central Banking had 
acknowledged. William Parker analyzed steel output movements in various 
regions of Western Europe.  Lance Davis used corporate finance theory to 
analyze the sources of industrial finance of 19th century American textile 
industry.42 The great majority of articles published in the last two issues of 
Volume IX and the first issue of Volume X of Explorations – coinciding with 
Meyer’s short editorship - were highly quantitative and made explicit reference 
to contemporary theoretical literature in economics. However, once the editor 
had changed (Barry Supple for a year, then Jane Jack in 1958), Explorations 
reverted to articles about entrepreneurship. 
 In other words, both Conrad and Meyer were well aware of the different 
strands of economic history at Harvard and in the book length version of their 
slavery studies, they thanked Gerschenkron as their main inspiration. 43 Overall, 
they seemed to be arguing for an economist-history along his lines, or what they 
perceived his line to be.  Yet Gerschenkron did not feel that the meeting had 
achieved what he set out to do, and most other participants recalled that while 
the slavery paper was intriguing, Conrad and Meyer had perhaps been slightly 
too “cocky” to be taken very seriously.44 In any case, there was no “revolution” 
in American economic history in 1957.    
 
                                                   
42 Davis (1957); Lovell (1957); Parker (1957). 
43 They mention that “their greatest debt is to Professor Alexander Gerschenkron, our 
teacher and critic” - Conrad and Meyer (1964), viii. 
44 Gallman recalled how cocky they had seemed and did not remember a tremendous 
amount of controversy around the slavery paper - Gallman (1992). While he was not 
opposed to their work, he did not find it very inspiring. Easterlin recalled being 
unimpressed, and having shared these feelings with William Parker - Easterlin (1993). 
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3.2. Gerschenkron evaluates the Williamstown Meeting 
When Gerschenkron reviewed his students’ performance – in a September 
1957 exchange of letters with Kuznets who was writing a summary report of the 
session – he made clear that he was “on their side”, but that he wished they had 
done a better sales job. In particular, he regretted that they had spent much time 
discussing econometric techniques (in particular the error term) thus generating 
confusion about the truly useful way theory could be applied to history: 
 
“putting that one single equation on the board including the controversial 
“e” term was less than perfectly felicitous, to say the least. That, of course, 
is not how an historian who is willing to apply theoretical models will 
proceed. What he actually will do is to construct a given model, try to 
apply it to his observed phenomena and see how well it fits. He will then 
proceed to construct and to apply other models and to observe the 
goodness of the resulting fit and somehow, with every additional model 
he will get some better idea as to what is left outside his models.  And that 
balance in some cases may be capable of some systematization and in 
most cases will not be.”45 
 
For Gerschenkron, economic theory was an aid to historical investigation, and 
conversely, historical investigation could refine models (history was good for 
economics). Compared to earlier groups of economic historians discussed in this 
thesis, he seemed much closer to the Annales – someone like Braudel who was  
happy to use a model (like national accounting) to organize and make sense of 
evidence, rather than to generate evidence, or remain within the necessarily 
restricted bounds of a given representation of reality.  This was not the way 
Conrad and Meyer had used the yield equation in their slavery paper. They had 
                                                   
45 Letter from Gerschenkron to Kuznets, September 23rd 1957, Harvard University 
Archives, HUG FP45.12, Folder: “Economic History Convention, 1957”. 
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indeed started with the equation and applied it to 1800-1860 southern 
agriculture, but discussions of the slave market and competing uses of capital 
had certainly not opened the door to any discussion on the pertinence or 
universal application of the yield equation. Their paper was a much more 
straightforward application of a model to a historical question; and only towards 
the conclusion did they start spelling out “lessons” from history, such as the 
economic viability of slave, or near slave labor in contemporary under-developed 
nations, and the consequent necessity for political action. Yet such lessons were 
for policy, not for economics.  
Generally, Gerschenkron regretted that his message had not come across 
at the Williamstown meeting, and he told Kuznets that he had found most 
EHA’s members’ performance “ludicrous”.46 Yet, he seemed to identify one good 
thing from the session: 
 
“Economic history is in a poor way. It is unable to attract good students, 
mainly because the discipline does not present any intellectual challenge (…) 
This is a deplorable situation and I feel it is at this point that all this talk about 
growth and economic development comes in. I think Rostow was perfectly 
right in stressing it. Economic development may be a fad and a fashion, but 
(…) it gives economic history a great chance to snap out of rut and stagnation 
and to receive new and fruitful intellectual impulses. The question therefore 
is not whether all work in economic history should be limited to problems of 
growth and development, but it is really the problem of whether economic 
history will, or will not, miss a tremendous opportunity to rejuvenate the 
discipline by addressing themselves in the past to the grave economic 
problems that are now the general concern to those interested in economic 
development (…)  
                                                   
46 Letter from Gerschenkron to Kuznets, September 23rd 1957, Harvard University 
Archives, HUG FP45.12, Folder: “Economic History Convention, 1957”.  
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On the whole the meeting greatly reinforced my feeling that what is 
needed is to re-inject into the profession a number of first rate young 
economists who have developed an abiding interest in economic history. 
With eight to ten men placed in good universities, the complexion of the 
discipline would quickly change. This is not a difficult thing to do. We did 
that to the field of Soviet economics with a surprising degree of success. ” 47 
 
Considering Kuznets’ own view that economic history (i.e. the observation of 
phenomena over the long run) was the only source of information for reliable 
statements about economic development, Gerchenkron’s call to seize the 
“development” opportunity must have sounded very familiar. However, there 
was a distinctly strategic element to Gerschenkron’s vision that separated him 
from Kuznets: Kuznets was doing economic history almost incidentally, as a 
result of wanting to examine the growth of nations. Thus he was never interested 
in reforming or rejuvenating economic history per se. On the other hand, 
Gerschenkron wanted to exploit the post WWII “fad” for development to revive 
the field and re-inject it with intellectual stamina. They also differed on the 
confidence they placed in economic theory: Gerschenkron seemed comfortable 
with economic theory, though the fact that he was surprised and slightly 
disappointed by Conrad and Meyer’s performance was an indication that he was 
not exactly at the frontier of econometrics and mathematical economics.  As 
Kuznets emphasized: 
 
“You see less of a gap than I see between economic theory (as it currently 
exists or even as it existed in the past) and what economic history can 
borrow and use from it with some reasonable chance of fruitful results. Or 
to put it differently, I have more sour view of the accomplishments of 
                                                   
47 Letter from Gerschenkron to Kuznets, September 23rd 1957, Harvard University 
Archives, HUG FP45.12, Folder: “Economic History Convention, 1957”, p. 3.  
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economic theory and its serviceability in interpreting the processes of 
historical change (even as they affect the economy alone) than you 
apparently have.” 48  
 
They found their common ground in a rhetoric that presented economic history 
as a sine qua non of growth and development studies: a rhetoric that was gaining 
large momentum in the growing cold war environment and had come to shape 
much of the Ford Foundation’s interest in the social sciences.   
 
4. The Ford Foundation and the contenders for American Economic History 
4.1. Gerschenkron solicits the Ford Foundation 
In his assessment of the Williamstown meeting, Gerschenkron had told 
Kuznets that the only remedy he could envisage to the stagnation in economic 
history was to recruit a new generation of economist-historians; this claim was 
consistent with the general inertia that he must have felt constrained by.  As 
Conrad and Meyer’s experience had shown, there was no momentum to pick up 
whatever seeds of change they (and Gerschenkron) wanted to sew. The 1957 
Williamstown conference had served as confirmation of Meyer’s short-lived 
attempt to change the nature of EEH. Hence, it is not surprising to find 
Gerschenkron, as early as the summer of 1957, testing the Ford Foundation’s  
(FF) interest in helping train a new generation of economic historians.  He sensed 
that it would take more than a controversial article or a new editor to change the 
field. 
 The FF’s Economic Development and Administration division (EDA) was 
somewhat predisposed to listen to an argument about the importance of 
economic history, having inherited many of RF’s Social Science Division funding 
                                                   
48 Letter from Kuznets to Gerschenkron, September 28th 1957, Harvard University 
Archives, HUG FP45.12, Folder: “Economic History Convention, 1957”.   
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categories.  In chapter 5 we already saw the continuity between the RF’s 
involvement in France in the 1940s, and the FF’s subsequent presence. This was 
also true of research in the U.S. When the FF emerged in the early 1950s, the size 
of its endowment so considerably dwarfed RF’s that no competition was really 
possible.49 RF social science officers decided to retreat into niche markets (in 
particular in the developing world) and the FF took over much of the areas 
Willits had been interested in.  As economic history had been one of Willits’ 
favored fields, FF took interest in it.50  
But there was a second factor pushing in favor of economic history at FF, a 
factor we have already encountered in chapters 4 and 5 – namely the increasing 
popularity of development economics, and the seductive belief that the past of 
advanced nations was experimental grounds for current policy in 
underdeveloped nations.  By the mid 1950s, in spite of its present-minded 
agenda, the EDA was particularly vulnerable to rhetoric blending economic 
history and development studies.51 In 1956 (nearly two years before the 
Williamstown meeting), EDA officers organized a round-table on economic 
history, and invited Abramovitz, Gerschenkron, Kuznets, Rostow, Sawyer, 
George Stigler (whom we will encounter again in chapter 7) and the British 
economist A.K. Cairncross to participate. In the preliminary letter sent to 
participants, they were asked to reflect on several questions:  
                                                   
49 See “How much was that” interlude. 
50 Evidence of this very straightforward transfer of interests and competences can be 
gleaned from Willits’ diaries. As his directorship came to an end, he received several 
visits from Thomas Carroll, who came to seek Willits’ opinions and advice in sponsoring 
social sciences. Carroll became the first Director of the EDA, and held his post from 1954 
to 1961. See for example October 21st 1953, visit from Thomas Carroll. RAC-RF, RG 12.1, 
Diaries, Box 70, Joseph Willits, 5 volumes. 
51 Economic history was not considered for the sake of history – but rather in a very 
instrumental way, for the sake of solving present day problems. This ambiguity can be 
gleaned in an EDA officer’s diary. After a visit from two economic historians (Parker 
and Sawyer) he commented: “we could give no indication now of the reaction their 
formal proposal might meet, partly because of its historical orientation”. Excerpt from 
Allan Cartter’s diary, June 16th 1958. FF, PA 59-27.  
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“What is the relation between work in economic history and work in 
economic growth or economic development? It is often said that historical 
study should be guided by theoretical hypotheses and that lack of such 
hypotheses is a serious weakness in the field. Is that true? Why is the 
personnel of the field so depleted in the United States as compared, say, 
with Britain? What are the most promising lines of development in 
economic history at present?”52 
 
From the minutes of the meeting, one gets the distinct sense that 
Gerschenkron was more vocal than any other participant and that he was 
pushing two lines at once. His first argument was that progress in economic 
theory would make historical study more scientific – this was the “theory as a 
tool” argument. But he was also pushing for a “history is good for economics” 
view, stating that “economic historians would bring to economic problems a 
better knowledge of social and political factors”.53 This second line was closer to 
Rostow who claimed that “there was a need for economic history to develop raw 
data to develop propositions in economics”  - to which Kuznets acquiesced, but 
mentioned that tying the data with theory was no easy matter (something he had 
learned at the NBER!). And Gerschenkron concluded with a relatively general 
point on the continuum from “history to theory” – it was not useful to think in 
terms of empiricism and theory, but rather a “whole spectrum of levels of 
abstraction”. This conversation had echoes of the perennial debate about the 
proper degree and place of empiricism in theorizing, and the willingness of all 
participants to recognize the “spectrum of abstractions” suggests that the circle 
                                                   
52 Letter from Loyd G. Reynolds, Director EDA, to Moses Abramovitz, January 9th 1956 
FF-Area III, General Correspondance 1956. This exact letter was also sent to all other 
invitees. 
53 Minutes of the meeting on Economic History, January 24th 1956, FF-Area III, General 
Correspondance 1956. 
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depicted in Figure 2. 3 may indeed be a useful way to think about these debates 
among economists. 
But the most distinct element that emerged from the (brief) minutes of the 
meeting was the feeling that many participants understood the strategic potential 
of the meeting. Having sensed the interest from the big donor, they were quite 
willing to sink their differences (Kuznets and Rostow were in the same room!) 
and market their discipline using the development theme, or any other EDA 
emphasis. Rostow, for example, added “problems of decision making and 
administration” to the list of the economic historian’s competencies – which is 
almost too obvious to be true, considering that the EDA stood for economic 
development and administration!54  
At the end of the meeting, the participants were asked to rule on two 
economic history proposals that had been submitted a few months earlier: the 
first was Hamilton’s proposal to study interest rates in Europe from the late 17th 
century to 1880. The second was Williamson’s proposal to study “income and 
wealth in the 19th century”. Neither project was supported. Recall that both 
Hamilton and Williamson were Edwin Gay’s students  - and that no member of 
the Gay network was invited to the FF roundtable!  Hamilton’s proposal was 
deemed to narrow  - his previous work on prices had not “contributed enough to 
economic analysis” and the interest rates would be of no interest in isolation.  
Williamson’s project was deemed too loosely organized: Kuznets warned that “a 
strong director would be needed and a large amount of time devoted to making 
the data comparable” – as he had learned from running projects in retrospective 
accounting.55 Instead the participants called for more fundamental measures to 
draw “new people” into the field.  
                                                   
54 Minutes of the meeting on Economic History, January 24th 1956, FF-Area III, General 
Correspondance 1956. 
55 Letter from Reynolds to Carroll, January 27th 1956, FF-Area III, General 
Correspondance 1956. 
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Gerschenkron had his own idea on how to do this, and he approached the 
FF in late summer of 1957. He used the outcome of the Williamstown conference 
as confirmation that economic history was in an impasse, and that the FF could 
help: 
 
“the meeting at Williamstown was helpful and perhaps not quite 
unsuccessful (…) Nevertheless it is my feeling (…) that what is needed is 
the creation of a new generation of economic historians who could 
drastically reform the teaching of economic history in the country, and at 
the same time provide the general economist, and particularly the man 
interested in economic development, with relevant problem oriented and 
problem molded materials. If anything, the meetings greatly reinforced 
my feeling that this is a task of magnificent promise and first rate 
urgency.”56 
 
Such a letter may be interpreted as suggesting that he was not sure Conrad and 
Meyer’s approach would have the desired effects, and that he wanted to adopt a 
new strategy to reform the field.  In his subsequent exchanges with FF officers he 
outlined his plan, stating his intention to train students. But he also mentioned 
that the field’s rejuvenation crucially depended on a whole-hearted embrace of 
his hypothesis on the importance of relative backwardness – which was his entry 
point into development theory, a point he emphasized to FF officers:  
 
“the purpose of the grant is twofold: a) to stimulate the study of past 
economic backwardness and of its gradual diminution over long periods 
and b) to revitalize the discipline of economic history in the country. The 
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two aims are closely related in the sense that the attainment of one almost 
necessarily involves attainment of the other.”57 
 
His justification for using a single unified framework rested on evidence of past 
work in the field. According to him, miscellaneous accumulations of 
monographic studies had not yielded, and could not yield, synthetic or analytic 
results. They had to be devised with a unifying goal, namely the advantages of 
backwardness. 58 He suggested that the FF provide him with a fellowship 
program, to train the scholars capable of producing these more focused 
monographs. Such men would have a typical economists’ toolkit and would 
have to commit to write a thesis on some problem related to past economic 
development.59 In other words, his plan was not only methodological (use 
economists’ tools), it was also theoretical: he wanted to encourage the use of the 
advantages of backwardness hypothesis. Seen in light of the competing research 
programs outlined earlier, Gerschenkron had devised a new way to confront the 
entrepreneurial historians: rather than convert them, he would outnumber them.  
Gerschenkron would have to wait an additional year before the FF made its 
decision. In the meantime, potential contenders had found their way into the 
EDA’s office.   
 
4.2. The William Parker and John Sawyer initiative 
In January 1958, shortly after the 1957 September Williamstown meeting 
William Parker and John Sawyer jointly approached the FF, voicing their concern 
about the state of the discipline, and asking for funds to train young scholars. In 
these early exchanges with FF, they mentioned that they had been thinking and 
talking about this for two years – that they were very concerned that the causes 
                                                   
57 Letter from Gerschenkron to Neil Chamberlain, January 3rd 1958, FF- PA 59-26. 
58 Letter from Gerschenkron to Neil Chamberlain, January 17th 1958, FF- PA 59-26. 
59 Letter from Gerschenkron to Neil Chamberlain, January 17th 1958, FF- PA 59-26. 
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of American economic development had still not been fully understood, or 
worse, misrepresented. 60 Recall that Sawyer had attended the 1956 FF 
roundtable, so he was well aware of FF’s potential interest in this area. He and 
Parker had met at Harvard, when Parker was writing his dissertation – which he 
began with Usher, and finished with Gerschenkron, though Parker never felt 
particularly comfortable with the Russian émigré.61  
Their proposal, and subsequent grant, came to be known as the 
interuniversity grant, as it federated economic historians in four geographically 
dispersed universities: Abramovitz at Stanford, Ross Robertson at Indiana, 
Parker at the University of North Carolina and Sawyer at Yale. 62 The four 
university partnership was justified along a pluralistic/division of labor vision of 
the field. According to them, if economic history was to contribute to growth 
studies, it needed to focus on American economic history, and do so from several 
complementary angles. As Parker wrote in 1958: 
 
“Jack Sawyer and I have natural division of labor (…) He has been 
interested in business enterprise, in entrepreneurship and in the social 
context and organization of innovation and production. I have been 
                                                   
60 Letter from William Parker to Neil Chamberlain, March 6th 1958. FF, PA 59-27. 
61 Parker (1991). 
62 Parker included a brief biography of the fourth scholar, Robertson, in a letter to Neil 
Chamberlain, suggesting that he was not well known at that time: “He was an 
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis for a number of years, and went to the 
Indiana School of Business to head up their program in business and economic history 
last year. His textbook in American Economic History was published a few years ago 
and is becoming, should I think, the most widely used in the field (at least Jim Potter 
and I use it, and Jack Sawyer intends to). He has a greater interest in monetary 
institutions and in questions of corporate organization than the rest of us and I feel sure 
we will all work very well together. He has the incidental advantage of adding to the 
geographical balance of our group and to the balance between ‘pure’ economics 
departments and business schools (which now stands at two to two, since I am in a 
business school, for all intents and purposes)”. Letter from William Parker to Neil 
Chamberlain, September 24th 1958. FF, PA 59-27.  
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interested in technological change in relation to the resource endowment 
in the natural setting for economic growth.” 63 
 
As summarized by a FF officer, the Parker/Sawyer proposal boiled down to four 
points:  
 
“-Rejuvenate the field of economic history by demonstrating the vital part 
which it can play in attacking current economic problems.  
 -Train a group of graduate students in economic history who could 
spread this refurbished approach.  
 -Substantively, to rewrite American economic history. 
 -Illuminate and improve theory of economic growth, of which the U.S. 
stands as an outstanding case.”64 
 
The obvious difference between this proposal and Gerschenkron’s was the 
exclusive focus on American economic history. This may remind the reader of the 
project proposed by the “old” economic historians 16 years earlier (see chapter 
3), due to its focus on the American record and a desire for interdisciplinarity.65  
There was even a feeling that economic historians could contribute to America’s 
worldwide reputation. Sawyer and Parker made reference to the tenuous 
international political situation, suggesting that it could benefit from a scientific 
study of their nation’s success. They even made rather explicit mention of 
growing Cold War tensions: 
 
                                                   
63 Letter from William Parker to Allan Cartter, May 12th 1958. FF, PA 59-27. 
64 Excerpt from Diary, Neil Chamberlain, June 4th 1958. FF, PA 59-27. 
65 See for example the following sentences in their proposal: “The study of American 
economic history since 1800 is, by its very nature, a study of economic growth” - 
Proposal sent by William Parker, undated. FF, PA 59-27, p. 3. 
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“Perhaps even outside the U.S. resentment and envy of American wealth 
might be reduced if its origins were shown to lie in social processes not 
wholly foreign to the history or future hopes of most mankind.” 66  
 
Yet the InterUniversity agenda seemed more coherent than Willits et al.’s 
position, or at least more clearly focused around growth, testimony that the 
identification of economic history with growth questions was complete by 1960 
(recall that CREH economic historians were looking for a much vaguer 
“philosophy”, that pertained to civil society and harmony rather than economic 
growth).  This commitment to study growth went along with an unproblematic 
reliance on economic theories and tools. They urged economic historians to 
“incorporate techniques and concepts of modern economics” and “develop with 
the help of modern economic theory plausible hypotheses about the inter-
relationship among major elements and to test them”.67 Note that this is not very 
far from the generic definition of cliometrics offered in chapter 1.  
The Gerschenkron and the Sawyer/Parker proposals were both approved 
by the FF in December 1958, under the same appropriation. The grant file made a 
point of stating that these were the first economic history grants awarded by 
EDA.  Parker/Sawyer were awarded $125,000 for five years; Gerschenkron was 
awarded $75,000, also for five years.68 While both grants may have appeared to 
FF as two ways of furthering the same goal, these projects were actually quite 
different in nature, and had diverging outcomes. While both had decried the 
uselessness of “scattered and uncoordinated research”, only Gerschenkron’s plan 
proved capable of counteracting this tendency. 69 Before we explore the roots of 
his ability to draw a dozen young economists to economic history, we shall 
                                                   
66 Proposal sent by William Parker, undated. FF, PA 59-27, 4. 
67 Proposal sent by William Parker, undated. FF, PA 59-27. 
68 EDA: Harvard University and University of North Carolina, recommended action 
brief. FF, PA 59-27. 
69 Letter from Sawyer to Allan Cartter, May 1958. FF, PA 59-27. 
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examine the third proposal submitted by economic historians to the FF in the late 
1950s, namely that of members of the Committee for Research in Economic 
History (CREH), who made one last attempt to hold on to a multidisciplinary,  
“live and let live” tradition in American economic history. 70 
 
4.3. The Committee for Research in Economic History (CREH) initiative71 
The CREH proposal was drafted by David Landes, Douglass North, 
George Taylor, Hugh Aitken and John Dales – notice that none of them had been 
invited to the 1956 FF roundtable. This last project was informally submitted in 
late 1959, at which time both earlier projects had obtained funding, and it was 
declined. The proposal had been long in the making, preparations having begun 
around the same time as the Sawyer-Parker negotiations, i.e. right after the 
Williamstown meeting.72  In December 1958, just as the FF was deciding the fates 
of the Gerschenkon and Parker/Sawyer grant, a sub-committee of the CREH met 
to “discuss the present weaknesses in economic history, how the field might be 
strengthened and what role the CREH might most usefully seek to play in 
strengthening and promoting economic history.”73 The opportunity for economic 
historians to seize the growth fad had not passed them by, as minutes of a 
February 1959 meeting of the CREH Trustees revealed: 
 
                                                   
70 I borrow this expression from Sawyer, who asked Gerschenkron to let the RCEntrepH 
pursue its agenda, just as it did not stop him from pursuing his. For reasons explained 
earlier (resources and the size of any serious empirical historical project), this was not a 
viable strategy - Sawyer (1954). 
71 The reader will remember the CREH from chapter 3. Though it had lost RF funding in 
the early 1950s, it had remained in existence, with little means to directly influence 
research in economic history. By the late 1950s, all its founding members had either died 
or retired, and new scholars now staffed the CREH. 
72 See for example a September 1958 Memo from Cameron to Aitken, Dales, Landes and 
North discussing their upcoming December 1958 meeting and strategies for wooing the 
foundations. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 97. 
73 Minutes from a meeting of the sub-committee, December 5th and 6th 1958. Hagley, 
Accession 1479, Folder 97.  
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“Professor Taylor agreed that the Foundations did seem disposed to give 
grants for research projects in areas related to economic development. He 
raised the question to what extent research programs in economic 
development do involve work in economic history. A general discussion 
followed of the extent to which contemporaries are being forced into 
economic history by the very nature of the problem, of the quality of the 
economic history work that is done in this way, and of the degree to 
which professional economic historians are being by-passed in the 
awarding of grants for economic development and in the execution of the 
research done under these grants. There appeared to be agreement that 
the contribution economic history has to make to the analysis of economic 
development is a solid and substantial one (…) that went far beyond 
merely channeling empirical material to the theorist.”74 
 
However, they were concerned that too little work in economic history was 
geared towards this development audience, largely because very little work had 
been “interpretative”, and did not really address “the causes of economic growth 
(and decline)”. As they saw it, the discipline’s failure to issue interpretative 
statements was due to a lack of coordination:  
 
“It would help the monographic literature in the field if authors held 
roughly the same view as to the major goals of economic history, their 
books would reflect some basic unity of purpose and this in turn would 
greatly facilitate the development of both comparative and interpretative 
history.”75 
  
                                                   
74 Minutes from a meeting of the trustees, February 22nd 1959. Hagley, Accession 1479, 
Folder 99. 
75 Minutes from a meeting of the sub-committee, December 5th and 6th 1958. Hagley, 
Accession 1479, Folder 97. 
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They proposed two routes to create this unity: the first was to train a new 
generation of economic historians (they emphasized both the historical and the 
economic side of this revamped training – unlike Gerschenkron, their goal was 
not to incentivise top notch economists to do economic history, but appeal to an 
aspiring interdisciplinary scholar). The second was to organize a conference on 
specific topics regarding economic growth, and let groups of experts decide 
which topics were worthy of subsequent profession-wide investigation.  
Members of this group seemed to share the desire to assert a strong 
“economic historian” identity, engulfed neither by economists nor historians.  
This stood out clearly as a differentiating factor from the Parker/Sawyer or 
Gerschenkron initiatives (which were really framed in terms of economics and 
economists), and even from the 1956 round-table, where all had agreed that 
economic history should not be separate from economics.76 This difference was 
partly explained by the less homogeneous nature of the group: David Landes 
and Hugh Aitken were young members of the RCEntrepH. Douglass North was 
a U.C. Berkeley Economics graduate who had just spent several years at the 
NBER. George Taylor was a contemporary of Nef, Innis, Bezanson and Cole – he 
had written his Ph.D (1929) on “Agrarian discontent in the Mississippi Valley 
preceeding the war of 1812”at the University of Chicago Economics Department, 
under Chester Wright and Frank Knight.77 John Dales was a Canadian economic 
historian. The reason they co-authored the proposal was that they were all 
officers of EHA, or members of the CREH in the late 1950s. 
As part of this autonomous “economic history” identity they insisted on 
developing a whole new curriculum for economic history graduate studies: an 
                                                   
76 Minutes of the meeting on Economic History, January 24th 1956. FF, Area III, General 
Correspondance 1956.  
77 George Rogers Taylor interviewed by Hugh Aitken, October 16th, 1973,  
2 tapes available at Hagley Pictorial Archives; the transcript of this interview is at 
Hagley, Accession 1479, Box 99, Folder 1973-74. 
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“interdepartmental” track with a firm grounding in both disciplines, with an 
identity of its own.  As Hugh Aitken wrote in October 1958: 
 
“I look forward to a day when we will no longer be asked whether we are 
primarily economists, or primarily historians, when we will no longer have to 
identify ourselves with either an economics or a history department, but 
when we can describe ourselves as economic historians without further 
qualification.”78 
 
Douglass North also voiced this desire to reinforce the economic historian’s 
identity, when reviewing a preliminary program for the growth conference: 
 
“The papers should be given by the people who are in the field of 
Economic History and are pioneering in the direction outlined in the 
proposal rather than people who are outside economic history and who 
either because of testing hypotheses or working with long run time series 
(such as National Bureau people) incidentally touch upon the field. I think 
we are trying to put over a revolution from within rather than without, 
and I would therefore exclude someone like John Meyer, who 
demonstrates virtuosity in the field from without. I think the role of 
people who are in effect outside the field should be in criticism, discussion 
etc.. like Kuznets, Hoselitz, Fabricant”79 
 
Applying his criteria, he listed the following people as “true” economic 
historians: Henry Rosovsky, David Landes, Rondo Cameron, Douglass North, 
Goran Ohlin, Eric Lampard and Morris D. Morris – he also suggested inviting a 
                                                   
78 Memo from H. Aitken on the Future Organization and Policies of the CREH, October 
6th 1958. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 97. 
79 Letter from North to Aitken, October 2nd 1959. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 97. 
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scholar from Britain (and proposed Habbakuk).  Notice that his list was 
“research program” neutral, as he included scholars from the Gerschenkronian 
vein (Rosovsky, Ohlin) and the entrepreneurial vein (Landes). In doing so, he 
hinted at a vision for economic history that was not so different from the 
interuniversity proposal: a belief that economic history could be tackled via 
many angles, provided it focused on growth and provided it use tools of 
economic analysis. However the CREH’s program differed from the Parker-
Sawyer proposal in one important way: it did not privilege American economic 
history, and emphasized the necessity for all economic history to be comparative 
– much like Gerschenkron had. 
Having considered their funding options, members of the sub-committee 
on the future of the CREH decided on the following strategy: they would ask the 
NSF to sponsor a week-long conference and invite Foundation officers to attend. 
The outcome of the conference would be research projects that individual 
scholars could submit to these Foundations, with special emphasis on graduate 
training as well. They never got past the first step. The NSF declined their 
proposal for the conference in early 1960, and conversations with officers of the 
FF discouraged them from soliciting them further.   
 
5. Gerschenkron’s Harvard Workshop in Economic History 
5.1. A successful workshop 
By the time CREH members got wind of their rejection, Gerschenkron’s 
workshop was on its way- he had just recruited his first students, Paul David 
and Albert Fishlow, whose exceptional performance earmarked the workshop as 
a place for talented students. This only served to exacerbate the CREH’s 
frustration at having been rejected. As David Landes wrote to Taylor, in January 
1960: 
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“I just heard about the NSF rejection and the fact they did so ‘on the advice of 
other specialists in the field of economic history from such august institutions 
as the SSRC and the National Bureau’. I don’t like to sound discouraged or 
persecuted but I am afraid that our field, which the NSF described as 
“crowded”, is indeed filled to overflowing with a small but voracious group 
of insiders who have managed to take over such funds as were available and 
are systematically unenthusiastic about others’ efforts and proposals (…) We 
will probably get a far more favorable hearing by putting Kuznets , 
Gerschenkron and a few of the leading lights of the NBER on our committee 
than by all the cogitation and ingenuity in the world”.80 
 
Yet, in expressing his frustration, Landes may have misjudged both 
Gerschenkron and Kuznets’ influence on the foundations (in this particular 
instance), and not taken into account the simple fact that the CREH proposal had 
come last, third in a succession of apparently similar proposals (as we can see on 
the time line depicted earlier in Figure 6.2). As Parker pointed out to Taylor a 
year later, in June 1961: 
 
“When several of us undertook to get the grant of $125,000 from the FF for 
the Interuniversity Project in American Economic History, it was only by the 
merest good luck that a request from the [CREH] for funds did not arrive 
until a few months after our award had been made. Had it arrived earlier, it 
would have thrown both proposals completely off the rails.”81 
 
Indeed there is evidence that the FF did not really discriminate between 
the Parker/Sawyer proposal and the Gerschenkron one, so there is little reason 
to believe that they would have looked at the CREH proposal in a different light. 
                                                   
80 Letter from Landes to Taylor, 29th January 1960. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 99. 
81 Letter from Parker to Taylor, June 16th 1961. Hagley, Accession 1479, Folder 99. 
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However, as Parker said, they may have been disheartened by the lack of 
coordination in a relatively small field. Thus, the FF officers did not consciously 
cast their vote in favor of Gerschenkron’s brand of economic history: their 
understanding of his project stopped at the conjunction between development 
economics and historical studies.  Unlike the situation in the early 1940s, where 
Rockefeller Foundation officers had exerted much influence on the field of 
economic history, the FF did not discriminate between different approaches 
within the field.  They took for granted the fact that economic history could 
contribute to growth studies and sought to sponsor whomever worked in this 
direction (which, as we saw, encouraged practically every economic historian to 
adjust his or her spiel).82 While the FF’s intervention in this highly contested field 
was somewhat uninformed, it certainly was not inconsequential. Indeed, the 
Harvard workshop’s success soon began transforming the field of economic 
history.  
Gerschenkron’s annual reports to the FF revealed the care with which he 
handpicked each of his funded students: he accepted only those who had 
performed well on their second year exams, and in both his graduate courses in 
economic history.  Given these criteria, he had to reject a “considerable number 
of applications”.83 As we see in Figure 6. 3, though the grant was set to expire at 
the end of 1963, Gerschenkron obtained a 5-year extension (no additional money, 
but the right to spread the balance on subsequent years). In 1968, he still had 
some money left, and asked the FF for the right to spend it all in the years to 
come.  He thus ran the workshop for 12 years on the initial $75,000 grant – a feat 
that thoroughly impressed FF officers. The grant was officially closed in 1973.84  
                                                   
82 Curiously enough, no one ever questioned the epistemological validity of this claim: 
could historical studies really unveil useful empirical or theoretical information, in 
development, or for that matter any other kind of economics?  
83 Letter from Gerschenkron to Joseph McDaniel, May 10th 1953. FF, PA 59-26. 
84 Memo from Peter de Janosi, June 13th 1973: “Final comments on grant 59-26 for 
workshop in Economic History”. FF, PA 59-26. He made several interesting points in 
this memo: “The grant to Professor Gerschenkron’s seminar in economic history was 
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A look at Figure 6.4 should convince the reader that Gerschenkron’s 
workshop bred a phenomenal number of remarkable scholars. All the names 
listed under the “Workshop” label spent a period of at least one year at Harvard, 
working with Gerschenkron (those with an MIT label were not officially 
supervised by Gerschenkron but they participated in the workshop). The 
expression “working with” may be a bit misleading as Gerschenkron was a 
famously hands-off advisor. Once he has selected them (and “seduced” them 
into writing a thesis in economic history), they were relegated to the offices of the 
Economic History Workshop. They would meet once a week, as a group, to 
discuss one of their papers, or the work of an invited scholar - Gerschenkron 
would remain perfectly silent for the duration of the discussion, only speaking 
up in the last 15 minutes, to issue his judgment on the better or worse arguments 
he had heard. 85 
The table depicted in Figure 6.5 lists these students’ thesis topics, and their 
first jobs. They overwhelmingly chose topics in American economic history, 
which many justified as being a safe strategy considering Gerschenkron’s awe-
inspiring knowledge of European economic history. There isn’t much evidence 
that they chose it for political concerns like those voiced by Parker and Sawyer in 
their proposal to FF – i.e. they were concerned with growth, but did not have a 
strong conviction that the study of American economic growth would reveal 
American exceptionalism.86 
                                                                                                                                                       
part of the Foundation’s intensive effort to develop and strengthen the economics 
profession. Economic history received only modest attention within this context, but 
Gerschenkron, nonetheless managed to produce an entire new generation of economic 
historians who turned out not only as excellent historians, but also modern economists 
trained in contemporary quantitative techniques. The small grant lived on as 
Gerschenkron used the money frugally and supplemented it from as many sources as 
possible. This grant was a gem!” 
85 David, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Palo Alto, January 2004; McCloskey, 
Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, San Diego, January 2004; Sylla, Interviewed by 
Cristel de Rouvray, San Diego, January 2004; Temin, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, 
London, March 2004.  
86 Peter Temin , interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray in London, March 2004.  
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Figure 6.3: Timeline of events in section 5 
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Figure 6.4: Alexander Gerschenkron’s students 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 - The Gerschenkron, Conrad and Meyer Paradox 
 269
Figure 6.5: Gerschenkrons’ students’ Dissertation Topic and First Job 
Name FF 
$$ 
Year 
in 
Year 
out 
Dissertation  Topic First job 
Albert Fishlow yes 1959 1963 Railroads in 19th century 
U.S. 
Asst. Prof. Econ. 
 U.C. Berkeley 
Paul David yes 1959 1963 Economic growth of 
Chicago. Left workshop 
before finishing his 
dissertation.  
Asst. Prof. Econ. 
Stanford (full Prof in 
1968) 
Peter Temin 
(MIT) 
yes 1961 1963 Iron industry in 19th 
century U.S. 
Fellowship at Harvard; 
then Prof. at MIT 
Business School (Sloan) 
William Whitney yes 1962 1964 The structure of the 
American economy in the 
late 19th century. Left the 
workshop before finishing 
Asst. Prof. Econ  
University of 
Pennsylvania 
Peter McClelland yes 1963 1965 New Brunswick Economy 
in the 19th century 
Instructor Econ.   
Harvard 
Richard Sylla yes 1966 1968 The American capital 
market, 1846-1914: a study 
of the effects of public 
policy on economic 
development 
Asst. Prof. Econ.  
State University North 
Carolina 
Stephano 
Fenoltea 
yes 1966 1967 Resigned from the 
workshop 
 
Donald 
McCloskey 
no 1966 1967 The economics of the 
British pig iron industry  
Asst. Prof. Econ.  
University of Chicago 
Barbara Solow no Mid 
60s 
Early 
70s 
19th century Ireland  
Charles Harley no  1969 Economics of British 
Shipbuilding in the 19th 
century  
Asst. Prof. Econ. 
Univeristy of British 
Columbia 
Richard Sutch 
(MIT) 
no  1967 Expectations, Risk, and the 
Term Structure of Interest 
Rates 
Asst. Prof. Econ. 
 U.C. Berkeley 
 
Did Gerschenkron’s students apply, push or even use the “backwardness” 
hypothesis in their work? One of his first students, Henry Rosovsky did so in his 
study of the Japanese late 19th century catch-up with the West. But this was 
probably the most obvious instance of applied “backwardness” research. For 
Gerschenkron’s workshop students, the connection lay rather in the fact that 
backwardness was one of many historical theories aimed at explaining economic 
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development. Paul David recalls feeling the limitations of Keynesian demand 
side theories and supply side theories that took technology, culture, demography 
and politics for granted. He was much more enthused by the work of Paul Baran, 
and other development economists who argued that history mattered – that 
patterns of development were not uniform or deterministic.87  As we shall see in 
the next chapter, Albert Fishlow chose his thesis topic for similar reasons: as a 
refutation of Rostow’s take-off and universal “stages” theory of economic 
development.  
 
5.2. Who is in? Who is out? 
Geschenkron’s students greatly impressed economic historians in the U.S. 
This can be gleaned from the Parker’s reports to the FF. Because both his 
interuniversity grant and Gerschenkron’s grant had been awarded at the same 
time, under the same appropriation, Parker felt the constant need to evaluate 
their performance against the Gerschenkron benchmark –which he felt they had 
fallen short of.  In 1966, as Parker liquidated the few dollars remaining from the 
original $125,000 grant, he reflected: 
 
 “I do not feel that the quality of this work was as high as that which 
Professor Gerschenkron obtained by use of his grant at Harvard. There 
clearly the money produced at least four outstanding young men who are 
carrying out work in the field.”88 
 
In this same letter, Parker mentioned that his lesser performance could be linked 
to the heterogeneity of the interuniversity group (which, if you recall, was 
initially presented as a strength): 
 
                                                   
87 David (1999). 
88 Report from Parker to Irma Bischoff, March 22nd 1966. FF, PA 59-27. 
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“My own impression is that the project was more useful for the individual 
work which it stimulated than for its collective results (…) [Myself, 
Gallman and Abramovitz] have shared a common interest in developing a 
statistical basis for the study of American economic history. This interest 
we have shared with a number of scholars who were not in the project (…) 
e.g. Easterlin at Penn, North at Seattle, Fogel at Chicago and Davis at 
Purdue. This is the group interested in the development of a statistically 
and theoretically valid understanding of American economic 
development. Those whose interests are more directly in business history, 
in which I would include Sawyer and Robertson, form a separate 
constellation.”89 
 
Thus, in the space of 8 years (1958-1966) Parker seemed to have moved in a 
direction that made him feel quite distant from Sawyer and other economic 
historians interested in business and entrepreneurship. He now saw himself as a 
part of a well-defined group working on statistically and theoretically valid 
American history (in particular agrarian development). Despite his feeling of 
failure (in the InterUniversity grant), this new venture was on the way to 
becoming incredibly successful: in 1965 Parker and Gallman had obtained an 
NSF grant to build a very large statistical picture of agricultural production in 
19th century U.S.90 In addition, Parker now saw entrepreneurial research as a 
separate group. This separation was in part the product of “new” economist-
historians’ efforts to push entrepreneurial themes out of their discipline. For 
example, as seen in Figure 6.3, they resurrected Explorations in 1963, by moving 
the editorship to the University of Wisconsin, and gradually changing the flavor 
of the articles.  A brief glance at the tables of contents of issues published in 
Explorations in the 1960s reveals a marked decrease in articles relating to 
                                                   
89 Report from Parker to Irma Bischoff, March 22nd 1966, FF- PA 59-27 
90 Gallman (1992). 
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entrepreneurship, particularly evident after 1965. In 1969, the name was changed 
from Explorations in Entrepreneurial History to Explorations in Economic History, 
sealing the transformation. But the separation of economist-history from business 
history was also aided by the fact that entrepreneurial historians set out to 
recreate a community of their own. Recall that the Harvard RCEntrepH had been 
shut down in 1958; by the mid 1960s, a still numerous group of business 
historians were at work solidifying their own institutions. For example, they set 
up the Business History Conference, the first meeting had been held in 1954 but 
the permanent, associative status was only established in 1970 (Figure 6.3).91  
Gerschenkron certainly had a hand in this separation– not least because he 
encouraged his students to be very suspicious of scholars of entrepreneurship. 
As Temin recalled:  
 
“They were the enemy!  (…) We used the business school library which 
Cole had put together, and we thought that was terrific but it never 
occurred to us to associate the library with Arthur Cole! (…) But we 
wouldn’t talk to them because we were firmly in Gerschenkron’s camp, 
and all this qualitative stuff like entrepreneurship was just terrible.  (…)  I 
think I met Redlich once.  I’m not sure I even ever met Cole (…) 
Gerschenkron invested an enormous amount of emotion in this, and so it 
wasn’t just that these were people who disagreed, but these were, in a 
sense, the enemies, the forces of darkness.”92  
6. Conclusion: the Gerschenkron paradox 
Alexander Gerschenkron’s actions in the late 1950s were crucial for the 
emergence of the generation of economist-historians who chose to call 
themselves “cliometricians”. Without his stamina and dedication to framing 
                                                   
91 A brief history of the Business History Conference is available at http://www.h-
net.org/~business/bhcweb/about/index.html; Chandler (2004). 
92 Temin (2004). 
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monographic research in a coordinated, coherent way, many fewer economists 
would have been drawn to economic history. Not only did he identify the 
opportunity to ride the development “fad”, but he had a vision for overcoming 
the field’s tendency to wither away in miscellaneous monographs and seduced 
his students with talk of historical theories. 
Seen from this perspective, the Gerschenkron paradox is less daunting. He 
enticed young economists to take on historical questions with their tools, and did 
so with the conviction that their work would gradually contribute to a historical 
view, perhaps a theory of economic development. The young scholars 
responded, not only because they could ascribe to this “big picture”, but because 
Gerschenkron also brought a degree of excitement and euphoria to the field. His 
students recalled his mentorship as an incredibly exciting time, a crucial factor in 
explaining their relatively large numbers in a rather small time period. This is 
where the “enemy” played a crucial role; and the barrier between economist and 
entrepreneurial history was partly erected on Gerschenkron’s ability to inspire 
his students with suspicion of entrepreneurial study. Compare this to Kuznets’ 
students and colleagues, who may have been awed by his capacity for detailed 
work, and tried to replicate this dedication in their construction of retrospective 
data series, but could find it tedious.  
Thus one cannot discount Gerschenkron’s personal role in creating a 
critical mass of young economist-historians. Yet there was an enduring tension 
between his vast, big picture work (history matters for economics) and his claims 
that economic theory would aid history, claims that were first taken up by 
Conrad and Meyer, and became an integral part of most workshop students’ 
research. This would become the cornerstone of cliometrics  - though the 
workshop would not be the stage where economist-historians completely shed 
their aspirations to historical theorizing. Chapter 7 looks into the circumstances 
that brought cliometrics to life and definitively pushed American economist-
historians towards the “economics is good for history” side of the fence.  
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CHAPTER 7. 
 
 
THE 1960s RAILROAD DEBATES AND THE 
CRYSTALLIZATION OF CLIOMETRICS 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
According to most accounts and informal recollections, the term 
“cliometrics” was coined in late 1960 or early 1961. The term’s inventor was a 
mathematician, Stanley Reiter, whose association with economists at Purdue 
University (Indiana) had begun in an applied mathematics seminar and 
continued in an economic history forum first held in December 1960.1 In all 
anecdotal histories of cliometrics (see chapter 2), this first Purdue meeting was 
cited as one of two founding stones of the movement: the other being the 1957 
Williamstown meeting examined in chapter 6. Yet the connection between these 
two events is hard to assess – indeed, neither Conrad nor Meyer attended the 
1960 Purdue meeting, and the topic of excitement was not slavery but railroads. 
In addition, the “new economic historian” group identity only emerged in the 
mid 1960s, in the wake of what is now known as the “railroad debates”: a series 
of published and live discussions on the railway’s impact on 19th century 
American economic growth.2 Thus there seems to be a case for examining these 
                                                   
1 Hughes (1991). 
2 The first appearance of the term “new economic history” in print was North (1963) as 
confirmed in Fogel (1964a). Journal articles announcing the new methods and new ideas 
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debates as a crucial moment in the creation, or crystallization of the cliometric 
movement and identity. 
Robert William Fogel started the debate at the first Purdue meeting when 
he argued that the railways had not provided significantly cheaper 
transportation than the best available alternative - a combination of water and 
road. He published the first segment of this argument in a 1962 article in the JEH 
and the full version of his findings appeared in the 1964 publication of his Ph.D. 
thesis: Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History.3 
While Fogel – Simon Kuznets’ student - was busy refuting the commonly held 
belief that the railroad had been indispensable for growth, one of Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s students, Albert Fishlow, was tackling a similar issue. In his 
Ph.D. research he examined the validity of Walt Rostow’s hypothesis that the 
railroad had been the “leading sector” triggering American economic take-off in 
the mid 19th century. This overlapping endeavor brought Fogel and Fishlow 
together and spurred sustained dialogue among students from both the Kuznets 
and Gerschenkron lineage.4 It also pitted them against representatives of the 
“indispensability” thesis – Rostowians (though there were few of these) and 
proponents of the view that the railroad had fundamentally altered the ways and 
course of American business (Alfred Chandler, Fritz Redlich, Louis Hacker for 
example). In the course of these exchanges there was much opportunity to define 
“cliometrics”, both by what it was and what it was not. This chapter uses the 
railroad debates as a platform for answering the following questions: on what 
grounds was the cliometric identity forged? In particular what did cliometricians 
                                                                                                                                                       
surfaced in the mid 1960s, and self-consciously “new” textbooks were published starting 
1970. For examples of journal articles see North (1963); Fogel (1964a); Hughes (1965); 
North (1965). The first textbooks, or volumes of collected essays were Andreano, Ed. 
(1970); Fogel Robert and Stanley Engerman, Ed. (1971); Lee Susan and Peter Passell 
(1979). 
3 Fogel (1962); Fogel (1964b).  
4 Fishlow’s thesis was published as Fishlow (1965). 
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mean when they claimed to be applying “theory” to history? Was this a 
genuinely new development?  
The chapter begins with a description of the first cliometric meeting and 
the course of the railroad controversies (section 2).  Section 3 then analyzes Fogel 
and Fishlow’s work to get a better understanding of what they did when 
claiming to be using “theory”. Section 4 looks at these young cliometricians‘ 
graduate training and the “transformation” of economics after WWII. Section 5 
analyses Fogel’s famed counterfactual and compares it to other uses of 
“comparison” in economic history: could the counterfactual method be seen as 
an original alternative to the comparative work advocated by both Kuznets and 
Gerschenkron? Throughout, the chapter argues that the railroad debates were 
the crucible that brought cliometrics to life and forged the new economic 
historian identity. This was done in an adversarial way, thus completing Kuznets 
and Gerschenkron’s efforts to marginalize the entrepreneurial approach to 
economist-history. Yet cliometricians departed from their mentors in two 
important ways: they retained the American-centrism that had characterized the 
founders of the EHA and they argued that history needed economics, not the 
reverse. 
 
2. The railroad controversies 
2.1. The first cliometric meeting 
In December 1960, a dozen scholars met in Indiana, at Purdue University, 
for a multiple day conference that would subsequently be known as the first 
cliometric meeting. Three young scholars in the economics department had 
organized the meeting: Lance Davis, Jonathan Hughes and D. McDougall. In the 
early 1960s, the Purdue economics department was not among America’s best, 
but an entrepreneurial dean of the Graduate School of Industrial Administration 
(who oversaw the economics department) was committed to changing this. 
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Starting in the mid 1950s, E.T. Weiler had hired tens of young, promising 
scholars – with retrospect Purdue was the breeding ground for more than one 
ground breaking initiative in empirical economics (Davis and Hughes’ 
cliometrics and Vernon Smith’s experimental economics were two prominent 
examples of this success).5 In the late 1950s, Davis, Hughes and McDougall had 
written a “manifesto” for Weiler, arguing that Purdue had a comparative 
advantage in computational economic history: few schools had more than three 
economic historians (Harvard, Columbia and Johns Hopkins may have been the 
exception) and Hughes had already used the school’s computation facilities to 
process amounts of historical data that no other economic historian had handled 
– data on steamship travel and cargo.6  
When Davis, Hughes and McDougall set out to organize the December 
1960 meeting, they were able to tap the relatively small (but well defined) 
network of economist-historians that their graduate training had introduced 
them to. Davis and McDougall were Johns Hopkins graduates, and had worked 
with Simon Kuznets. Jonathan Hughes had been a graduate student at the 
University of Washington, where he had worked with Douglass North. He had 
interrupted his academic career for a finance job, but was recruited to Purdue, 
where his old friend Lance Davis (who had been an undergraduate at the 
University of Washington and had taken Douglass North’s class) had also just 
arrived. This served to mutually strengthen their interest in economic history – a 
“big idea” economic history as they characterized Doug North’s teaching 
(dealing with questions such as the origins of wealth and growth).7 Their 
connection to Kuznets and to North accounted for the presence of most 
                                                   
5 Hughes (1991). 
6 Hughes and Reiter (1958); Hughes (1991). Lance Davis , Interviewed by Cristel de 
Rouvray, Pasadena, January 2004. 
7 Hughes (1991). 
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participants.8  Robert Fogel recalled hearing Davis and McDougall’s names 
among Hopkins students, and this connection most probably accounted for his 
invitation to Purdue; Easterlin and Gallman were also Kuznets’ students.9 
William Parker had just been named co-editor of the JEH with Douglass North; 
Betram had spent a year at the NBER with North.10 The only notable absentees 
were Harvard economist-historians, specifically Conrad and Meyer, whom 
Fogel, at least, remembered expecting to see at the meeting, as their 1958 paper 
on slavery had caused quite a stir at Johns Hopkins.11 
It is quite likely that most participants shared a desire to “change” 
economic history, to turn it into a more vibrant, more “scientific”, more economic 
field. Recall that both North and Parker had been involved in drafting “reform” 
proposals in the late 1950s. Yet the failure of the North/Landes appeal for funds, 
and the mitigated success of the Parker/Sawyer initiative should be taken as an 
indication that the will to change did not necessarily entail the actuality of 
transformation. This is also consistent with the effects of the Conrad and Meyer 
slavery paper. As we saw in chapter 6, though it was delivered in 1957, 
published in 1958, it did not really trigger an immediate following.  
In anecdotal accounts from the late 1960s and more recent interviews, 
witnesses of the cliometric revolution did highlight the importance of the slavery 
paper for the movement’s emergence, though it appears that this diagnosis was 
made after the fact, and strengthened by later events, namely the mid 1970s 
                                                   
8 Davis remembered a dozen attendees - Davis (1990). North recalled meeting Fogel for 
the first time at this meeting - North (1993). I don’t have an exact count of attendees to 
the first meeting; only 6 papers were given, one was co-authored, so 7 scholars officially 
spoke: J.H. McRandle and J.P. Quirk on “An Econometric Study of Strategic Decisions 
with Respect to the Anglo-German Naval Armaments Race, 1900-1914”; Fogel; Parker on 
“A Statistical Framework for Agricultural History”; Bertam on “ The Process of 
Canadian Industrialization, 1870-1900”; G.S. Murphy on “The Simple Structure of Some 
Historical Methods” and J. Snyder on “Ancient Sumerian Economic Documents”- 
Purdue University Department of Economics, Ed. (1967), vii. 
9 Fogel (1990)., Fogel, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray via telephone, February 2004. 
10 Gallman (1992). 
11 Fogel (1990). 
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controversy around Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman’s own work on 
slavery.12  As seen in Figure 7.1, a closer look at the chronology of events and at 
the concentration of “identity creation” moments in the mid 1960s (in Blue), 
overlapping with railroad papers (in Red), points instead to the railroad debates 
as the birthplace of a well-articulated cliometric group. In Robert Gallman’s 
opinion, “the creation of a special cliometric group with a sense of identity came 
from the Purdue meetings [and ensuing sharp] exchanges between cliometricians 
and historical traditionalists [on railroads]”.13  
 
2.2.  The railroad studies 
In December 1960, Robert Fogel presented one of the chapters of his Ph.D. 
thesis, which aimed at measuring the extent to which the railroad industry had 
contributed to 19th century American economic growth. According to Fogel, 
Kuznets had given him the idea: 
 
“I got the idea from one of [Kuznets’] lectures. He pointed out that 
although there had been much discussion of the economic impact of the 
railroad, no one had yet measured the extent of their impact or analyzed 
the sources of the productivity gains associated with them.”14 
 
Fogel had come to Johns Hopkins in the late 1950s and must have 
attended Kuznets classes in 1958 or 1959, just about the time when Kuznets was 
organizing a meeting to refute Rostow’s theory of economic growth. Recall from 
chapter 4 that Kuznets found the concept of leading sectors to be remarquably 
unscientific (because he found it too vague). 
                                                   
12 Engerman and Fogel (1974). 
13 Gallman (1992). 
14 Fogel (1990). 
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Figure 7.1: Time line of railroad controversy 
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In response to Kuznets’ criticisms, many of the attendants had cited Railroads as 
the “obvious” example of an industry that had had “leading sector” effects on 
Western economies. Kuznets’ general point, as Fogel righly recalled in the above 
quotation, was that one could not say this until one had measured the actual 
impact of the railroad at an aggregate level.  
Fogel set up his work in conscious opposition to the existing 
historiography on American railroads. He mentioned two authors who had 
helped propagate the joint beliefs that railroads had been indispensable and that 
their exact contribution could not be measured: Leland Jenks and Walt Rostow. 
Recall from chapter 3 that Leland Jenks was one of the senior scholars at the 
RCEntrepH, a prominent sociologist, and a friend of Arthur Cole’s. In 1946, a few 
months after he had been invited to join the CREH (to replace Kuznets who had 
resigned during WWII) he had published an article in the JEH entitiled 
“Railroads as an Economic Force in American Development”. In this very 
general article where he listed all the potential ways in which the railroad could 
have affected the American economy, Jenks had stated: 
 
“By rendering this transportation service, the railroad in operation has 
doubtless added directly to the real income of the U.S. and indirectly to 
economic expansion. There appears to be no satisfactory technique for 
giving a precise measure to the extent of this contribution.”15 
 
Recall that this willingness to draw conclusions without pushing for systematic 
measurement had also been one of the divisive factors between Kuznets and 
Rostow.  
While Kuznets’ commitment to measurement may have reinforced Fogel’s 
conviction that this was the right way to set up the problem, the idea of 
restricting historical conclusions to a precise quantitative statement seemed to 
                                                   
15 Jenks (1946), 12. 
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have predated his interaction with Kuznets. Indeed, the master’s thesis he wrote 
at Columbia in the mid 1950s under the guidance of Carter Goodrich - published 
as The Union Pacific Railroad: a Case in Premature Enterprise (1960) – also set up a 
measurement problem, displaying many of the devices that Fogel used in his 
Ph.D. analysis (notably the order of magnitude and counterfactual methods, see 
sections 3 and 5).16 This hints at the existence of several traditions of 
measurement in mid 20th century economist-history – thus cautioning us against 
a dichotomic quantifier vs. qualifier view of various scholars involved in these 
debates. As already shown in chapters 4 and 5, there were different types of 
quantifiers among mid 20th century economist-historians. 
 In the Purdue paper, Fogel presented one of the building blocks of his 
argument. His driving concept was the notion of “social savings”: the profits in 
railroad company books represented some of the benefits accrued by the U.S. 
from building the railroad – yet, to really understand the way in which this faster 
mode of transportation had affected overall productivity, one needed to factor in 
public benefits, reflected in productivity gains due to cheaper transportation. 
Fogel thus set up the problem in terms familiar to students of cost-benefit 
analysis, though he was not so much concerned with the cost – the issue being 
rather a measure of the comparative cheapness and beneficial side effects of two 
modes of transportation – hence the rather unusual term “social savings”. The 
Purdue paper was devoted to computing one of the many components of the 
lower cost of transportation – the inter-regional distribution of goods. In this 
paper, Fogel showed that the water rates were actually lower than rail rates, and 
that even when one added the extra wagon mileage, the loss in time and the 
increase in shipping risk, the overall savings attributable to interstate transport of 
agricultural goods was less than 1% of the national income of 1890. When his 
completed thesis came out in 1964 he had estimated the total social savings to be 
a disappointingly small figure: less than 5% of 1890 national income. Fogel 
                                                   
16 Fogel (1960). 
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claimed that this small number had surprised him as he had expected a much 
higher number – which only served to strengthen his commitment to the result.17 
 Fogel had begun his graduate work in 1958; by 1960 he was one-third 
along the way.18 He was not aware that one of Alexander Gerschenkron’s 
students – who had begun his graduate work in 1959 - was working on a very 
similar problem.19 Gerschenkron’s student had also started from the desire to 
challenge existing historiography, and very specifically Rostow: 
 
“I came up with railways, in part because of W.W. Rostow’s work (…) and 
its emphasis on the railway as the cause of the take-off in the United 
States. It didn’t really seem to make much sense to me. From the little that 
I knew of economic history at the time, the idea of the take-off in the 
United States seemed quite a misleading emphasis. Rostow had 
elaborated somewhat on the railways, and I saw that there was a chance 
to do something.”20 
 
Fishlow wanted to examine Rostow’s claim that the railroad had triggered 
benefits up and down the industrial chain: for example a higher demand for iron 
and steel products. As could be gleaned from his table of contents, such an 
assessment of the railway’s impact had to be multifaceted, and could not be 
reduced to a computation (however specific) of the savings due to cheaper 
transportation.21 Thus Fishlow differed from Fogel in three important respects; 
the first was his willingness to use other people’s estimates of the numbers he 
                                                   
17 Fogel (1990). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Neither was Fishlow was aware of Fogel: “Needless to say, when I selected the 
railways I didn’t know much about Mr. Fogel. I read his earlier stuff on the Union 
Pacific, which was a master’s thesis (…) We first met at Harvard in 1961” - Fishlow 
(1998). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Fishlow (1965). 
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needed for his computations (often estimates that had been made by rail 
executives or legislators to justify or warn against building a new branch). This 
revealed his conviction that the social savings estimate was necessarily very 
rough, and perhaps not the best use of a scholar’s time and energy. In contrast, 
Fogel estimated each of the steps himself. The second was the fact that Fishlow 
had left the door open to discussions about seemingly un-quantifiable factors, 
thus not entirely refuting the indispensability “myth”. The third was that his 
analysis was principally built on an examination of forward and backward 
linkages (in order to assess whether or not there was such a thing as a leading 
sector sending virtuous impulses up and down the industrial chain), whereas 
Fogel’s analysis was principally built around productivity within the rail sector. 
Their respective final theses blended both components, but it may have been the 
result of their post 1961 interaction, rather than identical ways of originally 
setting up the study.22 
 Fogel and Fishlow were both present at the second Purdue meeting in 
December 1961 – where an even greater number of young economist-historians 
were drawn into the railroad conversation. In particular, many of 
Gerschenkron’s students joined the group (Fishlow, David and Temin), adding 
to the existing Kuznetsian majority. Lance Davis remembered this second 
meeting as the real beginning of all the “fun and excitement”.23 Many of the 
participants played Fogel’s game, critically examining the particulars of his 
computation. As Fogel recalled of the first meeting his audience “wanted [him] 
                                                   
22 According to Paul David, who shared a graduate student office with Fishlow at 
Harvard, Fishlow was more interested in the Hirschmanian and Rostowian analysis of 
industrial growth, and Fogel only added Rostow (and industrial linkages) to his thesis 
after meeting Fishlow. In his remembrance, Fishlow’s work on social savings was 
definitely inspired by Fogel - Paul David, Conversation with Cristel de Rouvray, 
Oxford, August 2004.  
23 Davis (1990). I only have a list of the seven scholars who gave papers, which included 
Davis, Easterlin, David, Parker, Gallman and Brady - Purdue University Department of 
Economics, Ed. (1967), vii. 
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to explain in considerable detail how [he] had estimated this or that factor.” 24 By 
the second and third Purdue meetings, other scholars had taken up pieces of 
Fogel’s demonstration, or calculation to replicate, discuss or adjust it. As 
Gallman somewhat ironically recalled (an opinion doubtless shaped by Fogel’s 
subsequent influence in the profession): “[Fogel] has always had the knack of 
obliging everyone to talk about what he wants to discuss. He did it with the 
railroads”.25 Thus, the railroads, and more specifically, Fogel’s way of tackling 
the railroad question became a focal point and an exemplar of the kind of study 
new economic historians undertook.  
 The focalizing power of railroad debates was further exemplified in a 
session of the 1964 AEA meetings – where cliometrics was officially introduced 
to hundreds of economists. Fogel chaired a session on “Reappraisals in American 
Economic History”. 26 The four papers presented at this session all directly, or 
indirectly addressed the railroad social savings issue. Peter Temin’s paper was 
on 19th century iron manufacturing and considered the importance of the 
demand for rails in accounting for technological changes in the iron industry.  
Albert Fishlow’s paper examined the actual pattern of American inter-regional 
trade in the first half of the 19th century – and while he did not spell out the 
implications of his findings for the social savings calculations, there was an 
obvious connection between this exercise and his earlier railroad work. Roger 
Ransom’s paper was on canals.27 Fogel’s paper was a general “discussion” in 
which he aimed to use the three previous papers to define “the typical product” 
of new economic history. He pointed to quantification, theory guided 
measurement and counterfactuals as the trademarks of this new school. All panel 
participants, and more generally all cliometricians may not have had identical 
                                                   
24 Fogel (1990). 
25 Gallman (1992). 
26 Three papers were presented, and Fogel’s “Discussion” paper was a summary 
statement; Fishlow (1964); Ransom (1964); Temin (1964). 
27 Roger Ransom had just earned his Ph.D. (1963) from the University of Washington, 
where he studied with Douglass North.  
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definitions of their own work, or of their movement, but they recognized that the 
railroad studies were their first contribution to historiography, and a stamp of 
legitimacy for their new movement: 
 
“For those of us who lived through the exciting days of the "cliometric 
revolution," the publication of Robert Fogel's Railroads and American Economic 
Growth represented a very major milestone - it was as if we now had proof 
that we had left the bumpy and unpaved dirt road of the first few years and 
could see ahead a straight and well-paved highway into the future.”28 
 
Conrad and Meyer’s work on slavery, Davis and Hughes’ work at Purdue, the 
budding Harvard economic history workshop were all crucial elements in the 
appearance of a new economist-history, but the critical event so important to a 
movement’s genesis was built around Fogel’s controversial study. 
  
2.3. Traditional historians fight back 
Fogel’s study was not only effective for focalizing the energies of budding 
cliometricians but it also succeeded in drawing into the conversation those who 
came to be known as “traditional historians”. Much of their work insisted on the 
“forward and backward linkages” - economic, technological and psychological 
features that had come with the railroad. For example, Alfred Chandler, who had 
spent his graduate years at the Harvard RCEntrepH, published a book in 1965 
where he argued that a thorough understanding of the widespread impact of the 
railroads on American business required investigation of the ways in which it 
affected transportation costs, corporate finance, corporate management, labor 
relations, modes of competition and government regulation.29 According to 
Chandler, many of these elements were not amenable to measurement, and he 
                                                   
28 Davis (2000). 
29 See the table of contents of Chandler, Ed. (1965). For a breakdown of the seven points 
that make up all “indispensability” arguments see O'Brien (1977), chapter 1. 
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acknowledged Fogel’s work as an enterprise that could never overcome this 
fundamental limitation: 
 
“To measure statistically the full impact of the transportation revolution in 
which the railroad played the leading role in an extremely difficult task. 
The stimulus the railroad gave to the westward movement, to the 
expansion of wheat and cattle production, to the coming of new 
commercial routes, and to the adoption of mass production methods in 
manufacture or iron and consumer durables is almost impossible to pin 
down with precise, meaningful figures. But while economists may argue 
as to the extent to which the railroad affected the nation’s income and 
product, few deny that the railroad was a significant force in the growth 
of the American economy during the second half of the 19th century.”30 
 
Among the factors that escaped measurement, Chandler particularly stressed the 
spread of modern information and decision systems – this fit into an Arthur Cole 
like vision that economic development was the result of the growing 
sophistication of the entrepreneurial system: 
 
“No existing business required so many, so varied, and so intricate short 
term operating decisions, and none called for such difficult long term 
decisions as to pricing and allocation of resources (…) Every day, railroad 
managers had to make decisions controlling the activities of many men to 
whom they rarely talked or even ever saw. Moreover, these operational 
decisions had to be made (…) quickly (…) The long-range decisions on the 
setting and adjustments of rates and the determination of costs, profits 
and losses were also endlessly complicated. Therefore both the short term 
operating decisions of coordination and appraisal and the long term 
                                                   
30 Chandler, Ed. (1965), 23. 
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policy decisions – involving expansion of tracks, equipment, terminal and 
other facilities and the methods used to finance such expansion were 
unprecedented in their intricacies.”31 
 
 
Such factors did not even figure in Fogel’s assessment of the importance of the 
railroads, nor did it represent an important part of the critiques he received from 
Fishlow and other young cliometricians. Thus, “traditional” historians began 
seeing economist-historians as scholars who focused on measurement problems, 
ignored or evaded non-quantifiable features, in particular those having to do 
with the psychology and organization of individuals.  
 Yet, even while scholars like Chandler, Fritz Redlich or Louis Hartz tried 
to emphasize the narrowness of Fogel’s exercise, and draw the profession’s 
attention to the many other factors Jenks had listed, they still found themselves 
caught in his game – as they would embark on discussions of the validity of his 
assumptions, the representative nature of the water or rail rates he chose etc.32 
For example, in heated exchange with Fogel, in the mid 1960s, after the 
publication of their respective books, Chandler recalled having “replied” using 
maps to show canal routes, and reminding the audience that lakes and 
waterways could freeze during the winter.33 These were the factors that Fogel 
had tried to put monetary values to, and did not really matter for Chandler’s 
argument about entrepreneurial and organizational skills within the railroad 
                                                   
31 Ibid, 97-100. 
32 In his study of the gradual expansion of cost-benefit analysis in American government 
bureaucracies, Porter has shown that disputes around the particulars of a given 
calculation were very frequent, if not the norm, and that different branches of 
government ultimately recognized the necessity of having matching rules and standards 
for computation of costs and benefits, otherwise their discussions could get stuck in 
unsolvable points of detail; Porter (1995), 175-82. So there may be something inherent to 
cost benefit analysis that gets all participants focused on the same narrow estimation 
issues! 
33 Chandler (2004). 
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corporation. Nevertheless he invested time and energy in refuting these. 
Similarly, in a scathing article reviewing Fogel’s 1964 book, Louis Hacker spent 
much of the review scrutinizing the details of Fogel’s computation, when 
Hacker’s main point was about the way the problem was set up, not really the 
execution! 34 
 When they were not picking through the details of Fogel’s computations, 
“traditional historians” were making more general points about his method. 
Their arguments revolved around three topics: evidence, use of formal economic 
theory, and legitimacy of the counterfactual method.  The “evidence” argument 
was a derivative of the measurement issue. According to Chandler et al., the 
quantitative demonstration was overly constraining as it necessarily excluded all 
the intangibles (psychological and organizational aspects of the railroad’s 
influence). To document these crucial aspects he preferred to invoke evidence 
from contemporaries – his 1965 book was a collection of essays about the 
railroads, many of which had been written in the 19th century: 
 
“The following readings focus on the railways as pioneers in the ways of 
modern big business. They concentrate on institutional innovation more 
than on quantitative economic growth and do so by letting the innovators 
speak for themselves.”35 
 
This aspect of the debate may call to mind the Kuznets versus Landes 
disagreement evoked in chapter 4, and can be understood, in part, as 
disagreement over what constituted reliable empirical information – yet another 
round in the perennial debate about the proper way to “observe” in economics. 
 The second focal point for discussion was the value of formal economic 
theory.  As Fogel wrote in the mid 1960s: 
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35 Chandler, Ed. (1965), 11. 
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 “It seems clear that what is most novel and most important in the new 
economic history is not the increased emphasis on measurement but the 
reliance on theory to measure that which was previously deemed un-
measurable.”36  
 
Yet the exact meaning of the word “theory”, in this case as in others, was not 
often clear. Though it was sometimes qualified with the adjectives “economic” or 
“statistical”, it was mostly used in a very broad way, sometimes even to refer to 
ontological dispositions, “Weltanschaungs”, as Redlich called them: “a certain 
articulate outlook on the world (…) the old approach [dealt] essentially with 
institutions (…) [while] the new approach often [went] directly at 
macroeconomic processes, thus disregarding institutions.” 37  This was certainly 
how the “traditionalist” historian Louis Hacker interpreted the debates: 
 
“[Traditionalists] look to the creation of a new climate – political, 
psychological, social, legal – and the appearance of real structural changes 
in the American economy (…) [If one wants an explanation of the impact 
of the railroads] one can find it in Schumpeter’s seminal idea of 
entrepreneurship, when new men can emerge in a fluid society to 
reactivate economic processes and in William Graham Sumner’s equally 
seminal idea of the folkways and the mores.”38 
 
As seen in chapter 2, this was the point Lamoreaux made in her brief analysis of 
the origins of the cliometric revolution. According to her, the two sides, old and 
new, were not divided along the use of the theory, but the choice of theory – 
                                                   
36 Fogel (1964a), 381.  
37 Redlich (1965), 480. 
38 Hacker (1966), 171-2. 
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cliometricians were more enthused by theories of human behavior predicated on 
individual rational choice or macro-economic theories, while the “old” guard 
was more seduced by sociological role theories and systemic institutional 
explanations.39 Cliometricians did not acknowledge these different 
Weltanschaungs, preferring to characterize traditionalists as people with no 
theory, or no explicit theory (which as Hacker and Redlich showed, was not 
true). We thus realize that these claims for “theory” played an important 
rhetorical role, often meant different things to different participants and were 
perhaps not the clearest way of defining cliometricians or their opponents.  
The last element of dispute between “traditionalists” and “cliometricians” 
was the issue of counterfactual analysis. To prove his point that railroads could 
have been dispensed with, Fogel had considered an alternative world with no 
iron horse and where a combination of road and water transportation was used 
instead. He had imagined a much vaster network of canals, to supplement for 
some of the missing rail routes. Traditional economic historians were not 
comfortable with these “figments”, which according to them, had no grounding 
in reality.40 In response, cliometricians had claimed that all causal statements in 
history implied a counterfactual, thus the question was not deciding whether 
they were legitimate, but rather whether some counterfactual worlds were more 
legitimate than others.41 Cliometricians referred to economic theory as the 
foundation of their  (better) counterfactual worlds.42 For example, when 
reviewing the work of American cliometricians, the British economic historian 
Patrick O’Brien reported that Fogel “had made full use of economic theory to 
assist him to describe a counterfactual economy without railways.”43  This 
brought the conversation back to the “economic theory” prong described above, 
                                                   
39 Lamoreaux (1998). 
40 See for example Redlich (1965). 
41 For a thorough discussion of the various positions in the counterfactual debates see 
McClelland (1975), 147.  
42 See McCloskey (1990), 92.  
43 O'Brien (1977), 23. 
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and the discussion ended in stalemate, as the word “theory” was being used 
strategically by both sides. But in the process both camps were forced to bring to 
light the elements that underlay their notions of explanation and causality, 
elements that prove particularly useful for the historian who seeks to understand 
why these debates could have been so important in the crystallization of the 
cliometric identity.  
 
3. What cliometricians meant when they claimed to be applying “theory” to 
history 
3.1. Textbook economic theory 
In his 1964 book, Fogel used the word “theory” to refer to what a modern 
reader would recognize as neoclassical economic theory, sometimes, but not 
always expressed in mathematical terms. For example, he would invoke the 
“theory of increasing returns” to say that his use of 1890 actual water rates biased 
the social savings in favor of the railroads, as a world with more water traffic 
would surely have seen lower water rates (due to decreasing marginal costs of 
transporting more goods by water, because the cost of transportation factored in 
the large sunk cost of building and operating the canals, irrespective of how 
much merchandise was actually transported).  
The most frequent theory both he and Fishlow used was price theory. For 
example, they estimated the increase in national income due to Western 
settlement (permitted by railroads) by looking at land values – as, in theory, the 
price of the land was the present value of all future profits earned from farming 
it.  Fogel used this equation for computing the benefits of cheaper transportation 
costs, but did not discuss the behavioral assumptions underlying neoclassical 
price theory. He was not a committed free marketer who saw the world in terms 
of individuals pursuing their self-interest (actually he was an open radical 
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student leader well into the 1950s), but rather an instrumental user of precise 
tools that could help him think though an empirical puzzle.44  
But these examples of textbook economic theory did not constitute the 
bulk of activities that Fogel undertook under the label “theorizing”. When one 
takes a closer look at Fogel’s study and the responses it triggered one realizes 
that much of the analysis involved simplifying assumptions (for example, 
assuming that the weight of a butchered cow had not changed over a 20 year 
period), proxies (for example, using a sample survey of 20th century British 
household consumption as a proxy for 19th century American household 
consumption) and mathematical tricks (for example, assuming that the 
relationship between two variables was linear). Cliometricians and traditionalists 
may have called them “theory” but these procedures were certainly not on the 
same level as the formal theory of rent. Thus, an understanding of the origins of 
the cliometric revolution has to take into account these different types of 
“theory” and account for their origins. 
   
3.2. National accounting devices 
In each step of his analysis, Fogel would start with a list of data that he 
would ideally be able to use if he were to obtain an exact solution to the 
computation he had defined. Unfortunately these data did not always exist. For 
example, in the framework he presented at Purdue in 1960, he listed four types of 
data he would need to estimate the import demand for western agricultural 
goods from each of the eastern and southern states (for example, how much 
grain New Hampshire had imported from the Midwest in 1890). He began by 
stating that this demand was the difference between the state’s production and 
its consumption. He would thus need data on farm production and variations in 
                                                   
44 For information about Fogel’s Marxism, see Schrecker (1986), 61, 87. Mark Perlman 
recalled reading a letter of recommendation from Carter Goodrich that made note of 
Fogel’s student politics – Perlman (2003), conversation with Cristel de Rouvray, Duke 
University, June 2003.  
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stock – for the production side - and on total consumption and net exports - for 
the consumption side. Fogel had found data on farm production, net exports and 
variations in stock, but he had no source that documented total consumption of 
state residents. Instead he had to estimate it. To do this he multiplied total state 
population figures – which he obtained from the 1890 census, using half weights 
for children - by the average consumption of wheat, corn, pork and beef products 
as had been established by a 1909 British survey of urban workers.45 
What kind of “theory” was Fogel using in performing the total 
consumption estimate and deriving the agricultural imports for each state? In the 
first place, he had relied on a national accounting identity to define state imports 
as the difference between the components of local production and consumption. 
This “theory” was conceptual rather than causal. Indeed, as mentioned in 
chapter 4, national accounting equations were accounting identities, built from 
an exhaustive classification of economic activity. These equations never implied 
action of one variable upon another – for example, there was no justification for 
saying that an increase in local consumption would trigger an increase in 
imports, as there were no underlying dynamic or behaviorist assumptions.  
Hence, while one could use the word “theory” to describe this accounting 
identity, one should recall that it was the kind of “theory” that Kuznets was 
comfortable with, and the reader knows from chapter 4 what Kuznets thought of 
most speculative economic theory! It may thus be more appropriate to call it a 
systemic framework, as Kuznets would have called it, or a “measuring 
instrument” as was suggested in chapter 4 (to highlight the data creation power 
of this view).  
In the second place, Fogel had used a British survey as a proxy for 
consumption among American households. He had also assumed that children 
ate half as much food as adults. There was no formal theoretical justification for 
doing this. If there was any legitimacy behind such assumptions it would have to 
                                                   
45 He only went through the detailed calculation for wheat - Fogel (1962), 180-4. 
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be empirical. Fogel recognized this, and validated his estimates with small 
studies of regional American consumption – that seemed to fit with the British 
estimates. These procedures were very common in Fogel’s work: for example he 
had to determine how many bushels of wheat made up one sack of flour using 
“representative” empirical information. Note that such estimation procedures 
were much more prevalent in his 1964 thesis than in his 1960 Union Pacific – 
where he had actually given up the idea of pursuing a social savings calculation, 
having said that the relevant data simply could not be found.46 This change in 
willingness to use empirically grounded proxies for the sake of data estimation 
may have been linked to his move to Johns Hopkins and Simon Kuznets’ 
influence. Thus it may be useful for the 21st century reader to think of many of 
Fogel’s “assumptions” as devices that he had learned from Kuznets, his students, 
and the wider community of national accountants.47  
The reader may recall from chapters 4 and 5 that numbers generated 
within a national accounts framework were not un-problematic among economic 
historians.  The accountant’s simplifying assumptions might have been more or 
less justified on empirical grounds, yet they were never “found” in any archive 
or read off an almanac. This brings us back to the arguments that divided Jan 
Marczewski’s retrospective accountant team and the Annales historians in France. 
National accounting procedures may not have been “high” theory, but they 
nonetheless belonged to a macro-economic view of the past that the likes of 
Redlich, Chandler and Hacker did not instinctively accept or find particularly 
useful. Much of the disagreement lay in the estimated, or guessed nature of these 
numbers – and Fogel brought it to another level, by adding order of magnitude 
exercises to his list of acceptable evidence.  
                                                   
46 “Unfortunately the data needed to determine the unpaid benefits falling into 
categories (b), (c) and (d) are not available” - Fogel (1960), 99. 
47 For example in his chapter on intra-regional savings he mentioned that he had 
followed the “method of the Department of Agriculture” in estimating the “national 
disappearance of butter per capita” (i.e. consumption) - Fogel (1964b), 62. 
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3.3. Order of Magnitude exercises 
In his 1962 and 1964 texts, Fogel often made reference to “orders of 
magnitude” or “back of the envelope” calculations, and referred to these as 
“theorizing”. With these terms, he meant both the nature of the result he sought 
(i.e. not exact numbers, but the range) and his use of a set of pragmatic 
assumptions that could simplify the computation.  The entire study was 
structured to get a social savings estimate that would not be exact, but be in the 
right order of magnitude: i.e. he wanted to know if development of the railroad 
had saved Americans tens, hundreds or millions of dollars. Thus, while his final 
5% of GNP figure was much discussed, his own study did not make much of it, 
except that it was smaller than what he had expected. 
He contrasted this pragmatism to the ideal way of solving the problem, 
the exact computation method, which he claimed could not be fulfilled, due to 
data and resource problems. According to Fogel, the problem of understanding 
exactly how much the railroad had contributed to inter-regional transport savings 
was a linear programming issue. In the 1962 paper (which became chapter 2 of 
the 1964 book), he thus spent quite a bit of time explaining this procedure to his 
reader, though he actually never ran the computations.48 Behind this unused 
feature lay the distinct feeling that a large enough computer would have been 
                                                   
48 As he explained it, the idea was to run two separate computations. The first would 
establish the total cost of transporting all the actual 1890 wheat, corn, pork and beef 
between states using the cheapest possible routes. To find these routes, Fogel would 
stipulate the amount of wheat, corn, pork and beef that was shipped from each primary 
market, the amount of each received by each secondary market. He would then plug in 
the alternatives that could have been used: the existing wagon, water and rail routes, 
and the rates charged on each segment. Solving the linear model would then entail 
distributing the entire produce to its destined locations minimizing the total cost, and 
under constraint of volume capacities of each mode of transport. The second 
computation would be identical, except that railroads would not longer be an option. 
The difference between these results would represent the money saved by having 
railroads. The computations were large because there were 11 primary markets and over 
40 secondary ones - Ibid, 26-28. 
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able to solve the problem in a direct, very exact way – though the 1964 reader 
would have to make due with Fogel’s order of magnitude calculation as a 
sufficient substitute.  
Fogel’s pragmatism surfaced at each stage of the computation. It 
intervened in the general set up, justifying for example his focus on the 
transportation of only 4 (instead of all) agricultural goods, as they constituted 
more than two thirds of total freight. It also intervened at a micro level, when it 
came to construct estimates for each of the steps that led to the final number. For 
example, he had used cooking books to establish the wheat equivalent of a 
certain amount of bread: 
 
“The budget studies gave estimates not of wheat, but of pounds of bread 
consumed. So there was an issue of how one got from pounds of bread to 
the wheat requirement (…) I went through the different sources that I had 
used, including a number of formulas that reported the amount of wheat 
that commercial bakeries use in a pound of bread. I had also examined a 
sizeable list of cookbooks of the time, including those that were common 
in the rural areas.”49  
 
This was an ingenious and efficient way to define the likely range of household 
wheat consumption.  
This “order of magnitude” approach to measurement – which Fogel often 
called “theory” - was distinctly different from the emphasis on quantification 
provided by Kuznets and his accounting peers, who were much less prone to 
using “back of the envelope” assumptions. When they did, these assumptions 
had to be legitimized on an empirical, rather than rough order of magnitude or 
theoretical basis. It was much closer to Conrad and Meyer’s strategy for 
estimating the total cost of owning and working a slave. They had obtained a 
                                                   
49 Fogel (1990). 
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very rough set of estimates derived from previously published data and reduced 
wide ranges of observed prices to much narrower ones, without much 
justification.50 This had led to some harsh critique, in particular from Gallman 
and Easterlin, who were Kuznets’ students.  
 Fogel seemed to move from one extreme to the next – he could replace the 
linear programming with an approximation (which entailed dozens of rough 
assumptions), just as he could delve very deeply into the empirical justification 
for a single assumption. For example Fogel criticized Fishlow for having 
assumed that the average weight of slaughtered cattle had stayed the same in the 
twenty years from 1840 to 1860. Fogel had evidence to suggest that a different 
assumption would have been more appropriate, and could have avoided some 
strange and contradictory results. Indeed, his examination of corn production 
showed: 
 
“A major change in animal husbandry over the twenty year period. There 
was obviously a major movement away from grazing and mast feeding to 
corn feeding. Such a turn suggests a rise in the slaughter weight of hogs 
and cattle.”51  
  
If one considers Fogel’s “theoretical” approach to economic history as a 
combination of order of magnitude work and national accounting devices, one 
can see the relatively marginal role played by “high” economic theory in the 
actual solving of the problem. Price theory, the notion of marginal cost or price 
elasticity for example were used opportunistically as short cuts to justify 
assumptions that were an exception in a set of otherwise empirically justified 
ones. Also, Fogel did not have a model of the 19th century American economy 
                                                   
50 For example, the price of a acreage per slave was found to vary between $90 and 
$1400, a range they reduced to $450, with justifications as loose as: “the typical case was 
probably half way between these two” - Conrad and Meyer (1958), 101. 
51 Fogel (1964a), 386. 
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that explicitly spelled out the relationship between the transportation sector and 
the rest of the economy. He did not proceed as Conrad and Meyer had, setting 
up one equation (model) whose terms needed to be calculated to solve for the 
variable of interest. Fogel admitted to not having had a “model” for his 1964 
work when he presented a new version of the railroad argument in his 1979 
presidential address to the EHA. In this 1979 version, he developed a two-sector 
model. 52 Thus his initial use of the word theory was quite heterogeneous and 
masked a tension between different types of quantification - evidence of the 
multifaceted education he, and other cliometricians had received in the 
immediate post WWII U.S.  
 
4. The transformation of American economics and the training of a 
cliometrician 
4.1. The transformation of American economics 
The challenge of understanding where cliometrics might have come from 
lies, in part, in the characterization of 1940s and 1950s economics, and the ways it 
differed from earlier years. As the economic historian Barbara Solow exclaimed 
when trying to account for the cliometric revolution: “economics had changed”!53 
There is a growing literature about the “transformation” of 20th century 
economics – the picture that emerges from these studies is a mutation of the 
general look and feel of the economics profession in the decades surrounding 
WWII. While the interwar economics profession supported variety in beliefs, 
ideology, methods and policy recommendations, post-war economists were 
much more homogeneous. Historians of economics refer to this change as “the 
transformation from pluralistic to monolithic neoclassical economics”.54 This 
                                                   
52 Fogel (1979). 
53 Robert and Barbara Solow (2004), Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Boston, June 
2004. 
54 See the essays in Morgan Mary and Malcolm Rutherford, Ed. (1998b). 
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phenomenon was most acute in the U.S., though it had delayed repercussions in 
practically every Western developed nation. In France, for example, the 
transformation arguably only occurred in the late 1970s, early 1980s.55 
Though historians of economics agree about the existence of this 
transformation, there is some discussion around its exact timing, the factors that 
precipitated it and the outcome of the process.  How important was American 
economists’ experience in WWII for bringing about these changes? Was there a 
purposeful weeding out of radical economists, or any type of non-conventional 
social scientist? Did mathematical and statistical expression unambiguously take-
over to the detriment of other methods? Though certain accounts have argued 
that WWII, and more importantly the Cold War created a politically conservative 
environment that suppressed any form of profound or humanistic discussion in 
economics, encouraging the profession to seek refuge behind a mathematical, 
technical veil, the vast majority of explanations shuns from such a Manichean 
view in favor of a more subtle appreciation of the phenomenon. True, there were 
some changes, but one should be weary of attributing them to cold-blooded 
mathematization or the inevitable march of progress.  
A more comprehensive way of accounting for the transformation is to 
look at it in terms of changing standards of “scientificity”. According to Morgan 
and Rutherford a shift in these standards occurred in mid 20th century 
economics.  While interwar economists associated “the scientific status of work 
more with the personal qualities and attitudes of the economist qua scientist” - a 
vision that was compatible with advocacy, provided the pundit refer to 
alternative positions in an evenhanded way - post-war economists placed the 
onus of objectivity onto tools, thus restricting all argument to the choice of 
method. When it came to policy advice, post-war economists agreed that a 
scientific approach would yield a single, uncontested recommendation. The role 
of the mathematization of the discipline should thus be understood in this 
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context: it certainly was not the case that economists did not use mathematics 
before WWII, or that the adoption of mathematics would automatically trigger a 
pro-market view of the world. Rather, mathematical expression proliferated, as it 
proved to be a very powerful ally in these newly charged debates over method.56  
So what were the factors that triggered these changes in notions of science 
and objectivity? Was the economics profession undergoing a boom, a great 
increase in numbers that may have changed the dynamics of the profession? The 
Great Depression, and even more importantly WWII and the Cold War seem to 
have triggered a demand for expert economic advice – a demand that could not 
possibly be satisfied by a profession that supported widely different takes on and 
remedies to a given problem.57  These events may have provided the pressure 
and impetus for economics to change, but they also provided means. In the 
course of war service in particular, many economists were employed in very 
concrete tasks: for example resource allocation, price control or the conversion 
from one productive activity to another.58  By working on such problems they 
found that some of their existing tools were very useful (simple mathematical 
optimizing models and statistical measurement devices for example), but they 
also shared assignments with physicists and mathematicians whose skills and 
ways of thinking rubbed off on them. For example, the general field of 
operations research was developed as a result of such synergies.  In other words, 
war experience served both to reinforce the status of certain existing methods, 
and to create new ones.59  
During WWII economists gained a reputation for successful problem 
solving (in stark contrast to the reputation they had earned from government 
work during the Great Depression) which entrenched demand for their services 
                                                   
56 For a discussion of the complex process that led to the so-called “mathematization” of 
economics, and of its ties to a much larger debate about the appropriate role of 
mathematics in science, see Weintraub (1991); Weintraub (1996); Weintraub (1998). 
57 Coats, Ed. (1992). 
58 Goodwin (1998), 63  
59 Mirowski (2002), 203. 
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in the post war era. For example, the Council of Economic Advisors (a 
permanent advisory body to the President) was created in 1946.  Such demand 
triggered a new hierarchy within the academic field of economics: those who 
could contribute more tools for decision advice were better rewarded.  But this 
demand (and the perceived success of the service) also buttressed the 
profession’s confidence in these tools. It could well be that post-WWII 
economists did not have unambiguous faith in individual rationality or the 
superiority of free markets. Their tools, however, contained such assumptions 
(often for the sake of mathematical simplicity). The fact that these tools “worked” 
when applied to concrete problems (such as the most cost effective way of 
allocating the country’s steel capacity to the war effort) may have ironically 
served to validate the underlying assumptions.  As Morgan and Rutherford 
wrote: “it is because of the success of their tools that economists came to believe 
in the ideas behind them. This is certainly an interesting reversal of the normal 
internalist history of economics that portrays ideas (“thought”) as the leading 
light in any account”.60 
 
4.2. The education of a cliometrician 
While these changes in economics have been well documented, their 
implications for economic history have not been thoroughly spelled out. One 
may wonder whether cliometricians’ post WWII education had something to do 
with the fact that they distinguished themselves from older economist-historians 
(including their mentors) by the belief that economics was good for history, 
while the vast majority of economic historians the reader has encountered so far 
believed that history had something to bring to economics. 
Graduate education in economics changed dramatically in the immediate 
post WWII era. Paul Samuelson’s best selling neoclassical textbook first appeared 
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in 1948.61 Shortly thereafter mathematical analysis became the backbone of most 
graduate programs. As Paul David recalled, even undergraduate curricula had 
been affected by the time he entered Harvard:  
 
“The very idea of a unified theoretical framework for studying economic 
activity was a powerful one. Remember, at this time [early 1950s] 
Samuelson was already having a big impact on the way undergraduate 
economics was taught at places like Harvard – even though the 
Foundations of Economic Analysis were not assigned until you got to the 
most advanced theory course.”62  
 
Though he qualified this statement by adding that his “initiation into advanced 
economic analysis occurred before ‘the neoclassical system’ was the form in 
which theoretical analysis was presented to students”; perhaps an indication that 
education in the 1950s was somewhat eclectic and bred an instrumental (rather 
than religious) rapport to theory. Paul David claimed that he always considered 
a range of “off the shelf” theories and textbook analyses when he aimed at 
explaining a particular situation. In the same interview, David mentioned that he 
was one of the first students to take the graduate econometrics course at 
Harvard, with Hendrick Houthakker as his teacher, and Fishlow as the Teaching 
Assistant. As the technical requirements multiplied, other courses were 
marginalized and eventually dropped. As Barbara Solow recalled: “when I was 
an undergraduate student, you needed two foreign languages – as an economics 
concentrator. When I was a graduate student it changed: you could substitute 
mathematics for your second foreign language”.63  
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 These changes were not only occurring at Harvard – across the nation, 
students were being increasingly exposed to a more homogeneous theoretical 
body, especially in micro-economics (there still was quite a bit of controversy 
around Keynesian ideas, and some universities, like Purdue, did not even teach 
macroeconomics!).64 In the micro-economic curriculum, price theory held a 
special status. Recall that price theory had been the most common piece of 
textbook theory used by Fogel and Fishlow. Fogel’s reference was George 
Stigler’s 1954 work, The Theory of Price.65 In the mid 1950s, when Fogel was at 
Columbia studying for a masters degree, Stigler was still teaching there and 
Fogel remembered him as one of two people who most influenced him at 
Columbia (the other was Carter Goodrich): 
 
“George J. Stigler taught the graduate micro-economics sequence (…) 
Stigler made microeconomic theory come alive. He emphasized not its 
elegance but its applicability to a wide range of issues in economic policy. 
He continually moved between theory and evidence, carefully considering 
the empirical validity for the assumptions that theorists made about the 
slope or other aspects of the shape of key functions.”66  
 
As argued by the historians of economics Hands and Mirowski, Stigler’s version 
of price theory was free of any psychological assumptions concerning the 
behavior of economic agents, and carried strong connections with a general way 
of thinking he had developed as a war consultant: a pragmatic, “can do” 
attitude.67   
Fogel’s exposure to Stigler introduced him to the Operations Research 
(OR) tradition that emerged at Columbia in the early 1940s, in the wake of 
                                                   
64 Hughes (1991). 
65 Stigler (1954). Note that this was the only theoretical reference in Fogel (1960).  
66 Fogel (1993). 
67 Mirowski and Hands (1998). 
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Harold Hotelling, Henry Schultz and their heirs – some of the mathematically 
most advanced economists of the interwar and immediate post-war period.68  
Stigler had been Schultz’s student and had joined Columbia just as Hotelling was 
starting the Statistical Research Group (SRG) – which did consulting work for the 
Mathematics Panel of the National Defense Research Council. According to 
Mirowski, this led to the emergence of OR, a way of thinking that Mirowski 
described as: 
 
 “Look for “quantifiable” variables, even if the problem resists quantification 
(…) Use statistics to paper over the uncertainties and unknowns of the 
problem as portrayed, both for the economist and the agent, and to churn out 
implementable predictions for the client. Keep psychology out of it. 
Remember OR is just ‘social science done in collaboration with and on behalf 
of executives’.”69  
 
The OR mindset was a powerful mix of pragmatism and mathematical 
sophistication, and encouraged economists to think in terms of order of 
magnitude. As Stigler recalled: 
 
 “One subject I worked on was the vulnerability of aircraft to various 
kinds of firepower (20mm. cannon, .50-caliber machine guns, etc.). Within 
six months after our group began work on this subject, we were consulted 
by other war-research agencies on the details of aircraft vulnerability. One 
day I would be measuring a secretary to estimate how many square feet of 
target a seated pilot made, and a short time later I would be gravely 
discussing that number with another research group.”70 
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70  Quoted from Stigler (1988), 62. in Mirowski (2002), 206. 
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Stigler apparently had not felt the need the measure the exact size of a pilot in a 
plane – a secretary (a woman presumably) would provide an adequate estimate.  
Mirowski interpreted these experiences, and the “can–do hubris” that 
economists derived from the success of their war jobs, as the roots of their post-
war scientific ontology. Economists developed a reflex of systematically cutting 
up problems by way of staggered approximations. Implicit in this way of 
working was the idea that the analyst could subsequently check the empirical 
validity of each of his assumptions, and adjust the calculations in light of any 
changes. But, for the sake of setting up the exercise, the crucial factor was the 
“order of magnitude” – i.e., the result did not need to be exact, provided it was 
approximate to the real value.71 Hence the emphasis was much less on the 
empirical validity of each assumption than on the process of identifying each 
step of the analysis. Actually, it is not clear who was responsible for checking the 
validity of each estimate, as economists like Stigler seemed to think that their job 
primarily consisted in finding original ways of setting up the problem so that it 
could be measured. 
We have already stressed the importance of order of magnitude analysis 
and linear programming in Fogel’s work, and the differences between this type 
of quantification and the older national accounts tradition. The importance of the 
OR mindset for understanding the origins of cliometrics was further confirmed 
in the genesis of the name. Recall that it had been coined by Stanley Reiter, a 
mathematical economist who was at Purdue with Davis and Hughes, running a 
seminar in advanced mathematical and computational techniques. A decade 
earlier, Reiter had worked with Tjalling Koopmans on transportation 
optimization models (for example, how to configure shipping routes to minimize 
the number of miles sailed with empty cargo) – an example of their joint work 
                                                   
71 Note that in physics, “order of magnitude” means a factor of 10 – this is not the way 
Fogel used the expression.  
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was presented at a 1949 conference organized by the Cowles Commission (where 
Reiter had spent several years).72 Koopmans’ 1944 work on transportation had 
been a pioneering element of the development and spread of linear 
programming techniques at the nexus of industrial, military and theoretical lines 
brought together by WWII.73 Though he had not met Fogel when he coined the 
term, there was an interesting parallel between his background and the linear 
programming methodology Fogel longed to apply. 
The similarity between Fogel’s “ideal solution” and Reiter’s work with 
Koopmans deserves notice. Of course, OR transportation models were 
principally about the way things should be, rather than the way they were, and 
Fogel was claiming to describe the 19th century American economy as it was. 
However, to compute social savings, he had used two benchmark, ideal worlds: 
the first was described in his linear programming scheme (how much should it 
have cost to distribute all agricultural goods from the 10 primary markets to the 
40 or so secondary markets using existing transportation lines); the second was 
his famed counterfactual (how much should it have cost to move all merchandise 
on actual and imagined canals?). In both cases the “should” was approximated 
with the smallest possible cost – i.e. the optimal cost, and Fogel simply assumed 
that this optimal cost was the best proxy for the actual one. This was a very 
strong assumption, mostly when one recalls that dozens of economists were 
hired by the War Production Board to specifically ensure that goods were 
transported in the best possible way, evidence that it was not spontaneously so. 
If this was the case in the 1940s, it is hard to believe that the 1890s saw a perfect 
minimization of transportation costs. Thus Fogel’s reference points were very 
similar to OR analysts’ more normative and prescriptive work.  
                                                   
72 See “A Model of Transportation” in Koopmans, Ed. (1951). 
73 See Dantzig’s 1963 chart representing the origins and influence of linear 
programming; shown in Klein (2001), 130. 
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Cliometrics seems to have been intimately tied to the education of a post 
WWII empirical economist, and specifically to Fogel’s education: as he blended 
Kuznetsian macro empiricism with OR pragmatism and chards of textbook 
theory. Compared to Conrad and Meyer’s work, Fogel’s originality was his 
reliance on national accounting practices. This is depicted on Figure 7.2 where 
these two separate traditions of empiricism (and quantification) are symbolized 
on either side of the picture: the operations research branch is in red (dark), while 
the national accounting branch is in blue (light). Textbook theory is in green. 
Notice that Fogel (1964) was the only one to combine three elements. Conrad and 
Meyer (1958) and Fogel (1960) were missing extensive use of accounting devices; 
while Fishlow (1965) did not display much order of magnitude or linear 
programming work.  
As seen on Figure 7.2 there was a fourth component to cliometrics, namely 
an interest in traditional themes of American historiography, what Fogel called 
“myths”. In spite of all the disagreement around method, there was a striking 
similarity between Cole’s heirs (Chandler, Redlich, Handlin) and Fogel, Conrad 
and Meyer (and to a lesser extent Fishlow): the isolated interest in America’s 
history, which contrasted deeply with Kuznets and Gerschenkron’s commitment 
to comparative history. This difference is best illustrated in Fogel’s use of 
counterfactuals. 
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Figure 7.2 : the making of “cliometrics” 
 
Chapter 7 – The 1960s Railroad Debates 
 310
5. Kuznets, Gerschenkon and the cliometricians: comparison v. counterfactual 
5.1. The counterfactual method: what Fogel actually did 
In the course of the railroad debates, much ink was spilled on whether 
Fogel’s counterfactual world was a legitimate procedure for establishing 
historical causal relationships. In his 1964 thesis, Fogel used the counterfactual 
world in two ways. The first was a relatively unproblematic reference to 
alternate modes of transportation: if American producers and consumers had not 
had access to the railroad in 1890 how much extra would they have had to pay to 
transport the same bundle of goods on roads, canals, lakes and seashores? 
Fishlow had also made reference to these transportation substitutes – and most 
readers found the procedure relatively straightforward (after all, one could 
imagine a widespread, breakdown of the railroad system due to natural 
catastrophe or rogue management!). This alternative situation was simply a 
rhetorical device to make clear that there were other means of transporting goods 
in late 19th century U.S.  
Fogel pushed this counterfactual world much further in his second 
application. When it came to computing the savings that had been earned from 
rail usage in intra-regional transport, he stated that a fair comparison would 
have to take into account both disaffected and potential new canals. According to 
him, had there been no railroad, the economy would have developed an 
alternative mode of cheap transportation. He added that given the momentum 
and scope of canal construction in the first four decades of the 19th century, it 
surely would have continued had it not been for the railroad boom of the 1850s. 
Hence, he imagined additional canals: “37 canals and feeders”, representing 
“5,022 miles in length”, whose construction “would have brought almost all of 
the agricultural land in the Midwest within 40 straight line miles of a navigable 
waterway”. This extended water network had implications for the range of 
settled land (hence national income from land value), price of transportation 
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(hence national income from cheap water transport), and he even computed the 
costs of construction of this additional canal mileage, to show that the investment 
would have been worthwhile. 74 He concluded: 
 
“This proposed extension of the internal water transportation is more than a 
historian’s hallucination. In the absence of railroads, the canals shown (…) 
would have been both technologically and economically feasible. This 
assertion can be verified by considering the two main issues on which the 
question of feasibility turns: the nature of the terrain over which the canals 
could have been built and the water supply available for the operation of the 
canals.”75 
 
Fogel’s imagined canal network was not the product of an economist’s 
over-optimism or ontological belief that the market always worked. He did not 
simply state that the economy would have adjusted to a lower level of 
technology and developed an equally efficient alternative mode of cheap 
transport. Rather it seemed to be the product of an OR mind: the canals he 
imagined were part of the economy as it should, and could be. He argued that 
both the knowledge (know-how) and the physical conditions would have 
permitted such an extension: “[none] of these developments required new 
knowledge. They merely involved an extension of existing technology.”76 He 
almost went as far as drafting engineering plans for each of his proposed canals – 
he had five pages of tables showing both the horizontal scale in miles, and the 
vertical scale in feet for each new canal (a sample can be seen in Figure 7.3). 
 
 
                                                   
74 Fogel (1964b), 79-81. 
75 Ibid, 94. 
76 Ibid, 92. 
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Figure 7.3: Horizontal length and vertical depth of each imagined canal77  
 
 
Here again, the foundations of Fogel’s assumptions were ultimately empirical: 
the final test of plausibility was pragmatic: could it be done? If he had to build 
these canals, would he have been able to do it?  Such practical thoughts were not 
unfamiliar to generations of American Army engineers whose cost-benefit 
calculations had been used as official sanction and benchmark for decades of 
water transportation public projects (canals, dams, navigation, locks).78 His easy 
adoption of this engineer’s mentality is further evidence of the post-WWII 
convergence of certain economists’ thinking with models from engineering. 
Fogel seemed to belong (or to imitate, which is an important distinction, 
considering the rhetorical power of the OR aura) to a generation of “hands-on” 
                                                   
77 Ibid, 101. 
78 The history of the Army Corps of Engineers and their pioneering role for diffusing 
cost benefit analysis in the U.S. (well before economists began working on more abstract 
theoretical bases of cost-benefit analysis) is well examined in Porter (1995). His chapter 7 
is entirely devoted to their role in public water projects and legislation in the 1920-1960 
period. 
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economists, whose criterion for legitimizing their method was “does it work?” 
Theoretical considerations of a philosophical and ontological kind were seen as a 
waste of time. In other words, Fogel never bothered justifying his methodology 
on epistemological terms. His concerns were always practical. 
 
5.2. Are counterfactuals illegitimate “figments”? 
The practicality of this counterfactual method was lost on most of Fogel’s 
readers who immediately attacked him on epistemological grounds. The most 
frequent criticism concerned the unreality, hence futility of the whole approach. 
As a member of the RCEntrepH, Fritz Redlich, wrote: 
 
“Fogel investigates what would have happened to American economic 
development if there had not been any railroads. Now, as every schoolchild 
knows, there were railroads. That is Fogel investigates what would have 
happened in the event that something else had happened which could not 
have happened. I emphasize now the phrase, which could not have 
happened. Technological development follows its own logic. Once the 
atmospheric engine had been developed into an efficient steam engine (…) it 
was only a question of when the steam engine would be put on wheels (…) 
[This] does not make Fogel’s product history. “79 
 
One could say that Redlich and Fogel had two very different Weltanschaungs 
concerning the role and dynamics of technology in society, but it seems more 
profitable to think of their differences in terms of attitudes towards problem 
solving. Redlich understood Fogel’s question and the need to erect some sort of 
reference point to be able to tackle it: to see whether the railroad had mattered 
you had to be able to refer to an economy without it. But, in Redlich’s mind, 
                                                   
79 Redlich (1965), 486-7.  
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there could be no justification for inventing a world that had not existed. You 
needed to find a world that had existed. Hence, his appeal to comparison:  
 
“Everyone who knows French economic history in the eighteenth, and 
English economic history in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
knows that then there was economic development underway without the 
railroad. The fruitful question seems to be (…) at what point would 
economic development, underway by 1800, have become an arrested 
development for lack of adequate transportation? The stop would have 
come rather late in England, because the ore and coal were available in 
close proximity (..) the United States development would have come to a 
halt much earlier, or several national economies might have developed.”80  
 
According to Redlich, the scientific way to go about tackling Fogel’s problem 
would have been to proceed via comparison: looking at actual economies where 
there had been no railroads. This, in his opinion, would be good history – and, 
incidentally, good economics, since Redlich shared Edwin Gay’s students’ views 
that good economics depended on good economic history. 
 
5.3. Beyond Comparison? An American centric history 
The reader must recall that many earlier economist-historians shared the 
belief that comparison was the only genuine way to jump from monographs to 
general statements. In the U.S., Kuznets had expressed this view as early as 1941, 
during the round table at the Rockefeller Foundation, when Gay’s students were 
trying to build an agenda for a purely American economic history. The idea of 
using spatial comparisons had later been adopted by the founders of the 
RCEntrepH – who encouraged studies of entrepreneurial behavior across time 
and place (though their focus on the entrepreneur had been born from their 
                                                   
80 Ibid, 487-8. 
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study of American history and nothing seemed to change their mind about this 
Schumpeterian interpretation of economic development!). The reader should 
recall that Gerschenkron’s scientific research program was also inherently 
comparative. His framework needed to be populated with concrete examples of 
different degrees of backwardness and the ways in which this retardation had 
spurred or hampered development. He was looking for thresholds: at what point 
did backwardness become a handicap, rather than an advantage? To find these 
thresholds he would need studies of several countries at different stages of 
development to pinpoint which factors had been their Achilles’ heel.  
So Redlich had no monopoly on using comparison as the handle to make 
causal statements and Fogel himself had thought of proceeding comparatively 
before he adopted the explicit counterfactual method. Indeed, in his 1960 study 
of the Union Pacific Railroad, he had already introduced the idea of 
benchmarking a railroad economy to a non-railroad one: 
 
 “If there had existed a nation which had been the twin of the United States in 
every respect except that it had not built the Union Pacific, the social rate of 
return on the investment could be determined by first finding the differences 
in annual income between the two countries over the life of the investment, 
and then finding the rate of discount which made the present value of these 
annual income differences equal to the amount of the investment. However, 
since the United States did not have such a national twin, this method of 
procedure is ruled out.”81 
 
In other words, while the ideal controlled experiment involved a comparison 
between two real and almost identical countries, when this was not possible the 
scholar needed to find a different way of proceeding. Fogel had chosen the 
counterfactual. 
                                                   
81 Fogel (1960), 98. 
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 In Fogel’s mind there did not seem to be a trade-off between comparisons 
and counterfactuals. Comparisons had the merit of involving “real” cases, where 
the complex interaction of all economic variables had run its course, producing 
side effects that the theoretician could not have predicted (this is what some 
scholars have called the “seamless web of history”). But counterfactuals more 
neatly resembled a controlled experiment, as the analyst could literally leave 
everything unchanged, except for the variable of interest. For Redlich there may 
have been a higher degree of artificiality to this second method but for Fogel it 
was just another facet of his pragmatism. His counterfactual was actually not 
rooted on a specific theory that would tell him how to build the alternate world – 
it was an ad hoc combination of empirical facts (actual 1890 water rates), 
plausible developments (for example build a canal in this place) and theoretical 
precepts (theory of rent). Hence we may want to amend O’Brien’s 1977 assertion 
and recognize that the counterfactual was not built on a model of the 19th century 
economy, but rather on a combination of assumptions that Fogel may have called 
“theory”, but as we showed in section 3 were actually a combination of eclectic 
methods and devices from mid 20th century economics.82 
The fact that the analyst controlled this world made it a strong rhetorical 
device.  Indeed the real difference between the comparative and counterfactual 
method was not the truthfulness or realism inherent in each method. As 
mentioned above, each method was an imperfect substitute for controlled 
experiments. So the choice between them was much more a matter of persuasion. 
In his analysis of counterfactuals, the historian and philosopher Geoffrey 
Hawthorn has highlighted the rhetorical power of this device. According to him, 
the essence of historical explanation lies in the act of situating the actual 
occurrence that needs to be explained in a spectrum of possible events. This 
                                                   
82 Recall that O’Brien had said that Fogel’s counterfactual world was built on economic 
“theory” - O'Brien (1977). 
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spectrum can never be exhaustive (who are we to know what could have 
happened in all possible worlds!), but it can be more or less persuasive.83  
Kuznets and Gerschenkron had chosen to build their spectrums from a 
chain of actual events: Kuznets wanted national income time shots for as many 
countries at as many points in time as he could obtain; while Gerschenkron 
wanted pictures of various nations’ degrees of relative backwardness (which he 
spelled out in terms of capital availability, mobility of labor, state policies, 
availability of scientific knowledge). In both cases, the spectrum implicitly 
constrained the realm of possible worlds. For example, if Gerschenkron wanted 
to know whether it would have been possible for Russia to finance its railroads 
privately, he could refer to Germany – where private individuals and investment 
banks had done the job – and show that certain features of German society 
(namely effectiveness of contract and law enforcement) were missing in late 19th 
century Russia. Thus the German case set a possibilities limit to the Russian past: 
no banking elite meant no possibility of private railroad financing.  
Had Fogel followed a Kuznetsian or Gerschenkronian comparative 
strategy, he would have needed to establish a spectrum of countries before and 
after the advent of the railroad, indicating their national wealth and growth at 
each time. For his Union Pacific study, he could have compared 1860s U.S. to 
1890’s Russia, for example, to test his explanation about the causes of the 
                                                   
83 Hawthorn (1991).; in this wonderful book Hawthorn showed counterfactual analysis 
in action when analyzing the causes of repeated Plague epidemics in Europe. According 
to him, a historian will have explained a particular outburst only if he can answer the 
following question: “was there a possible world where the Florentine authorities would 
have known what to do?” To prove that lack of scientific knowledge was not the main 
cause, Hawthorn showed that a medieval Italian city-state would have been unable to 
implement the quarantine and mobility restriction procedures necessary to contain the 
epidemic. So unless the counterfactual world was one where people had 20th century 
knowledge in the 14th century and had large enough bureaucracies to implement and 
enforce these policies, and had a sense of national interest that went beyond commerce, 
the plague would not have been contained. Hawthorn argued that these extra clauses 
were impossible given the historical and economic context of medieval Italy (and 
medieval Europe), and hence that such a counterfactual was implausible. Implausible 
counterfactuals are not persuasive. 
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bankruptcy, as both could be seen as cases of state led premature enterprise. For 
his 1964 study, he could have done as Redlich had suggested: looked at the U.S. 
before the railroad boom, or France in the late 18thcentury. 
However, there was an obvious difficulty with this type of exercise: when 
one changed countries, and even when one changed epoch, one inevitably varied 
too many factors at once. The biggest and least tangible of these uncontrolled 
factors were specifically all elements that could not be measured (“institutions”, 
“culture”, “entrepreneurship” etc.).  Considering that the RCEntrepH insisted on 
the fact that social expectations (and the consequent roles adopted by 
entrepreneurs) were crucial to understanding national income growth (just as 
Rostow had insisted on psychological “propensities” to take advantage of a take-
off period), any causal argument about the railroads that relied on cross-country, 
or cross-temporal comparisons would have to wrestle with these non-measurable 
elements (as Kuznets had realized when confronting Rostow and Landes, as we 
saw in chapter 4) .  
And this was exactly the point that Fogel wanted to deny: he wanted to 
bust the “myth” that the railroads had affected people’s mindsets and created 
enough entrepreneurial energy to warrant unprecedented economic expansion. 
By using an imagined counterfactual economy, he could simply erase them from 
his analysis – as he could assume that nothing changed except the medium of 
transportation. Whereas Kuznets and Gerschenkron had left the door open to 
cultural explanations of economic growth, Fogel had shut it tight. Yet in the 
process of doing so, he also eliminated any motivation to do comparative 
economic history – to actually delve into the particulars of another place, or 
another time! 84  As we see in Figure 7.4 (which is identical to Figure 7.3 except 
                                                   
84 The counterfactual method has since become a standard tool among economist-
historians, to the point where it can sometimes be depicted as less problematic than 
plain old comparative work. See for example Robert Bates’ comment about not being 
able to use a counterfactual, and adopting a “less direct” method of evaluating the 
efficiency of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) by comparing prices within the 
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that it spells out the relationship between Kuznets, comparison, counterfactual 
and Fogel), the counterfactual can be usefully understood as a variation on the 
comparative method that had been so important to Kuznets. Yet this innovation 
combined to strengthen the American only feature of cliometric research, as it 
avoided investigation of non-American history, thus constituting a fundamental 
departure from Kuznets’ economist-history.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
ICO region to prices that actually prevailed outside it. According to him, this method is 
“less direct” because it cannot control for differences in quality and markets - Bates 
(1998).  
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Figure 7.4: The counterfactual as a “super” comparison 
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6. Conclusion: the irony of the railroad debates 
The railroad debates spurred by Robert Fogel’s provocative calculation of 
the iron horse’s contribution to 19th century American economy provided a focal 
point around which the cliometric identity crystallized. Though there was much 
reformist energy among many late 1950s economist-historians, the debates both 
shaped and constrained the nature of this reform, and the establishment of a 
“new” economist-history. For example, the comparative agenda that had been at 
the heart of both Kuznets and Gerschenkron’s battles for economic history was 
lost to the following generation, in favor of a much more American centric 
approach. The railroad debates were also crucial because they involved 
“traditional historians” – thus clearly defining the line between who was “in” 
and who was “out” of the new economist-history. By the late 1960s, the likes of 
Chandler – who had once belonged to a group within the Harvard economics 
department - were definitely excluded from the face of “scientific” economic 
history, as defined by economists. They gradually left the EHA, JEH and EEH to 
create their own institutions.85  
Yet, there was nothing necessary to this exclusion of cultural, 
entrepreneurial or institutional interpretations of past economic events, as the 
situation in France revealed. In the 1960s, French Annalistes were still primarily 
interested in materialist explanations of economic change, but by the end of the 
decade they were seriously considering the impact of mentalités – ways of 
thinking and doing, the “customs and mores” cited by Hacker. So for those 
readers who are wondering why Willits, Bezanson, Cole, Jenks and their 
students disappeared from American economist–history, they may want to 
reflect on the fact that their research funding was quite suddenly terminated in 
the early 1960s and that they never had a Gerschenkron (or a Braudel) to 
mobilize people and resources. Note that cliometricians’ success at eliminating 
                                                   
85 Chandler (2004). 
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the entrepreneurial, institutional line thought in American economist-history was 
ironic on two counts. For one thing they continued to focus on the American 
themes that had been selected by Willits and Bezanson’s heirs. For another, 
Douglass North brought institutions back into economic history in the 1980s, and 
psychology and mindset in the 21st century.86  
Yet, the irony becomes even stronger when one considers that the issues 
that Chandler emphasized were not only ignored by cliometricians, but they 
failed to see the connection between 19th century railroad management 
innovations and the tools they used to “scientifically” prove their point. 
Chandler listed many of the tools developed by these railroad operatives, 
including cost accounting, cost-benefit analysis and general “control through 
statistics” – ways of seeing the world that had been developed to cope with 
extensive rail networks, and that were completely taken for granted by the mid 
20th century. Fogel acknowledged his debt to 19th century transportation 
engineers, though he did not see the irony of the connection: 
 
“It was really the literature because people were comparing railroads to 
waterways all along. Let me say there is virtually nothing I did in my 
work on railroads that was not anticipated by some state legislator or 
other public figure. [For example,] there was hardly a session of state 
legislature that dealt with a proposal to build a canal or a railroad in 
which the advocates did not refer to the predicted increase in land values 
or use that idea to estimate the social benefit that wouldn’t be covered by 
the income of the road.”87 
 
                                                   
86 North (1991); North (2005). 
87 Fogel (1990). 
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He added: “economists did not discover cost benefit analysis. It really comes out 
of engineering.” 88 And Chandler had shown that railroad managers had turned 
it into a much more widespread way of thinking. So railroads may not have 
mattered for 19th century economic growth (if you believe Fogel), but they 
pioneered methods that mattered tremendously for Fogel’s analysis and the 
crystallization of cliometrics. 
 
                                                   
88 Ibid. More precisely, it came out of transport engineering, as Porter showed in his 
study of the Army Corps of Engineers. Porter (1995), chapter 7.; more generally cost-
benefit analysis came from the French civil engineering tradition, see Walliser (1990), 4-
11. 
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INTERLUDE 
 
 
HOW MUCH WAS THAT? 
 American Philanthropic Foundations and Economic History in the 
mid 20th century 
 
 
1. How much was that? 
Throughout the preceding chapters the reader has learned about 
numerous grants awarded to economic historians in the U.S. and France; from 
the 1929 Price History grant to Kuznets and Abramovitz’s 1963 post-war growth 
grant; from Perroux’s ISEA grants to Braudel’s $1million for the Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme. As the foundation records only contain nominal values (the 
actual dollar amounts received, with no discussion of cost of living, cost of 
research, inflation etc.) the figures are not easily comparable. The general 
purpose of this interlude is to help readers understand the relative value of each 
grant, provide benchmarks to compare these amounts across time and place and 
get a sense of the buying power they represented. It also provides an overview of 
the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations’ participation on the American and 
international scene and a measure of their influence in immediate pre and post-
WWII social science research. How much did these foundations give? What 
percentage went to social sciences? How big were the economic history outlays? 
What could scholars buy with these grants? What did a successful initiative in 
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economic history cost? Was there any clear correlation between this success and 
the size of the grant? 
2. American foundations’ total endowment, annual expenditure and share 
spent on social science: 1930-1960. 
WWII marked a watershed for social science research in most developed 
nations (including the Soviet Union), resulting, among other things, in a general 
increase in resources available for research in economics, anthropology, political 
science, statistics, psychology and practically every other science of “man”.1 In 
the U.S., the military, and then the federal government (by way of the National 
Science Foundation - NSF) recognized the importance of financing academia thus 
fundamentally altering the rules and mechanisms of research in economics.2  
However, the arrival of such mighty sponsors did not crowd out a much older 
tradition of philanthropic commitment to scientific research. For mid 20th century 
economist-historians for example, the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and Ford 
Foundation (FF) were the main providers of financing, until Robert Fogel and 
Stanley Engermann set a new precedent in the late 1960s by obtaining NSF 
support for their work on slavery.3  
The RF was established in the early 20th century and began sponsoring 
social sciences in 1923, though the official Division of Social Sciences was only 
created in 1929.4 The FF was created in 1936, but only became a national and 
international foundation in 1950.  Thereafter economics was mostly confined to 
the Economic Development and Administration division (EDA) created in 1952. 
Yet, one should note that social science initiatives (including economics) were 
also considered in other divisions, like Education and International Affairs, so 
that EDA’s budget is best interpreted as the minimum available to social science 
                                                     
1 Goodwin (1998). 
2 Mirowski (2002). 
3 Engerman and Fogel (1974). 
4 Grossman (1982). 
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in any given year.  Charts 1 and 2 show the evolution of total endowment, 
annual expenditure, and share for social sciences for both foundations, from the 
date of their creation to the 1960s. In charts 1.B, 2.A and 2.B, the thicker lines are 
built from 2003 adjusted dollars – thus permitting a consistent comparison across 
time and foundation.  
Chart 1.A gives an overview of the evolution of RF total endowment from 
1921 to 2001; the darker curve shows the steady increase in nominal amounts, 
with a more noticeable increase after WWII and a real jump starting in the 1980s. 
The light curve -real figures - is more messy, showing peaks and troughs 
throughout the pre war and WWII period and a very large increase in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the highest point was reached in 1966, when the RF had an 
endowment of 5 billion dollars (in 2003 terms, which corresponded to less than a 
billion in 1966 values). 
 
Chart 1.A: RF total endowment 1921-20015 
 
                                                     
5 Source: 
http://www.rockfound.org/display.asp?context=2&Collection=9&SectionTypeId=13&
Preview=0&ARCurrent=1 
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Chart 1.B: RF total and social science expenditure, 1929-19606 
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The lines on chart 1.B follow two different scales; the thick lines – 2003 
values - are measured on the left side axis, while the thinner dotted lines are 
measured on the right side axis. The 2003 curves help show a more considerable 
variation in expenditure than is apparent if one only looks at the current price 
lines. For example we see that the amount of money available for social science 
decreased considerably in the late 1930s (as did the total expenditure) and 
remained steady until 1960 (whereas total expenditure increased after WWII). In 
general, the cut in social science expenditure was more than proportional. 
Indeed, in the first decade of operations, the Social Science Division spent on 
average 18% of total RF expenditure, while in the following decades, the average 
was 12% (1940s) and 14% (1950s). This is consistent with chapter 3 and the 
diagnosis that social sciences were in a crisis, or on a lifeline at RF when Willits 
began his directorship in 1939.  Note that, on average, during this 1929-1960 
                                                     
6 Sources for this chart come from RF Annual Reports, available at the Rockefeller 
Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. The 2003 adjusted figures were obtained by 
using a share of GDP index, available at http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare/. The share 
of GDP index was preferred to a consumer goods indicator in order to give readers a 
sense of the size of these amounts as related to the economy at large – and to account for 
drastic movements in annual GDP variations in the mid 20th century. This choice is 
particularly relevant for endowment figures, as investment portfolios – made up of 
equity on stock markets - were likely to vary with nominal GDP.  
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period, the Social Science Division had a  $194 million annual budget (in 2003 
adjusted dollars), but that the last decade’s average annual spending was down 
to $93 million.  This was the size of the RF “pot” that economist-historians could 
have aspired to. Let’s now compare it to FF “pot” – to see if it was considerably 
larger for mid 20th century economists, as much literature on the size of the FF 
endowment would lead us to expect.   
As can be gleaned from chart 2.A, the FF’s endowment was indeed very 
large. In 2003 terms, when the FF appeared on the scene (early 1950s) it had an 
endowment of  $8 billion, by 1960 this figure had climbed to $33 billion. 
Compare this to RF’s evolution from $2.3 to less than $4 billion in this same 
period, and you get a sense of the potential watershed for academic research 
induced by the FF’s creation!   
 
Chart 2.A: FF total endowment 1951-19667 
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7 Sources for this chart come from FF Annual Reports, all available online at 
http://www.fordfound.org/elibrary/search/browse-year.cfm. The 2003 adjusted 
figures were computed at http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare/, using the share of GDP 
index. 
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Chart 2.B : FF total and social science expenditure, 1950-19668 
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 Here again, on chart 2.B thick lines have their scale on the left and the thin 
line’s values should be read on the right.  The EDA budget (minimum available 
to social scientists) was quite small compared to annual expenditure, and it 
averaged 6.5% of total expenditure during the 1950-55 period and 5.5% during 
the 1956-1960 period. This corresponded to $456 million  (2003 dollars) in the first 
5-year period (averaging $91 million per year) and $1.4 billion in the second 5-
year period (averaging $280 million per year).  This was indeed much larger than 
the RF’s expenditure. However, while economist-historians may have had access, 
in principle, to a much larger pot, the reality was quite different – if anything, the 
RF earlier period was comparatively richer for American economists interested 
in history.  
 
                                                     
8 Sources for this chart come from FF Annual Reports, all available online at 
http://www.fordfound.org/elibrary/search/browse-year.cfm. The 2003 adjusted 
figures were computed at http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare/, using the share of GDP 
index. 
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3. Grants to economist history 
Table 1.A : RF grants to economist history initiatives (nominal) 
Start  End Date Name Description Nominal $ 
1929 1933 International Price 
History Committee 
Cover labor and expenses 
of individual scholars in 
10 countries working on 
collecting worldwide 
historical price data 
250,000  for 5 
years 
(50,000/year) 
1933 One time 
payment 
Ibid. Emergency grant to cover 
Committee’s debts 
75,000 
1941 5 years, 
lasted 10 
years 
(1950) 
Committee on 
Research in 
Economic History 
(CREH) 
Research grant 300,000 (1st 
installment was 
60,000) 
 
1950 One time 
payment 
Ibid Interim grant to enable 
CREH to find other 
sources of funding 
10,000 
1952 1957 Harvard Research 
Center for 
Entrepreneurial 
History  
Grant to aid in setting up 
and running center + 
research 
150,000 for 5 
years 
(30,000/year) 
 
1952-
58 
1952-58 Ibid Total amount of money 
received from RF 
(including above grant) 
219,000 
Late 
40s- 
early 
50s 
Late 40s- 
early 50s 
Kuznets’ SSRC 
Committee for 
Growth studies 
Money to pay for 
international retrospective 
accounts and Kuznets’ 
time 
70,000 (over 
several 
appropriations) 
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Table 1.B : RF grants to economist history initiatives (2003 dollars) 9 
Start  End Date Name 2003 $10 
1929 1933 International Price History 
Committee 
3 million 
1933 One time 
payment 
Ibid. 1 million 
1941 lasted 10 yrs  CREH 2.8 million 
1950 One time payt. Ibid 76,400 
1952 1958 Harvard Center for 
Entrepreneurial History 
1.5 million (several 
grants) 
Late 
40s 
Early 50s Kuznets’ SSRC Committee for 
Growth studies 
535,000 (over 
several 
appropriations) 
 
Overall, RF gave approximately $9.5 million (in 2003 terms) to American 
economist-historians.  This was a very large figure compared to the FF’s grants. 
As shown in table 2.B the FF gave $5.6 million (in 2003 terms), a smaller amount 
both in absolute and relative terms. This divergence may be interpreted in light 
of the analysis presented in chapter 3 – there seems to have been an element of 
“agency capture” in the early years of American economist-history, and the 
noticeable support that RF gave Edwin Gay and his students is certainly not 
unrelated to their personal ties and connections to Willits and Bezanson.  No 
economist-historian had similar clout inside the Ford Foundation. 
                                                     
9 To put these amounts in comparable terms, I use a price deflator. This is appropriate 
since we want to think in terms of salaries (as most research costs seemed to be research 
wages) – and salaries changed with inflation. Though CPI indices can be misleading 
when comparing over long periods of time, our earliest and latest grants are separated 
by less than 4 decades, which is perhaps not too distant for these calculations. The eh.net 
website describes the CPI benchmark, as “most often used to make comparisons (…) 
This series tries to compare the cost of things the average household buys such as food, 
housing, transportation, medical services, etc. (…) It can be interpreted as how much 
money would you need today to buy an item in the year in question if it had changed in 
price the same as the average price change.” 
10 To obtain this figure I took the total grant amount and converted it in 2003 terms, 
using the mid year of actual grant length (so if grant lasted from 29 to 33, I took 1931 as 
the reference year); conversions were done at http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare/ 
using CPI index.  
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Table 2.A: FF grants to economist history initiatives 
Start  End Date Name Description Nominal $ 
1953 ? Kuznets’ SSRC 
Committee for 
Growth studies 
To improve and expand 
research on long term 
changes in the size and 
structure of nations 
32,200 
1953 1965 Ibid For international 
retrospective accounts 
and Kuznets’ time; 
several appropriations 
(including above) 
Nearly 
370,000 
1954 1959 Kuznets – Johns 
Hopkins 
To support a critical 
review of the literature 
and statistics on the 
comparative economic 
growth of nations 
60,000 
(12,000/year) 
1963 1966, but 
extended 
to late 60s 
SSRC Committee 
for Growth studies 
International study of 
post-war growth, with 
Moses Abramovitz 
300,000  
(they planned 
it to cost 
100,000/year) 
1958 1963 Parker/Sawyer: 
Interuniversity 
grant 
For research of scholars 
in 4 universities (Parker, 
Sawyer, Abramovitz 
and Robertson) 
125,000  
(25,000/year) 
1958 lasted until 
1970 
Gerschenkron 
workshop 
Training graduate 
students 
75,000  
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Table 2.B: FF grants to economist history initiatives (2003 dollars) 
Start  End Date Name 2003 $ 
1953 1965 Kuznets’ SSRC 
Committee for 
Growth studies 
Nearly 2.3 million 
1954 1959 Kuznets – Johns 
Hopkins 
400,000 
(81,000/year) 
1963 1966, but 
extended to 
late 60s 
SSRC Committee 
for Growth 
studies (post war 
growth study) 
1.7 million 
1958 1963 Parker/Sawyer: 
Interuniversity 
grant 
780,000 
1958 1963, but 
lasted to 
1970 
Gerschenkron 
workshop 
440,000 
 
There are no obvious patterns that emerge from this constellation of 
grants (and certainly no increase in resources available to economist-historians as 
a result of the FF’s appearance in the early 1950s) – both RF and FF awarded a 
relatively wide range of financing packages, varying in size and duration, and 
greater amounts of money did not necessarily mean greater amounts of actual 
support (as the value depended on the number of researchers involved, and the 
projected length of the project). Yet, one can see that the largest grants were 
Edwin Gay’s International History of Prices (which was budgeted at 
$600,000/annum but ended up costing $800,000/annum, in 2003 terms); the 
CREH (budgeted at $560,000/annum, but ended up lasting longer and costing 
approximately $350,000 per year); and the numerous grants for Simon Kuznets’ 
retrospective accounts initiatives (financed via the SSRC), which seemed to have 
cost about $175,000/year. Recall from chapter 4 that Kuznets’ work was rather 
cheap, considering the number of people and places it involved, and compared 
to previous economist-history initiatives.  
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 It is difficult to evaluate the relative size and value of these grants without 
a more substantive benchmark: indeed, different grants were supposed to cover 
different numbers of scholars, and it may well be that the larger grants simply 
paid for more people. In addition, once one went beyond models where 
researchers worked alone, or with small amounts of coordination, it may well be 
that communication costs (institutions, means of sharing, travel etc.) greatly 
increased overall costs – so a rough measure of overhead may be useful to 
compare these grants. 
 
4. Benchmark 1: How much did it cost to hire a junior researcher?  
In 1954, Kuznets applied to the FF for a grant to cover his annual expenses 
associated with his work on comparative quantitative growth. He asked for 
$5,000 per year (1954 dollars) for his main assistant (Lilian Epstein who had been 
helping him with his statistics for 20 years) and  $4000 for a junior researcher 
(student or new Ph.D. with a small allowance for travel). In 2003 terms, he was 
asking for $34,000 for Epstein, and $27,000 for the Ph.D and travel allowance (i.e 
the Ph.D salary was lower than this figure). Compare this to a request from 
Arthur Cole, who in 1950 asked for $16,000 to aid 6 Ph.D. students in their final 
year. If divided equally, this would have amounted to $2600 per year, which 
corresponds to $20,000 in 2003 terms. Finally, compare it to the fellowships 
awarded by Gerschenkron at his Harvard Workshop – all students were given 
$3500 per year (which if you take 1963 as the mid-period benchmark year 
corresponds to $21,000). In other words, it seems that Ph.D. labor cost no more 
than $27,000 per year and was probably lower, around $21,000.11 
 
                                                     
11Letter from Lowell J. Reed, president of Johns Hopkins University, to T.H. Carroll, 
September 16th 1954, FF - PA 55-28; Letter from Alexander Gerschenkron to Neil W. 
Chamberlain, January 3rd 1958, FF - PA 59-26; Letter from Alexander Gerschenkron to 
Joseph McDaniel , May 10th 1963, FF - PA 59-26; Letter from Arthur Cole to William 
Pew, undated, but filed in 1950, RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 397, Folder 4709.  
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COST OF JUNIOR RESEARCH LABOR in 1950-1965 period in U.S.: 
$21,000/annum (2003 dollars) 
 
5. Benchmark 2: How much did it cost to coordinate more than one 
researcher? 
In the same 1954 proposal, Kuznets estimated the total cost of research 
(excluding his salary, but including his assistants) to be $12,000 per year – i.e., if 
you subtract $9000 already mentioned above for Epstein and the Ph.D student, 
he added $3000/year for typing, printing, publishing, correspondence etc. In 
2003 terms, this overhead amounts to $20,000. Compare this to Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s proposal for the Harvard workshop – whose expenses he 
estimated at $20,000 per year, $5000 of which represented publication subsidies, 
university overhead and general secretarial assistance. Using 1963 as the mid-
period benchmark year, we obtain the workshop expenses at $30,000, in 2003 
terms. Gerschenkron obtained this figure by assuming an average of 3.5 students 
per year – so it would seem that Kuznets and Gerschenkron’s estimates were 
consistent: Kuznets needed $20,000 to coordinate the work of 3 people (himself, 
Epstein and junior researcher); while Gerschenkron needed $30,000 to run a 
center with 4.5 people (including himself) – i.e they both budgeted $6600 per 
person.  
COST OF CENTER WITH MORE THAN ONE PERSON – BUT LESS THAN 10  
and MINIMAL OVERHEAD EXCLUDING SALARIES in 1950-1965 period in 
U.S. : $6,000/annum/person (2003 dollars) 
 
COST PER RESEARCHER OF COORDINATED RESEARCH, INCLUDING 
SALARIES OF JUNIOR RESEARCHERS: $6,000+ [$21,000-$27,000]= [$27,000-
$33,000]/annum/person (2003 dollars) 
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Given these benchmarks, the CREH could have hired 13 researchers per 
year (over 10 years), or twice as many if they had chosen to spend all the money 
in the first 5 years, as the grant originally called for (as seen in Table 1.B they 
spent $ 3.6 million in 10 years, in 2003 terms). This is exactly what the CREH did 
– in a 1946 report to the RF (normally their end of grant report, but actually a 
request to extend remaining funds for an additional 5 years) they mentioned 
having “26 young social scientists” at work and had spent half their funds.12  
Based on these benchmarks, the Price History project could have hired 
and coordinated 30 junior researchers for 5 years. They actually employed nearly 
20 researchers, though it is unclear whether all were given salaries from the RF 
money. In case they spent all the money that had originally been earmarked for 
them, and had to ask for an emergency grant because they had incurred 
noticeable debt!  Could it be that their large scale, empirical project may have 
cost more per researcher? A useful benchmark for estimating the cost of such 
projects is the NBER. 
                                                     
12 Exploring America’s economic contribution, May 1945, RAC-RF, RG 1.1, Series 200, 
Box 397, Folder 4705. These are very rough calculations and we don’t know if they 
employed the 26 scholars throughout the entire 5-year period; however figures are 
consistent with a research project whose main expense was young scholar research 
labor. 
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6. Benchmark 3: How much did it cost to run the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER)? 
Chart 3: Expenditure at the NBER  (1920-1965) – in 2003 terms13 
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The first observation to draw from this chart is the gradual increase of 
NBER expenses - aside from a temporary contraction during the depression- 
reflecting large needs of the extensive empirical inquiry into business cycles 
(though lack of organization and financial laxity of the first directors – Mitchell, 
Burns and Fabricant – has also been blamed).14 The steep ascent after 1960 may 
                                                     
13 Source: expenditure (and income) data can be found, for a selection of years, in 
Rutherford (2004); the number of research staff at the NBER was taken from the 
quarterly bulletins, published by the NBER since 1922. I only had access to 1922-1940 
bulletins on the web http://www.nber.org/newsbulletin/. Both series have been 
adjusted to reflect 2003-equivalent dollar values, using a CPI index– the conversion was 
made at http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare/. 
14 For an account of the NBER’s financial difficulties, see Rutherford (2005). 
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reflect the increasing cost of hiring qualified labor, as academic and government 
salaries were increasing.15 
The second observation pertains to the relatively stable cost per research 
staff – in the period 1920-1940 it averaged $200,000. 16  Note that this amount 
does not reflect actual salaries – but rather total NBER expenditures divided by 
the number of scholars who worked there full time, and were authors of the 
NBER publications (i.e. presumably including their salaries and overhead costs 
such as support staff, offices, printing services etc.). This is much higher than the 
estimated $27,000 -$33,000 per young researcher in the Gerschenkron, Kuznets 
examples.  It is quite likely that NBER researchers were earning a better income 
than young scholars, however it is difficult to establish how much more they 
earned. As an indication, in the 1930s, most senior economists who taught at 
“very good schools” made around $12,000/annum (which translates to $150,000 
in 2003 terms, i.e. 7 or 8 times more than the Ph.D stipend).17 When George 
Stigler was appointed to the Walgreen Chair at the University of Chicago in 1958 
(a Business School chair), his salary was $25,000 (which translates to $160,000 in 
2003 terms) – though he mentioned in his autobiography that this salary was the 
“talk of the economics profession”.18 Hence if we take $160,000 as the highest 
possible salary for top quality researchers, the NBER still spent $40,000 per 
annum on additional costs per capita, nearly ten times as much as either Kuznets 
or Gerschenkron had budgeted (and this is a minimum estimate).  
 
                                                     
15 Fabricant made note of this in the mid 1960s, see Ibid. 
16 This is consistent with anecdotal evidence of NBER costs; for example, in 1937 Wesley 
Mitchell applied to the RF for funds to cover 6 projects (the work of 5 men) and asked 
for $75,000 a year – he thus anticipated costs to be at least $15,000 per man – in 2003 
terms, this amounts to $200,000 per person. 
17 This figure was drawn from Malcolm Rutherford’s research on Institutionalism in the 
Interwar period.  
18 Stigler (1988), 157. 
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COST OF A LARGE COORDINATED EMPIRICAL INITIATIVE INCLUDING 
SALARIES – in the 1930-1950 period in U.S. : $200,000/annum/person (2003 
dollars) 
 
Using these more generous estimates of salaries and costs per researcher 
in large measurement projects, one can get a new perspective on the expenses of 
the Price Project.  If their costs were at all comparable to the NBER (which is a 
difficult claim to make as the Price Project did not have the real–estate expenses 
incurred by the NBER, so it’s better to think of this figure as an upper bound), 
with $4 million, Gay and Beveridge could have hired at least 4 senior researchers 
for the entire 5 year empirical project (and support them with secretarial, 
publication, research assistance resources). This is a meaningful figure because it 
gives an indication of the real source of cost: data collection. The Price project 
was discontinued in 1933, as it had proved unable to control costs, and scholars 
were spending much more time accumulating data in archives than had 
originally been expected.19 As the much longer experience of the NBER seemed 
to have proven, this was relatively standard in quantitative data collection 
projects. And as Malcolm Rutherford has argued, the patience and reiterated 
commitment of the RF was not to be discounted in explaining the achievements 
of the NBER, as these were quite slow in coming. In retrospect, the Price Project 
seems to have been of the same nature as many NBER projects, and its early 
discontinuation (compared to all other NBER projects, most notably Mitchell’s 
business cycle work) may have nipped it in the bud. But one may also wish to 
compare it to the NBER on a more social and contextual level – it was a grant 
typical of the 1920s, an epoch characterized by many as the crest of enthusiasm 
for empirical work in the social sciences, and a relatively new and sizeable 
commitment from foundations to sponsor research of this sort.20  
                                                     
19 Rutherford (2003). 
20 See for example Rutherford (2005). 
Interlude: How much was that? 
 341
In other words, for certain empirical initiatives (in particular large scale, 
not necessarily international, but involving data collection, compilation and 
presentation from more than one source) money was important, but time 
commitment was equally, if not more crucial. Such projects gained substance and 
credibility after several years, and were often the product of a few scholars rather 
than armies of data collectors. Their work seemed to require more than the 
habitual 5-year moratorium offered by practically every foundation grant. A 
comparison between the short lived Price Project, and the much longer lived 
NBER and SSRC Quantitative Growth projects highlights this point.  
A comparison between the cost of running the NBER and Kuznets’ 
projects highlights a more historical point. Compared to Mitchell’s endeavor, 
Kuznets’ project seemed incredibly cheap, in spite of the fact that it involved, at 
some time or another, dozens of scholars in many different countries (as we saw 
in chapter 4.) These studies lay the foundations for the work that earned Kuznets 
the 1971 Nobel Memorial Prize. The striking difference between Kuznets and 
Mitchell’s research empires was the infrastructure that Kuznets was able to 
leverage: many of his collaborators had appointments in existing statistical 
institutes (Malinvaud at l’INSEE for example), and in the American case, the data 
had already been, and was continuing to be collected by the NBER. In other 
words, Kuznets’ research may have cost less to the FF, but it was building off of a 
radical change in the economics landscape brought about by WWII – the rapid 
expansion of national income rationales, and official (national or international) 
statistical institutes.  
 
7. France: what could $10, 000/ year and $ 1million buy? 
In chapter 5 we read about several different grants from American 
foundations to social science research in France – a sample of these is listed in 
Table 3.  
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Table 3: Sample of RF and FF grants in France  
Starts End Name Description Amount 
(current $) 
1947 3 
years 
RF 
VI e section 
To help establish the 6eme 
section – according to Mazon 
it was only enough to cover 
1/4th of the 6eme section’s 
operating expenses in this 
period. 
30,000 or 
10,000/year 
1952 2 
years 
RF   
VI e section 
Renewal of previous grant 
under guarantees that no 
money would be used for 
operating expenses  
13,500 or 
7,750/year 
1949 N/a RF 
ISEA 
The RF awarded several 
grants, which amounted to the 
following average figure 
10,000- to 
15,000 /year 
1959 N/a FF -MSH To help build and run an 
interdisciplinary social science 
unit + library; the French 
government matched this 
grant with $2 million 
$1,000,000  
1955 
or 
1958? 
6 
years 
FF - ISEA Research and operations grant 50,000 or 8, 
200/year 
 
Aside from the exceptionally large MSH appropriation, these grants all averaged 
to $8-15,000 per year. What buying power did this represent on the French 
academic labor market in the early and late 1950s? 
In Table 4, we see the French Franc equivalent of $10,000 a year in the 
early and late 1950s 
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Table 4: Franc equivalents to dollar grants, 1950, 195921 
 1950 1959 
$10,000 3.5 million Francs 4,9 million Francs 
$1,000,000  491 million Francs 
 
In Table 5 we see the cost of academic labor in France: 
 
Table 5: Salaries for professors, research unit directors and secretaries at the 
College de France and the VI e Section in the 1950s22 
 College de France 
Annual salary and (number 
of positions) 
VI e Section: annual salary 
and (number of positions) 
 1950 1959 1950 1959 
Senior 
Professor 
1.1 Million  
(12) 
2.8 Million  
(47) 
N/a N/a 
Sous-
Directeur de 
Laboratoire 
1 Million 
(30) 
 
(12) 
N/a N/a 
Directeur  N/a N/a 805,000 
(2) 
1.9 Million 
(31) 
Secretary 235,000 to 
470,000  
(3) 
  436,000 
(2) 
 
In other words, when l’ISEA or the VI e Section received $10,000 in 1950, 
that was the equivalent of three times the annual salary of a senior professor (like 
Perroux or Febvre who were both professors at the College de France). By 1959, 
this was only equivalent to twice their salaries. Compared to Stigler’s American 
salary in 1958, a French professor at the College de France was paid 4 times less. 
                                                     
21 Using an exchange rate calculator at http://www.eh.net/hmit/exchangerates/ where 
we find that $1U.S. bought 350 old French Francs in 1950, and 491 in 1959. The exchange 
rate was stable from 1950 to 1956, and the French Franc began losing value after 1956. 
22 All figures from from Education Nationale (1950), Budget Voté de 1950, Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, chapitre 31.14; Education Nationale (1959), Budget Voté de 1959, 
Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, chapitre 31.14. Available at Archives du Ministère de 
l’Education Nationale, 101 rue de Grenelle, 75007, Paris.  
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As for the FF’s gift of $1 million in 1959 (491 million French Francs) it was 
equivalent to 1/1000th of the French Ministry of Education’s annual budget in 
1959 (which covered all education in France, from kindergarten to higher 
education, including vocational training), but it was also five times the amount 
paid in salaries to all staff of the VI e Section (full time directors, part time 
directors, research students, secretaries and even concierges and errand boys). 
Indeed in 1959, the French ministry of Education had a budget of 481 billon 
French Francs, and the VI e Section spent 93 million French Francs on salaries. In 
other words, the money these foundations gave either to Perroux or to Braudel 
gave them considerable buying power on the academic scene. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM THE PAST ? 
 
 
 
1. A perennial debate on the nature of reliable evidence  
Why did mid 20th century American economists show such an interest for 
historical investigation and how did the cliometric revolution change the way 
they wrote history? Chapter 2 suggested that both the commitment to history, 
and debates around cliometrics were related to ongoing questions about 
empiricism in economics. Most economic historians both in France and the U.S 
believed that the only scientific path to economic knowledge was the observation 
of long-term phenomena – i.e. history (recall Figure 2.3 depicted economic 
history on the left side of the economic space). They may have contrasted this 
choice with abstract and speculative modes of reasoning (on the right side), but 
as Figure 2.3 aimed to show, this was more a matter of speech and rhetoric than a 
representation of the actual spectrum of positions in the debate over scientificity. 
As the circular figure suggested, there never was a dichotomy between 
deductivists and inductivists but rather, as Alexander Gerschenkron told the 
Ford Foundation in 1956 “a whole spectrum of levels of abstraction” (see chapter 
6).  
By thinking in terms of “spectrum” rather than dichotomy, this thesis has 
uncovered one of the main theatres of debate among economic historians. In the 
1940s, 50s and 60s, the issue was not whether observation should come before or 
after theory (as we would expect in a dichotomous world), but rather it revolved 
around diverging notions of reliable evidence. From the 1940 Rockefeller 
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Foundation round-table meeting to the mid 1960s railroad debates, scholars 
disagreed about the nature of trustworthy and useful “facts”. What information 
could or should the economic historian use in his empirical quest about past 
events? This was not the first or only instance when economists debated such 
questions (for example 18th century political arthimetists – the ancestors of 
national accountants – had triggered similar controversies) but the mid 20th 
century, in particular in America, does stand out as a moment of unusual 
recurrence in these questions.  
  This thesis began with a disagreement between the CREH economist-
historians (Edwin Gay and his students) and Kuznets. As we progressed through 
Kuznets’ battles with Rostow, Marczewski’s run-ins with Chaunu, and Fogel’s 
disputes with Chandler we saw emerge a division between observers who were 
willing to put estimates in their bag of evidence, and those who were not. For the 
participants, this was never a trivial issue, and the fact that they agreed on the 
big picture (that economics should involve a large investment in empirical 
investigation, in particular of long term phenomena) only seemed to make the 
debates more critical and virulent. In other words, debates raged across sides of 
Figure 2.3, but also within the left side. Thus, there is a case for moving from a 
Figure 2.3 picture of the perennial debate on empiricism, to the following view – 
which essentially is a “zoom” onto the left side of Figure 2.3. 
In Figure 8.1 the main line of division is North/South – with “estimators” 
like Marczewski and the cliometricians on the North side of economic history, 
and those who relied on found data (in archives or almanacs), like Simiand or the 
international price project historians on the South side. Notice that this cleavage 
has nothing to do with qualitative versus quantitative data (represented on an 
east/west divide) – and this should dispel any view that retrospective accounts 
or cliometrics were innovative because they introduced quantification into 
economic history. Gay and Beveridge’s price history project, Simiand’s history of 
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wages, and Labrousse’s quantitative studies of agricultural prices are a reminder 
that economic history was already quantitative in the early 20th century. 
As we saw in chapters 4, 5 and 7, the issue was not whether or not to quantify, 
but rather deciding which numbers were reliable, or better than others. 
Also notice that the North/South division does not overlap with 
theoretical versus empirical investigation (i.e. the inductive/deductive 
dichotomy). On both hemispheres you find researchers who expected to have 
nature speak to them – for example Kuznets or the price historians - just as you 
find those who wanted to make nature speak – for example Gerschenkron who 
adopted the view that all human behavior could be explained with elementary 
economic principles, Rostow who fit evidence into his stages theory, Marczewski 
who fit French economic history into a Keynesian mold or Cole who fit American 
history into an evolutionary view of the entrepreneurial system. 
This is the meaning of the triangles that break into the economic history space:  
for example, Cole used sociological theory to make American history speak 
about entrepreneurial systems. This should dispel any views that cliometricians 
brought “theory” (in the sense of a body of general principles about individual 
and collective behavior) to economic history – as Lamoreaux pointed out in her 
brief history of the cliometric revolution, many of the so-called “old” economic 
historians were scholars with theories of their own, just not the same theories as 
cliometricians. 
 In other words, Figure 8.1 is both a zoom and a fractal of Figure 2.3. It is a 
zoom as we are looking at economic history only (including economist – history) 
- not economics at large - and using this space to show debates on the left side of 
the spectrum (the empirical side). It is a fractal on two counts. First in the literal 
sense of a fractal: reproducing at a smaller scale patterns that exist at a larger 
scale. 
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Figure 8.1: Perennial debates on the nature of reliable evidence in economic 
history 
 
 
As mentioned above, we find a range of methodological positions extending 
from full empiricism (NBER-like hopes that the data will speak for themselves) 
to abstract speculation (recall from chapter 3 the British graduate student who 
told RF officers that the RCEntrepH did nothing but speculate about the 
relationship between entrepreneurial optimism and growth). However these 
extremes are not depicted on a West-East dimension as they were in Figure 2.3. 
The point is rather that questions of reliable evidence overlapped with more 
general issues of scientific method such as the proper origin of theory (should it 
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spring from the evidence as Mitchell hoped, or should it come from logical bases 
as Solow maintained?).  
Secondly, Figure 8.1 is a fractal of Figure 2.3 because it shows that notions 
of reliable evidence also exist on a spectrum, and not in a dichotomous space.  In 
other words there are different types of estimations, just as there are different 
types of “found” data. For mid 20th century economic historians there was no 
clear divide between found and estimated data, rather a constellation of each. For 
example, while many American economic historians seemed willing to accept 
Kuznetsian estimates, they were very critical of “back of the envelope” estimates 
(recall Gallman’s negative impression of Conrad and Meyer’s 1957 slavery 
paper). This may have been linked to the uneasiness of conflating the world as it 
was with the world as it should be (the trademark of an OR mind), yet 
participants tended not to express their doubts in these terms, preferring to say 
that this was sloppy data collection. The fact that they could see nuances among 
estimates warns us against fitting all scholars into one of two categories (finders 
and estimators) though there clearly were some scholars who rejected estimation 
outright (like Burns, for example, who found Kuznets’ data habits mercenary!). 
Nuances also existed among finders. In France, when Vilar cited Simiand 
to remind Marczewski that the best guarantee of data quality was the process by 
which it had been recorded: the more automatic the process and the least 
vulnerable to the choices of any man, the better the resulting data. Thus accounts 
from a large business with standardized procedures, parish records or tax 
receipts were reliable sources, provided the historian had a clear view of the 
collection process. “Old” American economic historians seemed to share this 
view, and this was a reason why numbers were often privileged (recall that Gay 
had written a quantitative thesis on enclosures, and that Usher had sung the 
praise of quantification in the 1930s). These considerations often surfaced in the 
study of slavery, where American economic historians did not await 
cliometricians to argue that there was difference between numbers (accounts 
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from a plantation, prices, interest rates, balance of trade) and autobiographical 
accounts from plantation owners, even though both were technically “found”. 
The progress from Figure 2.3 to Figure 8.1 constitutes this thesis’ main 
contribution. It helps us move our understanding of economic methodological 
debates away from clear dichotomies like induction versus deduction, or the 
choice of quantitative versus qualitative procedures. Concretely, the issue of 
whether or not estimated data could serve as reliable, useful evidence was a 
matter of much debate among economic historians, and continues to divide 
them. 
 
2. Diverging outcomes in France and the U.S. 
Whether this concentration of debates on reliable evidence was the cause 
or the consequence of economists’ mid 20th century interest in history is a moot 
point, as the comparison between France and the U.S. revealed.  On the one hand 
there were clear instances when economists’ interest in history was triggered by 
questions that had nothing to do with such epistemological musings – such as for 
example, Jacques Mayer’s Marxist impulse to “test” the law of the falling rate of 
profit. On the other hand, there were times when epistemological questions 
about the proper place and nature of evidence did push economists into 
becoming economic historians – this was Simon Kuznets’ path. The more 
important point is that once economists had opened the economic history box – 
by creating associations, committees, journals and drawing the attention of 
foundations – the debates seemed to take a life of their own. In other words, once 
there were numerous economists competing for economic history (as we saw in 
chapter 6), debates on legitimate evidence were bound to resurface.  
Given the very different outcomes of these debates on reliable evidence in 
France and the U.S. the reader will wonder about the factors that made 
retrospective accounting and cliometrics possible on American soil, while French 
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economic historians shunned both. The reader must first recognize the 
legitimacy of each position – the fact that debates about reliable evidence were 
recurrent and resulted in different outcomes at different times and places is an 
indication that “each side had a point”. The reader may want to ask herself about 
the conditions that make estimates, rough or not, different from data lying in old 
account books. Are they both constructs, and thus equally shaped by their 
“manufacturing conditions”? Is reliability based on consistency (data cross 
checks) in any way superior to confidence based on critical source examination 
and triangulation (recall chapter 5)? These are not simple questions and the rich 
history of objectivity and quantification now available to the 21st century reader 
suggests that the social sciences have been through more than one 
transformation in their notions of objectivity and that the current situation in 
economist-history (i.e. cliometrics) that accepts estimation as a necessary 
procedure (whose risks can be hedged with sensitivity analysis) may not last 
indefinitely (Kuhn would say this is a defining feature of pre-paradigmatic 
science).1  
 Having acknowledged the epistemological legitimacy of these different 
positions on the nature of reliable evidence, we can now recognize that current 
divisions between historians and economists within economic history were not 
the cause but the result of such debates. Annalistes did not shun estimation 
because they were “historians”. Quite the contrary, they were following the 
methodological precepts of Simiand, who was considered an “economist” in the 
1930s. The fact that Malinvaud, an “economist” and “econometrician” who 
worked on historical accounts with Kuznets and Abramovitz in the 1960s could, 
in a 2004 interview, recall thinking that Simiand’s work was “very strange” is 
evidence of a change in economists’ notion of objectivity.2 This post-war 
                                                   
1 Daston (1992); Porter (1995); Desrosières (2000). 
2 Edmond Malinvaud, Interviewed by Cristel de Rouvray, Paris, January 2004.  
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transformation reconfigured the lines of division between disciplines and 
entailed changes in the meaning of the labels “historian” and “economist”.  
Nevertheless we are still confronted with the task of explaining how and 
why “estimators” took over economic history in the U.S. at the exact time (mid 
1960s) that “finders” in France were blossoming. This brings us to the delicate 
task of tying scientific debates to the social and political world in which they take 
place. Among the external factors considered in previous chapters was a certain 
degree of happenstance. For example the fact that Lane was such good friends 
with Braudel, and that he happened to be the main scout for the Ford Foundation 
in France in the 1950s was a stroke of luck for Braudel and certainly increased his 
chances of getting substantial American funding, thus placing him and his 
acolytes in a much more powerful position than Marczewski and his colleagues. 
Yet this contingency should not obstruct the noticeable impact of both the 
“growth and development” craze in the U.S and American economists’ wartime 
experience. The first contributed to draw more economists into economic history 
and increase their sense of urgency, while the second accounted for much of the 
evolution from Kuznestian to cliometric methods. Neither of these had any 
counterpart in France.   
The demand for “development” knowledge created a clear opportunity 
for American economic historians to appeal to philanthropic sponsors (Kuznets 
was the first to recognize this, but Rostow, Gerschenkron, the RCEntrepH, the 
CREH and Parker/Sawyer all attempted to exploit it in the 1950s). The 
availability of considerable funds made it possible for numerous young scholars 
to enter the field, but it also tied this new generation to the RF and the FF’s 
agenda, in particular their time horizons. In Kuznets and Marczweski’s views 
there was a clear feeling that Ashley’s, Gay’s, Willits’ and the Annalistes’ call for 
research programs that would last decades was unreasonable, as results needed 
to be generated more quickly. This time compression was an element from 
“outside” economic history, and may have been tied to the growing influence of 
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development agencies and other international organizations whose task was to 
aid development in poor countries. But it was not directly imposed onto 
economic historians (though Marczewski and Kuznets may have spoken as if 
they were directly addressing this public concern for helping developing 
nations). Rather it seems to have been mediated through Foundation agents. 
Thus foundation officers played an interesting intermediary role in our narrative: 
neither fully inside nor outside science, they imported shreds of political and 
economic culture into the dynamics of research, and increased economist-
historians’ sense of urgency and pragmatism. They did not have this effect on the 
MSH (though they did have it on l’ISEA and on Marczewski via Kuznets), an 
indication that their influence was directly proportional to their grantees’ degree 
of financial dependence. Note that this is not a point about Foundations’ strong 
agency; the argument is not that the Ford Foundation preferred estimation or 
Gerschenkronian economic history to Chandler or Landes’ approach. Quite the 
contrary, chapters 5 and 6 showed that FF officers were not really equipped to 
see the nuances inside economic history, in particular inside economist-history. 
Instead, the grantees they chose voluntarily adopted the constraints of a 
seemingly more urgent research schedule and this increased their tolerance for 
estimates. 
Foundation agents did not play such a crucial role for the migration from 
retrospective accounts towards cliometrics. Instead we identified American 
economists’ experience during WWII and ensuing post-war ontology as an 
important factor in accounting for the “revolution”. In particular, the willingness 
to think in an operations research mindset - combining a commitment to 
conclusions framed in quantitative terms, the muddling of lines between “the 
world as it is” and the “world as it should be” and the willingness to estimate 
data in a “back of the envelope”, “order of magnitude” sort of way as we saw in 
chapter 7 – was a clear legacy from the war, and had been transmitted to young 
economists in the revamping of graduate education that occurred in the 1950s.  
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From this perspective it comes as no surprise that cliometrics did not 
migrate to France in the 1960s and 1970s (while Annales was still strong). If 
Kuznetsian estimations were a matter of real epistemological debate, if there was 
much less sense of urgency in the economic history community (immune from 
development talk) and if French economic historians were completely isolated 
from an OR culture then the order of magnitude work so crucial to the 
crystallizing moment of cliometrics was not going to stick! Indeed, recall from 
chapter 5 that among all types of estimation Toutain used in 1961, Chaunu had 
identified order of magnitude estimates to be “worse than nothing at all”. As 
neither Kuznetsian nor OR estimates were acceptable to Annalistes, other aspects 
of the cliometric agenda (theoretical modeling, econometric hypothesis testing) 
were ignored in France.  
 
3. Using the past to say something about the present; or using the present 
to say something about the past? 
Chapter 1 began with the observation that the mid 20th century stood out 
as a unique time for American economist-history, compared to earlier and later 
periods. In chapter 3 we discovered that until the 1930s economic history was 
blended into economics as proponents of historical views co-existed with other 
types of economists. This is consistent with a picture of a pluralistic economics in 
the U.S. before WWII, and the emergence of a relatively autonomous field of 
economic history right after the war can be seen as one of the many facets of the 
subsequent transformation. As the discipline became less pluralistic, those who 
felt threatened tried to section off a piece of it for themselves; yet once the 
transformation was completed it’s no surprise that young economists should 
have taken over this space. In other words, the cliometric revolution can be used 
as a point in the time line of 20th century American economics: by the mid 1960s 
the transformation marking the end of pluralism had been sealed. 
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When Cole, Bezanson, and their acolytes (Redlich, Aitken) commented on 
the state of economics and economic history in the 1970s they despaired that 
their efforts to create a separate space for economic history had turned against 
them. In their eyes, cliometrics was not what economists interested in history 
should be doing; in particular they lamented the fact that economic historians 
were no longer digging into the past to say something about long-term 
phenomena and social dynamics.  
The issue of whether or not the past can ever yield lessons about the 
present was conspicuously absent from debates around economic history. The 
Methodenstreit is remembered for having pitted observers against hypothetico-
deductivists, not presentist versus past-minded economists, as if observation of 
the past were the same as observation of the present, only at a larger scale (more 
data). This is certainly how Kuznets justified his interest in history (a long term 
view). Neither Schmoller nor Kuznets had any strong historical stance – i.e. they 
did not ascribe to an evolutionary or stagist view of economic dynamics. Rostow 
and Arthur Cole may have leaned more in this direction, believing that societies 
could only be understood in the context of where they came from and where 
they were going, yet they were seldom challenged on the historical nature of 
their theories, the focus of the debate lying instead around the validity of their 
empirics.3  In the 1950s and 60s, economist-historians did not really have a 
consensus position on why the past had something to do with the present.  
 To a certain extent the cliometric revolution put a temporary hold on the 
necessity to confront this question. Indeed by replacing a “history is good for 
economics” with the “economics is good for history” view, they buried the claim 
that the past had something to say about the present, and instead suggested that 
the present had something to say about the past. This is one of the definitions of 
                                                   
3 In economist history, the crucial debate on historicity – on whether societies function 
according to mechanic or time-sensitive principles - would become a standard feature of 
the literature much later, largely thanks to Paul David’s work on path dependence in the 
mid 1980s- David (1985). 
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“Whig history”: starting from the present and looking back for pieces of the past 
that are similar or seem to have led to the present situation. This is not an 
unreasonable method (though it has its limitations). Indeed, if one considers that 
contemporary economic theory is the product of past ideas and events, we are 
very likely to find instances where grain markets, central banks and insurers did 
function according to what we recognize as modern day theoretical principles. 
But as all Whig histories it has the double handicap of ignoring events that did 
not make it to the contemporary world, and not inquiring into the factors that 
made the survival of one way of thinking, or one way of transacting more likely 
than the others. 
 While there may have been fundamental differences between old 
economic historians’ and cliometricians’ agenda, the cliometric interlude appears 
to have been more beneficial (to the old agenda) than Cole, Willits and Bezanson 
could glean from their late 1970s vantage point. For one thing, the cliometric 
movement temporarily increased the number of professorships in economic 
history within economics departments. For another, it’s leading practitioners 
evolved to a much more blended position in the 1980s. Paul David and Douglass 
North are notable examples of scholars whose started out in cliometrics, but later 
contributed general ideas (path dependence and new institutionalism) that are 
today part of a standard economists’ conceptual toolkit, thus effectively adding 
some historical perspective to many economists’ work. Hence, from a 21st 
century perspective, the story told in these chapters (the mid 20th century peak in 
separate economic history) is a parenthesis in an otherwise blended call for 
historical perspective in economics. It also acts as a reminder that economics is a 
science much more like astronomy, evolutionary biology and geography 
(sciences that study events over time) than one like mechanics.   
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http://www.fordfound.org 
 
Hagley Museum and Library Archives, Wilmington, Delaware: 
http://www.hagley.lib.de.us/manuscripts.html 
Economic History Association Papers 
 
Harvard University Archives, Boston, Massachusetts: 
http://hul.harvard.edu/huarc/ 
Arthur Cole Papers 
Simon Kuznets Papers 
Alexander Gerschenkron Papers 
 
Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York: 
http://archive.rockefeller.edu/ 
Rockefeller Foundation Archives 
SSRC Archives 
Officer profiles 
 
Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina: http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/ 
American Economic Association Papers 
Douglass North Papers 
Earl J. Hamilton Papers 
 
University of Pennsylvania Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/ 
Industrial Research Department (IRD) papers 
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France 
 
Archives de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 54 Blvd. Raspail, 
75006, Paris 
Fichiers Centre de Recherche Historique 
Fichiers ISEA 
Fichiers Editions de l’EHESS (aux Archives Nationales, Fontainbleau) 
 
Archives du Ministere de l’Education Nationale, 110 rue de Grenelle,  75007, 
Paris 
Budgets 1950, 1955, 1959 
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APPENDIX 2: 
People Interviewed in the U.S. and France 
 
U.S. 
Alfred Chandler (June 2004, at his home, Boston, Massachussets) 
Paul David (January 2004, at his home in Palo Alto, California) 
Lance Davis (January 2004, at Cal Tech, Pasadena, California) 
Richard Easterlin (January 2004, at the ASSA meetings in San Diego, California) 
Alexander Field (January 2004, at the ASSA meetings in San Diego, California) 
Robert Fogel (February 2004, via phone) 
Claudia Goldin (January 2004, at the ASSA meetings in San Diego, California) 
Deidra McCloskey (January 2004, at the ASSA meetings in San Diego, California) 
Douglass North (February 2004, via phone) 
Hugh Rockoff (January 2004, at the ASSA meetings in San Diego, California) 
Anna J. Schwatz (June 2004, at the NBER, NY, NY) 
Robert Solow (June 2004, at his home, Boston, Massachussets) 
Barbara Solow (June 2004, at her home, Boston, Massachussets) 
Peter Temin (Fall 2004, at the LSE, London) 
Gavin Wright (September 2004, at Stanford, California) 
 
France 
Maurice Aymard (November 2003, at l’EHESS, Paris) 
Pierre Chaunu (January 2004 and November 2004, at his house, Caen) 
Francois Crouzet (November 2003, at his home, Paris) 
Patrick Fridenson (January 2004, at l’EHESS, Paris) 
Jean Yves Grenier (January 2004, at l’EHESS, Paris) 
M. Heffer (January 2004, at l’EHESS, Paris) 
Emmanuel Leroy-Ladurie (January 2004, at his house, Paris) 
Maurice Levy-Leboyer (November 2003, at his house, Paris) 
Edmond Malinvaud (January 2004, at his home, Paris) 
Christian Morrisson (January 2004, at his home, Paris) 
Jean Claude Perrot (Novemner 2003, at his home, Paris) 
Jean Claude Toutain (March 2003, at my home, Paris) 
Andre Vanoli (September 2003, at l’INSEE, Paris) 
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Sample Letter sent to interviewees 
 
Dear … 
 
I am writing in the hope that you will consider being interviewed for my 
research in the history of American economic history. I would be incredibly 
grateful if you could find the time to speak with me during … 
  
I am a PhD student at the LSE, where I work with Professor Mary Morgan on the 
evolution of economic history in France and the United States, 1940-1980. I am 
currently in my third year of research, wrapping up my primary work- which 
has consisted in visits to archives (so far I have examined the records of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the AEA, the EHA, Harvard, the 
University of Pennsylvania and the Parisian EHESS) and interviews (so far I have 
conducted interviews of Annales historians and French economists active in the 
period from 1950 to 1970). I use this information to draw as complete (and lively) 
a picture of the stakes, choices and changes of economic history in the post-war 
era. I hope this new material, and the comparative framework it is set in will cast 
a new light on the history of our discipline. I have included a copy of an article I 
wrote on “old” economic history in the United States, as an example of the 
research I have done so far.  
 
I am now in the process of organizing my American interviews. As I live in 
London, I am not able to travel frequently to the USA and am thus hoping to 
interview as many people as possible in one place. This place is the 2004 ASSA 
meetings. If you were able to give me between 30 minutes and an hour of your 
time, that would be wonderful. I would be happy to provide a set of questions in 
advance. I am aware that you gave an extensive interview to the Cliometric 
Society a few years ago, and I would like to use this information as a starting 
point for a slightly different discussion.  
 
I will be … 
 
Please feel free to contact me by email if you have any questions, or require 
further information 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Cristel de Rouvray 
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Structure of all interviews 
 
The interviews were tailored to each person, often along chronological and 
informational lines (what did you do, where, how?). However, there was a 
standard part to each interview, where the interviewee was asked to do free 
association on 10 words. The task was presented in this way:  
 
“let’s imagine we are in the 1950s and early 1960s, could you please tell 
me what came to mind when you thought of the following words? If your 
associations have since changed (i.e. if something different comes to mind 
today) please say so.”  
 
Empirical 
Complexity, Complex Social Phenomena 
Objectivity, the possibility for the historian to be objective 
Comparative 
Old Economic History 
Institutionalist/Institutionalism 
Entrepreneurship 
Kuznetsian (Simon Kuznets) 
American 
Laboratory 
 
